Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 1247 (ALL)

Brahma Nand Maurya v. United India Insurance Company Ltd.

2023-05-05

J.J.MUNIR

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal for enhancement of compensation has been preferred by the injured-victim of a motor accident, Brahma Nand Maurya, the claimant of MACP No.418 of 1996. He is aggrieved by the judgment and award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ Special Judge (Essential Commodities Act), Gorakhpur, which he says, has granted him insufficient recompense for the damage he sustained and the misery he underwent on account of the motor accident, that happened on 29th April, 1996. 2. The facts pleaded in the claim petition are these: Brahma Nand Maurya is a native of Village Beladar, Post Shivpur, District Gorakhpur. On the 28th of April, 1996, he had gone to his sister's place at Balsadh. On the day following i.e. 29th April, 1996, he was returning home on board Jeep No. UPK-8702. He was sitting by the driver's side. When the Jeep reached near Village Palahipar at about 11.30 a.m. and was about the Durga Mandir, the driver, who was negligently driving the vehicle at a high speed, swerved out of control and hit a tree. The accident happened on account of negligence of the Jeep driver. Brahma Nand Maurya (hereinafter referred to as 'the claimant') was admitted to the Emergency Section of the District Hospital, Gorakhpur. Since his medical condition deteriorated, the doctors there lost hope. He was then admitted to the care of Dr. S.C. Kaushik, an Orthopedic Doctor at the Jeevan Jyoti Medical Centre, Kasya Road, Betia Hata, Gorakhpur. The head of his left femur had been badly fractured on account of the injury. During the ensuing surgical operation, the femur head was removed, which is attached to the hip joint. In consequence, the claimant's leg was shortened by an inch and a half. This caused the claimant considerable difficulty in movement. The middle finger of his right hand was bent. The hip joint was dislocated because its head was fractured. 3. The claimant suffers from perpetual pain on this account. The claimant remained admitted to the District Hospital from 29.04.1996 to 30.04.1996 and then from 30.04.1996 to 26.06.1996 at Dr. S.C. Kaushik's Nursing Home. Between 26.06.1996 to 26.07.1996, Dr. S.C. Kaushik visited the claimant at his home five times during the duration. These visits were at the claimant's cost. During each of these visits, Dr. Kaushik would do the claimant's dressing etc. S.C. Kaushik's Nursing Home. Between 26.06.1996 to 26.07.1996, Dr. S.C. Kaushik visited the claimant at his home five times during the duration. These visits were at the claimant's cost. During each of these visits, Dr. Kaushik would do the claimant's dressing etc. According to the claimant, he was entitled to a compensation of more than Rs.9 lakhs under various heads. It was urged that he was enrolled as an Advocate in the year 1974 and had a legal practice worth Rs.6000/-per month. In addition, he would earn from agriculture that he did, Rs.4000/-a month. After he was handicapped on account of the accident, all his income was effaced. He was bed ridden for four months. His practice had spanned across a period of 22 years, which was all ruined. His clients moved away to different chambers. The claimant is the lone son of his parents. The handicap has left no one at home to carry on farming etc. The claimant asserted that he has suffered immense physical and mental pain. His future had turned bleak. 4. A written statement was filed on behalf of Ram Nakshatra Singh, who pleaded that he is not the owner of the offending Jeep. Long before the accident happened, he had sold the Jeep to Adya Prasad Pandey, which stood transferred to his name. Ram Nakshatra Singh, therefore, said that he had no liability in the matter. Ram Nakshatra Singh was impleaded as opposite party No.1 to the claim petition and respondent No.2 to the appeal. 5. Adya Prasad Pandey was impleaded as opposite party No.2 to the claim petition and respondent No.3 to this appeal. He will hereinafter be called the owner. He filed a written statement separately and admitted the fact that he was the registered owner of the offending Jeep. It is averred that the Jeep aforesaid had not met with any accident on 29.04.1996 at 11.30 a.m. within the local limits of Police Station Khajni nor was the injured travelling on board the said vehicle. The Jeep on the date of the accident was driven by Ram Kripal son of Kishun, who had a driving experience of many years behind him. He held a valid and effective driving licence on the date of the accident. According to the owner, the claimant had sustained injuries in some other incident. The Jeep on the date of the accident was driven by Ram Kripal son of Kishun, who had a driving experience of many years behind him. He held a valid and effective driving licence on the date of the accident. According to the owner, the claimant had sustained injuries in some other incident. He had set up the claim against the Jeep, without any basis, in order to recover compensation. No FIR was lodged against the offending Jeep on the date of the accident. It was lodged months afterwards, following consultation and premeditation. The claimant did not sustain any injury. The kind of injuries that have been described are utterly wrong and concocted. The ill-fated Jeep, on the date of the accident, was insured with the United India Insurance Company Ltd., opposite party No.3 to the claim petition and respondent No.1 to the appeal. The Insurance Company aforesaid shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the Insurers'. The Jeep was insured with the Insurers under a Cover Note bearing No. 206178, valid from 10.10.1995 to 10.10.1996. The driver was a necessary party and not being impleaded, the claim petition was bad for mis-joinder (incorrectly described as such in the written statement, which should be non-joinder). The owner asserted that the claimant never did travel on board his Jeep, but in case the Tribunal was of opinion that his Jeep was involved in the accident, the burden has to be borne by the Insurers. 