JUDGMENT RAVI NATH TILHARI, J. - Heard Sri K.R.S. Prakash Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri T. Ashok Srivastava, learned counsel representing Sri N. Harinath, Deputy Solicitor General of India for the respondents. 2. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner for the following prayer as amended till date: "For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit that the petitioner herein prays that this Hon'ble court may be pleased to issue a writ order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of mandamus by declaring the action of the respondents in issuing the impugned proceedings No.RE/127/KNL/23/2000 dtd. 17/10/2000 and the order passed in O.A.No.589/2001 dtd. 25/6/2001 on the file of CAT, Hyderabad are illegal improper and against the fundamental rights of the petitioner and set a side the same declaring the OM No.171/2017GDS dtd. 30/5/2020 and OM No.171/2017GDS dtd. 5/3/2020 issued by Department of Posts Government of India Ministry of Communications to the extent of restricting the cases which were rejected by the Committee on Compassionate Engagement between the period Year 2005 to May 2017 as illegal improper and against the fundamental tights of the petitioner and consequently direct the official respondents to consider the petitioners case under revised scheme and to provide the employment to the petitioner on compassionate grounds immediately in the vacancy of EDBPM Peddoddi and pass such other order or orders as this Honble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case (Prayer amended vide orders passed in I.A No.2 of 2023 in W.P. No.1093 of 2003 dt 6/2/2023)." 3. The petitioner is challenging the order passed in O.A.No.589 of 2001 dtd. 25/6/2001, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, Hyderabad, (in short, "Tribunal") by which his O.A was dismissed. 4. In O.A. the petitioner challenged the order dtd. 17/10/2000, by which his claim for compassionate appointment on the death of his father, was rejected by the departmental authorities. 5. The petitioner's late father B. Chenna Kesava Reddy who was EDBPM, Peddoddi died on 10/12/1998, while he was in service. The petitioner was appointed as provisional EDBPM, Peddoddi, but his services were terminated on 5/11/1999. The present 5th respondent D. Vijaya Bhaskara Reddy, is the petitioner's brother who was continuing as provisional EDBPM, Peddoddi since the date of termination of the petitioner's service. The petitioner was appointed as provisional EDBPM, Peddoddi, but his services were terminated on 5/11/1999. The present 5th respondent D. Vijaya Bhaskara Reddy, is the petitioner's brother who was continuing as provisional EDBPM, Peddoddi since the date of termination of the petitioner's service. The petitioner applied for his appointment on compassionate ground, which was rejected vide proceedings No.B6/Comp.Appt./BVR dated GTL 11/8/2000. Challenging the said order, initially O.A.No.1277 of 2000 was filed which was disposed of by order dtd. 18/9/2000 directing the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner on compassionate ground for appointment. Pursuant to which the petitioner's case, after consideration, was again rejected vide proceedings No.RE/1-27/KNL/23/2000, dtd. 17/10/2000. 6. The order of rejection dtd. 17/10/2000 was passed on the ground that the family of the deceased, consisted of wife, married daughter and 4 grownup sons. The three sons were depending on agriculture. The eldest son was working in a Rural Development Trust. Sri B.Venkateswara Reddy, the applicant, was Inter passed, possessing 2.52 acres of dry land in his own name and possessing own house. The family had no major liabilities like marriages of unmarried daughter, education of minor children etc. Consequently, the family was not in indigent circumstances. Against the order dtd. 17/10/2000, the petitioner filed O.A.No.589 of 2001 which was dismissed by the Tribunal on 25/6/2001, finding no ground to interfere. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner, before us, did not dispute the correctness of the grounds on which the order of rejection was passed. 8. Any argument contrary to the petitioner's no indigent circumstances as per the criteria, of having land, house, etc. was not raised. The only point he urged was that at the time of rejection of the petitioner's case there was no transparent criteria laid down, for determining "indigent" for compassionate engagement. It was for the first time, the department reviewed the existing procedure and issued DOPT.OM.No.17-17/2010- GDS dtd. 14/12/2010 by introducing point based selection procedure applicable to eases of compassionate engagement on or after 1/1/2011, under different heads. He submitted that the department vide DOPT.OM.No.17-1/2-17-GDS dtd. 30/5/2017 removed 10% ceiling and provided that hard and deserving candidates would mean cases over the above 50 merit points on the attributes allocated vide above order dtd. 14/12/2010, which points were reduced to 36 merit points. He further submitted that vide Directorate letter No.17-01/2017- GDS dtd. He submitted that the department vide DOPT.OM.No.17-1/2-17-GDS dtd. 30/5/2017 removed 10% ceiling and provided that hard and deserving candidates would mean cases over the above 50 merit points on the attributes allocated vide above order dtd. 14/12/2010, which points were reduced to 36 merit points. He further submitted that vide Directorate letter No.17-01/2017- GDS dtd. 30/5/2017, the scheme for engagement of the dependent of the deceased Gramin Dak Sevaks on compassionate grounds and point based system was dispensed with. The department removed relative degree of indigence and all cases of compassionate engagement were to be considered by the Committee. The scheme was made applicable to all cases pending and arising on or after 30/5/2017. This OM further provided that "the cases which have already been settled will not be reopened". However, vide DOPT.OM.No.17-1/2017-GDS dtd. 5/3/2020 the scheme for engagement of a dependents of deceased Gramin Dak Sevaks was again reviewed the sentence "the cases which have been settled will not be reopened" was deleted and it was provided that "as one time measure in cases which were earlier rejected by the Committee on Compassionate engagement (CCE) between period year 2005 and May, 2017". 