JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has sought for quashment of FIR No. 152/2014 registered with Shyam Nagar, Police Station, Jaipur (south) for offences under Section 120, 120B, 409, 461, 468 and 471 IPC. 2. The main ground of challenge is that statutory provisions were not complied before registration of FIR and the FIR discloses no offence against the petitioner. The petitioner was elected Chairman of the Board of Directors of Vaishali Urban Co-operative Bank Limited, Jaipur from the year 1998 to 2004 and again from 2006 to 26.6.2009. The said society was registered under The Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 2001. The society had permission/licence from Reserve Bank of India under Section 22 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 to commence banking business. From time to time, inspection of the society was made by the Reserve Bank of India. Financial mismanagement and other deficiencies were recorded in the reports dated 6.2.2003 and 11.1.2003. When anomalies were not removed nor financial status of the society was improved, on direction of the Reserve Bank of India, banking facilities of the society was withdrawn and in the year 2009, the Board of Directors was superseded and an administrator was appointed to look after affairs of the society. On 13.1.2012, the Additional Registrar of Co-operative societies conducted an inquiry under Section 55 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act and made several recommendations to take action against office bearers of the society for recovery of the mismanaged amount and side by side recommendation was made for institution of FIR against erring officers and employees of the society. Accordingly, impugned FIR was registered. 3. The present status of the criminal case is that charge-sheet has been submitted against the petitioner and his wife, whereas, against other named co-accused, a closure report has been submitted vide charge-sheet No. 105 dated 15.7.2022. The FIR contains allegation of defalcation of rupees six crore seventy one lakh twenty thousand eight hundred and sixty five (Rs.6,71,20,865/-). The report of the respondent dated 13.1.2012 was challenged in an appeal under Section 104 of the Act. The petitioner sought for permission of the Registrar for deposit of the aforesaid amount along with his undertaking at Annexure-6. Permission was granted vide order dated 5.12.2018 and communication to this effect was made to the petitioner on 18.12.2018 and the petitioner deposited entire amount which was due of the creditors/depositors. 4. The petitioner sought for permission of the Registrar for deposit of the aforesaid amount along with his undertaking at Annexure-6. Permission was granted vide order dated 5.12.2018 and communication to this effect was made to the petitioner on 18.12.2018 and the petitioner deposited entire amount which was due of the creditors/depositors. 4. Preliminary objection of the respondents, especially respondent No.2 who is complainant of the FIR is that the petitioner had moved earlier this Court for quashing of the same FIR in S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No. 517/2015 and the said Misc. Petition was disposed of on 5.9.2017 with the following orders: “Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he may be permitted to withdraw the petition to enable the petitioner to take up all the pleas available to him before the trial court at the time of framing of charges. Ordered accordingly.” 5. The respondents are of the view that once the High Court had rejected the petition for quashing the proceedings, it was not competent for the High Court to entertain another petition for the same purpose as that would amount to review of its earlier order which the High Court has no jurisdiction to do. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Atul Shukla Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and anr. 2019 (17) SCC 299 & Sunita Jain Vs. Pawan Kumar Jain and Ors. (2008) 2 SCC 705 in support of his submission that entertainment of second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C for the same cause would amount to review of the earlier order passed on the same prayer under Section 482 Cr.P.C. On the facts of this case, though these judgments are not helping the respondents as the Court is not going to review its earlier order noticed above rather, is going to consider the prayer of the petitioner in light of the fact that no question involved was decided in the earlier petition and the fundamental right of the petitioner cannot be scuttled to keep the investigation pending for indefinite period and to ask the petitioner to wait till the stage of framing of the charge comes. 6. Per contra, Mr. K.K. Sharma, Sr. Advocate for the petitioner contends that the order was passed on 5.9.2017. 6. Per contra, Mr. K.K. Sharma, Sr. Advocate for the petitioner contends that the order was passed on 5.9.2017. However, investigation was not completed for next 5 years (in an FIR registered in the year 2014), hence, the petitioner filed the present petition on 7.2.2022. Moreover, in the meantime, petitioner had already deposited amount just to come out of unnecessary harassment in long lingering litigation. 