6. The Insurers filed their written statement dated 06.01.1998. The factum of the accident was denied, as was the involvement of the offending Jeep. It was pleaded in the alternative that without prejudice to the last mentioned plea, in case it were proved that the accident happened, involving the ill-fated Jeep, it was then the Insurers' case that the Jeep was not being rashly and negligently driven. The owner had not maintained the ill-fated Jeep. It was not roadworthy on the date of accident. It was being plied against the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. The insurance of the vehicle too was denied. The Insurers said that neither the owner had filed the insurance policy in original in Court nor furnished it to the Insurers. The owner had not maintained the ill-fated Jeep. It was not roadworthy on the date of accident. It was being plied against the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. The insurance of the vehicle too was denied. The Insurers said that neither the owner had filed the insurance policy in original in Court nor furnished it to the Insurers. It was also said on behalf of the Insurers that if the owner proved that the premium had been paid and Section 64VB of the Insurance Act, 1938 was complied with, in that case alone the insurance policy would oblige them; else not. The injuries, if any, sustained by the claimant were simple and cured after routine medical aid. The compensation claimed is excessive and exorbitant. The driver of the ill-fated Jeep did not hold a valid and effective driving licence as envisaged under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act'). Accordingly, the Insurers were not liable to indemnify the assured for the said reason. It was pleaded that the claimant bears the burden to prove by cogent evidence that he was travelling on board the ill-fated Jeep. In the submission of the Insurers, the claim petition deserved to be dismissed. 7. On the pleadings of parties, the following issues were framed (translated into English from Hindi): “1. Whether on 29.04.1996 at about 11:30 a.m. within the limits of Village Palahipar near the Durga Mandir, falling under Police Station Khajni, District Gorakhpur, Jeep No. UPK-8702 collided with a tree, on account of the driver's speed and negligence, resulting in life threatening and grievous injury to Brahma Nand Maurya and that these injuries caused him to be handicapped? 2. Whether at the time of the accident in question, the driver held a valid driving licence? 3. Whether at the time of the accident in question, the vehicle in question was insured with opposite party No.3? 4. Whether at the time of the accident in question, the vehicle was being used contrary to the terms of the insurance policy? 5. To what compensation is the claimant entitled and from which opposite party? 6. Any relief, to which the claimant might be entitled?” 8. In support of the claim petition, the claimant examined himself as PW-1, Ram Bachan as PW-2 and Dr. S.C. Kaushik as PW-3. 5. To what compensation is the claimant entitled and from which opposite party? 6. Any relief, to which the claimant might be entitled?” 8. In support of the claim petition, the claimant examined himself as PW-1, Ram Bachan as PW-2 and Dr. S.C. Kaushik as PW-3. Radha Mohan Dhar Dwivedi, Investigator for the Insurers was examined on their behalf as DW-1 and Sanjay Kumar Sinha, Junior Clerk in the office of the R.T.O., Gorakhpur was examined as DW-2. 9. The claimant in his documentary evidence through a list, bearing paper No.59-Ga placed on record 28 documents. These include a copy of the FIR, the site plan, the charge-sheet and GD. Also included amongst the document are the medical papers of the claimant and cash-memos showing purchase of medicines. Vide another list, 124-Ga, the claimant's birth certificate was filed. Another list, 68-Ga, carried with it paper No.69-Ga, which is a certified copy of the claimant's registration certificate showing his enrollment as an Advocate. Besides, through another list, bearing paper No.70-Ga was filed the claimant's handicap certificate. A list of documents, bearing paper No.95-Ga was filed to bring on record a report from the R.T.O.'s office relating to the driving licences of Ram Kripal and Balram Mishra. By a list of document No.16-Ga, paper No.17-Ga, another list of document No.90-Ga, paper Nos.91-Ga to 92Ga, list of document No.100-Ga, paper No.101-Ga and a list of document No.86-Ga, paper No.87-Ga to 88-Ga/2 were filed. All these documents relate to registration and insurance. 10. The Tribunal decided Issue No.1 in the affirmative and in favour of the claimant, holding that the driver of the ill-fated Jeep caused the accident due to his gross negligence, high speed and rash driving, dashing it against the tree near Village Palahipar, in consequence whereof the claimant sustained life threatening and grievous injuries, which led him to be handicapped. Issue Nos.2, 3 and 4 were decided against the Insurers, holding that on the date of the accident, the driver held a valid and effective driving licence, the ill-fated Jeep was insured with the Insurers and the vehicle was being used in accordance with the terms of the insurance policy. 