JUDGMENT : This appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “the Act”) has been filed by the appellant/Insurance Company challenging the judgment and award dated 09.11.2010 delivered by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-VII Additional District Judge (FTC), East Godavari, Kakinada in M.V.O.P.No.183 of 2007 granting compensation of a sum of Rs.85,000/- along with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of the claim petition till the date of realization to the petitioner on account of injuries sustained by him in a road traffic accident while he was proceeding towards Mandapeta from Jonnada on 11.07.2006. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as they are arrayed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal’). 3. The factual matrix of the case is thus: (a) A 50-year-old person namely, Chitturi Bhogeswara Rao(petitioner/claimant) was a coolie in a brick kiln at the time of the accident and used to earn Rs.3,000/- per month by doing brickwork. On 11.07.2006 at about 6.00 a.m., while he was proceeding to his workplace and when he reached near ‘S’ turning on foot, the driver of the goods auto bearing No.AP 5 Y 8473 proceeding from Jonnada towards Mandapeta drove the same in a rash and negligent manner at a high speed without blowing horn and dashed him on his back due to which, the petitioner sustained multiple fractures on his left leg and injuries all over the body. He took treatment at Primary Health Centre, Alamuru and later at Government General Hospital, Kakinada. He got treatment for two months as an inpatient and six months as an out-patient and now he is not able to do coolie work due to the fractures sustained in the accident. The matter was reported to the Police alleging that the accident took place as a result of the rash and negligent driving of the said offending Auto and based on the complaint lodged by the petitioner/injured, a case in Crime No.101 of 2006 of Alamuru Police Station under Section 338 IPC was registered and after investigation of the case, a charge sheet was submitted against the accused-driver(1st respondent) for having committed the offence under Sec.338 IPC. (b) The petitioner/injured filed an application claiming compensation of a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- before the Tribunal on account of the injuries sustained by him in the road traffic accident. (b) The petitioner/injured filed an application claiming compensation of a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- before the Tribunal on account of the injuries sustained by him in the road traffic accident. (c) The 1st respondent/driver of the offending vehicle did not contest the matter. (d) The 2nd respondent/owner of the offending vehicle filed a counter denying the earning capacity of the petitioner. It is contended that the offending vehicle got a valid insurance coverage and the 1st respondent has got a valid driving licence and therefore, prays to dismiss the petition against him. (e) The 3rd respondent/Insurance Company filed a counter denying the age, income and avocation of the petitioner and the manner in which the accident occurred. It is contended that this respondent was not admitting that the auto bearing No.AP 5 Y 8473 was driven by the 1st respondent in a rash and negligent manner. Further averred that the 1st respondent was not having valid driving licence. It is further contended that the 1st respondent has got licence only to drive Light Motor Vehicle whereas, the offending vehicle is a transport goods auto, hence, this respondent is not liable to pay the compensation to the petitioner and prays to dismiss the petition. (f) On the above pleadings, the Tribunal framed the following issues: (1) Whether the accident occurred out of the use of the Goods Auto bearing No.AP 5 Y 8473 and due to the rash and negligent driving of the said vehicle by the 1st respondent? (2) Whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation, and if so, to what amount and from which of the respondent? (g) In order to establish the claim of the petitioner, at the time of enquiry, P.W.1(injured) and P.W.2(Doctor) were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.4 and Exs.X.1 and X.2 were got marked on behalf of the petitioner. R.W.1(owner of the offending vehicle), R.W.2(Administrative Officer of the Insurance Company) and R.W.3(Junior Assistant of R.T.O Office) were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.3 were got marked on behalf of the 2nd and 3rd respondents. R.W.1(owner of the offending vehicle), R.W.2(Administrative Officer of the Insurance Company) and R.W.3(Junior Assistant of R.T.O Office) were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.3 were got marked on behalf of the 2nd and 3rd respondents. (h) The Tribunal, after analyzing the entire oral and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that the alleged accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending auto bearing No.AP 5 Y 8473 by its driver, and dashed the injured on his