7. Identical issue was there before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs W.B. Vs. Mohan Singh & ors., AIR 1975 SC 1002 wherein earlier prayer for same relief was refused by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court on 12.12.1968 however, second application was made on the ground that no progress at all was made in the criminal case till March 1970. In para 2 of the judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated the law as follows: “2. The main question debated before us was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to make the Order, dated 7th April, 1970 quashing the proceeding against Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 when on an earlier application made by the 1st respondent, the High Court had by its Order dated 12th December, 1968 refused to quash the proceeding. Mr. Chatterjee on behalf of the State strenuously contended that the High Court was not competent to entertain the subsequent application of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and make the Order dated 7th April, 1970 quashing the proceeding, because that was tantamount to a review of its earlier Order by the High Court, which was outside the jurisdiction of the High Court to do. He relied on two decisions of the Punjab and Orissa High Courts in support of his contention, namely, Hoshiar Singh v. The State and Namdeo Sindhi v. The State . But we fail to see how these decisions can be of any help to him in his contention. They deal with a situation where an attempt was made to persuade the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to reopen an earlier drctet passed by it in appeal or in revision finally disposing of a criminal proceeding and it was held, that the High Court had no, jurisdiction to revise its earlier Order, because the power of revision could be exercised only against an Order of a subordinate Court. Mr. Mr. Chatterjee also relied on a decision of this Court in U. J. S. Chopra v. State of Bombay where M. H. Bhagwati, J., speaking on behalf of himself and Imam, J., observed that once a judgment has been pronounced by the High Court either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment and there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction over the same. These observations were sought to be explained by Mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the first respondent by saying that they should not be read as laying down any general proposition excluding the applicability of Section 561A in respect of an Order made by the High Court in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction even if the conditions attracting the applicability of that Section were satisfied in respect of such Order, because that was not the question before the Court in that case and the Court was not concerned to inquire whether the High Court can in exercise of its inherent power under Section 561A review an earlier Order made by it in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The question as to the scope and ambit of the inherent power of the High Court under Section 561A vis-a-vis an earlier Order made by it was, therefore, not concluded by this decision and the matter was res Integra so far as this Court is concerned. Mr. Mukherjee cited in support of this contention three decisions, namely, Raj Narain v. The State , Lai Singh v. The State. and Ram Vallabh v. State of Bihar . It is, however, not necessary for us to examine the true effect of these observations as they have no application because the present case is not one where the High Court was invited to revise or review an earlier Order made by it in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction finally disposing of a criminal proceeding. Here, the situation is wholly different. Here, the situation is wholly different. The earlier application which was rejected by the High Court was an application under Section 561A of the CrPC to quash the proceeding and the High Court rejected it on the ground that the evidence was yet to be led and it was not desirable to interfere with the proceeding at that stage. But, thereafter, the criminal case dragged on for a period of about one and half years without any progress at all and it was in these circumstances that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were constrained to make a fresh application to the High Court under Section 561-A to quash the proceeding. It is difficult to see how in these circumstances it could ever be contended that what the High Court was being asked to do by making the subsequent application was to review or revise the Order made by it on the earlier application. Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such Orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The High Court was in the circumstances entitled to entertain the subsequent application of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceeding against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice. The facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application of the first respondent because, despite the rejection of the earlier application of the first respondent, the prosecution had failed to make any progress in the criminal case even though it was filed as far back as 1965 and the criminal case rested where it was for a period of over one and a half years. It was for this reason that, despite the earlier Order dated 12th December, 1968, the High Court proceeded to consider the subsequent application of respondents Nos. It was for this reason that, despite the earlier Order dated 12th December, 1968, the High Court proceeded to consider the subsequent application of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for the of deciding whether it should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561A. This the High Court was perfectly entitled to do and we do not see any jurisdictional infirmity in the Order of the High Court. Even on the merits, we find that the Order of the High Court was justified as no prima facie case appears to have been made out against respondents Nos. 1 and 2.” 