11. It is the findings on Issue Nos.5 and 6 alone that are impugned in this appeal. These relate to the quantum of compensation that the claimant has been held entitled to by the Tribunal. 11. It is the findings on Issue Nos.5 and 6 alone that are impugned in this appeal. These relate to the quantum of compensation that the claimant has been held entitled to by the Tribunal. The Tribunal awarded a total sum of Rs.35,149/- towards medical expenses, that includes the hospital bills and purchase of medicines. The Tribunal held the claimant's income to be Rs.5000/-per month from his legal practice, but negatived his income from agriculture saying that there is no document to prove it. The total period of deprivation of his practice was held to be four months, awarding him Rs.20,000/-for the loss of income. Towards expenses on conveyance and special diet, a sum of Rs.10,000/-has been granted. A sum of Rs.10,000/-has been awarded under the head of pain and suffering. About the 80% permanent handicap certificate, it was observed by the Tribunal that the claimant moves with a limp. The contention that the claimant has suffered a loss of income to the extent of 80% was negatived. The Tribunal opined that the claimant while testifying as PW-1 had admitted that his practice had suffered a setback of 50% on account of his handicap. Therefore, the loss of earning capacity due to the functional disability was assessed at Rs.2500/-per month, making for an annual loss of Rs.30,000/-. The loss of earning capacity has been awarded for a period of ten years. Thus, reckoned the total compensation was determined by the Tribunal at a figure of Rs.3,75,149/-. The aforesaid compensation has been ordered to be paid with 9% annual interest with effect from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. 12. Heard Mr. S.N. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the claimant and Mr. Anubhav Sinha, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Amresh Sinha, learned Counsel for the Insurers. No one has appeared on behalf of the owner. 13. In order to ascertain damages payable in an injury case, resulting in a disability claimed to be permanent, the principles governing the approach to the issue have been adumbrated by the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and another, (2011) 1 SCC 343 , where it has been held: “12. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and, if so, the extent of such permanent disability. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and, if so, the extent of such permanent disability. This means that the Tribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence: (i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary; (ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement; (iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is, the permanent disability suffered by the person. If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability then there is no question of proceeding further and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity. 13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of the permanent disability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenities of life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted from discharging his previous activities and functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale of activities and functions so that he continues to earn or can continue to earn his livelihood. 14. For example, if the left hand of a claimant is amputated, the permanent physical or functional disablement may be assessed around 60%. 14. For example, if the left hand of a claimant is amputated, the permanent physical or functional disablement may be assessed around 60%. If the claimant was a driver or a carpenter, the actual loss of earning capacity may virtually be hundred per cent, if he is neither able to drive or do carpentry. On the other hand, if the claimant was a clerk in government service, the loss of his left hand may not result in loss of employment and he may still be continued as a clerk as he could perform his clerical functions; and in that event the loss of earning capacity will not be 100% as in the case of a driver or carpenter, nor 60% which is the actual physical disability, but far less. In fact, there may not be any need to award any compensation under the head of “loss of future earnings”, if the claimant continues in government service, though he may be awarded compensation under the head of loss of amenities as a consequence of losing his hand. Sometimes the injured claimant may be continued in service, but may not be found suitable for discharging the duties attached to the post or job which he was earlier holding, on account of his disability, and may therefore be shifted to some other suitable but lesser post with lesser emoluments, in which case there should be a limited award under the head of loss of future earning capacity, taking note of the reduced earning capacity.” 