JUDGMENT RAVI NATH TILHARI, J. - Heard Sri T. Ashok Srivastava Reddy, learned counsel, appearing for the Deputy Solicitor General of India for the petitioners and Sri Ravi Kiran, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent. 2. The petitioners - Union of India and its Railway Authorities have filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following reliefs: "....to issue a Writ, Order or direction more particularly one in the nature Writ of Certiorari by calling for the order dt. 2/11/2018 in O.A.No.020/00362/2016 on the file of Hon'ble Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench and declare the same as illegal, arbitrary, capricious and contrary to the judgments of Apex Court and pass such other or further orders......" 3. By the order impugned dtd. 2/11/2018 in O.A.No.020/00362/2016, (O.A), the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench (in short "the Tribunal") allowed the original application of the 2nd respondent (applicant in O.A); quashed the departmental proceedings, the other orders impugned in O.A and with further directions to the petitioners (respondents in O.A). 4. The operative portion of the Tribunal's order is as under: "20. Hence the Departmental Proceedings are quashed. The impugned orders No.B/C.DAR/Non-Vig/Major/08/2015, dtd. 1/1/2016 and Memorandum No. SCR/P-BZA/212/Comml /Gr.D/TE/15, dtd. 22/1/2016 are set aside. There will be no legal bar or hurdle in granting any consequential service benefits to the applicant. Original application is accordingly allowed. 21. Therefore the respondents are directed to consider: (i) including the name of the applicant in the memorandum dt. 22/1/2016 for promotion to the post of Ticket examiner and promote him from the date due on a notional basis. Seniority to be fixed on a notional basis from the date he is notionally promoted to the post of Ticket Examiner; (ii) pay and allowances on (i) above be fixed and drawn from the date of the joining the post of Ticket Examiner along with the consequential benefits thereof. No back wages need to be paid from date due to date of joining; (iii) Time frame allowed to implement the order is three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 22. No order as to costs." 5. No back wages need to be paid from date due to date of joining; (iii) Time frame allowed to implement the order is three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 22. No order as to costs." 5. The 2nd respondent while working as Hamali in Goods Shed, Rajahmundry Railway Station in Vijayawada Division of South Central Railway, was deputed to perform duty near Booking Office, on Scouts monitoring duty during Sankranthi festival time to regularize the passengers standing in the queue in front of the Railway Booking Office on 12/1/2009. In the matter of theft that took place in the railway booking office, on 12/1/2009 the Government Railway Police (in short "GRP") registered a case against the cashier and the Booking Supervisor of the Booking Office which case was not pursued further by the GRP, Rajahmundry. However, the Railway Protection Force (in short "RPF") officials registered a case on 27/3/2009 for the very same incident of loss of railway cash against the 2nd respondent and others. He was arrested under Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 (in short "RPUP Act") on 27/3/2009. He was placed under suspension on 27/3/2009 till revocation of the suspension order on 24/6/2009 and was transferred to Krishnapatnam where he reported to duty on 2/7/2009. He was however again suspended with effect from 5/7/2009 which order was revoked on 31/12/2009. 6. In C.C.No.751 of 2010 under Sec. 3 (a) of RPUP Act, the 2nd respondent, with other accused, was acquitted by the Court of II Metropolitan Magistrate of Railways, Vijayawada, vide judgment dtd. 20/3/2015. He then addressed a letter, dtd. 15/7/2015, seeking pay and allowance for the period of suspension, enclosing copy of the judgment of acquittal. 7. After acquittal, the Divisional Commercial Manager, the present 4th petitioner, issued charge memo dtd. 1/1/2016, containing the following charges, under Rule 9 of the Railway Servant (Discipline & Appeal) Rules 1968 (in short "Rules 1968"): "State of article of charge framed against Sri S. Veerabhadra Rao, GSH/KAPT: Article:- That the said Sri S. Veerabhadra Rao, GSH/KAPT while working as GSH/RJY committed a serious act of misconduct in that, (a) On 12/1/2009 he committed theft at booking office/RJY and stolen the RJY station earnings pertaining to 10/1/2009 and 11/1/2009 amounting to Rs.12,97,895.00 from booking office/RJY and spent the said amount for his personnel gains there by caused leakage of Railway revenue. (b) On 27/3/2009, he was found possessing an amount of Rs.3,00,000.00 related to stolen cash of 12/1/2009 near East booking office/RJY. (c) On 27/3/2009, he was found acquired and holding three Cars bearing No.AP10 Q 0250, AP-05 AB 0617 (found parked at his Railway Quarter No.189-B, East Railway Colony, Rajahmundry) and AP-37 L 8333 (found driving) and Motor cycle No.AP-05 S 1388-CD 100 Deluxe with registration certificate and site document in the name of wife of Sri S. Veerabhadra Rao, without obtaining departmental permission. (d) The value of the property acquired by him is exceeding the known sources of his income. Thus Sri S. Veerabhadra Rao, GSH/KAPT (the then GSH/RJY) failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty, high ethical standards and honesty and refrain from doing anything which is or may be contrary to any law, rules, regulations and established practices thereby acted in a manner unbecoming of a railway servant thus violated Rule 3(1) (i), (ii), (vi), (xviii), (iii) and 18 of Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966." 8. The 2nd respondent submitted reply, dtd. 8/2/2016, denying the charges. He also submitted that the charges pertain to the theft of railway cash in January 2009 and on that charge, he was acquitted in the criminal case. He requested to drop the charge memo. 9. In the meantime, the petitioners published a select list dtd. 22/1/2016, containing the names of 17 employees found suitable, for promotion to the post of Ticket Examiner, but not enlisting the 2nd respondent though his case is that he was eligible for such promotion. The selected candidates were directed for pre-promotional training vide proceedings, dtd. 1/2/2016. The 2nd respondent submitted representation, dtd. 29/1/2016 to include his name and to send him also to undergo the training with other candidates. 10. The 2nd respondent filed O.A.No.020/00362/2016, challenging the Charge Memo, dtd. 1/1/2016 and the Memorandum, dtd. 22/1/2016 and for direction to the petitioners herein to include his name in the Memorandum, dtd. 22/1/2016, for promotion to the post of Ticket Examiner. 11. Before the Tribunal, the main ground of challenge was that the charge memo was issued highly belated after about 7 years and that on the same charge the 2nd respondent had seen acquitted in the criminal case. 12. 22/1/2016, for promotion to the post of Ticket Examiner. 