9. His submission is that in view of subsequent OM(s) the cases of the dependents, even if closed/settled during 2005 to May, 2017 were reconsidered on one time measure and on such consideration approximately 238 cases were recommended for compassionate engagement, but as the petitioner's claim was rejected in the year 2000, it was not reviewed /reconsidered. 10. Consequently, the petitioner filed I.A.No.2 of 2023 for amending the prayer, inter alia, challenging the proceedings of OM No.17-1/2017-GDS dtd. 30/5/2017 to an extent of cutoff year provided i.e., the year 2005. In his submission such reopening of the closed matters could not be confined to 2005 till May, 2017 but ought to have been fixed from previous years so as to cover the case of the petitioner as well. 11. He submitted that the cut of date as provided is arbitrary. It does not cover the cases which were closed in the year 2000, causing prejudice to the petitioner. Consequently, he submitted that the part providing the period from the year 2005 to May, 2017, may be set aside and the respondents be directed to consider afresh the case of the petitioner under the subsequent O.M(s). 12. It does not cover the cases which were closed in the year 2000, causing prejudice to the petitioner. Consequently, he submitted that the part providing the period from the year 2005 to May, 2017, may be set aside and the respondents be directed to consider afresh the case of the petitioner under the subsequent O.M(s). 12. Learned Government Pleader submitted that the petitioner's case was considered as per the guidelines and circulars, standing on that date on which the petitioner's case was not found fit as his circumstances were not indigent. 13. He further submitted that the petitioner's case cannot be reopened. It is not covered under the subsequent O.M(s). The period fixed for the cases to be reviewed as one time measure, cannot be said to be arbitrary. 14. Learned Government Pleader placing reliance in the cases of State Bank of India and another vs. Somvir Singh, (2007) 4 SCC 778 State of J & K and others vs. Sajad Ahmed Mir, (2006) 5 SCC 766 and the State of West Bengal vs. Debabrata TGiwari and others etc.,2023 LiveLaw (SC) 175 contended that the object of compassionate employment is to enable the family of deceased Government employee to mitigate the sudden crisis, by providing gainful employment to one of the dependents eligible for such appointment. 15. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record. 16. The petitioner's father died in the year 1998. The petitioner's claim for compassionate appointment was rejected in the year 2000. The rejection was on the ground that the family was not in indigent circumstances requiring the provision for compassionate appointment, assigning the reasons, which reasons and the correctness thereof has not been disputed. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that his case required reconsideration on the subsequent O.M(s) by reopening the closed matter, by extending the year 2005 backward to year 1998 so as to cover the petitioner's case. 17. The aforesaid submissions deserve rejection being misconceived. 18. It is settled in law that the compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The purpose of providing appointment on compassionate ground is to make good to hardship caused due to the death of the breadwinner in the family which is to be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. 18. It is settled in law that the compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The purpose of providing appointment on compassionate ground is to make good to hardship caused due to the death of the breadwinner in the family which is to be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. The object of the compassionate appointment is not to provide for endless compassion nor as a source of recruitment. It is a departure from the general provisions, providing for appointment to a post by following a particular procedure of recruitment. Since the compassionate appointment is made without following the prescribed procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provision and is to be resorted only to achieve the objective i.e., to enable the family of the deceased to get over sudden financial crisis. It is not a vested right nor can be granted after a lapse of more than 35 years of the death of the deceased government servant. 19. In Sajad Ahmed Mir (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "11. We may also observe that when the Division Bench of the High Court was considering the case of the applicant holding that he had sought 'compassion', the Bench ought to have considered the larger issue as well and it is that such an appointment is an exception to the general rule. Normally, an employment in Government or other public sectors should be open to all eligible candidates who can come forward to apply and compete with each other. It is in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution. On the basis of competitive merits, an appointment should be made to public office. This general rule should not be departed except where compelling circumstances demand, such as, death of sole bread earner and likelihood of the family suffering because of the set back. Once it is proved that in spite of death of bread earner, the family survived and substantial period is over, there is no necessity to say 'goodbye' to normal rule of appointment and to show favour to one at the cost of interests of several others ignoring the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. 12. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Rani Devi and Anr. 12. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Rani Devi and Anr. [ (1996) 5 SCC 308 : AIR 1996 SC 2445 ], it was held that the claim of applicant for appointment on compassionate ground is based on the premise that he was dependant on the deceased-employee. Strictly this claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution. However, such claim is considered reasonable as also allowable on the basis of sudden crisis occurring in the family of the employee who had served the State and died while in service. That is why it is necessary for the authorities to frame rules, regulations or to issue such administrative instructions which can stand the test of Articles 14 and 16. Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. 13. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar (Mrs.) and Anr. [ (1994) 2 SCC 718 ], it was indicated that High Courts and Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic considerations to make appointments on compassionate grounds when the regulations framed in respect thereof do not cover and contemplate such appointments. 14. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and Ors. [ (1994) 4 SCC 138 ], it was ruled that public service appointment should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and on merits. The appointment on compassionate ground cannot be a source of recruitment. It is merely an exception to the requirement of law keeping in view the fact of the death of employee while in service leaving his family without any means of livelihood. In such cases, the object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crisis. Such appointments on compassionate ground, therefore, have to be made in accordance with rules, regulations or administrative instructions taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased. This favorable treatment to the dependant of the deceased employee must have clear nexus with the object sought to be achieved thereby, i.e. relief against destitution. At the same time, however, it should not be forgotten that as against the destitute family of the deceased, there are millions and millions of other families which are equally, if not more, destitute. This favorable treatment to the dependant of the deceased employee must have clear nexus with the object sought to be achieved thereby, i.e. relief against destitution. At the same time, however, it should not be forgotten that as against the destitute family of the deceased, there are millions and millions of other families which are equally, if not more, destitute. The exception to the rule made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the services rendered by him and the legitimate expectation, and the change in the status and affairs of the family engendered by the erstwhile employment, which are suddenly upturned. In Smt. Sushma Gosain and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [ (1989) 4 SCC 468 ], it was observed that in claims of appointment on compassionate grounds, there should be no delay in appointment. The purpose of providing appointment on compassionate ground is to mitigate the hardship due to death of the bread-earner in the family. Such appointments should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. Recently, in Commissioner of Public Instructions and Ors. v. K.R. Vishwanath, [ (2005) 7 SCC 206 ], one of us (Pasayat, J.) had an occasion to consider the above decisions and the principles laid down therein have been reiterated." 20. In Somvir Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "7. Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India guarantees to all its citizens equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Article 16(2) protects citizens against discrimination in respect of any employment or office under the State on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent. It is so well settled and needs no restatement at our ends that appointment on compassionate grounds is an exception carved out to the general rule that recruitment to public services is to be made in a transparent and accountable manner providing opportunity to all eligible persons to compete and participate in the selection process. Such appointments are required to be made on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. Dependants of employees died in harness do not have any special or additional claim to public services other than the one conferred, if any, by the employer. 8. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal Vs. Such appointments are required to be made on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. Dependants of employees died in harness do not have any special or additional claim to public services other than the one conferred, if any, by the employer. 8. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal Vs. State of Haryana [ (1994) 4 SCC 138 ] this Court held, "As a rule, appointments in the public services should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. No other mode of appointment nor any other consideration is permissible. Neither the Governments nor the public authorities are at liberty to follow any other procedure or relax the qualifications laid down by the rules for the post. However, to this general rule which is to be followed strictly in every case, there are some exceptions carved out in the interest of justice and to meet certain contingencies. One such exception is in favour of the dependants of an employee dying in harness and leaving his family in penury and without any means of livelihood. In such cases, out of pure humanitarian consideration taking into consideration the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be able to make both ends meet, a provision is made in the rules to provide gainful employment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such employment. The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post held by the deceased." (emphasis added). 