JUDGMENT : 1. The Criminal Appeal is directed against the order of acquittal passed under Section 256 Cr.P.C. in C.C.No.303 of 2016 on the file of Special Judicial Magistrate of I Class (Excise), Eluru (for short, “the trial Court”) whereby the complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, “the N.I. Act”) by the appellant against the 2nd respondent for the dishonour of cheque issued towards discharge of legally enforceable debt, was dismissed and accused was acquitted on account of the absence of the complainant on the date of hearing. 2. Heard Sri Ramakrishna Akurathi, learned counsel for the appellant and Additional Public Prosecutor for the 1st respondent-State. Despite the service of notice on the 2nd respondent/accused, he did not appear either in person or counsel representing on his behalf. 3. The appellant is the complainant in C.C.No.303 of 2016 before the trial Court. He filed a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act against the 2nd respondent herein, accused in the said case, on the ground that the Cheque issued for Rs.11,00,000/- on 20.04.2015 by the 2nd respondent towards the discharge of legally enforceable debt was dishonoured. 4. As seen from the order dated 17.03.2017, the trial Court noticed that the complainant did not comply with the earlier order dated 03.03.2017. On 04.11.2016, the complainant filed his chief affidavit by paying costs of Rs.200/-. The trial Court directed the complainant to attend on 21.04.2017 by passing a conditional order indicating the dismissal of the complaint, in case of failure of the complainant to attend before the Court. 5. The learned counsel representing the appellant/complainant submits that the complainant promptly attended the trial Court except on 21.04.2017, but the appellant counsel reached the trial Court a little bit late on that day, in the meantime, the case was called, and dismissed for default. The impugned order passed by the trial Court, is extracted as under : “The case was called on for hearing today to which it had been posted. The accused is absent. The petition is filed and allowed. The complainant is absent. No representation. The complainant failed to comply with the docket order dated 17.03.2017. Costs not paid. It shows that the complainant has no interest in proceeding with the matter further. Hence, the complaint is dismissed, and the accused is acquitted under Section 256 of Cr.P.C.” 6. The accused is absent. The petition is filed and allowed. The complainant is absent. No representation. The complainant failed to comply with the docket order dated 17.03.2017. Costs not paid. It shows that the complainant has no interest in proceeding with the matter further. Hence, the complaint is dismissed, and the accused is acquitted under Section 256 of Cr.P.C.” 6. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment of acquittal passed under Section 256 Cr.P.C., the complainant preferred the present appeal. 7. In the circumstances pleaded, the question is whether the trial Court is justified in invoking the provisions of Section 256(1) Cr.P.C. and dismissing the complaint. POINT: 8. It is settled law that the primary objective of the court should be to uphold justice, but not to deny it. It's essential to recognize that there could be a multitude of valid reasons for the complainant's absence when the case is called. When a case is scheduled for evidence recording, it would be better course to pass over the matter without immediately resorting to invoking Section 256(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) solely based on the complainant's failure to appear in the Court Hall. Various factors might contribute to their inability to be present in court or to reach the court in time. There may also be instances where the complainant's counsel could not attend court due to prior engagements or other reasons. While it's the responsibility of the counsel to ensure representation, it's important to acknowledge that a valid case should not be dismissed solely due to the counsel's errors or oversights. The impugned judgment does not show that it positively accommodated the complainant's counsel by passing over the matter. 9. It is apposite to refer to a decision reported in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand, (1998) 1 SCC 687 , the purpose of inserting a provision like Section 256 of the Code was discussed, and in light thereof, in paras 13 & 16, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : “13. When a trial court acquits an accused due to the non-appearance of the complainant, the appellate Court has the same powers as the trial court to reach a fresh decision as to whether the Magistrate should have acquitted the accused in the particular situation. When a trial court acquits an accused due to the non-appearance of the complainant, the appellate Court has the same powers as the trial court to reach a fresh decision as to whether the Magistrate should have acquitted the accused in the particular situation. What the trial court did not then ascertain and consider could be known to the appellate Court, and a decision different from the trial court can be taken by the appellate Court, whether the order of acquittal should have been passed in the particular situation. xxx 16. What was the purpose of including a provision like Section 247 in the old Code (or Section 256 in the new Code)? It affords some deterrence against dilatory tactics by a complainant who set the law in motion through his complaint. An accused who is perforce to attend the Court on all posting days can be put to much harassment by a complainant if he does not turn up to the Court on occasions when his presence is necessary. The section, therefore, affords protection to an accused against such tactics of the complainant. But that does not mean if the complainant is absent, the Court has a duty to acquit the accused in invitum." 