11. Before the Tribunal, the main ground of challenge was that the charge memo was issued highly belated after about 7 years and that on the same charge the 2nd respondent had seen acquitted in the criminal case. 12. The petitioners contested the O.A. They filed counter affidavit, inter alia, taking the plea that acquittal in the criminal case under Sec. 3 (a) of RPUP Act, was under benefit of doubt. The disciplinary authority, on detailed examination of the matter, issued the charge memo, dtd. 1/1/2016. The charges in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal proceedings were different. The 2nd respondent submitted explanation on 8/2/2016. The Enquiry Officer was appointed on 15/2/2016. The 2nd respondent also nominated his defense counsel, which was accepted. The Inquiry Officer commenced the regular inquiry, by examining the witnesses for the employer and it was during regular enquiry that on 1/7/2017, the 2nd respondent submitted representation, stating that the charges in the departmental and criminal proceedings were one and the same, and took objection to crossexamination of PW.2, upon which the Inquiry Officer referred the matter to the disciplinary authority, which in turn referred it to the head quarters. After obtaining the legal advice, Inquiry Officer again commenced inquiry proceedings on 6/4/2018. The 2nd respondent, changed his defence counsel and participated in inquiry, however, during the pendency of the enquiry, he filed miscellaneous application No.020/384/2018 in the pending O.A. for interlocutory orders, however, rejecting the same, main O.A was heard. 13. The Tribunal allowed the O.A. by order dtd. 2/11/2018 with directions as reproduced in earlier part of this judgment in paragraph 4. 14. The Tribunal, in brief, held that, the departmental proceedings could not be initiated after a lapse of more than seven years and that too, after acquittal of the 2nd respondent in criminal case. It further observed that the possession of three cars beyond the known source of income/disproportionate assets, was not so serious charge, to be inquired after about seven years. It observed that the charge was also vague in nature. It would be hazardous and 2nd respondent would be in a disadvantageous position to defend himself. In the view of the Tribunal, it would have been different if the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated and kept in abeyance till the disposal of the criminal case. It observed that the charge was also vague in nature. It would be hazardous and 2nd respondent would be in a disadvantageous position to defend himself. In the view of the Tribunal, it would have been different if the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated and kept in abeyance till the disposal of the criminal case. In the view of the Tribunal, it would not be in the interest, to permit the department to continue with the disciplinary proceedings. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that, at the threshold, the charge memo could not be quashed. It was not vague in nature. The departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings were on different charges. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that where the accused is not acquitted honorably, departmental action can be taken even after acquittal. The same by itself would not be a ground not to initiate departmental proceedings or to drop the same. He further submitted that, acquittal even in disproportionate assets case does not mean immunity from violation of departmental rules or that the departmental proceedings cannot be held in respect of transactions done without intimation to or permission of the department. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that, Circular No.144/2007, based on Railway Board Circular RBE No.128 of 2007 circulated instructions contained in Ministry of Railways letter bearing No.E (E&A) 2007 RG 6-29, dtd. 9/10/2007, on the subject of initiation of departmental proceedings in the cases of prosecutions in criminal cases. As per the Circular, the Railway Board, reiterated the MHA O.M.No.39/30/54-Ests, dtd. 7/6/1955, and No.398/64-Ests, dtd. 4/9/1964 that the departmental action should not precede prosecution in cases where subject involved criminal misconduct and loss of substantial public funds. He submitted that in view thereof, there was no fault on the part of the Railways in issuing charge memo after the criminal case was over. The Tribunal legally erred in holding that there was long delay of seven years, in initiation of the departmental proceedings. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance in P.D.Agrawal v. State Bank of India,(2006) 7 SCC 776 and Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Muralidhar ,1997 Lab IC (SC) 284 and Principal Secretary v. M. Adinarayana, AIR 2004 (SC) 4870 . . 19. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that, there was delay of seven years in initiation of departmental proceedings by serving the charge memo. . 19. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that, there was delay of seven years in initiation of departmental proceedings by serving the charge memo. The authorities had the knowledge of the incident for which charge memo was issued as also filing of the criminal case before the Trial Court. Under such circumstances, the delay itself is fatal to initiation of the departmental proceedings for which there was no satisfactory explanation. He submitted that, after acquittal in criminal case, the departmental proceedings cannot be initiated. In his submission, the charge memo contains the same charges as in the criminal case. The evidence in support of the charges in the departmental proceedings is the same as in criminal case. With respect to obtaining permission for purchase of properties in the name of his wife he submitted that they were from known sources of his father-in-law. He submitted that, if the departmental proceedings are taken after long years, that would cause prejudice and injustice to the 2nd respondent. 20. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent further submitted that pursuant to the notification dtd. 11/8/2015, 2nd respondent appeared and was successful in written examination for promotion to the post of Ticket Examiner vide result declared on 2/12/2015. In medical examination also, he succeeded on 10/12/2015. But he was denied promotion due to the charge memo dtd. 1/1/2016 i.e pendency of the departmental proceedings. 21. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent placed reliance in the cases of The State of M.P. v. Bani Singh, AIR 1990 SC 1308 , P.V.Mahadevan v. MD, T.N.Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636 and G.M.Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 in support of his contentions. 22. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record. 23. In view of the submissions, advanced the following point arises for our consideration. Whether the Tribunal is justified in setting aside the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay in initiation of the proceedings by serving charge memo dtd. 1/1/2016 for the incident dtd. 12/1/2009 as also on the ground of acquittal of the 2nd respondent in C.C.No.751 of 2010 vide judgment dtd. 20/3/2015? 24. Both the grounds as in the order of the Tribunal are interconnected. 1/1/2016 for the incident dtd. 12/1/2009 as also on the ground of acquittal of the 2nd respondent in C.C.No.751 of 2010 vide judgment dtd. 20/3/2015? 