ORDER : 1. The instant petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India directed is against the order dated 16.07.2022 passed by the Additional Munsif-VIII, Giridih in Civil Misc. Case No. 04 of 2020, whereby and whereunder, the petition filed under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC praying therein to set aside the ex-parte decree dated 17.06.1993 passed in Partition Suit No. 204 of 1991 has been sought to be quashed. 2. The aforesaid order dated 16.07.2022 has been challenged on the ground that the petition filed under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC is after the lapse of the period of 27 years and although the said petition was coupled with the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act but the learned Court while allowing has issued notice as to why the decree dated 17.06.1993 passed in Partition Suit No. 204 of 1991 be not quashed and set aside by condoning the delay but without issuing notice on the issue of limitation. 3. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the petition which requires to be enumerated, reads as under: The original plaintiff, namely, Devi Mahto, filed a Partition Suit No.204 of 1991 against the defendants in the court of Munsif, Giridih praying therein a decree claiming partition of 8 annas share in the suit property fully described in the schedule to the plaint and in the said case, summons were issued to the defendants and the defendants refused to receive and same and affidavit of process server was filed on 29.09.1992 and the service of notice upon the defendants were held proper and valid. The learned trial court, after considering the material on the record, decree the suit and accordingly preliminary decree was prepared on 09.07.1993 and final decree was also made on 04.10.2019 and the plaintiffs filed execution case on 02.02.2021 for execution of the final decree passed in Partition Suit No. 204 of 1991. Thereafter, the defendants filed Misc. Case No. 04 of 2020 before the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Giridih under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC along with a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for setting aside the ex-parte preliminary decree and all subsequent orders on the ground of non-service of summons. It is the case of the petitioner that no notice was issued to the petitioner in Misc. It is the case of the petitioner that no notice was issued to the petitioner in Misc. Case and the learned court without hearing the plaintiffs has passed the order for condonation of delay in filing the misc. case, the impugned order herein. 4. It appears from the factual aspect that a partition suit was filed in the year 1991 being Partition Suit No. 204 of 1991. Decree was passed on 17.06.1993 said to be preliminary. Thereafter, final decree was passed on 04.10.2019. It is the case of the applicants who have filed petition under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC, the defendant to the suit that the day when the process was executing the final decree dated 04.10.2019 has been taken recourse, then the defendant came to know about the preliminary decree passed in the year 1993 which according to the defendants, the respondents herein, that the said decree was ex-parte, hence, the petition was filed under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree dated 17.06.1993 passed in Partition Suit No. 204 of 1991. It further appears that the petition under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC was filed along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for seeking prayer therein to condone the delay of 27 years in filing the aforesaid petition under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC. The plaintiff, the petitioner to this petition, is having grievance that the executing court has issued notice after condoning the delay of 27 years but without issuing notice upon the issue of limitation as would appear from the order dated 16.07.2022, hence, petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the said order. 5. Mr. Sandeep Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the ground that the issue of limitation since is the mixed question of law and fact, hence, a notice was required to be issued by the concerned executing court before condoning the delay but no effort has been taken as would appear from the order dated 16.07.2022. 6. 5. Mr. Sandeep Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the ground that the issue of limitation since is the mixed question of law and fact, hence, a notice was required to be issued by the concerned executing court before condoning the delay but no effort has been taken as would appear from the order dated 16.07.2022. 6. It has further been submitted by referring to the position of law that if any petition is filed for setting aside the ex-parte decree beyond the period of limitation, then a right will be said to be accrued in favour of the other side and in that view of the matter, it was the bounded duty of the concerned court to issue notice upon the plaintiff so as to provide an opportunity of hearing before passing an order for condonation of delay but the same having not been done, the order dated 16.07.2022 is bad in the eyes of law. 7. While on the other hand, Mr. R.N. Sahay, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Yashvardhan, learned counsel for the respondents/opposite parties has submitted that no prejudice has been caused even if no notice has been issued under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before dealing and condoning the said delay since it is the admitted fact as would appear from the impugned order dated 16.07.2022 that the decree passed in the year 1993 is ex-parte. The submission, therefore, has been made that when the fact has been admitted to the effect that the decree dated 17.06.1993 is ex-parte, wherein no notice was issued, hence, if on that pretext, a petition was filed under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree, and in that eventuality, if the learned court has condoned the delay by allowing the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act without issuing notice upon the plaintiff, the same cannot be said to suffer from error, hence, the instant petition lacks merit and as such, the same is fit to be dismissed. 8. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties, gone across the pleading made in the petition as also the finding/reasoning referred in the impugned order dated 16.07.2022. 9. 8. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties, gone across the pleading made in the petition as also the finding/reasoning referred in the impugned order dated 16.07.2022. 9. This Court, on the basis of the argument advanced on behalf of the parties, has gathered that the petitioner has raised the issue as to whether while allowing the application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act, a notice is required to be issued upon the other side, the plaintiff herein. 10. This Court, before answering the said issue, deems it fit and proper to refer the position of law so far as the issue of limitation is concerned. 