10. Again, in the matter of Mohd. Azeem vs. A. Venkatesh and another, (2002) 7 SCC 726 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in a proceeding under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the single default in appearance on the part of the complainant, the dismissal of the complaint case is not proper, legal and justified. Dismissal of the complaint was not the only option before the trial Court. It would have adjourned the case to some other date as per the provisions of Section 256(1) Cr.P.C. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that it is not an outright dismissal of the complaint contemplated under Section 256(1) Cr.P.C. According to him, discretion is conferred on the learned Magistrate under Section 256(1) Cr.P.C. which is meant to be exercised reasonably and not mechanically or arbitrarily. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that sub-section (1) of Section 256 of the Code mandates the Magistrate to acquit the accused if, on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused or any day subsequent thereto, to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear. 13. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that sub-section (1) of Section 256 of the Code mandates the Magistrate to acquit the accused if, on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused or any day subsequent thereto, to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear. 13. In the nature of the argument put forth by the learned counsel, a re-production of Section 256(1) Cr.P.C. is necessitated. Section 256(1) reads : “Non-appearance or death of complainant, if a summons has been issued on complainant, and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day. Provided that where the complainant is represented by a Pleader or by the Officer conducting the prosecution or where the Magistrate is of the opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case.” 14. In cases falling under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the individual who files the complaint typically has a direct interest in the proceedings. Hence, it is not appropriate for the relevant magistrate to outright dismiss the complaint solely based on the complainant's absence. Such a dismissal order would hold finality, which could potentially harm the complainant's rights. Given this scenario, there exists a genuine possibility of adverse consequences for the complainant. Consequently, the Magistrate ought to exercise their judicial discretion prudently and considerately. 15. To put it more simply, if the complainant is not present during a court hearing, the court should refrain from summarily dismissing the case. Rather, the court could either choose to postpone the hearing or proceed with the case as per Section 256(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), provided that the complainant is represented by their legal counsel. This would apply when the complainant's personal presence is deemed unnecessary based on the prevailing circumstances. Notably, the magistrate holds the authority to grant an exemption from appearing in court either autonomously or upon the request of the complainant's lawyer. 16. The complainant has been actively and diligently pursuing the case for the past three years. This would apply when the complainant's personal presence is deemed unnecessary based on the prevailing circumstances. Notably, the magistrate holds the authority to grant an exemption from appearing in court either autonomously or upon the request of the complainant's lawyer. 16. The complainant has been actively and diligently pursuing the case for the past three years. It was the responsibility of the Magistrate to thoroughly review the case's previous proceedings, as documented in the records, to ascertain whether the complainant's absence was deliberate. Generally, complainants do not intentionally evade court appearances, given the serious repercussions. Similarly, legal practitioners typically do not intentionally neglect their cases. Consequently, the Magistrate should have carefully considered the historical progression of the case before making a decision that could significantly impact the complaint and the complainant. 17. It is essential for the Magistrate to evaluate the complainant's conduct as a party involved in the case to ascertain whether their absence was willful. This assessment is pivotal for the Magistrate to appropriately exercise the discretion granted under Section 256(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) when determining the accused's acquittal. If the Magistrate had thoroughly analyzed the situation, he would likely not have issued the contentious order of acquittal. 18. While adhering to the fundamental principle of presuming the accused as innocent until proven guilty, the Court should exercise prudence and refrain from hastily dismissing complaints under the provision stipulated in Section 256(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), without duly considering the potential adverse consequences it might inflict upon the complainant. The Court's primary goal should be to advance justice rather than obstruct it. It is imperative to acknowledge that there could be numerous legitimate reasons for the complainant's non-attendance when the case is scheduled for a hearing. 19. In the realm of criminal justice, a complainant who initiates legal action against an accused individual bears the onus of proving the latter's guilt, beginning from the foundational presumption of innocence. In this context, if the Court prematurely dismisses a complaint – wherein the complainant holds a direct stake – without affording them the opportunity to present evidence, it unquestionably constitutes an act of unfairness and injustice. Such an action on the part of the lower court contradicts the fundamental principles of natural justice. The core essence of the rules of natural justice lies in ensuring equitable treatment and preventing the occurrence of miscarriages of justice. Such an action on the part of the lower court contradicts the fundamental principles of natural justice. The core essence of the rules of natural justice lies in ensuring equitable treatment and preventing the occurrence of miscarriages of justice. 