ORDER : K. Sreenivasa Reddy, J. 1. A.S. No. 526 of 2021 is preferred challenging the Judgment and Decree dated 28.03.2011 passed in Original Suit No. 17 of 2003 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Kadapa. 2. 1st respondent in the A.S. filed the aforesaid suit against appellants in the A.S., seeking partition of the plaint schedule properties into three equal shares and to allot one such share to him. Vide the Judgment dated 28.03.2011, the trial Court decreed the suit, passing a preliminary decree, declaring that 1st respondent/plaintiff is entitled for 1/3rd share in the suit schedule properties. 3. In the Appeal Suit, vide Order dated 25.08.2011 in A.S.M.P. No. 1830 of 2011, this Court granted stay of passing of final decree alone, by observing that all other proceedings may go on. 4. During pendency of the A.S., appellant No. 1 and sole respondent died. Appellants 4 to 6 were brought on record as legal representatives of deceased appellant No. 1, vide Order dated 24.03.2023 in I.A. No. 4 of 2022. Respondents 2 to 4 were brought on record as legal representatives of deceased respondent, vide Order dated 24.03.2023 in I.A. No. 6 of 2022. 5. For sake of convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to, as arrayed in the Appeal Suit. 6. During pendency of the appeal, appellants filed I.A. No. 1 of 2023 seeking temporary injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with their possession and operation of two rice mills viz. Sri Venkateswara Rice Mill and Sri Lakshmi Srinivasa Modern Rice Mill and Flour Mill of the plaint schedule properties situated in Gunthapalli village, Badvel mandal, YSR Kadapa district, pending disposal of the Appeal Suit. By an Order dated 12.04.2023, this Court passed an order observing that all the three ingredients to grant temporary injunction were found and granted interim injunction restraining 3rd respondent from interfering with the management of the two rice mills until further orders, and ordered urgent notice to the respondents. Thereafter, respondents filed I.A. No. 2 of 2023 praying to vacate the temporary injunction granted on 12.04.2023 in I.A. No. 1 of 2023. 7. Learned senior counsel Sri V.S.R. Anjaneyulu appearing for the appellants submits that there was a family partition which was reduced into writing between the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 in respect of the plaint schedule properties, and the same was accepted by all the parties. 7. Learned senior counsel Sri V.S.R. Anjaneyulu appearing for the appellants submits that there was a family partition which was reduced into writing between the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 in respect of the plaint schedule properties, and the same was accepted by all the parties. He further submits that Sri Venkateswara Rice Mill and Sri Lakshmi Srinivasa Modern Rice Mill and Flour Mill are in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of appellants even long prior to filing of the suit and the appellants are operating both the rice mills, by obtaining license from competent authorities and paying electricity consumption charges, and while so, respondent No. 3, who came on record after death of original respondent, with the aid of anti-social elements, is interfering with their possession and not permitting them to operate the rice mills. He submits that the appellants satisfy all the three ingredients essential for grant of temporary injunction, and hence, the petition. In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel relied upon decisions in (i) Tanusree Basu & others v. Ishani Prasad Basu & others (2008) 4 SCC 791 and (ii) Rachamadugu Sridevi v. Sanka Anjaneyulu 2017 LawSuit (Hyd) 183. 8. On the other hand, Sri Y.V. Ravi Prasad, learned senior counsel appearing for respondents contended that the respondents are co-owners of the aforesaid properties; that it is settled principle of law that in a suit for partition, one cannot seek injunction against co-owner having equal rights in the ancestral properties. The learned senior counsel further submits that merely because the appellants are in possession of the said rice mills, it does not necessarily mean that the respondents are ousted from the possession. It is his further submission that in joint family properties, question of absolute possession and enjoyment of the property by one of the share holders would not arise. It is his further submission that the appellants, with a fraudulent motive to knock away the stock comprising 1961 bags of rice and 1927 bags of paddy, equivalent to Rs. 82.00 lakhs, lying in Sri Lakshmi Srinivasa Modern Rice and Flour Mill, filed frivolous petition and obtained injunction behind back of respondents. In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel relied on the decisions in (i) Md. Mohammad Ali (dead) by LRs. 82.00 lakhs, lying in Sri Lakshmi Srinivasa Modern Rice and Flour Mill, filed frivolous petition and obtained injunction behind back of respondents. In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel relied on the decisions in (i) Md. Mohammad Ali (dead) by LRs. V. Jagadish Kalita and others, (2004) 1 SCC 271, and (ii) Jai Singh & others v. Gurmej Singh, (2009) 15 SCC 747 . 