11. The law is well settled that the issue of limitation is mixed question of law and fact. It is further settled that if the statutory command is to make an application within stipulated period and if not filed within the said statutory period, then it is the requirement of law to file petition coupled with the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act so as to show the sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning the delay. The sufficient cause is the crux of the issue basis upon which the concerned court is to take decision as to whether the reason which has been shown can be said to be sufficient cause or not. Reference with respect to the interpretation of the word ‘sufficient cause’ has been made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 , has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:- “12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [ (2013) 14 SCC 81 ], wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:- “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [ AIR 1964 SC 1336 ], Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [ (1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953 ], Parimal v. Veena [ (2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150 ] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [ (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629 ].) 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [ AIR 1964 SC 993 ] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [ (2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100 ] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [ (2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201 ].) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [ (2005) 7 SCC 510 ], Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [ (1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537 ] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [ (2008) 17 SCC 448 ] 14. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [ (2005) 7 SCC 510 ], Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [ (1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537 ] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [ (2008) 17 SCC 448 ] 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [ (2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 ]. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336 , Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770 , Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 . It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195 , wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:- “12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.” It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein, expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with which means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. 12. It is evident that the concerned court has got power to condone the delay but sin qua non for doing the same, is that court has to come with the conclusive finding that the reason which has been shown for condonation of delay is sufficient cause for the same. 13. The court if comes to the conclusion that the reason shown is not sufficient, then, the concerned court has got power to reject the said application. 13. The court if comes to the conclusion that the reason shown is not sufficient, then, the concerned court has got power to reject the said application. The reason for doing so is based upon the principle that the moment the period of limitation expires for invoking the jurisdiction of the concerned court under specific provision of law, a right will be said to be accrued in favour of the other side and the moment a right will be accrued, the requirement of law is that the other side in whose favour the right has been accrued, is to be heard and that is the cardinal principle of law since after accrual of right, if any order will be passed which is adverse to the interest of the concerned party, the same will be said to be in violation of principles of natural justice. 14. We are living in the principle to be followed of fairness and transparency and in order to achieve the same, it is the requirement that before taking any decision either way, positive or negative, in favour of a party, the requirement is to provide an opportunity of hearing and that is the concept given by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Anr., (1978) 1 SCC 248 wherein the concept of cardinal principle of natural justice has been evolved in a case that even if the statute does not refer any power to provide opportunity of hearing, then also, opportunity is to be given to the other side. Relevant paragraph, i.e., paragraph-184 of the said judgment is being referred as under: “184. It was submitted on behalf of the state that an order under sub-clause 10(3)(c) is on the subjective satisfaction of the passport authority and that as the decision is purely administrative in character it cannot be questioned in a court of law except on very limited grounds. Though the courts had taken the view that the principle of natural justice is inapplicable to administrative orders, there is a change in the judicial opinion subsequently. The frontier between judicial or quasi-judicial determination on the one hand and an executive or administrative determination on the other has become blurred. The rigid view that principles of natural justice applied only to judicial and quasi-judicial acts and not to administrative acts no longer holds the field. The frontier between judicial or quasi-judicial determination on the one hand and an executive or administrative determination on the other has become blurred. The rigid view that principles of natural justice applied only to judicial and quasi-judicial acts and not to administrative acts no longer holds the field. The views taken by the courts on this subject are not consistent. While earlier decisions were in favour of administrative convenience and efficiency at the expense of natural justice, the recent view is in favour of extending the application of natural justice and the duty to act fairly with a caution that the principle should not be extended to the extreme so as to affect adversely the administrative efficiency. In this connection it is useful to quote the oft-repeated observations of Lord Justice Tucker in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109, 118] “The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth ... but, whatever standard is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case.” In R. v. Gaming Board ex. p. Benaim [ (1970) 2 QB 417 : (1970) 2 All ER 528] Lord Denning held that the view that the principle of natural justice applied only to judicial proceedings and not to administrative proceedings has been overruled in Ridge v. Baldwin [(1964) AC 40]. The guidance that was given to the Gaming Board was that they should follow the principles laid down in the case of immigrants, namely, that they have no right to come in, but they have a right to be heard. The Court held in construing the words the Board “shall have regard only” to the matter specified, the Board has a duty to act fairly and it must give the applicant an opportunity of satisfying them of the matter specified in the section. They must let him know what their impressions are so that he can disabuse them. The reference to the cases of immigrants is to the decisions of Chief Justice Parker in Re H. K. (An infant [(1967) 2 QB 617, 630]). They must let him know what their impressions are so that he can disabuse them. The reference to the cases of immigrants is to the decisions of Chief Justice Parker in Re H. K. (An infant [(1967) 2 QB 617, 630]). In cases of immigrants though they had no right to come into the country it was held that they have a right to be heard. These observations apply to the present case and the plea of the petitioner that the authority should act fairly and that they must let her know what their impressions are so that, if possible, she can disabuse them, is sound.” 