back due to which, the injured sustained multiple fractures, and thereby, passed the impugned Award granting compensation of Rs.85,000/- along with interest @ 7.5% per annum and with proportionate costs against the Respondents 1 to 3, from the date of petition till the date of realization. (i) The Tribunal allowed the petition in part in favour of the claimant and awarded Rs.85,000/- as compensation as given below. S.No. Heads of compensation Amount of compensation awarded in Rs. 1. Compensation awarded towards fractures sustained by the petitioner 60,000/- 2. Pain & Sufferance 10,000/- 3. Loss of earnings 15,000/- Total 85,000/- (j) Aggrieved by the said award, the appellant/Insurance Company preferred the present appeal seeking to set aside the award passed by the learned Tribunal. 4. Heard Sri Kiran Kumar, learned standing counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company and Sri G.Padmavathi Srinivas, learned counsel for the respondents/claimants. 5. Learned Standing Counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company has submitted that the 3rd respondent/owner of the offending vehicle erred in observing the statutory liability of entrusting the vehicle to the driver, who was having a valid and effective driving licence at the time of the accident. Further, he would submit that the driver of the offending vehicle was having L.M.V driving licence whereas, the offending vehicle is a goods transport vehicle. Therefore, the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the compensation. Further, he would submit that the award passed by the Tribunal suffers from infirmity and illegality which calls interference of this Court and therefore, prayed to set aside the impugned award. 6. Learned Counsel for the 1st respondent/claimant would submit the compensation as awarded by the Tribunal is meager and the claimant is entitled to more compensation taking into account the multiple fractures sustained by him and in view of the evidence adduced, which was not properly appreciated by the learned Tribunal. 6. Learned Counsel for the 1st respondent/claimant would submit the compensation as awarded by the Tribunal is meager and the claimant is entitled to more compensation taking into account the multiple fractures sustained by him and in view of the evidence adduced, which was not properly appreciated by the learned Tribunal. Further, he would submit that though the amount of Rs.3,000/- was claimed by the injured as his monthly income, the Tribunal erroneously fixed the income @ Rs.1,500/- per month, as if the injured was a non-earning member. He submits that, even as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramachandrappa Vs. The Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Limited, (2011) 13 SCC 236 an amount of Rs.4,500/- would be reasonable as monthly income of the injured even if he is a labourer. Further, he would submit that the petitioner/injured is entitled to the amounts under different heads which were not granted by the learned Tribunal. Further, he submits that the amount of compensation may be determined in view of the four fractures sustained by the injured, which may be just and reasonable in the light of the above-referred judgment. 7. In the light of the above rival arguments, the points for determination in this appeal are: 1. Whether the award passed by the Tribunal suffers from any infirmity or illegality and needs interference of this Court? 2. Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is not in accordance with the principles of law and requires enhancement? POINT Nos.1 and 2: 8. A perusal of the impugned award would show that the Tribunal has framed Issue No.1 as to whether the accident occurred out of the use of the Goods Auto bearing No.AP 5 Y 8473 and due to the rash and negligent driving of the said vehicle by the 1st respondent, to which the Tribunal after considering the evidence of P.W.1/Injured coupled with documentary evidence, has categorically observed that the offending vehicle was driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner and responsible to cause the accident. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle (auto) bearing No.AP 5 Y 8473. 9. In Kajal Vs. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle (auto) bearing No.AP 5 Y 8473. 9. In Kajal Vs. Jagdish Chand, (2020) ACJ 1042 (SC) the Hon’ble Apex Court has quoted pertinent observations from a very old case Phillips Vs. London & South Western Railway Co., (1879) LR 5 QBD 78 as under: “You cannot put the plaintiff back again into his original position, but you must bring your reasonable common sense to bear, and you must always recollect that this is the only occasion on which compensation can be given. The plaintiff can never sue again for it. You have, therefore, now to give him compensation once and for all. He has done no wrong, he has suffered a wrong at the hands of the defendants and you must take care to give him full fair compensation for that which he has suffered.” Besides, the Tribunals should always remember that the measures of damages in all these cases “should be such as to enable even a tortfeasor to say that he had amply atoned for his misadventure.” 