8. In State represented by DSP, SB CID, Chennai Vs. K.V. Rajendran & ors., (2008) 8 SCC 673 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated that the High Court cannot review its earlier order passed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by entertaining interlocutory application in the same matter, however, subsequent development can be a ground to entertain fresh petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 9. Evidently, the investigation of the case could not be completed till next 5 years after the first order of this Court, therefore, fresh ground was there with the petitioner to approach this Court to prevent miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of law. Therefore, objection of the respondents is not acceptable. 10. Learned Sr. Advocate for the petitioner contends that under Bye Laws of Vaishali Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., Jaipur, the petitioner had no responsibility to deal with the finances of the society rather, Chief Executive Officer Mr. Amit Agarwal was empowered under Item No. 36 of the bye-laws to deal with the finances. The Reserve Bank of India in its inspection report dated 6.2.2003 recorded as follows: “Amit Agarwal continues to be the Chief Executive Officer of the Bank since beginning and was designated as a Managing Director. He is a full time and paid employee of the Bank. However, it was observed that Shri Agarwal was not attending to his prescribed bank’s duties at all, however, he has nothing to do with the Banks banking activities. In fact post of Chief Executive Officer in Bank was only for record purpose. Even otherwise, Shri Agarwal had no knowledge of the banking activities, except to prove required executive lead. It was expected from the petitioner in the capacity of Chairman of the Bank to personally supervise the working of the Bank.” 11. In fact post of Chief Executive Officer in Bank was only for record purpose. Even otherwise, Shri Agarwal had no knowledge of the banking activities, except to prove required executive lead. It was expected from the petitioner in the capacity of Chairman of the Bank to personally supervise the working of the Bank.” 11. The petitioner in response to the aforesaid inspection note stated that “since our Chief Executive Officer is mainly responsible for growth (over 50% growth is registered against the last year business) of business, in this connection, most of the time he is in the field but if you suggest other ways, we will ask him to work more hard.” 12. The business of Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer as mentioned in Serial No. 35 and 36 of the bye-laws of the society are being reproduced below: “35. CHAIRMAN The power and duties of the Chairman shall be as under:- (i) To preside over the General Meeting, meeting of the Board of Directors, Sub-Committee meeting & the meeting of any other Committee. (ii) To supervise the general working of the Bank. 36. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER The powers and duties of Chief Executive Officer who will be responsible to the Board of Directors, will be as under:- (i) To take action on the resolutions and decisions taken by the General Body and Board of Directors. (ii) To convene the meetings of the General Body, Board of Directors, Sub Committees, Staff Committee or any other Committee and to attend and to record the minutes of all meetings in the minutes book and to countersign the same along with the Chairman of the meeting. (iii) To conduct correspondence on behalf of the Bank. (iv) To maintain all books of account, registers, and ledger as may have been prescribed under the Cooperative Societies Act and bye-laws. (v) To receive applications for membership of the Bank and for additional shares and place them before the Board of Directors with his report containing his specific comments/recommendations. (vi) To receive applications for loans and to place them for consideration before the Board of Directors together with a detailed report containing his specific comment/recommendations. (vii) To accept deposits of all kinds and types and to arrange for issue of receipts, statements and pass books. (viii) To disburse moneys on behalf of the Bank. (vi) To receive applications for loans and to place them for consideration before the Board of Directors together with a detailed report containing his specific comment/recommendations. (vii) To accept deposits of all kinds and types and to arrange for issue of receipts, statements and pass books. (viii) To disburse moneys on behalf of the Bank. (ix) To be the custodian of cash on hand, property both moveable and immovable, documents, securities and bonds. (x) To seek orders from Staff Committee for appointment of staff subordinate to him within the sanctioned strength, on such scales of pay and allowances as may have been sanctioned by the Board of Directors from time to time. (xi) To allot work amongst the Bank’s staff and supervise their work. (xii) To take disciplinary action against the Bank’s staff in accordance with the Service Rules. (xiii) To issue orders of transfer of staff whenever necessary. (xiv) To pass orders on leave applications, travelling, allowance bills, medical bills and other permissible bills of the staff. (xv) To incur expenditure within the budget approved by the Board of Directors. (xvi) To arrange for investments of moneys in accordance with the Board’s policy and to report the same to the Board of Directors in their next meeting. (xvii) To exercise such other powers and discharge such other duties as may be delegated or entrusted to him by the Board of Directors or by the Chairman. (xviii) To sanction loans up to the limit so authorised by the Board of Directors against pledge or approved securities excluding immovable property. He shall, however, place a statement of such loans sanctioned before the next meeting of the Board of Directors. (xix) To conduct legal proceedings on behalf of the Bank in all Courts of law as per decisions of the Board of Directors.” 