15. This Court in the backdrop of the aforesaid legal position is now proceeding to examine the factual aspect in order to consider the issue as referred above. 16. Admitted fact herein is that the preliminary decree was passed on 17.06.1993 in Partition Suit No. 204 of 1991. The said decree is said to be ex-parte. The reason for showing this decree to be ex-parte by the defendant, the respondent herein, is that no notice has been issued. 17. This Court is not entering into this controversy whether it was ex-parte or not for the present since that is not the issue herein. The final decree was passed on 04.10.2019. 18. It is the case of the respondent-defendant that when the process of execution was started, the it came to the notice of the defendant concerned that a decree was passed on 17.06.1993 said to be preliminary followed by the final decree dated 04.10.2019 and as such, occasion arisen to file a petition under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree. However, in the meanwhile, a substantial period was lapsed, i.e., about 27 years, hence, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed for condoning the delay. 19. The concerned executing court has condoned the delay in filing the petition under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC and thereafter issued notice to the petitioner herein, the plaintiff to the suit, for hearing on merit of the suit vide order dated 16.07.2022. The said order is under challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 20. 19. The concerned executing court has condoned the delay in filing the petition under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC and thereafter issued notice to the petitioner herein, the plaintiff to the suit, for hearing on merit of the suit vide order dated 16.07.2022. The said order is under challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 20. As has been referred hereinabove that after expiry of the limitation period, if any petition is being filed, a right will be said to be accrued to the other side, and on the said accrued right, the concerned party against whom any decision has been taken so far as the fact of this case is concerned, then the requirement of law is to provide opportunity of hearing on the issue of limitation. But, as would appear from the impugned order dated 16.07.2022 there is no reference of issuance of notice upon the petitioner, the plaintiff to the suit. 21. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the vital right of the petitioner/plaintiff has been snatched away by not issuing notice on the issue of limitation. 22. This Court, before passing further order, deems it fit and proper to refer the scope of High Court exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited and is to be exercised if there is error apparent on the face of record or if there is any jurisdictional error. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty Vrs. Rajendra Shankar Patii, (2010) 8 SCC 329 has laid down regarding the scope of Article 227 which relates to the supervisory powers of the High Courts and by taking aid of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vrs. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Calcutta 193, wherein it has been laid down that Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not vest the High Court with limit less power which may be exercised at the court’s discretion to remove the hardship of particular decisions. The power of superintendence confers power of a known and well recognized character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. The power of superintendence confers power of a known and well recognized character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. In general words, the High Court’s power of superintendence is a power to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of the authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. The power of superintendence is not to be exercised unless there has been; (a) an unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in a court or tribunal; or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction; or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in courts or tribunals. Further, in the aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken aid of a judgment rendered in Mani Nariman Daruwala Vrs. Phiroz N. Bhatena, (1991) 3 SCC 141 wherein it has been laid down that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. The Hon’ble Apex Court has made it clear that except to this limited extent the High court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of facts. Further, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani Vrs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, (1995) 6 SCC 576 it has been laid down that the High Court under Article 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. It has been laid down at paragraph 47 of the aforesaid judgment that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is not original nor is it appellable. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. It has been laid down at paragraph 47 of the aforesaid judgment that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is not original nor is it appellable. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226 the High Court normal annuls or quashes an order or proceedings but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. It has further been laid down regarding the powers to be exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence, can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it within the bounds of its authority, in order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested with them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. Apart from that, High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. 23. Herein, considering the aforesaid position of law as has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court and coming to the order dated 16.07.2022, this Court, is not hesitant in holding the said order to be improper reason being that while allowing the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 27 years, no notice was issued to the petitioner/plaintiff. Therefore, the said error is apparent on the face of the said order, therefore, this Court is of the view that it is a fit case where the power conferred to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised. 24. Accordingly, the order dated 16.07.2022 is hereby quashed and set aside. 25. In consequence thereof, the petition filed under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC is restored to its position. 26. The concerned executing court is directed to issue notice to the plaintiff on the issue of limitation. Further, since the suit is of the year 1991, hence, the learned counsel for the petitioner has undertaken that he will appear and file objection under Section 5 of the Limitation Act within 15 days from the date of issuance of notice. 27. The concerned court is further directed to decide the issue of limitation within fortnight. 28. The concerned court is further directed to expedite the hearing of the suit, since the same is of the year 1991, so that the suit be concluded at an early date. 29. It is made clear that there shall be no unnecessary adjournment on behalf of the parties. 30. Accordingly, the instant petition stands allowed and disposed of with the above observation and direction. 31. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. 32. It is also made clear that the learned court is directed to take decision strictly on merit without being prejudiced by this order.