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further quoted pertinent observations from the case titled H. West & Son Ltd. vs. Shephard, 1963 (2) WLR 1359 as under: “Money may be awarded so that something tangible may be procured to replace something else of the like nature which has been destroyed or lost. But money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All that Judges and Courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Futhermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards. In the process there must be endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Futhermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards. In the same case Lord Devlin observed that the proper approach to the problem was to adopt a test as to what contemporary society would deem to be a fair sum, such as would allow the wrongdoer to "hold up his head among his neighbours and say with their approval that he has done the fair thing", which should be kept in mind by the court in determining compensation in personal injury cases.” 11. It is a well settled principle that while determining the compensation payable to the injured in the claim filed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, this Court referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ward Vs. James, (1965) 1 All ER 563 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 12 (Page 446) wherein, it was held as follows: “When compensation is to be awarded for pain and suffering and loss of amenity of life, the special circumstances of the claimant have to be taken into account including his age, the unusual deprivation he has suffered, the effect thereof on his future life. The amount of compensation for non-pecuniary loss is not easy to determine but the award must reflect that different circumstances have been taken into consideration”. 12. Further, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rekha Jain Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2013 ACJ 2161 (SC) wherein, it was held as follows: “It is well settled principle that in granting compensation for personal injury, in injured has to be compensated (1) for pain and suffering (2) for loss of amenities, (3) shortened expectation of life, if any, (4) loss of earnings or loss of earning capacity or in some cases for both, and (5) medical treatment and other special damages”. 13. If the above judgments are read together, the intention of the Hon’ble Apex Court though under different contexts, is crystal clear that the learned Tribunal committed an error while awarding compensation to the petitioner/injured which is not just and reasonable. 13. If the above judgments are read together, the intention of the Hon’ble Apex Court though under different contexts, is crystal clear that the learned Tribunal committed an error while awarding compensation to the petitioner/injured which is not just and reasonable. In the facts of this case and looking into the beneficial purpose of the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act, and having regard to the principles laid down in the aforementioned judgments, the award passed by the Tribunal is not in accordance with law. 14. In the instant case, the appellant/Insurance Company had taken a plea in the counter that 1st respondent (driver) was not holding a valid and effective driving licence at the time of the accident. Further contended that the driver of the offending vehicle possessed licence to drive LMV whereas, the offending auto was transporting goods and it is a clear case of violation by the driver without possessing valid driving licence to drive the transport vehicle. 15. In the present case, the Insurance Company examined P.Sandhya Rani, who was working as Junior Assistant in R.T.O. Office, as R.W.3. She stated in her evidence that, as per the direction of the Court, she produced Ex.X.2 driving licence. Further, she stated that the 1st respondent/driver got LMV non transport licence from 11.10.2004 and the said licence is valid upto 10.10.2024. Further she stated that he got LMV transport on 23.03.2010 and he got the same upto 22.03.2013. Further, she stated that on 11.07.2006 the 1st respondent/driver had no transport LMV driving licence. She further deposed that the goods auto is a transport vehicle and they will issue transport licence for every three years. Further, she stated in her cross examination that Exs.B.1 and B.3 were issued by their office. She further deposed that she does not know whether the vehicle bearing No.AP 5 Y 8473 was used for transport or for non-transport purpose. 16. In the light of the above evidence and the plea taken by the appellant/Insurance Company as stated supra, now the position of law is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mukund Dewangan Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, 2017 ACJ 2011 (SC) more particularly, in Paragraphs 43, 45 and 46 as follows: “43. Section 10(2) (a) to (j) lays down the classes of vehicles to be driven not a specific kind of motor vehicles in that class. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, 2017 ACJ 2011 (SC) more particularly, in Paragraphs 43, 45 and 46 as follows: “43. Section 10(2) (a) to (j) lays down the classes of vehicles to be driven not a specific kind of motor vehicles in that class. If a vehicle falls into any of the categories, a licence holder holding licence to drive the class of vehicle can drive all vehicles of that particular class. No separate endorsement is to be obtained nor provided, if the vehicle falls in any of the particular classes of section 10(2). This Court has rightly observed in Nagashetty (supra) that in case submission to the contrary is accepted, then every time an owner of a private car, who has a licence to drive a light motor vehicle, attaches a roof carrier to his car or a trailer to his car and carries goods thereon, the light motor vehicle would become a transport vehicle and the owner would be deemed to have no licence to drive that vehicle. It would lead to absurd results. Merely because a trailer is added either to a tractor or to a motor vehicle it by itself does not mean that driver ceased to have valid driving licence. In our considered opinion, even if such a vehicle is treated as transport vehicle of the light motor vehicle class, legal position would not change and driver would still have a valid driving licence to drive transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class, whether it is a transport vehicle or a private car/tractor attached with trolley or used for carrying goods in the form of transport vehicle. The ultimate conclusion in Nagashetty (supra) is correct, however, for the reasons as explained by us. 44. …………………………… 45. Transport vehicle has been defined in section 2(47) of the Act, to mean a public service vehicle, a goods carriage, an educational institution bus or a private service vehicle. Public service vehicle has been defined in section 2(35) to mean any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward and includes a maxicab, a motor cab, contract carriage, and stage carriage. Public service vehicle has been defined in section 2(35) to mean any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward and includes a maxicab, a motor cab, contract carriage, and stage carriage. Goods carriage which is also a transport vehicle is defined in section 2(14) to mean a motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use solely for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods. It was rightly submitted that a person holding licence to drive light motor vehicle registered for private use, who is driving a similar vehicle which is registered or insured, for the purpose of carrying passengers for hire or reward, would not require an endorsement as to drive a transport vehicle, as the same is not contemplated by the provisions of the Act. It was also rightly contended that there are several vehicles which can be used for private use as well as for carrying passengers for hire or reward. When a driver is authorised to drive a vehicle, he can drive it irrespective of the fact whether it is used for a private purpose or for purpose of hire or reward or for carrying the goods in the said vehicle. It is what is intended by the provision of the Act, and the Amendment Act 54/1994. 46. Section 10 of the Act requires a driver to hold a licence with respect to the class of vehicles and not with respect to the type of vehicles. In one class of vehicles, there may be different kinds of vehicles. If they fall in the same class of vehicles, no separate endorsement is required to drive such vehicles. As light motor vehicle includes transport vehicle also, a holder of light motor vehicle licence can drive all the vehicles of the class including transport vehicles. It was pre-amended position as well the post-amended position of Form 4 as amended on 28.3.2001. Any other interpretation would be repugnant to the definition of “light motor vehicle” in section 2(21) and the provisions of section 10(2)(d), Rule 8 of the Rules of 1989, other provisions and also the forms which are in tune with the provisions. It was pre-amended position as well the post-amended position of Form 4 as amended on 28.3.2001. Any other interpretation would be repugnant to the definition of “light motor vehicle” in section 2(21) and the provisions of section 10(2)(d), Rule 8 of the Rules of 1989, other provisions and also the forms which are in tune with the provisions. Even otherwise the forms never intended to exclude transport vehicles from the category of ‘light motor vehicles’ and for light motor vehicle, the validity period of such licence hold good and apply for the transport vehicle of such class also and the expression in Section 10(2)(e) of the Act ‘Transport Vehicle’ would include medium goods vehicle, medium passenger motor vehicle, heavy goods vehicle, heavy passenger motor