13. Evidently, the main responsibility of dealing with the finances of the society was with the Chief Executive Officer who has already been exonerated after investigation of the case. Not only the Chief Executive Officer has been exonerated but all other office bearers have also been exonerated after investigation. In the aforesaid circumstance, criminal prosecution of the petitioner and his wife who are carrying allegedly vicarious liability only is not understandable in absence of real perpetrators. 14. Not only the Chief Executive Officer has been exonerated but all other office bearers have also been exonerated after investigation. In the aforesaid circumstance, criminal prosecution of the petitioner and his wife who are carrying allegedly vicarious liability only is not understandable in absence of real perpetrators. 14. According to the respondents, in the inspection note of the Reserve Bank of India it is mentioned that the Chief Executive Officer was only for the record purpose as he always used to remain away from the office. This cannot absolve the Chief Executive Officer from statutory responsibility. Moreover, the Chief Executive Officer-Amit Agarwal never made any complaint that he was not being allowed to discharge his official responsibility by anyone including the petitioner rather, he shared his responsibility along with the petitioner in a memorandum of understanding signed between the petitioner and the Chief Executive Officer on 24.3.2006 brought on the record by the State respondents. After conclusion of the investigation, there is no material that the petitioner had individually dealt with any of the financial matter of the society. If official allegedly acted on the dictate of the petitioner, they cannot be exonerated nor could have been exonerated from their primary responsibility. Therefore, prosecution of the petitioner suffers from malice and continuation of the same would be abuse of process of law, in absence of the main responsible persons. 15. Learned Sr. Advocate for the petitioner next contends that the Additional Registrar while submitting his report dated 13.1.2012 after inquiry under Section 55 of the Act has gone beyond the scope of Section 55 in recommending for institution of criminal case. Learned counsel submits that the said report of Additional Registrar of the Cooperative societies dated 13.1.2012 was considered by a screening committee in its meeting dated 22.2.2012 and the committee resolved to take action under Section 57 of the Act and did not approve recommendation for FIR. Section 57 provides for notice to the individuals who were responsible for financial mismanagement and ascertainment of proportion to be paid by the individual. The detailed procedure to be followed is mentioned in Rule 76 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Rules, 2003. Learned counsel contends that only after conclusion of entire formalities of opportunity of hearing to the charged persons, the authority could have recommended for other action against erring office bearers of the society. The detailed procedure to be followed is mentioned in Rule 76 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Rules, 2003. Learned counsel contends that only after conclusion of entire formalities of opportunity of hearing to the charged persons, the authority could have recommended for other action against erring office bearers of the society. According to learned counsel only then, the impugned FIR could have been lodged but the factual scenario of this case would reveal that proceeding under Rule 76 was decided on 24.4.2014 making different recommendations but no recommendation for institution of the FIR. However, FIR was already instituted on 3.4.2014 itself without following mandates of law. Moreover, order dated 24.4.2014 under Section 57(2) read with Rule 76(6) of Additional Registrar was considered on 2.5.2014 and it was recommended that involvement of the then Managing Director Mr. Amit Agarwal be also examined and the matter was resent for inquiry under Section 57(2) read with Rule 1976. The entire provisions of Section 55 and 57 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act and Rule 76 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Rules, 2003 are reproduced below for convenience to ascertain whether its compliance was necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case: “55. Inquiry by Registrar. -(1) The Registrar may, on the application of - (a) a co-operative society to which the society concerned is affiliated; or (b) a majority of the members of the committee of the society; or (c) not less than one-tenth of the total number of members of the society, or, of his own motion, either by himself or by a person authorised by him by order in writing, hold and inquiry into the constitution, working and financial condition of a co-operative society. (2) The Registrar, or the person authorised by him under subsection (1), shall, for the purpose of an inquiry under this section, have the following powers, namely:- (a) he shall, at all reasonable times, have free access to the books, accounts, documents, securities, cash and other properties belonging to, or in the custody of, the society and may summon any person in possession, or responsible for the custody, of any such books, accounts, documents, securities, cash or other properties, to produce the same at the headquarters of the society or any branch thereof; (b) he may summon any person, who, he has reason to believe, has