9. In Union Bank of India and Ors. Vs. M.T. Latheesh [ (2006) 7 SCC 350 ], this Court while dealing with the similar question observed that indiscriminate grant of employment on compassionate grounds would shut the door for employment to the ever-growing population of unemployed youth. 10. There is no dispute whatsoever that the appellantBank is required to consider the request for compassionate appointment only in accordance with the scheme framed by it and no discretion as such left with any of the authorities to make compassionate appointment de hors the scheme. In our considered opinion the claim for compassionate appointment and the right, if any, is traceable only to the scheme, executive instructions, rules etc. In our considered opinion the claim for compassionate appointment and the right, if any, is traceable only to the scheme, executive instructions, rules etc. framed by the employer in the matter of providing employment on compassionate grounds. There is no right of whatsoever nature to claim compassionate appointment on any ground other than the one, if any, conferred by the employer by way of scheme or instructions as the case may be." 21. In Debabrata Tiwari (supra) as the Hon'ble Apex Court held under: "7. The majesty of death is that it is a great leveller for, it makes no distinction between the young and the old or the rich and the poor. Death being as a consequence of birth at some point of time is inevitable for every being. Thus, while death is certain, its timing is uncertain. Further, a deceased employee does not always leave behind valuable assets; he may at times leave behind poverty to be faced by the immediate members of his family. Therefore, what should be done to ensure that death of an individual does not mean economic death for his family? The State's obligation in this regard, confined to its employees who die in harness, has given rise to schemes and rules providing for compassionate appointment of an eligible member of his family as an instance of providing immediate succour to such a family. Support for such a provision has been derived from the provisions of Part IV of the Constitution of India, i.e., Article 39 of the Directive Principles of State Policy. 7.1. It may be apposite to refer to the following decisions of this Court, on the rationale behind a policy or scheme for compassionate appointment and the considerations that ought to guide determination of claims for compassionate appointment. i. In Sushma Gosain vs. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 468 , this Court observed that in all claims for appointment on compassionate grounds, there should not be any delay in appointment. That the purpose of providing appointment on compassionate grounds is to mitigate the hardship caused due to the death of the bread earner in the family. Such appointment should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. ii. That the purpose of providing appointment on compassionate grounds is to mitigate the hardship caused due to the death of the bread earner in the family. Such appointment should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. ii. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138 , this Court observed that the object of granting compassionate employment is to enable the family of a deceased government employee to tide over the sudden crisis by providing gainful employment to one of the dependants of the deceased who is eligible for such employment. That mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood; the Government or the public authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased and it is only if it is satisfied that, but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis, that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family, provided a scheme or rules provide for the same. This Court further clarified in the said case that compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time after the death of a government servant. That the object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered after lapse of considerable amount of time and after the crisis is overcome." 22. The petitioner or the family of the deceased was not found in distress, as not only the petitioner was having the agricultural land and the house, but, his brothers were also engaged in agriculture and one brother was continuing as Provisional EDBPM. The petitioner's matter stood closed in the year 2000. 23. So far as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner to reopen the petitioner's case is concerned, the O.M dtd. 5/3/2020 provided for only those cases which were settled or closed from the year 2005 upto May, 2007 as a onetime measure undisputedly the petitioner's case does not fall within such period and relates to the year 2000. Consequently it could not be reopened pursuant to O.M date 5/3/2020. 24. 5/3/2020 provided for only those cases which were settled or closed from the year 2005 upto May, 2007 as a onetime measure undisputedly the petitioner's case does not fall within such period and relates to the year 2000. Consequently it could not be reopened pursuant to O.M date 5/3/2020. 24. Being conscious of such a situation, the petitioner has challenged the cut of date/year in OM No.17-1/2017, G.D.S date 5/3/2020. 25. So far as the submission of the petitioner's counsel with respect to the cut of date being arbitrary is concerned, it could not be argued as to how fixation of the said date/year, is arbitrary. Nothing has been pointed out with respect to the fixation of the cut off date from 2005 to May, 2007, being arbitrary. 