24. Both the grounds as in the order of the Tribunal are interconnected. The pendency of the criminal case and acquittal therein in the year 2015 is related to the issuance of the charge memo on 1/1/2016. 25. The Tribunal took the view that there was delay of about 7 years in issuing the charge memo. The incident related to the year 2009 and the charge memo was issued in the year 2016. In the mean time, the 1st respondent was acquitted in the criminal case in the year 2015. Consequently, the Tribunal held that there was delay of 7 years and after acquittal, the charge memo could not be issued. It was also of the view that the prejudice would be caused by initiation of the departmental proceedings at a late stage. 26. On the aspect of the delay in initiation of the departmental proceedings and its initiation after the acquittal in the criminal case, we shall first consider the legal position as settled, by referring to the various judgments, before proceeding further, to consider if there was delay, of 7 years or not in initiation of the disciplinary proceedings; and if there was delay, would the departmental proceedings still be initiated, and notwithstanding, the acquittal in the criminal case. The aspect of any prejudice if caused to the 2 nd respondent, shall also be considered. Additionally, the consideration would be if the charge was vague as observed by the Tribunal. 27. In P.D. Agrawal (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to the case of State of Punjab vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570 , in which the Hon'ble Apex Court refused to set aside the disciplinary proceedings which had been initiated after a delay of 5 and 1/2 years. The case of Bani Singh (supra), was distinguished and it was held in Chaman Lal Goyal (supra) that it is trite to say that the disciplinary proceedings must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after the discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable delay. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable delay. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, malafides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts, of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing. 28. It is apt to refer paras 26, 27 and 28 of P.D.AGARWAL (supra) as under: "26. In State of M.P. v. Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC 514] whereupon Mr Rao placed strong reliance, this Court opined that by reason of delay of 12 years in initiating the disciplinary proceeding, the delinquent officer could not defend himself properly. In that case there was no satisfactory explanation for such a long delay. There was also doubt as regards the involvement of the delinquent officer. 27. In State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal [ (1995) 2 SCC 570 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 541 : (1995) 29 ATC 546 ] however, this Court refused to set aside those disciplinary proceedings which had been initiated after a delay of 5 1/2 years. Distinguishing the decision of this Court in Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC 514] it was stated : (SCC p. 574, para 9) "9. Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five-and-a-half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. There is undoubtedly a delay of five-and-a-half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing." 28. In Addl. Supdt. of Police v. T. Natarajan [1999 SCC (L&S) 646] this Court held : [SCC (L&S) p. 648, para 7] "7. In regard to the allegation that the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings was belated, we may state that it is settled law that mere delay in initiating proceedings would not vitiate the enquiry unless the delay results in prejudice to the delinquent officer. In this case, such a stage as to examine that aspect has not arisen." 29. In Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha , (2012) 11 SCC 565 the law pertaining to the delay in domestic enquiry has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras-8 to 12, which are reproduced as under: "8. The law does not permit quashing of charge-sheet in a routine manner. In case the delinquent employee has any grievance in respect of the charge-sheet he must raise the issue by filing a representation and wait for the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. The law does not permit quashing of charge-sheet in a routine manner. In case the delinquent employee has any grievance in respect of the charge-sheet he must raise the issue by filing a representation and wait for the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. In case the charge-sheet is challenged before a court/tribunal on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings or delay in concluding the proceedings, the court/tribunal may quash the chargesheet after considering the gravity of the charge and all relevant factors involved in the case weighing all the facts both for and against the delinquent employee and must reach the conclusion which is just and proper in the circumstance. (Vide State of M.P. v. Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC 514] , State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal [ (1995) 2 SCC 570 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 541 : (1995) 29 ATC 546 ] , Registrar, Coop. Societies v. Sachindra Nath Pandey [ (1995) 3 SCC 134 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 648 : (1995) 29 ATC 538 ] , Union of India v. Ashok Kacker [1995 Supp (1) SCC 180 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 374 : (1995) 29 ATC 145 ] , Prohibition and Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivasan [ (1996) 3 SCC 157 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 686 : (1996) 33 ATC 745 ] , State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan [ (1998) 4 SCC 154 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1044 : AIR 1998 SC 1833 ] , Food Corporation of India v. V.P. Bhatia [ (1998) 9 SCC 131 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 466] , Supt. of Police v. T. Natarajan [1999 SCC (L&S) 646] , M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India [ (2006) 5 SCC 88 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 919 : AIR 2006 SC 3475 ] , P.D. Agrawal v. SBI [ (2006) 8 SCC 776 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 43] and Govt. of A.P. v. V. Appala Swamy [ (2007) 14 SCC 49 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 440] 9. In Forest Deptt. v. Abdur Rasul Chowdhury [ (2009) 7 SCC 305 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 327] (SCC p. 310, para 16) this Court dealt with the issue and observed that delay in concluding the domestic enquiry is not always fatal. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In Forest Deptt. v. Abdur Rasul Chowdhury [ (2009) 7 SCC 305 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 327] (SCC p. 310, para 16) this Court dealt with the issue and observed that delay in concluding the domestic enquiry is not always fatal. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The unexplained protracted delay on the part of the employer may be one of the circumstances in not permitting the employer to continue with the disciplinary proceedings. At the same time, if the delay is explained satisfactorily then the proceedings should not (sic) be permitted to continue. 10. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a chargesheet or show-cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, charge-sheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge-sheet or showcause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the court. (Vide State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma [ (1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 943 ] , Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh [ (1996) 1 SCC 327 ] , Ulagappa v. Commr. [ (2001) 10 SCC 639 : AIR 2000 SC 3603 (2)] , Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse [ (2004) 3 SCC 440 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 826 : AIR 2004 SC 1467 ] and Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [ (2006) 12 SCC 28 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 304] .) 11. In State of Orissa v. Sangram Keshari Misra [ (2010) 13 SCC 311 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 380] (SCC pp. 315-16, para 10) this Court held that normally a charge-sheet is not quashed prior to the conducting of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason that to determine correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. 315-16, para 10) this Court held that normally a charge-sheet is not quashed prior to the conducting of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason that to determine correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. (See also Union of India v. Upendra Singh [ (1994) 3 SCC 357 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 768 : (1994) 27 ATC 200] .) 12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the charge-sheet cannot generally be a subject-matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge-sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings." 30. In Union of India through Secretary and others vs. Udai Bhan Singh, (2021) 11 SCC 393 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the aspect of delay must be considered in the context of the facts of each case. It referred to the previous decision in the case of the State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bani Singh,1990 Supp SCC 738 in which the department had not initiated disciplinary proceedings for more than 12 years. Hon'ble Apex Court in Udai Bhan Singh (supra) observed that, that was a case where there was unexplained delay in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. Subsequently, the position of law was clarified by various decisions of the Apex Court. In that context, the judgment in the case of State of A.P vs. V. Appalaswamy, (2007) 14 SCC 49 was also referred in which it was held that so far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings is concerned, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down. Each case must be determined on its own facts. In that context, the judgment in the case of State of A.P vs. V. Appalaswamy, (2007) 14 SCC 49 was also referred in which it was held that so far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings is concerned, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are: (1) Where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of the employee: (2) Where the delay caused prejudice to the employee. It was also held that such a case of prejudice, is to be made out by the employee before the inquiry officer. 31. In Government of A.P and ors. V. Appla Swamy, (2007) 14 SCC 49 in paragraphs - 11 to 13, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "11. It may be true that there was some delay on the part of the appellants to conclude the departmental proceedings. The Tribunal did not accept the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that only by reason thereof the entire departmental proceedings became vitiated. The High Court thus, in our opinion, was required to consider the question as to whether, in the facts and circumstances of this case, particularly in view of the nature of the charges levelled against the respondent as also the explanation offered by the appellants in this behalf, it was a case where the entire proceedings should have been quashed. The High Court in its impugned judgment did not address itself the said question. It, as noticed hereinbefore, from the very beginning proceeded on the premise that the pension was payable to the respondent on his retirement. The High Court furthermore did not determine the question as to whether a proceeding could have been initiated against the respondent in terms of Rule 9 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1963. If it is held that the second proceeding was maintainable in terms of the extant rules, ordinarily, the Tribunal or the High Court should not have interfered therewith. If it is held that the second proceeding was maintainable in terms of the extant rules, ordinarily, the Tribunal or the High Court should not have interfered therewith. This aspect of the matter is concluded by the decisions of this Court in State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma [ (1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319] and State of U.P. v. Harihar Bhole Nath [(2006) 13 SCC 460 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 686 : (2006) 11 Scale 322 ] . 12. So far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is concerned, in our opinion, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down therefor. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are: (1) where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of the employee; (2) where the delay caused prejudice to the employee. Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the inquiry officer. 13. This aspect of the matter is now squarely covered by the decisions of this Court in Secy. to Govt., Prohibition and Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivasan [ (1996) 3 SCC 157 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 686 : (1996) 33 ATC 745 ] ; P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India [ (2006) 8 SCC 776 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 43 : (2006) 5 Scale 54 ] ; Registrar, Coop. Societies v. Sachindra Nath Pandey [ (1995) 3 SCC 134 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 648 : (1995) 29 ATC 538 ] ." 32. It is appropriate to reproduce paragraph 18 of Udai Bhan Singh (supra) as under: "18. Now, it is well settled that the aspect of delay has to be dealt with on the facts of each case. In the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bani Singh and Another, 1990 (Supp) SCC 738. the irregularities, which were the subject matter of an inquiry related to 1975-1977. Hence this Court held that it was not reasonable that the department had taken more than twelve years to initiate a disciplinary proceeding despite being aware of the irregularities. That was a case where there was an unexplained delay in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. the irregularities, which were the subject matter of an inquiry related to 1975-1977. Hence this Court held that it was not reasonable that the department had taken more than twelve years to initiate a disciplinary proceeding despite being aware of the irregularities. That was a case where there was an unexplained delay in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. Subsequently, the position of law has been clarified by the decisions of this Court in State of Punjab and Others vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570 . State of A.P. vs. N.Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 . and Secretary, Forest Department and Others vs. Abdur Rasul Chowdhury, (2009) 7 SCC 305 . In Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others vs. V.Appala Swamy, (2007) 14 SCC 49 . this Court after referring to the earlier decisions held thus: "12.. So far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is concerned, in our opinion, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down therefor. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are: (1) where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of the employee: (2) where the delay caused prejudice to the employee. Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the inquiry officer. 13. This aspect of the matter is now squarely covered by the decisions of this Court in Secy. to Govt., Prohibition and Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivisan; P.D.Agrawal v. State Bank of India; Registrar, Coop. Societies v. Sachindra Nath Pandey." 33. Recently, in State of Madhya Pradesh and another vs. Akhilesh Jha and another the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated that every delay in conducting the disciplinary enquiry does not ipso facto lead to the enquiry being vitiated. Whether prejudice is caused to the officer who is being enquired into is a matter which has to be decided on the basis of the circumstances of each case. Prejudice must be demonstrated to have been caused and cannot be a matter of surmises. 34. In the aforesaid judgments, it has been laid down that the disciplinary proceedings must be conducted soon after irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. Prejudice must be demonstrated to have been caused and cannot be a matter of surmises. 34. In the aforesaid judgments, it has been laid down that the disciplinary proceedings must be conducted soon after irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay makes the task of proving charges difficult and is not also in the interests of the administration. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the Court has to weigh the factors which appear for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. The Court has to indulge in a process of balancing. 35. The delay in the present case is directly related to the criminal proceedings. 36. We therefore proceed to consider the law with respect to the departmental and the criminal proceedings. The law on the subject is also well settled and is no longer res-integra. Both the proceedings can be taken simultaneously. There is no bar for continuance of the departmental proceedings pending criminal proceedings. But, at the same time the departmental proceedings can also await the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. Depending upon the result in the criminal proceedings, the departmental proceedings can be proceeded further. Even after acquittal in criminal case, the department can initiate the disciplinary proceedings. But if it is a case of honourable acquittal, on the same charges the same is to be given due weight. It is also settled in law, that where the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated, prior to initiation of the criminal proceedings or even during pendency of the criminal proceedings, it is for the employer to consider to proceed simultaneously to the criminal proceedings or to wait for the decision in criminal proceedings. It is also settled in law, that where the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated, prior to initiation of the criminal proceedings or even during pendency of the criminal proceedings, it is for the employer to consider to proceed simultaneously to the criminal proceedings or to wait for the decision in criminal proceedings. Further, if it has been decided to wait till conclusion of the criminal proceedings due to the likelihood of the prejudice caused to the delinquent/accused, but if criminal proceedings are delayed, the employer can resume the departmental proceedings from the stage those were stayed. 37. In State of Rajasthan and others vs. Heem Singh, (2021) 12 SCC 569 the Hon'ble Apex Court on the effect of acquittal on departmental proceedings observed and held as under: "3. The effect of an acquittal 38. In the present case, we have an acquittal in a criminal trial on a charge of murder. The judgment of the Sessions Court is a reflection of the vagaries of the administration of criminal justice. The judgment contains a litany of hostile witnesses, and of the star witness resiling from his statements. Our precedents PART J indicate that acquittal in a criminal trial in such circumstances does not conclude a disciplinary enquiry. In Southern Railway Officers Association v. Union of India ( (2008) 3 SCC 484 ), this Court held: "37. Acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The High Court did not say that the said fact had not been taken into consideration. The revisional authority did so. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charge." (emphasis supplied). 39. In State v. S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598 ), a twoJudge Bench of this Court held that unless the accused has an "honorable acquittal" in their criminal trial, as opposed to an acquittal due to witnesses turning hostile or for technical reasons, the acquittal shall not affect the decision in the disciplinary proceedings and lead to automatic reinstatement. But the penal statutes governing substance or procedure do not allude to an "honourable acquittal". Noticing this, the Court observed: "Honourable acquittal 24. But the penal statutes governing substance or procedure do not allude to an "honourable acquittal". Noticing this, the Court observed: "Honourable acquittal 24. The meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal" came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal [ (1994) 1 SCC 541 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 594 : (1994) 26 ATC 619] . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame", "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined (2009) 9 SCC 24 (2013) 1 SCC 598 PART J by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression "honourably acquitted". When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 25. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India [ AIR 1964 SC 787 ] it was held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari [ 1972 SLR 44 (SC)] this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168] which is as follows: (Raghava case [ 1972 SLR 44 (SC)] , SLR p. 47, para 8) "8. ... "The expression "honourably acquitted" is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term "honourably acquitted". (Robert Stuart case [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168] , ILR pp. 188-89) 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical PART J reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so." (emphasis added). 