vehicle which earlier found place in section 10(2)(e) to (h) and our conclusion is fortified by the syllabus and rules which we have discussed. Thus we answer the questions which are referred to us thus: (i) ‘Light motor vehicle’ as defined in section 2(21) of the Act would include a transport vehicle as per the weight prescribed in section 2(21) read with section 2(15) and 2(48). Such transport vehicles are not excluded from the definition of the light motor vehicle by virtue of Amendment Act No.54/1994. (ii) A transport vehicle and omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg. would be a light motor vehicle and also motor car or tractor or a road roller, ‘unladen weight’ of which does not exceed 7500 kg. and holder of a driving licence to drive class of “light motor vehicle” as provided in section 10(2)(d) is competent to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 7500 kg. or a motor car or tractor or road-roller, the “unladen weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg. That is to say, no separate endorsement on the licence is required to drive a transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class as enumerated above. A licence issued under section 10(2)(d) continues to be valid after Amendment Act 54/1994 and 28.3.2001 in the form. That is to say, no separate endorsement on the licence is required to drive a transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class as enumerated above. A licence issued under section 10(2)(d) continues to be valid after Amendment Act 54/1994 and 28.3.2001 in the form. (iii) The effect of the amendment made by virtue of Act No.54/1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 while substituting clauses (e) to (h) of section 10(2) which contained “medium goods vehicle” in section 10(2)(e), medium passenger motor vehicle in section 10(2)(f), heavy goods vehicle in section 10(2)(g) and “heavy passenger motor vehicle” in section 10(2)(h) with expression ‘transport vehicle’ as substituted in section 10(2)(e) related only to the aforesaid substituted classes only. It does not exclude transport vehicle, from the purview of section 10(2)(d) and section 2(41) of the Act i.e. light motor vehicle. (iv) The effect of amendment of Form 4 by insertion of “transport vehicle” is related only to the categories which were substituted in the year 1994 and the procedure to obtain driving licence for transport vehicle of class of “light motor vehicle” continues to be the same as it was and has not been changed and there is no requirement to obtain separate endorsement to drive transport vehicle, and if a driver is holding licence to drive light motor vehicle, he can drive transport vehicle of such class without any endorsement to that effect.” 17. In view of the above decision, now, the position of law is well settled. It is to be noted that mere absence of the endorsement to drive the transport vehicle, on the licence, does not amount to lead to the interpretation that the driver was not holding a valid and effective driving licence. Therefore, in view of the settled legal position as noted above, if the driver holds licence to drive light motor vehicle (LMV), he can drive transport vehicle of such class without any endorsement to that effect. Further, in the present case, the Motor Vehicle Inspector inspected the offending vehicle and issued Ex.A.3/MVI Report wherein at Column No.5 it was mentioned that the vehicle involved in the accident was noted as AP 05 Y 8473-light goods vehicle(three wheels). At Column No.15 it was mentioned that the insurance policy was in force till 28.12.2006. Further, in the present case, the Motor Vehicle Inspector inspected the offending vehicle and issued Ex.A.3/MVI Report wherein at Column No.5 it was mentioned that the vehicle involved in the accident was noted as AP 05 Y 8473-light goods vehicle(three wheels). At Column No.15 it was mentioned that the insurance policy was in force till 28.12.2006. R.W.2, who was the Administrative Office of the Insurance Company, deposed that the vehicle goods auto bearing No.AP 5 Y 8473 was insured with the appellant/Insurance Company. Ex.B.2 is the Insurance Policy. Hence, there is no substance in the submissions made by the learned standing counsel for the Insurance Company that the driver was not holding valid driving licence by the date of accident. In the facts of the case and looking into the beneficial purpose of the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act, therefore, a holder of the Light Motor Vehicle licence can drive all the vehicles of such class including transport vehicles more over the offending vehicle is a three wheels auto which is a Light Goods Vehicle. Hence, the Insurance Company cannot avoid its liability. 