26. In Ramarao and others vs. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Association and others, (2004) 2 SCC 76 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that unless a cut of date is held to be arbitrary or unreasonable the same cannot be set aside as offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 27. In Rama Rao (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to its earlier pronouncement in University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary & Ors., (1996) 10 SCC 536 in which it was observed and held that it is settled law that the choice, of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary, even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice, unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. 28. It is one thing to contend that if cut of date was fixed with effect from the year 1998 or 2000, the petitioner's case could also be covered but then there will always be a question as to why not from before 1998 so as to cover the cases of others also. 28. It is one thing to contend that if cut of date was fixed with effect from the year 1998 or 2000, the petitioner's case could also be covered but then there will always be a question as to why not from before 1998 so as to cover the cases of others also. In Ramarao (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court, held that Whenever such a cut-off date is fixed, a question may arise as to why a person would suffer only because he comes within the wrong side of the cut-off date but, the fact that some persons or a Sec. of society would face hardship, by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the cut-off date so fixed is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 29. It is apt to refer paragraphs 29 to 36 of Ramarao (supra) as under: 29. It is now well-settled that for the purpose of effecting promotion, the employer is required to fix a date for the purpose of effecting promotion and, thus, unless cut off date so fixed is held to be arbitrary or unreasonable, the same cannot be set aside as offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, the cut off date so fixed having regard to the directions contained by the National Industrial Tribunal which had been given a retrospective effect cannot be said to be arbitrary, irrational, whimsical or capricious. 30. The learned counsel could not point out as to how the said date can be said to be arbitrary and, thus, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 31. It is not in dispute that a cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of the statute or executive order. In University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary & Ors., [ (1996) 10 SCC 536 ]. It has been observed : "21. .... It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. It has been observed : "21. .... It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See: Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works (1975) 1 SCC 305 : (1975) 2 SCR 573 at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan (1985 Supp SCC 45 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 565: (1985) 3 SCR 243 ) at p. 269.) 32. If a cut-off date can be fixed, indisputably those who fall within the purview thereof would form a separate class. Such a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object which the decision of the Bank to promote its employee seeks to achieve. Such classifications would neither fall within the category of creating a class within a class or an artificial classification so as to offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 33. Whenever such a cut-off date is fixed, a question may arise as to why a person would suffer only because he comes within the wrong side of the cut-off date but, the fact that some persons or a Sec. of society would face hardship, by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the cut-off date so fixed is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 34. In State of W.B. v. Monotosh Roy and Anr. [ (1999) 2 SCC 71 ], it was held : - "13. In All India Reserve Bank Retired Officers' Association v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 664 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 517 :(1992) 19 ATC 856 a Bench of this Court distinguished the judgment in Nakara, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145 and pointed out that it is for the Government to fix a cut-off date in the case of introducing a new pension scheme. The Court negatived the claim of the persons who had retired prior to the cut-off date and had collected their retiral benefits from the employer. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. P.N. Menon, (1994) 4 SCC 68 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 860 : (1994) 27 ATC 515. In State of Rajasthan v. Amrit Lal Gandhi (1997) 2 SCC 342 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 512 : JT (1997) 1 SC 421 the ruling in P.N. Menon case (supra) was followed and it was reiterated that in matters of revising the pensionary benefits and even in respect of revision of scales of pay, a cut-off date on some rational or reasonable basis has to be fixed for extending the benefits. 14. In State of U.P. v. Jogendra Singh (1998) 1 SCC 449 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 300 a Division Bench of this Court held that liberalized provisions introduced after an employee's retirement with regard to retiral benefits cannot be availed of by such an employee. In that case the employee retired voluntarily on 12/4/1976. Later on, the statutory rules were amended by Notification dtd. 18/11/1976 granting benefit of additional qualifying service in case of voluntary retirement. The Court held that the employee was not entitled to get the benefit of the liberalized provision which came into existence after his retirement. A similar ruling was rendered in V. Kasturi v. Managing Director, State Bank of India (1998) 8 SCC 30 : JT (1998) 7 SC 147. 