40. In the present case, the respondent was acquitted of the charge of murder. The circumstances in which the trial led to an acquittal have been elucidated in detail above. The verdict of the criminal trial did not conclude the disciplinary enquiry. The disciplinary enquiry was not governed by proof beyond reasonable doubt or by the rules of evidence which governed the criminal trial. The circumstances in which the trial led to an acquittal have been elucidated in detail above. The verdict of the criminal trial did not conclude the disciplinary enquiry. The disciplinary enquiry was not governed by proof beyond reasonable doubt or by the rules of evidence which governed the criminal trial. True, even on the more relaxed standard which governs a disciplinary enquiry, evidence of the involvement of the respondent in a conspiracy involving the death of Bhanwar Singh would be difficult to prove. But there are, as we have seen earlier, circumstances emerging from the record of the disciplinary proceedings which bring legitimacy to the contention of the State that to reinstate such an employee back in service will erode the credibility of and public confidence in the image of the police force." 38. Recently, in State of Karnataka and another vs. Umesh, (2022) 6 SCC 563 the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case does not debar the employer from proceedings in exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction. It was reiterated that the principles which govern a disciplinary enquiry are distinct from those which apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution for an offence punishable under the criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence. The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquire into an allegation of misconduct by an employee which results in a violation of the service rules governing the relationship of employment. Unlike a criminal prosecution where the charge has to be established beyond reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding, a charge of misconduct has to be established on a preponderance of probabilities. The rules of evidence which apply to a criminal trial are distinct from those which govern a disciplinary enquiry. 39. It is apt to refer para 16 of Umesh (supra) as under: "13. The principles which govern a disciplinary enquiry are distinct from those which apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution for an offence punishable under the criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence. The principles which govern a disciplinary enquiry are distinct from those which apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution for an offence punishable under the criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence. The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquire into an allegation of misconduct by an employee which results in a violation of the service rules governing the relationship of employment. Unlike a criminal prosecution where the charge has to be established beyond reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding, a charge of misconduct has to be established on a preponderance of probabilities. The rules of evidence which apply to a criminal trial are distinct from those which govern a disciplinary enquiry. The acquittal of the accused in a criminal case does not debar the employer from proceeding in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction." 40. In the present case, the Tribunal in our view, proceeded on erroneous line of reasoning. It considered the delay to be of 7 years from the date of the incident upto to date of initiation of the disciplinary proceedings by issuing the charge memo. The disciplinary proceedings under law could be initiated also after the criminal proceedings come to an end. The criminal proceedings came to an end on 20/3/2015 whereas the charge memo was issued on 1/1/2016. Consequently in our view there was no delay of 7 years in initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. The same were initiated within one year from the date of acquittal of the 2nd respondent. The delay is to be considered in the light of the facts of each case. The right of the employer, to initiate disciplinary proceedings after acquittal cannot be lost sight of. Even if, it be considered, from the view point of the Tribunal, from the date of the incident upto the date of issue of charge memo, the criminal proceedings being pending, and concluded in March, 2015, such delay stood explained. 41. The Tribunal further took the view that it would have been different if the respondents had initiated disciplinary proceedings and had preferred to keep the same in abeyance till disposal of the criminal case. 41. The Tribunal further took the view that it would have been different if the respondents had initiated disciplinary proceedings and had preferred to keep the same in abeyance till disposal of the criminal case. We are of the view that only because the petitioners did not initiate the disciplinary proceedings during pendency of the criminal proceedings and did not keep disciplinary proceedings in abeyance till conclusion of criminal proceedings, it could not be said by the Tribunal that after conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the disciplinary proceedings could not be initiated as then the disciplinary proceedings suffered from delay of 7 years. 42. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent placed reliance in P.V. Mahadevan (supra) to contend that the delay (of more than 10 years as in that case) in initiating the disciplinary proceedings by issuance of charge memo would render the departmental proceedings vitiated and in the absence of any explanation for the inordinate delay in initiating such proceedings, by issuance of charge memo, would justify the prayer for quashing the proceedings. The judgment in P.V. Mahadevan (supra) is of no help to the 2nd respondent. Firstly because in the present case, there is no inordinate delay of 7 years as in our view, after acquittal of the 2nd respondent, the charge memo was served within a period of 10 months. Secondly P.V. Mahadevan (supra) is not on the point of delay connected with the criminal proceedings, due to which there was delay in initiation of the departmental proceedings as in the present case, and we have held above that the alleged delay stands explained. For the same reason, the judgment in Bani Singh (supra) is also of no help to the 2nd respondent. 43. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on G.M. Tank (supra) to contend that after the acquittal in criminal proceedings on the same set of charges, the departmental proceedings could not be initiated as in view of the judgment in G.M. Tank (supra), it would be unjust and unfair rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings to stand, in view of the finding recorded by the courts in criminal proceedings that the guilt was not proved. His submission is that once the finding in the departmental proceedings cannot be allowed to stand, over the findings of the court in criminal proceedings the initiation of the departmental proceedings on the same charges would be a futile exercise. Consequently there was no need to initiate the disciplinary proceedings in view of the petitioner's acquittal. 