18. In the instant case, P.W.1 stated that on 11.07.2006 at about 6.00 a.m., when he was going to attend the brick work and when he reached ‘S’ turning, the vehicle bearing No.AP 5 Y 8473 came in a rash and negligent manner and dashed on his back due to which he sustained injuries all over the body and he was treated in Primary Health Centre, Alamuru and Government General Hospital, Kakinada and he was inpatient for two months and for six months he took treatment as an out-patient. In the cross examination, he stated that he was getting Rs.4,000/- per month as a labourer by attending brick work. 19. P.W.2(Doctor), who treated P.W.1 deposed that on 11.07.2006, he examined the injured and found the injuries viz., 1) Bleeding and lacerated injury 4 x 2 x1 cm above right middle malleous; 2) Bleeding, lacerated injury middle of middle aspect of right leg with swelling and tenderness; 3) Multiple bleeding abrasions right foot; and 4) An abrasion of 3 x 3 left knee joint. Further, he deposed that the patient sustained type-1 compound fracture both bones right leg, type-II compound fracture middle malleus fracture clavicle, scapula and fracture ribs left side. Further, he deposed that the patient sustained type-1 compound fracture both bones right leg, type-II compound fracture middle malleus fracture clavicle, scapula and fracture ribs left side. Patient underwent surgery for fracture tibia with intra middllary nailing on 17.08.2006 and the patient was discharged on 23.08.2006 and advised bed rest for two months. Ex.X1 is the medical record with X-ray. He deposed that injuries 1 and 2 are grievous and compound fracture as per X-ray and as per case sheet, there are four grievous injuries. 20. On perusal of the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, coupled with the documentary evidence, the learned Tribunal has not awarded the compensation by following the principles laid down in the Apex Court’s judgments (supra) and erred in awarding meager compensation under various conventional heads, which needs to be awarded and also to enhance the compensation in view of the injuries sustained by the petitioner in the accident. In view of the gravity of the injuries sustained by the injured, the Appellate Court has the power to enhance the compensation. 21. In the instant case, the claimant/injured, who was an illiterate is not supposed to be that much of meticulous to maintain the medical bills for future use. As per the evidence of P.W.2(Doctor), the petitioner/injured suffered from four fractures. Definitely, he might have spent a huge amount for medical treatment though he has not filed medical bills. The Tribunal cannot deny awarding compensation for the medical treatment. Therefore, apart from the conventional heads awarded by the Tribunal, the compensation under other conventional heads also needs to be awarded. 22. In Ramachandrappa’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: "13.In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the appellant was aged about 35 years and was working as a Coolie and was earning Rs.4,500/- per month at the time of accident. This claim is reduced by the Tribunal to a sum of Rs.3,000/- only on the assumption that wages of the labourer during the relevant period viz., in the year 2004, was Rs.100/- per day. This assumption in our view has no basis. Before the Tribunal, though Insurance Company was served, it did not choose to appear before the Court nor did it repudiated the claim of the claimant. This assumption in our view has no basis. Before the Tribunal, though Insurance Company was served, it did not choose to appear before the Court nor did it repudiated the claim of the claimant. Therefore, there was no reason for the Tribunal to have reduced the claim of the claimant and determined the monthly earning a sum of Rs.3,000/- per month. Secondly, the appellant was working as a Coolie and therefore, we cannot expect him to produce any documentary evidence to substantiate his claim. In the absence of any other evidence contrary to the claim made by the claimant, in our view, in the facts of the present case, the Tribunal should have accepted the claim of the claimant. 14. We hasten to add that in all cases and in all circumstances, the Tribunal need not accept the claim of the claimant in the absence of supporting material. It 2 2011(6) ALD, 75 (SC) depends on the facts of each case. In a given case, if the claim made is so exorbitant or if the claim made is contrary to ground realities, the Tribunal may not accept the claim and may proceed to determine the possible income by resorting to some guess work, which may include the ground realities prevailing at the relevant point of time. 15. In the present case, appellant was working as a Coolie and in and around the date of the accident, the wage of the labourer was between Rs.100/- to Rs.150/- per day or Rs.4,500/- per month. In our view, the claim was honest and bona fide and, therefore, there was no reason for the Tribunal to have reduced the monthly earning of the appellant from Rs.4,500/- to Rs.3,000/- per month. We, therefore, accept his statement that his monthly earning was Rs.4,500/-." 