knowledge of any of the affairs of the society, to appear before him at the headquarters of the society or any branch thereof and may examine such person on oath; and (c) (i) he may, notwithstanding any rule or bye-law specifying the period of notice for a general meeting of the society, require the officers of the society to call a general meeting at such time and place at the headquarters of the society or any branch thereof and to determine such matters as may be directed by him, and where the officers of the society refuse or fail to call such a meeting, he shall have power to call it himself; (ii) any meeting called under sub-clause (i), shall have all the powers of a general meeting called under the byelaws of the society and its proceedings shall be regulated by bye-laws. (3) All officers, members and employees of the society, whose affairs are investigated under this section, shall furnish such information in their possession in regard to the affairs of the society as the Registrar or the person authorised by the Registrar may require. (4) It shall be competent for the Registrar to withdraw any enquiry from the officer to whom it is entrusted, and to hold the enquiry himself or to entrust it to any other person as he deems fit. (5) When an inquiry is made under this section, the Registrar shall communicate the result of the inquiry to the society and to the cooperative society, if any, to which that society is affiliated. (5) When an inquiry is made under this section, the Registrar shall communicate the result of the inquiry to the society and to the cooperative society, if any, to which that society is affiliated. (6) The Registrar may, by an order in writing, direct any officer of the society or its financing bank or any other society to take such action as may be specified in the order to remedy, within such time as may be specified therein, the defects, if any, disclosed as a result of the enquiry. 57. Surcharge -(1) If on the basis of an audit, inquiry, inspection or a Liquidator's report made under the provisions of this Act, it comes to the knowledge of the Registrar that any person, who has taken any part in the organisation or management of such society or who is or has at any time been an officer or an employee of the society, has made any payment contrary to the provisions of this Act, the rules or the bye-laws or has caused any deficiency in the assets of the society by wilful negligence or has misappropriated or fraudulently retained any money or other property belonging to such society, the Registrar may, inquire himself or direct any person authorised by him by an order in writing in this behalf, to inquire into the conduct of such person: Provided that no inquiry into the conduct shall be done under this section by a person who has earlier submitted report of audit, inquiry, inspection or liquidation in the same matter: Provided further that no such inquiry shall be held after the expiry of six years from the date of an act or omission or after the expiry of two years from the date of knowledge of the Registrar of such act or omission: Provided also that any business loss occurred due to an act done or decision taken in the interest of the society with a common business prudence shall not be a subject matter of such inquiry. (2) Where an inquiry is made under sub-section (1), the Registrar may, after giving the person concerned an opportunity of representing his case, make an order requiring him to repay or restore the money or property or any part thereof, with interest at such rate, or to pay contribution and costs or compensation to such extent, as the Registrar may consider just and equitable. (3) This section shall apply notwithstanding that such person or officer may have incurred criminal liability by his act. RULE 76. Procedure for assessing surcharge under section 57 -(1) On receipt of a report referred to in section 57 or otherwise the Registrar or any other person: authorised by him may make such further inquiries as he may deem necessary regarding the extent to which the person who has taken any part in the organization or management of a society or any deceased, past or present officer or employee of the society has misapplied or retained, or become liable or accountable for, any money or property of the society, or has committed misfeasance or breach of trust in relation to the society or has made any payment contrary to the Act, these rules or bye-laws. (2) On the completion of the further inquiries under sub-rule (1), where necessary, the Registrar shall issue a notice to the person or persons concerned furnishing him or them with particulars of the acts of misapplication, retention misfeasance or breach of trust and the extent of his or their liability involved therein and calling upon him or them to put in statements in his or their defence within fifteen days of the date of issue of the notice. (3) On receipt of the statement referred to in sub-rule (2), the Registrar, if he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for holding the person or persons liable, shall frame charges. (4) The person or persons concerned shall, after the charges are framed, be asked to put in his or their statements in defence and to indicate the documentary or oral evidence which he would like to produce. The Registrar may permit production of other documentary or oral evidence, if considered necessary, subsequently. (5) The Registrar shall thereafter record the evidence led by the society or the person or persons concerned and take on record the documents proved by them and shall thereafter fix a date for hearing arguments of both the parties. (6) On the day fixed for hearing under sub-rule (5), the Registrar shall hear