20. In the current scenario, the Magistrate's failure to meticulously evaluate the complainant's endeavors in diligently pursuing the case before issuing the disputed order has led to the accused's acquittal without undergoing a comprehensive trial for the complaint. This oversight has inevitably resulted in a glaring instance of justice being miscarried. Given the prevailing circumstances, this Court firmly believes that, in the earnest pursuit of justice, it is imperative to extend the complainant another opportunity to present and substantiate their case. 21. The trial Court judgment demonstrates a lack of comprehensive examination regarding the complainant's actions in relation to their non-appearance during court proceedings. There is no indication that the absence was intentional or deliberate. In such situations, it is customary for the Court to choose to adjourn the case rather than promptly dismissing it. 22. The order dated 21.04.2017 does not provide clarity on whether it was issued during the ongoing proceedings or if it was postponed for a certain period. Given this situation, it becomes difficult to definitively determine the accuracy of the submission made by the complainant's counsel with regard to his attending court a bit late on the day of adjournment. Considering the circumstances, it is unlikely that the complainant's counsel would provide an incorrect reason to support his client's case. Assuming the reason provided by the complainant's counsel is accurate; this Court believes that affording the complainant another opportunity to present his case is appropriate. The acquittal judgment passed by the trial Court can be deemed as technical, as the accused was acquitted without undergoing a proper trial. Considering that the appellant is willing to cover any costs the Court may impose, the impugned order can be set aside in the interest of justice by imposing reasonable costs. 23. At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1244 of 2017, wherein this Court vide order dated 08.12.2022 observed that “despite the docket that about 15 adjournments were granted to the complainant, but he did not turn up for cross-examination. 23. At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1244 of 2017, wherein this Court vide order dated 08.12.2022 observed that “despite the docket that about 15 adjournments were granted to the complainant, but he did not turn up for cross-examination. However, as it is now stated that a sum of Rs.1,70,000/- is involved in the lis for which a cheque was issued, which was issued, which was dishonoured and as the learned counsel for the appellant would implore the Court to provide an opportunity to the complainant to prosecute his case by imposing some costs to adequately compensate the accused on account of the said laches on the part of the complainant in prosecuting this case, this Court, in the said facts and circumstances of the case, is inclined to provide one more opportunity to the petitioner by imposing heavy costs with certain conditions”. 24. The Court cannot be permitted to apply the provisions under Section 256(1) Cr.P.C. mechanically and as a matter of routine. Therefore, the impugned judgment passed by the learned Magistrate is not justifiable on the face of the record, and, therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 25. Based on the aforementioned reasons and considering the similarities in the factual context, the same benefit granted to the complainant in Criminal Appeal No.1244 of 2014 should be extended to the current case. Therefore, the judgment rendered by the learned Magistrate is set aside. The proceedings will be reinstated to its original state on the file of Special Judicial Magistrate of I Class (Excise), Eluru. The complainant will now resume from the point in the proceedings where it was when the order of the acquittal/dismissal order of the complaint was passed. 26. Therefore, the judgment rendered by the learned Magistrate is set aside. The proceedings will be reinstated to its original state on the file of Special Judicial Magistrate of I Class (Excise), Eluru. The complainant will now resume from the point in the proceedings where it was when the order of the acquittal/dismissal order of the complaint was passed. 26. In the result, the appeal is allowed on the following terms : (1) The impugned order of acquittal of the accused dated 21.04.2017 in C.C.No.303 of 2016 on the file of learned Special Judicial Magistrate of I Class (Excise), Eluru, is set aside on payment of costs of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) to the Andhra Pradesh High Court Legal Services Committee, Amaravati within two (2) weeks from the date of this judgment, failing which, the appeal shall stand dismissed; (2) On payment of the said costs, both parties to this appeal are directed to attend before the Special Judicial Magistrate of I Class (Excise), Eluru, without fail on 22.09.2023; (3) In exigencies, they are permitted to represent by their learned counsel. In the event, the respondent fails to appear or is represented by counsel on 22.09.2023, the trial Court can issue a summons or notice to the accused for his appearance; (4) The learned Magistrate shall dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible, preferably within three months from 22.09.2023, without granting unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.