14. Again, in Raj Kumar (supra), the heads under which damages are to be awarded in case of personal injury of a permanent character, it has been laid down: “6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following: Pecuniary damages (Special damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure. (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising: (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries. (v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage). (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity). (iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries. (v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage). (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity). In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life.” 15. Now, in this case, the claimant is an Advocate, who was practicing in the District Court for the past 22 years, when he met with the accident. Apparently, he was commanding a good practice and claimed that he would earn Rs.6000/-a month. The Tribunal has assessed it at a sum of Rs.5000/-per month. Looking to the length of his practice, there is no reason to disturb the said finding by the Tribunal, particularly, when the income assessed is a reasonable figure, given the profession and circumstances of the claimant and not very different from what the claimant asserts. The Tribunal has found under the head of loss of earning during the period of treatment, a total loss of income for the period of four months. The claimant has stated in his testimony that he was out of practice on account of the injuries sustained for a period of one year. The Tribunal has not believed the said assertion with the remark that the details of treatment in the claim petition do not go beyond a period of three months and that, therefore, the period of total loss of income, considering the treatment involved and the nature of injuries, would be four months. This Court does not agree with the aforesaid assessment by the Tribunal. In his testimony, the claimant has stated thus: ^^nq?kZVuk esa vk;h pksVksa ds dkj.k esa 7&8 ekg rd pyus fQjus esa vleFkZ FkkA nks ekg oS'kk[kh ij pys mlds ckn vc Hkh NM+h ls pyrk gwWa lky Hkj ckn eSa /khjs&/khjs dpgjh vkus yxkA** 16. This Court does not agree with the aforesaid assessment by the Tribunal. In his testimony, the claimant has stated thus: ^^nq?kZVuk esa vk;h pksVksa ds dkj.k esa 7&8 ekg rd pyus fQjus esa vleFkZ FkkA nks ekg oS'kk[kh ij pys mlds ckn vc Hkh NM+h ls pyrk gwWa lky Hkj ckn eSa /khjs&/khjs dpgjh vkus yxkA** 16. There is nothing in the cross-examination of PW-1 that may discredit any of his assertions, as above indicated, made in his examination-in-chief. The injury sustained by the claimant was grievous, where the head of his left femur had been badly fractured, and a part of it had to be surgically removed, leading to shortening of the leg by one and a half inches. The nature of the injury, the impact whereof has been described by the claimant, need not be doubted. The claimant has said that he was non-ambulatory for 7-8 months in the first stretch. This followed locomotion with the aid of crutches for two months. The claimant then took aid of a walking stick and resumed going to Court after a year. 17. An Advocate is an asset to the society and the training of an Advocate comes after long and toilsome years in the profession. It is a behaviour commonplace amongst members of the Bar that once trained, disciplined and assimilated into the profession, they find it hard to stay away from their professional duties in Court. The period of the claimant's absence described in a graded normalcy back to work inspires confidence and appears to be the correct version about the period of time, during which the claimant had to stay away from work per compulsion. This Court, therefore, has no hesitation to hold that the claimant sustained a total loss of practice and consequent total loss of income for a period of one year. Given the fact that the claimant's income, at the time he suffered the accident, has been adjudged to be Rs.5000/-a month, the total loss of income calculated over a period of one year would be Rs.60,000/-. 18. The next head of determination is about the loss of future earnings caused by the permanent disability. The Tribunal while assessing the loss of future earnings has looked into the handicap certificate, where the permanent disability shown is 80%. 18. The next head of determination is about the loss of future earnings caused by the permanent disability. The Tribunal while assessing the loss of future earnings has looked into the handicap certificate, where the permanent disability shown is 80%. This Court also looked into the handicap certificate dated 16.09.1996 issued by a Board of Doctors in the office of the Chief Medical Officer, Gorakhpur, where the disability described is “FUC head of F left with limping due to shorting 80%”. A perusal of the certificate shows that the claimant has suffered a permanent disability, apparently to the extent of 80% in one of his lower limbs and developed a permanent limp. 19. The profession of an Advocate requires not only mental alacrity and faculties, but physical fitness to move around, speak to clients, go out on commissions and inspections, all of which would be badly affected by a disability of the kind sustained by the claimant. The Tribunal has, however, readily accepted the claimant's assertion in his testimony that he has lost his practice on account of the disability by 50%. Now, this being an admission by the claimant about a fact that may work to the diminishing of his claim, can safely be accepted. The Tribunal has precisely done that and this Court does not see any reason to disagree. Therefore, the permanent loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, would be a figure of Rs.2500/-per month. 