23. In view the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to supra, the monthly earning of a labourer was accepted to be Rs.4,500/- when the accident occurred in the year 2004. Whereas, in the present case the accident occurred in the year 2006 and the petitioner/claimant is a labourer. Hence, it would be appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to take the income of the petitioner/injured as Rs.4,500/- per month. Therefore, the income of the petitioner should be taken @ Rs.4,500/- per month. 24. In Sarla Verma & Others Vs. Hence, it would be appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to take the income of the petitioner/injured as Rs.4,500/- per month. Therefore, the income of the petitioner should be taken @ Rs.4,500/- per month. 24. In Sarla Verma & Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation & another, 2009 ACJ 1298 (SC) the Hon’ble Apex Court, while elaborating the concept of ‘just compensation’ observed as under: “Just compensation is adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the well settled principles relating to award of compensation. It is not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of profit.” 25. On an overall re-appreciation of the pleadings, material on record and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the afore-cited decisions, I am of the definite opinion that the petitioner/claimant is entitled to enhancement of compensation as modified and recalculated above and given in the table below for easy reference. S.No Head of Compensation Amount awarded by the Tribunal Enhanced Amount 1. Compensation awarded towards four fractures sustained by the petitioner 60,000/- 1,00,000/- (Rs.25,000/- for each fracture) 2. Pain & Sufferance 10,000/- 75,000/- 3. Loss of past and future earnings 15,000/- 27,000/- (Two months as inpatient and four months bed rest i.e., Rs.4,500 x 6) 4. Medical Expenses ---- 75,000/- 5. Transport Expenses 10,000/- 6. Future Medical Expenses ---- 10,000/- 7. Extra Nourishment ---- 3,000/- Total 85,000/- 3,00,000/- 26. In the decision in National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Komal and others, 2014 ACJ 1540 of the High Court of Delhi it is crystal clear that under Order XLI Rule 33 CPC the Appellate Court has the power to enhance the compensation even in the absence of Cross Objections. In the above-referred decision at Para No.12 it is held as follows: “12. Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 empowers the Court to award such compensation as appears to be just which has been interpreted to mean just in accordance with law and it can be more than the amount claimed by the claimants. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are clearly a beneficial legislation and hence should be interpreted in a way to enable the Court to assess just compensation. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are clearly a beneficial legislation and hence should be interpreted in a way to enable the Court to assess just compensation. The scope of Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the power of the High Court to enhance the award amount in accident cases in the absence of cross- objections has been discussed by the Supreme Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, AIR 2003 SC 674 where the Apex Court has held that the Court is required to determine just compensation and there is no other limitation or restriction for awarding such compensation and in appropriate cases wherefrom the evidence brought on record if the Tribunal/Court considers that the claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award and would empower the Court to enhance the compensation at the appellate stage even without the injured filing an appeal or cross-objections.” 27. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that the award passed by the Tribunal warrants interference and the compensation needs to be enhanced and thereby, enhanced from Rs.85,000/- to Rs.3,00,000/-. 28. Resultantly, the appeal preferred by the appellant/Insurance Company is dismissed enhancing the compensation from Rs.85,000/- to Rs.3,00,000/- with costs and interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of the petition till the date of realization against the Respondents 1 to 3 jointly and severally. (ii) Respondents are directed to deposit the compensation amount, within a period of two months from the date of this judgment, failing which execution can be taken out against them. (iii) The petitioner/claimant is directed to pay the requisite Court-fee in respect of the enhanced amount awarded over and above the compensation claimed (As per the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramla Vs. National Insurance Company Limited, 2019 ACJ 559 (SC)). (iv) On such deposit, the petitioner/claimant is entitled to withdraw the entire amount by filing proper application before the Tribunal. (v) The impugned award of the learned Tribunal stands modified to the aforesaid extent and in the terms and directions as above. (vi) The record be sent back to the Tribunal within three weeks from this day. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, pending if any, shall stand closed.