15. The present case will be governed squarely by the last two rulings referred to above. We have no doubt whatever that the first respondent is not entitled to the relief prayed for by him in the writ petition." 35. In Vice Chairman and Managing Director, A.P.S.I.D.C. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. R. Varaprasad & Ors. [ 2003 (4) Supreme 245 ] in relation to 'cut off' date fixed for the purpose of implementation of Voluntary Retirement Scheme, it was said : "...The employee may continue in service in the interregnum by virtue of clause (i) but that cannot alter the date on which the benefits that were due to an employee under the VRS to be calculated. Clause (c) itself indicates that any increase in salary after the cut off point/date cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculation of payments to which an employee is entitled under the VRS." 36. Clause (c) itself indicates that any increase in salary after the cut off point/date cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculation of payments to which an employee is entitled under the VRS." 36. The High Court in its impugned judgment has arrived at a finding of fact that the Association had failed to prove any malice on the part of the authorities of the Bank in fixing the cutoff date. A plea of malice as is well-known must be specifically pleaded and proved. Even such a requirement has not been complied with by the writ petitioners." 30. In State of A.P and another vs. A.P. Pensioners' Association and others, the relevant rules conferred benefit with effect from 1/4/1999. The Rules there not only created a legal fiction but also provided the limitations in operation thereof. It was held that if the rule itself provides a limitation on its operation, the consequences flowing from the legal fiction have to be understood in the light of the limitations prescribed. 31. In A.P. Pensioners' Association (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to its previous judgment in the case of State of Punjab and Others Vs. Boota Singh and Another, (2000) 3 SCC 733 in which it was observed and held that the retirement benefits which were claimed, therein were the benefits which were conferred by subsequent orders/notification. Therefore, the persons who retired after coming into force of the notification and orders would be governed by different rules of retirement than those who were retired under the old rules and were governed by the old rules. The two categories of persons, who retired were governed by two different sets of rules. They cannot, therefore, be equated. Further, granting of additional benefits has financial implications also. Hence, specifying the date for the conferment of such additional benefits cannot be considered as arbitrary. Referring to the judgment in the case of State of Punjab and Others Vs. Amar Nath Goyal and Others, (2005) 6 SCC 754 it was also observed that the financial implication is one of the relevant consideration for the State to deny certain benefits to a class of employees who retired on or before a particular date. 32. In this respect it is apt to refer paras 35 to 38 of A.P. Pensioners' Association and others (supra), as under:- "35. In State of Punjab and Others Vs. 32. In this respect it is apt to refer paras 35 to 38 of A.P. Pensioners' Association and others (supra), as under:- "35. In State of Punjab and Others Vs. Boota Singh and Another [ (2000) 3 SCC 733 ], it was stated: "7. On merits we find that the retirement benefits which are claimed by the respondent are benefits which are conferred by subsequent orders/ notifications. Therefore, persons who retired after the coming into force of these notifications and order are governed by different rules of retirement than those who retired under the old rules and were governed by the old rules. The two categories of persons, who retired were governed by two different sets of rules. They cannot, therefore, be equated. Further, granting of additional benefits has financial implications also. Hence, specifying the date for the conferment of such additional benefits cannot be considered as arbitrary." 36. In State of Punjab and Others Vs. Amar Nath Goyal and Others [ (2005) 6 SCC 754 ], upon consideration of a large number of decisions, this Court opined that the decision of a State to limit the benefits only to employees who retire or died on or after a particular date upon calculating the financial implications thereof was neither irational nor arbitrary. It was observed: "28...... It is trite that, the final recommendations of the Pay Commission were not ipso facto binding on the Government, as the Government had to accept and implement the recommendations of the Pay Commission consistent with its financial position. This is precisely what the Government did. Such an action on the part of the Government can neither be characterised as irrational, nor as arbitrary so as to infringe Article 14 of the Constitution." 37. Mr. Lalit placed strong reliance on D.S. Nakara and Others Vs. Union of India [ (1983) 1 SCC 305 ] for the proposition that the financial implication for implementation of the recommendations of PRC has not much relevance. Therein, the Constitution Bench came to the conclusion that the increased liability upon the said judgment is not too high to be unbearable or such as would have detracted the Government from covering the old pensioners under the scheme. 38. Therein, the Constitution Bench came to the conclusion that the increased liability upon the said judgment is not too high to be unbearable or such as would have detracted the Government from covering the old pensioners under the scheme. 