9. On a perusal of the material on record goes to show that 1st respondent (plaintiff) and appellants 1 and 2 (defendants 1 and 2) are brothers. After death of their father K. Venkataswamy Naidu, they and their junior paternal uncle Penchal Naidu partitioned joint family properties on 29.09.1993. According to the respondents, 1st respondent and appellants 1 and 2 were in joint possession of the properties fell to their share in the partition dated 29.09.1993, and in view of the fact that defendants 1 and 2 were acting detrimental to his interest, present suit is filed seeking partition stating that the schedule properties are joint family properties enjoyed by them all of them and there is no severance of status. According to the appellants, there was a family arrangement among the plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 on 14.05.2021, which was reduced into writing on stamp papers duly signed by all the three persons (Ex. B1), and hence, in view of the prior partition, the present suit is not maintainable. 10. The trial Court held that Ex. B1 document is inadmissible in evidence and rejected the said document. The trial Court held that even accepting for collateral purpose to prove the subsequent conduct of the parties regarding severance, no material has been placed by the defendants and the documents relied on by the defendants do not show that there is severance of the status. Therefore, the trial Court recorded a categorical finding that the plaintiff is the co-owner of the schedule properties. Admittedly, this Court has not stayed the judgment passed by the trial Court, but only passing of final decree was stayed by observing that all other proceedings may go on. Such is the case, one co-owner cannot exclusively claim the possession of the joint family property when the same is jointly entitled by all the members. 11. Admittedly, this Court has not stayed the judgment passed by the trial Court, but only passing of final decree was stayed by observing that all other proceedings may go on. Such is the case, one co-owner cannot exclusively claim the possession of the joint family property when the same is jointly entitled by all the members. 11. It is also pertinent to mention here that mere occupation of the property by one co-owner would not in any way oust the other co-owner from the possession of the said property. In Jai Singh & others v. Gurmej Singh (4 supra), relied on by the learned senior counsel appearing for respondents, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: (para 9) "9. It is to be noted that in the subsequent Full Bench judgment in Bhartu case [1981 PLJ 204], the earlier decision in Lachhman Singh case [ AIR 1970 P&H 304 ] was distinguished on facts. The principles relating to the inter se rights and liabilities of co-sharers are as follows: (1) A co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also in every parcel of it. (2) Possession of joint property by one co-owner is in the eye of the law, possession of all even if all but one are actually out of possession. (3) A mere occupation of a larger portion or even of an entire joint property does not necessarily amount to ouster as the possession of one is deemed to be on behalf of all. (4) The above rule admits of an exception when there is ouster of a co-owner by another. But in order to negative the presumption of joint possession on behalf of all, on the ground of ouster, the possession of a co-owner must not only be exclusive but also hostile to the knowledge of the other as, when a co-owner openly asserts his own title and denies, that of the other. (5) Passage of time does not extinguish the right of the co-owner who has been out of possession of the joint property except in the event of ouster or abandonment. (6) Every co-owner has a right to use the joint property in a husband like manner not inconsistent with similar rights of other co-owners. (5) Passage of time does not extinguish the right of the co-owner who has been out of possession of the joint property except in the event of ouster or abandonment. (6) Every co-owner has a right to use the joint property in a husband like manner not inconsistent with similar rights of other co-owners. (7) Where a co-owner is in possession of separate parcels under an arrangement consented by the other co-owners, it is not open to anybody to disturb the arrangement without the consent of others except by filing a suit for partition." In Md. Mohammad Ali (dead) by LRs. V. Jagadish Kalita and others(3 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: (paragraph 19). "19. Long and continuous possession by itself, it is trite, would not constitute adverse possession. Even non-participation in the rent and profits of the land to a co-sharer does not amount to ouster so as to give title by prescription. A co-sharer, as is well settled, becomes a construction trustee of other co-sharer and the right of the appellant and/or his predecessors-in-interest would, thus, be deemed to be protected by the trustees. As noticed hereinbefore, the respondents in their written statement raised a plea of adverse possession only against the third set of the defendants. A plea of adverse possession set up by the respondents, as reproduced hereinbefore, does not meet the requirements of law also in proving ouster of a co-sharer. But in the event, if the heirs and legal representatives of Gayaram Kalita and Kashiram Kalita partitioned their properties by metes and bounds, they would cease to be co-sharers in which event a plea of adverse possession as contradistinguished from the plea of ouster could be raised. The courts in a given situation may on reading of the written statement in its entirety come to the conclusion that a proper plea of adverse possession has been raised if requisite allegations therefore exist. In the event the plaintiff proves his title, he need not prove that he was in possession within 12 years from the date of filing of suit. If he fails to prove his title, the suit fails." From the aforementioned principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that a mere occupation of a portion or entire joint family property by one co-owner does not amount to ouster of the other co-owner from the said property. 