20. For some inexplicable reason, the Tribunal has chosen to limit this loss to a period of 10 years, virtually applying a multiplier of 10'. The claimant has asserted himself to be 47 years old, a fact that has not been denied or disputed. This Court, therefore, proceeds to find that the claimant was 47 years old at the time of the accident. Unfortunately, the Tribunal has not recorded any finding about the claimant's age. There was a date of birth certificate filed on record and shortlisted in the Tribunal's judgment as a document filed along with a list of documents, bearing paper No.124-Ga. Surprisingly, the list of documents, bearing paper No.124-Ga is on record, but there is no document accompanying it. This Court, therefore, proceeds to accept the undisputed assertion in the claim petition that the claimant was 47 years old, as already indicated above. 21. Surprisingly, the list of documents, bearing paper No.124-Ga is on record, but there is no document accompanying it. This Court, therefore, proceeds to accept the undisputed assertion in the claim petition that the claimant was 47 years old, as already indicated above. 21. According to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 for a person in the age group of 46-50 years, the applicable multiplier is 13'. Therefore, the claimant's loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability have to be multiplied adopting the multiplier of 13'; not 10' as done by the Tribunal. This would conclude the terms on which the loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability are to be calculated. 22. The next issue to be considered is compensation under the head of pecuniary damages or special damages, or expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food and miscellaneous expenditure. The Tribunal has awarded towards expenditure in the hospital a sum of Rs.25,660/-. The aforesaid sum has been proved on the basis of voucher-cum-receipts of expenses, incurred in the Jeevan Jyoti Centre dated 26.08.1996, bearing paper No.63-Ga/15. The document is signed by Dr. S.C. Kaushik, Orthopedic Surgeon. He appeared in the witness-box to prove the document and the Tribunal held it proved. The Tribunal has, therefore, accepted the aforesaid expenditure towards hospitalization. Likewise, on a perusal of the cash-memos of the medicines purchased, the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.9489/-under the head of expenditure relating to medicines. A sum of Rs.10,000/-in all has been awarded towards expenses incurred on nourishing food and payments made for the services of an attendant during the time that the claimant was recuperating. 23. So far as award towards expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization and medicines is concerned, this Court does not find any reason to disagree with the Tribunal. However, so far as the money spent on nourishing food and the services of attendant is concerned, all that has figured in the claimant's testimony is that he could not even move about on his own or put on his clothes without assistance. In the claim petition, the claimant has put forward a claim of Rs.20,000/-towards nourishing food and the services of an attendant. In the claim petition, the claimant has put forward a claim of Rs.20,000/-towards nourishing food and the services of an attendant. This Court is inclined to think that given the nature of the injuries sustained by the claimant, the claim is reasonable. The claim under the head of expenses for nourishing food and the services of an attendant ought to be enhanced from Rs.10,000/-to Rs.20,000/-. 24. So far as the non-pecuniary damages or general damages are concerned, a total sum of Rs.10,000/- has been awarded by the Tribunal towards damage for pain, suffering and trauma. The claimant has demanded a sum of Rs.5,35,000/- under the non-pecuniary heads. In addition, for the loss of expectation of life, a sum of Rs.20,000/-has been claimed. The Tribunal has not awarded anything towards loss of expectation of life or shortening of the life span in consequence of the injury. Learned Counsel for the claimant has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and others, (2020) 4 SCC 413 to submit that compensation for pain and suffering ought to be increased manifold, inasmuch as in Kajal (supra), the compensation awarded was enhanced from Rs.3,00,000/-to Rs.15,00,000/-. A perusal of decision in Kajal shows the following observations of their Lordships: “26. Coming to the non-pecuniary damages under the head of pain, suffering, loss of amenities, the High Court has awarded this girl only Rs 3,00,000. In Mallikarjun v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2014) 14 SCC 396 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 372 : (2013) 10 Scale 668 ], this Court while dealing with the issue of award under this head held that it should be at least Rs 6,00,000, if the disability is more than 90%. As far as the present case is concerned, in addition to the 100% physical disability, the young girl is suffering from severe incontinence, she is suffering from severe hysteria and above all she is left with a brain of a nine-month-old child. This is a case where departure has to be made from the normal rule and the pain and suffering suffered by this child is such that no amount of compensation can compensate. 