38. The decisions of this Court which have been noticed in Amar Nath Goyal (supra) categorically point out that financial implication is one of the relevant considerations for the State to deny certain benefits to a class of employees who retire on or before a particular date." 33. In Government of Andhra Pradesh and others vs. N. Subbarayudu and others, (2008) 14 SCC 702 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the cut of date is fixed by the Executive Authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constrains and many other administrative and other attendant circumstances. Fixing cut of date is within domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut of date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatently arbitrary. Referring to the case of D.S. Nakara & Ors. vs. Union of India, 1983(1) SCC 305 it was observed that in subsequent decisions the rigid view taken in Nakara case was watered down and in that regard the decision in the case of Amar Nath Goyal (supra) was referred. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that there were various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut of date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial administrative or other considerations. The court must exercise judicial restrain and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut of date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that the choice of a cutoff date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is given for the same, unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical. Even if no reason has been given in the counter affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cutoff date has been chosen, the Court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless the said cutoff date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result. Even if no reason has been given in the counter affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cutoff date has been chosen, the Court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless the said cutoff date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result. The Court must maintain judicial restraint in matters relating to the legislative or executive domain. 34. It is apt to refer paragraphs 4 to 8 of N. Subbarayudu (supra) as under: "4. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents preferred writ petition before the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court, after hearing the parties, was of the view that the cut off date 1/11/1992 fixed by the Government was arbitrary and discriminatory. 5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the Court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. (See State of Punjab and Ors. Vs. Amar Nath Goyal and Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 754 ). 6. No doubt in D.S. Nakara and Ors. vs. Union of India 1983(1) SCC 305 this Court had struck down the cut off date in connection with the demand of pension. However, in subsequent decisions this Court has considerably watered down the rigid view taken in Nakara's Case (supra), as observed in para 29 of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Amar Nath Goyal and Ors. (supra). 7. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut off date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The Court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 8. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The Court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 8. In fact several decisions of this Court have gone to the extent of saying that the choice of a cut off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counter affidavit filed by the Government, (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical) vide State of Bihar vs. Ramjee Prasad 1990(3) SCC 368 , Union of Indian and Anr. vs. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal 1994(4) SCC 212 (vide para 5), Ramrao and Ors. vs. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Association and Ors. 2004 (2) SCC 76 (vide para 31), University Grants Commission vs. Sadhana Chaudhary & Ors. 1996(10) SCC 536 , etc. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason has been given in the counter affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cut off date has been chosen, the Court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless the said cutoff date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result." 35. Recently, in Mohd. Islam and others vs. Bihar State Electricity Board and others, (2022) 9 SCC 67 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that any judicial review on the date chosen for applicability would arise only if such choice of date is demonstrated to be malafide or with ulterior motive. 36. It could not be contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the date of the applicability, as chosen is malafide or with ulterior motive. Nothing could be argued so as to show that the cut of date was arbitrary. Consequently the ground for judicial review of the cut of date on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not made out. Simply because the petitioner's case falls out of the cut off period prior to the year 2005, and could not be reopened causing alleged prejudice, by itself cannot be a ground to hold the cut of date as arbitrary violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 37. The writ petition is devoid of merits. 38. Simply because the petitioner's case falls out of the cut off period prior to the year 2005, and could not be reopened causing alleged prejudice, by itself cannot be a ground to hold the cut of date as arbitrary violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 37. The writ petition is devoid of merits. 38. We do not find any reason to interfere in the order of the Tribunal. 39. The challenge to the impugned OM(s) fails. 40. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Consequently, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the petition shall stand closed.