the arguments and may pass his final orders on the same day or on any date fixed by him within sixty days from the date on which the hearing was completed. (6) On the day fixed for hearing under sub-rule (5), the Registrar shall hear the arguments and may pass his final orders on the same day or on any date fixed by him within sixty days from the date on which the hearing was completed. On the day fixed for hearing under sub-rule (5) the Registrar shall make his final order either ordering repayment of the money or return of the property to the society together with interest at such rate as may be specified by him or to contribute such amount to the assets of the society by way of compensation in regard to misapplication, retention, misfeasance or breach of trust as may be determined or may reject the claim submitted on behalf of the society. (7) The Registrar may also provide in his order for the payment of the cost of the proceeding under this rule or any part of such cost as he thinks just. (8) The Registrar shall furnish a copy of his order, under subrule (6) to the party concerned within ten days of the date on which he makes his final order. (9) If during the course of proceedings under this rule, the Registrar is satisfied that a person whose conduct has been inquired into under sub-section (1) of section 57, is not responsible for the acts of misapplication, retention misfeasance or breach of trust he may pass an order to drop the case against him, and if he is also of the opinion that some other person is responsible for the same he shall send a note to this effect in detail to the competent authority within ten days to initiate further appropriate action in this regard. If he himself is the competent authority he shall himself initiate action immediately.” 16. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents does not dispute the factual development aforesaid, however contends that it was within the competence of the authorities under Society Registration Act to recommend for institution of FIR besides taking other steps for recovery of the defalcated money. 17. Thus, the Registrar acting under Section 55 of the Act could have made recommendations to the extent mentioned in sub-section (6) thereof to remove the defects/lapses within a specified time, however could not have recommended for punitive action. 17. Thus, the Registrar acting under Section 55 of the Act could have made recommendations to the extent mentioned in sub-section (6) thereof to remove the defects/lapses within a specified time, however could not have recommended for punitive action. Moreover, the screening committee considered the said report and resolved to proceed under Section 57 of the Act on each and every recommendation suggested by the Additional Registrar under Section 55 of the Act above. As noticed above, the provisions of Section 57 of the Act says that conduct of such person responsible for management of the affairs of society would be enquired. This inquiry requires notice and opportunity of hearing to the persons involved in the management of the society. The order under this Section would be only to the extent of fixation of individual responsibility. Directions issued in case No. 871/2012 by the Registrar of the Society was complied by the petitioner in spite of the fact that the said order dated 24.4.2014 was reviewed by the competent authority on 2.5.2014 and sent backed the matter for re-inquiry under Section 57 of the Act. Moreover, the basis of the FIR i.e. inquiry report dated 12.1.2013 was itself under challenge in appeal on the date of institution of FIR which was pending consideration on the date of FIR. 18. Thus, it would be evident that on the date of institution of the FIR, the authorities were not of definite opinion regarding individual and collective lapses committed by the management of the society. 19. The conclusion would be that the basis of FIR i.e. inspection report dated 13.1.2012 was under challenge in statutory appeal on the date of FIR. The authority who submitted inquiry report dated 13.1.2012 was not competent to submit punitive recommendation at the stage, till conclusion of further statutory proceedings as noticed above. Moreover, in the statutory proceedings, the responsibility of the petitioner was not fixed till the FIR or till date, hence the FIR suffers from arbitrariness and malice which was instituted without compliance of the statutory requirement. 20. Learned Sr. Advocate for the petitioner next contends that no offences for which charge-sheet has been submitted i.e. under Section 420, 409, 407, 468, 471 and 120B IPC are made out on bare perusal of the FIR and evidence collected during investigation. 20. Learned Sr. Advocate for the petitioner next contends that no offences for which charge-sheet has been submitted i.e. under Section 420, 409, 407, 468, 471 and 120B IPC are made out on bare perusal of the FIR and evidence collected during investigation. The Court has carefully examined the inquiry report dated 12.1.2013 to ascertain any individual act of the petitioner constituting ingredients of the offences. By order dated 2.5.2023, the respondents were directed to go through the case diary and place before the Court evidence regarding individual act of the petitioner disclosing commission of offence. The respondents have submitted a synopsis which does not contain any individual act of the petitioner disclosing ingredients of commission of any of the offences. 21. As has been discussed above, the statutory responsibility of the petitioner was to collectively take policy decision as members of the Board of Directors. The individual responsibility of the petitioner was to have overall supervision on the administration of the working of the society. Since the principal perpetrators of the offences alleged have been let free, the petitioner for his vicarious responsibility cannot be prosecuted. 