44. We are not convinced with the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents. As observed and laid down in various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court that even after acquittal in criminal proceedings, it is open to the department to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. The reasons for such view are consistently taken that the criminal proceeding is for violation of a statutory duty or for commission of some offence whereas the departmental proceeding is to maintain discipline in service. The same act, may not amount to an offence under the provisions of the penal statute but it may amount to a misconduct under the service jurisprudence. Even on the basis of the same evidence in criminal proceedings the charge may not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, as there, the burden of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, but on the evidence in the departmental proceedings, the charge can be proved as the burden of proof is not so strict; the strict rules of evidence do not apply; the degree of proof is different. It is the standard of preponderance of probabilities applicable to the departmental proceedings, which is not applicable to the criminal proceedings. This also makes the difference. It is only in those cases where there is clear acquittal known as honourable acquittal that the departmental proceedings with respect to the same set of charges cannot be initiated or even if had been initiated and concluded, applying the law in G.M. Tank (supra), the findings of the departmental enquiry cannot be permitted to override the findings recorded by the court in the criminal trial. But it is not the case here. In the present case, the acquittal is not honourable but is granting the benefit of doubt. G.M. Tank (supra) (para 32), makes it evident there was an honourable acquittal, during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, order. 45. At this stage, we may refer the judgment of acquittal of the 2nd respondent. 46. In the present case, the acquittal is not honourable but is granting the benefit of doubt. G.M. Tank (supra) (para 32), makes it evident there was an honourable acquittal, during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, order. 45. At this stage, we may refer the judgment of acquittal of the 2nd respondent. 46. From the reading of the judgment in C.C.No.751 of 2010, it is evident that the acquittal was, granting the benefit of doubt. Para No.78 of the judgment reads as under:- "78. In view of my above foregoing discussion on points No.1 and 2, the prosecution miserably failed to prove that the M.O.1 cash of Rs.3,00,000.00 is belongs to stolen Railway cash on 12/1/2009 and further failed to prove that out of the said stolen property of Railway cash A.1, A.2 parted Rs.4,80,000.00 to a.3 and also purchased M.Os.4 to 6 three cars from PW. 18 beyond reasonable doubt for the offence U/s, 3(a) of R.P. (U.P..) Act and in view of my above foregoing discussion on point No.3, it is clear that the prosecution failed to follow the mandatory provisions before making search and seizure of M.O.3 from the Railway Quarters of A.1 and A.2, thereby A.1 to A.3 are entitled for benefit of doubt." 47. Thus the 2nd respondent's acquittal was not honourable acquittal. 48. The charges as framed which require determination as reproduced in the judgment of the court of II Metropolitan Magistrate for Railways, Vijayawada in C.C.No.751 of 2010, are as under: (1) Whether the seized properties i.e., M.O.1, M.O.3 are belongs to railway property and whether the accused purchased M.Os.4 to 6 cars and parted an amount of Rs.4,80,000.00 to A.3, from the stolen Railway cash? (2) Whether the said properties i.e., M.Os,1 to 6 and 8 were seized from the unlawful possession of A.1, A.2? (3) Whether the prosecution is followed the mandatory Provisions relating to search and seizure before making search and seizure of the Railway quarters of A.1 and A.2? (4) Whether the prosecution is able to bring home the guilty of A.1 to A.3 beyond reasonable doubt for the offence U/s. 3(a) of R.P.(U.P) Act? If so, whether A.1 to A.3 are liable for punishment of the same?" 49. (4) Whether the prosecution is able to bring home the guilty of A.1 to A.3 beyond reasonable doubt for the offence U/s. 3(a) of R.P.(U.P) Act? If so, whether A.1 to A.3 are liable for punishment of the same?" 49. From the points for determination as in the judgment of acquittal, it is further evident that the charges in the departmental proceedings are different in particular charge No."C" relating to the acquiring and holding the properties without obtaining departmental permission. 50. In Government of A.P vs. C. Muralidhar, (1997) 6 SCC 594 the facts were that the respondent therein was prosecuted for the offence punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act for holding assets disproportionate to his known source of income. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. Some of the charges in the charge memo related to holding assets disproportionate to the known source of income, while some charges related to his having acquired the assets without permission of the department in violation of the A.P Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. He challenged the validity of the charge memo before A.P. Administrative Tribunal and during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings he was acquitted in the criminal case of the charge for having disproportionate assets to the known sources of income. The Tribunal disposed of the O.A observing that the issue pertaining to the disproportionate assets could not be enquired in the departmental enquiry but the other charges in departmental proceedings of acquiring the assets without permission of the department, not being part of the charge in the criminal case, that could be proceeded by the authorities. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, taking note of the acquittal in the criminal case passed an order dropping the further action with respect to the charge of disproportionate assets. Later on a fresh charge memo was issued for acquiring and disposing of properties without informing and taking permission from the Government for the same. The said charge memo was also challenged before the Tribunal. The O.A was allowed holding that in view of the dropping of the charge of disproportionate asserts it was not open to the authorities to initiate disciplinary action by issuing fresh charge memo. 51. The said charge memo was also challenged before the Tribunal. The O.A was allowed holding that in view of the dropping of the charge of disproportionate asserts it was not open to the authorities to initiate disciplinary action by issuing fresh charge memo. 51. In C. Muralidhar (supra), the Honourable Apex Court held that the dropping of the proceedings by the Government was confined to the charge of which the respondent therein was acquitted in the criminal case, which did not contain the direction to drop the disciplinary proceedings in respect of other charges regarding acquisition and disposing of the properties without permission of the Government or the department. The order of the Tribunal was set aside. The direction was given to the disciplinary authority to conclude the disciplinary proceedings initiated on the basis of the fresh charge memo within a specific time. 52. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied in C. Muralidhar (supra), and rightly so, that the charge with respect to obtaining and disposing of the property without seeking permission of the department/the authorities, which was not the subject matter of the charge in criminal proceedings, the departmental proceedings could be initiated, and proceeded with notwithstanding the acquittal of the 2nd respondent with respect to the other charge. 53. The charge No."C" in the charge memo, prima facie, cannot be said to be of a nature that could not be enquired departmentally. The Tribunal erred in taking the view that the possession of three cars beyond the known sources of income of the 2nd respondent was not so serious charge which required enquiry. Acquisition of properties by an employee without seeking permission, contrary to the service rules, is a serious misconduct. The employer is entitled to inquire into such charge and if the charge is proved, of acquisition of the property without the requisite permission, to take further action in the matter. It is not for the court or Tribunal to decide at the stage of the enquiry, if a particular charge should or should not to be inquired by the department. 54. We also find that the charge-"C" is not vague as observed by the Tribunal. A perusal of the charge memo shows that the charges are very specific, giving the particulars of the incident. 54. We also find that the charge-"C" is not vague as observed by the Tribunal. A perusal of the charge memo shows that the charges are very specific, giving the particulars of the incident. The charge memo is accompanied by the statement of 2nd respondent's misconduct or misbehavior in support of the article of charge framed against him. Consequently, it cannot be said that the charges are vague. 55. The contention of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that the properties were purchased from the known source of his father-in-law in the name of his wife, we find is being raised for the first time in the writ petition. There was no such averment before the Tribunal. Even otherwise, this is a question of fact which requires determination based on evidence and cannot be gone into, at this stage by this court in the writ jurisdiction. The charge has been framed specifically on this aspect. The contention of the 2nd respondent's counsel can appropriately be considered in departmental enquiry, if so raised. At this stage, this court is concerned only with the charge as framed in the charge memo. 56. In Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that normally a charge sheet is not quashed prior to the conducting of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason that to determine correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. 57. On the point of prejudice, we find that no prejudice is caused to the 2nd respondent. He has submitted his reply to the charge memo. Appointed his defence counsel. It was on his representation that the enquiry was deferred for some time and was restarted after seeking the legal opinion with respect to his contention regarding his acquittal. Further, nothing has been pointed out neither from the Original Application nor the counter affidavit to this petition, that any of the witnesses whom the 2nd respondent wanted to examine in his defence, became unavailable causing prejudice to his defence in the disciplinary proceedings. It is also not the argument for the 2nd respondent, as per the arguments that the witnesses, names mentioned in the list of witnesses along with memorandum of the charges, have become unavailable. It is also not the argument for the 2nd respondent, as per the arguments that the witnesses, names mentioned in the list of witnesses along with memorandum of the charges, have become unavailable. Further, though the 2nd respondent was kept under suspension, twice, during pendency of the criminal proceedings but such suspension was for short duration and was revoked. The 2nd respondent is continuing in service. So, we do not find it a case of such prejudice or any prejudice being caused to the 2nd respondent so as not to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings. The right of the employer to initiate the disciplinary proceedings even after acquittal, in the criminal proceedings of the delinquent, to maintain discipline etc., in service, as per the service rules, is also to be balanced. 58. It is argued by learned counsel for the respondent that the 2nd respondent could not be granted promotion due to the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings on issuance of the charge memo, which causes prejudice. 59. In Akhilesh Jha (supra) there was delay of about two years. The Tribunal had quashed the departmental proceedings purportedly on the basis that prejudice had been caused to the delinquent by the denial of opportunity for deputation or for promotion as a result of pendency of the proceedings, the High Court had affirmed the judgment of the Tribunal. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that apart from submitting that the delinquent therein was unable to proceed on deputation or to seek promotion, there was no basis on which it could be concluded that his right to defend was prejudicially affected by the delay. 60. In V. Appala Swamy (supra), it was held that a case of prejudice is to be made out by the employee before the enquiry officer. 61. The case of M. Adinarayana (supra) upon which the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance is on the scope of judicial review of the findings recorded on charge in the disciplinary proceedings and on the quantum of punishment imposed. That stage has yet not reached in the present case. 62. The direction of the Tribunal with respect to the 2nd respondent"s case for promotion is concerned, the same is based on quashing of the charge memo and the departmental proceedings. 63. All the reasons assigned by the Tribunal are legally not justified for quashing the charge memo. That stage has yet not reached in the present case. 62. The direction of the Tribunal with respect to the 2nd respondent"s case for promotion is concerned, the same is based on quashing of the charge memo and the departmental proceedings. 63. All the reasons assigned by the Tribunal are legally not justified for quashing the charge memo. The judgment of the Tribunal cannot be sustained. The same is accordingly quashed. The writ petition is allowed with the following directions: i) The petitioners shall proceed further in the departmental proceedings from the stage they had reached on the basis of the charge memo dtd. 1/1/2016, with due opportunity of hearing to the 2nd respondent and pass appropriate final orders, in accordance with law, under the relevant service rules. ii) The 2nd respondent shall cooperate in the departmental proceedings. If the 2nd respondent does not cooperate in the enquiry, the disciplinary authority shall be within its right to proceed even ex parte. iii) The disciplinary proceedings shall be concluded within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. 64. Since we have set aside the order of the Tribunal, those directions relating to the case of 2nd respondent's promotion cannot stand. 65. No order as costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.