27. One factor which must be kept in mind while assessing the compensation in a case like the present one is that the claim can be awarded only once. 27. One factor which must be kept in mind while assessing the compensation in a case like the present one is that the claim can be awarded only once. The claimant cannot come back to court for enhancement of award at a later stage praying that something extra has been spent. Therefore, the courts or the Tribunals assessing the compensation in a case of 100% disability, especially where there is mental disability also, should take a liberal view of the matter when awarding the compensation. While awarding this amount, we are not only taking the physical disability but also the mental disability and various other factors. This child will remain bedridden for life. Her mental age will be that of a nine-month-old child. Effectively, while her body grows, she will remain a small baby. We are dealing with a girl who will physically become a woman but will mentally remain a 9-month-old child. This girl will miss out playing with her friends. She cannot communicate; she cannot enjoy the pleasures of life; she cannot even be amused by watching cartoons or films; she will miss out the fun of childhood, the excitement of youth; the pleasures of a marital life; she cannot have children who she can love, let alone grandchildren. She will have no pleasure. Her's is a vegetable existence. Therefore, we feel in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case even after taking a very conservative view of the matter an amount payable for the pain and suffering of this child should be at least Rs 15,00,000.” 25. In the opinion of this Court, the assessment of compensation for pain and suffering in Kajal proceed on very extreme facts of a 100% disability, where the young girl was reduced to a bedridden life for all times to come and the growth of her mental faculty perpetually impaired to hold her back at a mental age of nine months. In the opinion of this Court, the principle, that was laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, will not at all be of assistance to the claimant here. 26. In Mohd. Sabeer alias Shabir Hussain v. Regional Manager, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1701, the claimant was a scrap dealer, travelling on board a bus to Delhi from his native place Noor Pur, Gajrola. The bus collided with a stationary tempo. 26. In Mohd. Sabeer alias Shabir Hussain v. Regional Manager, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1701, the claimant was a scrap dealer, travelling on board a bus to Delhi from his native place Noor Pur, Gajrola. The bus collided with a stationary tempo. In consequence the claimant sustained injuries. The disability certificate showed the claimant to have suffered 70% permanent disability in his right lower limb, besides other injuries. The claimant's permanent disability in that case arose from the amputation of his right lower limb. It was in that context held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the functional disability for the claimant, who was not a salaried man, but a self-employed businessman, ought to be assessed at 60%. The compensation for pain and suffering in the above background was determined at a sum of Rs.2,00,000/-. The assessment under various heads of compensation was made by the Supreme Court, bearing in mind the socio-economic background of the claimant, who was held to be a man from an economically weaker section of the society. The following observations of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Sabeer alias Shabir Hussain (supra) are relevant: “27. We are of the opinion that while awarding compensation in cases of permanent disability caused to claimants, the courts must look at the case in totality, and must consider the socioeconomic background of the claimants. The Appellant herein comes from an economically weaker section of the society. 28. It is almost universally seen that persons from marginalized backgrounds often face an additional layer of discrimination due to bodily disabilities. This is because persons from marginalized sections of the society already face severe discrimination due to a lack of social capital, and a new disability more often than not compounds to such discrimination. In such circumstances, to preserve the essence of justice, it becomes the duty of the Court to at the very least restore the claimant as best as possible to the position he was in before the occurrence of the disability, and to do so must award compensation in a liberal manner.” 27. In this case, the claimant has suffered a 50% permanent disability, where he has developed a permanent limp, impairing not only his capability to work as an Advocate the way he did earlier, but also affected the quality of his life. In this case, the claimant has suffered a 50% permanent disability, where he has developed a permanent limp, impairing not only his capability to work as an Advocate the way he did earlier, but also affected the quality of his life. With every step that he takes now, being different from what it was before the accident, his quality of life, as a whole, would be perpetually impaired. Therefore, while the claimant's case may be a little less harsher for the worth of pain and suffering than that before their Lordships in Mohd. Sabeer alias Shabir Hussain, it is still telltale of enormous pain and suffering for the claimant. The other factor, which has been taken into account in Mohd. Sabeer alias Shabir Hussain, is the economically weaker section of the society which the claimant hailed from in that case. The claimant here is an Advocate, who cannot be regarded a man from an economically weaker section of the society. Yet, one cannot lose sight of the fact that Advocates in contemporary society function under tremendous strain with no social support. The social security provided by the State Bar Council is marginal. Lesser is the social