22. There is not an iota of evidence to suggest that the petitioner dishonestly and fraudulently made any false document which is one of the ingredients of offence of forgery. When offence of forgery is not made out against the petitioner, the allegations under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC goes away. The prosecution has failed to establish a case of criminal breach of trust against the petitioner individually as the petitioner was not in any domain over any property. No money of the society was transferred to the personal account of the petitioner rather during pendency of the appeal against the vague inquiry report dated 12.1.2013, the petitioner took lead to deposit the amount which was stated to be mismanaged by the society and deposited the same. Likewise, from the act of the petitioner, the allegation of cheating is not made out as there is no allegation that the petitioner deceived any person to do or not to do anything. It was the policy decision of the society to give as loan to other companies, the money which was of the depositors. Only on that basis, it cannot be alleged that the petitioner had acted dishonestly and fraudulently. It was the policy decision of the society to give as loan to other companies, the money which was of the depositors. Only on that basis, it cannot be alleged that the petitioner had acted dishonestly and fraudulently. The subsequent conduct of the petitioner in reimbursing the society in respect of the mismanaged amount also lead to the conclusion that the petitioner was not dishonest at any point of time. Therefore, this Court holds that no ingredient of offences wherein charge-sheet has been submitted are made out against the petitioner. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta and Ors. Vs. B. Srinivas, (2008) 8 SCC 580 for his submission that merely for delay in conclusion of the investigation of the case, FIR cannot be quashed. This Court is not going to quash the FIR on the ground of delay in completion of the investigation. Learned counsel next relied on Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Jagjit Singh (2013) 10 SCC 686 for his submission that the accused repaying the loan amount of the Bank in pursuance of the order of Debt Recovery Tribunal would not be a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. As has been noticed above, this Court has not considered quashing of the matter on that ground. Learned counsel also relied on following judgments: 1. Kaptan Singh Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. AIR 2021 SC 3931 2. Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Aryan Singh and Ors. MANU/SC/0348/2023 Criminal Appeal Nos. 1025- 1026 of 2023 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 12794-12795 of 2022) Decided On: 10.04.2023 3. Veena Mittal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. MANU/SC/0378/2022 Criminal Appeal No. 122 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 5732 of 2019) Decided On: 24.01.2022 4. Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Respondent: A. Ravishankar Prasad and Ors. (2009) 6 SCC 351 5. Priti Saraf and Ors. Vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors. AIR 2021 SC 1531 6. Md. Allauddin Khan Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (2019) 6 SCC 107 7. Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2019) 14 SCC 350 8. Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389 9. State Vs. R. Vasanthi Stanley and Ors. AIR 2021 SC 1531 6. Md. Allauddin Khan Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (2019) 6 SCC 107 7. Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2019) 14 SCC 350 8. Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389 9. State Vs. R. Vasanthi Stanley and Ors. (2016)1SCC376 In none of the cases aforesaid, the issues involved herein was there rather, those cases were decided on different facts and circumstances of the case, hence not helping the respondents. 24. From the discussions above, it emerges that (a) the offences wherein FIR was registered or charge-sheet was filed are not made out against the petitioner or his wife; (b) the statutory responsibility of the petitioner and his wife was supervisory in nature as such for vicarious liability, in absence of real tortfeasors, prosecution of the petitioner would be a miscarriage of justice; (c) for arguments sake, the petitioner might have been prosecuted as abettor subject to availability of evidence in this regard but that could have been done only along with real tortfeasors; (d) the basis of the FIR, inquiry report dated 12.1.2013 never got approval by the screening committee or any other authority as yet. Moreover, inquiry under Section 55 of the Act does not permit recommendation for registration of FIR unless and until an opportunity of hearing was given to the individuals who were at the helm of management of the society and after hearing their individual liability is ascertained, which was never done, and has not been done as yet. Therefore, basis of the FIR itself is not acceptable in law to institute a criminal proceeding. Each of the three conclusions above, individually and collectively, lead to the conclusion that the impugned FIR and entire criminal proceedings arising out of that is not sustainable in law rather continuance of the criminal proceedings would lead to miscarriage of justice. 25. In the result, the impugned FIR and all subsequent criminal proceedings stands hereby quashed and this petition is allowed. 26. Pending applications stands disposed of.