12. If he fails to prove his title, the suit fails." From the aforementioned principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that a mere occupation of a portion or entire joint family property by one co-owner does not amount to ouster of the other co-owner from the said property. 12. On the other hand, learned senior counsel appearing for appellants relied upon a decision in Tanusree Basu & others v. Ishani Prasad Basu & others (1 supra), in support of his contention that a co-owner, being in exclusive possession of a joint property would be entitled to injunction. In the said decision, it is held thus: (paragraphs 13 and 14). "13. There cannot be any doubt or dispute as a general proposition of law that possession of one co-owner would be treated to be possession of all. This, however, in a case of this nature would not mean that where three flats have been allotted jointly to the parties, each one of them cannot be in occupation of one co-owner separately. 14. We have noticed hereinbefore that the appellant-plaintiffs themselves in no uncertain terms admitted that by reason of mutual adjust the parties had been in separate possession of three flats viz. Flats Nos. 201, 202 and 301. If they were in possession of the separate flats, the plaintiffs as co-owners could not otherwise have made any attempt to dispossess the first respondent by putting a padlock. The padlock, according to the first respondent, as noticed hereinbefore, was put by the appellant-plaintiffs immediately after the appeal preferred by them in the High Court was dismissed." The learned senior counsel also relied on a decision of the Composite High Court in Rachamadugu Sridevi v. Sanka Anjaneyulu (2 supra), wherein it is held thus: (paragraphs 12 and 13). "12. Once the above fact is kept in mind, it will be clear that it is not always in every case that the blanket rule of no co-owner can seek injunction against another co-owner, can be applied. As a matter of fact, this principle has been accepted by the Supreme Court in Tanusree Basu v. Ishani Prasad Basu (2008) 4 SCC 791 . 13. As a matter of fact, this principle has been accepted by the Supreme Court in Tanusree Basu v. Ishani Prasad Basu (2008) 4 SCC 791 . 13. In view of the above, I am of the considered view that the plaintiffs, who had enjoyed the benefit of an interim order from 29.02.2016, for the past more than a year and two months, cannot be deprived of the benefit. Hence, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed, the impugned order is set aside. The petitioners will be entitled to an interim injunction till the disposal of the suit. The trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order." There is no dispute about the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel for the appellants. 13. In Tanusree Basu & others v. Ishani Prasad Basu & others (1 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated the settled principle that possession of one co-owner would be treated to be possession of all, however, in the particular facts and circumstances of the said case where three flats have been allotted jointly to the parties, each one of them cannot be in occupation of one co-owner separately and as the appellant-plaintiffs themselves admitted that by reason of mutual adjustment, the parties had been in separate possession of three flats viz. Flat Nos. 201, 202 and 301, it is held that if they were in possession of the separate flats, the plaintiffs, as co-owners, could not otherwise have made any attempt to dispossess the first respondent by putting a padlock. In such circumstances, it was held that a co-owner, being in exclusive possession of a joint property, would be entitled to injunction. Therefore, the facts in the said case are distinguishable with the facts in the case on hand, where the co-owners are in joint possession of the joint family properties and the judgment of the trial Court, with regard to the said aspect, is staring at the appellants. 14. Therefore, the facts in the said case are distinguishable with the facts in the case on hand, where the co-owners are in joint possession of the joint family properties and the judgment of the trial Court, with regard to the said aspect, is staring at the appellants. 14. In Rachamadugu Sridevi v. Sanka Anjaneyulu (2 supra), relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants, a Division Bench of the Composite High Court reiterated the settled principle that there can be no injunction in favour of one co-owner against another, but held that the facts out of which the said case arose are on a slippery slope viz. there were two rival claims, one by mother-in-law of Kotiratnamma and another by the respondent therein, who claims not to be an adopted son but to be a foster son of Kotiratnamma. In those circumstances, the Division Bench granted interim injunction till disposal of the suit. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid decisions will not render any help to the case of the appellants herein. 15. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that a mere occupation of a portion or entire joint family property by one co-owner does not amount to ouster of the other co-owner from the said property and injunction cannot be granted in favour of one co-owner against another co-owner in respect of the said property. Accordingly, I.A. No. 2 of 2023 is allowed and I.A. No. 1 of 2023 is dismissed, vacating the interim injunction granted in the Order dated 12.04.2023 in I.A. No. 1 of 2023 in A.S. No. 526 of 2011.