security of a different kind offered by the society, who would have no sympathy for a Member of the Bar in distress, a man whom they otherwise look up to for help at every downturn of life. Therefore, given the permanent handicap and the pain and suffering involved, the claimant is entitled to a compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-under this head. 28. Now, it is turn to consider the award of future prospects, the claimant must be held entitled to on account of lost income. The question of award of compensation for the loss of future prospects in the case of a self-employed man suffering a permanent disability on account of an accident, engaged the attention of the Supreme Court in Jagdish v. Mohan and Others (2018) 4 SCC 571 . In Jagdish (supra), the claimant was a carpenter, aged 24 years when the accident happened. In the background of the said facts, the Supreme Court, relying on the decision of the Constitution Bench in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 , held in Jagdish: "13. In Jagdish (supra), the claimant was a carpenter, aged 24 years when the accident happened. In the background of the said facts, the Supreme Court, relying on the decision of the Constitution Bench in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 , held in Jagdish: "13. In the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi (supra), this Court has held that the benefit of future prospects should not be confined only to those who have a permanent job and would extend to self-employed individuals. In the case of a self-employed person, an addition of 40 per cent of the established income should be made where the age of the victim at the time of the accident was below 40 years. Hence, in the present case, the appellant would be entitled to an enhancement of Rs. 2400/-towards loss of future prospects. 14. In making the computation in the present case, the court must be mindful of the fact that the appellant has suffered a serious disability in which he has suffered a loss of the use of both his hands. For a person engaged in manual activities, it requires no stretch of imagination to understand that a loss of hands is a complete deprivation of the ability to earn. Nothing -at least in the facts of this case -can restore lost hands. But the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our yardsticks of compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. Awards of compensation are not law's doles. In a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law. Our conversations about law must shift from a paternalistic subordination of the individual to an assertion of enforceable rights as intrinsic to human dignity." 29. In the State of Uttar Pradesh, the issue of addition towards future prospects is not governed by the scale envisaged under the law in Pranay Sethi (supra), but by the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short 'the Rules of 1998'). 30. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822, it was held: "9. 30. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822, it was held: "9. It is to be noted that the validity of the Rules was not, in any way, questioned in the instant matter and thus the only question that we are called upon to consider is whether in its application, sub-Rule 3(iii) of Rule 220A of the Rules must be given restricted scope or it must be allowed to operate fully. 10. The discussion on the point in Pranay Sethi was from the standpoint of arriving at "just compensation" in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50 60 years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. If a statutory instrument has devised a formula which affords better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument must be allowed to operate unless the statutory instrument is otherwise found to be invalid. 12. We, therefore, reject the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and affirm the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court and dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs." 31. Upon an application of Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998 to the facts here, the claimant being aged 47 years, that is to say, in the age bracket of 40-50 years, an addition of 30% towards future prospects to his lost income has to be made. 32. Upon an application of Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998 to the facts here, the claimant being aged 47 years, that is to say, in the age bracket of 40-50 years, an addition of 30% towards future prospects to his lost income has to be made. 32. The compensation is, accordingly, revised and enhanced in the following manner: (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization and medicines 35149 (ii) Compensation for nourishing food and attendant charges 20000 (iii) Loss of earning during period of treatment (one year) 5000x12 = 60000 (iv) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability (monthly income x 12 x applied multiplier) = 2500x12x13 390000 (v) Lost income + 30% towards future prospects = 390000+117000 507000 (vi) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma 150000 The total compensation would therefore, work out to a figure of Rs.35149+20000+60000+507000 + 150000 772149 33. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the compensation awarded enhanced to Rs.7,72,149/-. The aforesaid sum of money shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. Any sum of money already deposited with the Tribunal by the Insurers, pursuant to the impugned award, shall be adjusted. Costs easy.