JUDGMENT : 1. This revision has been preferred against the order dated 23.1.2017 passed by Civil Judge (S.D.) Bareilly, in original suit no. 12 of 2017 (Span Infra Developers Pvt. Limited Vs. Sushil Kumar Kathooriya) by which learned Court below has rejected the application 36A moved by the defendants under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. 2. In brief, facts of the case are that the plaintiff Span Infra Developers-opposite party no. 1 filed the aforesaid suit against the defendant-revisionist for a relief of permanent injunction in respect of property shown by letters ¼v u x c½ in the plaint map. As per the plaint, 1/5th of the total area of gata no. 14 area 4 bigha 7 biswa, gata no. 15 area 9 biswa, gata no. 16 area 17 biswa, gata no. 17 rakabai 10 biswa, gata no. 18 area 13 biswa, gata no. 19 area 13 biswa, gata no. 20/1 area 13 biswa, gata no. 21 area 9 biswa, gata no. 22/1 area 8 biswa, gata no. 23/1, area 1 bigha, gata no. 24/1 area 2 biswa 10 biswansi total 30100 yard of i.e. 6020 square yard was under the ownership and in possession of Laxmi Sahakari Awas Samiti Ltd. through Satish Kumar Agrawal as secretary. This land was purchased by three sale-deeds from its previous owners in the year 1986 and the name of the society was also mutated. On the basis of consent and mutual oral partition, the society came into possession of the property shown by letters Ka Kha Ga and Gha in the plaint map. Apart from this, the society had also got some property of gata no. 23/1 on the east side of the road which has also been sold by the society. 3. On 14.6.2005 through registered sale deed society sold an area of 1315.87 square yard to Sarnath Infrastructure Pvt. Limited, Bareilly, after getting adequate consideration and also delivered the possession of the sold land which is shown by the letters M, N, G and Gha. 4. Sarnath Infra. Pvt. Ltd. executed a registered agreement for sale on 12.9.2012 for an area of 815.44 square yard, shown by the letter A, N, Ga & Ba in favour of the plaintiff. As per term no. 2 of the agreement for sale, Sarnath Infra. Pvt. Ltd. had to raise boundrywall for the property in suit before executing the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff. As per term no. 2 of the agreement for sale, Sarnath Infra. Pvt. Ltd. had to raise boundrywall for the property in suit before executing the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff. Since it could not be done so, therefore, Sarnath Pvt. Ltd. delivered the possession of the said land on 29.10.2012 by the letter of possession and on the request of the plaintiff, it was also notarized on 1.11.2012. Since then the plaintiff is in possession of the property in suit of area of 815.44 square yard and for the protection of the property it has also made some construction thereon. 5. Defendant is a land grabber and a mafia type of person who has no concern with the property in suit even then defendant with some unsocial elements on 5.1.2017 reached on the property in suit and tried to dismantle the constructions and occupy the land in suit forcefully. After getting the information from the security guard, the plaintiff reached on the spot and anyhow got stopped such illegal activities. The defendant left the place but threatened that he will come again and shall take possession of the property in suit. The matter was reported to the police who did not help the plaintiff saying it to be a civil matter. Hence, the cause of action arose and the suit was instituted. 6. The revisionist-defendant appeared in the case and moved an application 36 Ka under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC raising the question that the suit is barred by Section 229-B and 331 of the U.P.Z.A.& L.R. Act. The name of the plaintiff is neither recorded in the revenue record, nor in the agreement for sale, there is averment of delivery of possession. The notarized letter of delivery of possession 24C is a forged document. The plaintiff can file a suit only if the execution of sale-deed is in his name. The suit is barred by Section 31 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act. The plaintiff has not come with clean hands. Neither balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff nor any irreparable injury is caused to the plaintiff, therefore, the plaint be rejected. 7. The suit is barred by Section 31 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act. The plaintiff has not come with clean hands. Neither balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff nor any irreparable injury is caused to the plaintiff, therefore, the plaint be rejected. 7. Plaintiff filed objection 56C and opposed the application and contended that the suit is not barred by the provisions of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and since long time the property in suit is a residential land and the agricultural works are not being done. There are constructions over the property in suit. The suit has been filed on the basis of possession hence the application be rejected. 8. The learned trial Court referred the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and concluded that on the basis of agreement for sale and letter of possession, the suit can be maintained and at this stage it can not be said that the letter of possession 24 C is a forged document and conclusion can be drawn only after taking evidence of the parties. The learned Court below has also noted that there is no dispute about the fact that Sarnath Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Bareilly has executed an agreement for sale in favour of the plaintiff. The suit has been filed on the basis of agreement for sale and on the basis of possession, therefore, it does not appear that the suit is barred by the provisions of U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act and Specific Relief Act. 9. The learned Court below relied on the judgment of Kamla and Others Vs. K.T. Ishwara and others, (2008) 12 SCC 661 , wherein it has been held that the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 (d) CPC is very limited; at this stage merit of the case can not be looked into. Accordingly, the learned Court below rejected the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. 10. This revision was entertained and notice was issued to opposite party-plaintiff who filed counter affidavit no. Accordingly, the learned Court below rejected the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. 10. This revision was entertained and notice was issued to opposite party-plaintiff who filed counter affidavit no. 60549 of 2017 reiterating the averments of the plaint and the objection and has denied the averments of the application moved by the defendant under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and it has also been averred that the property in suit shall proceed under the Indian Stamp Act 1899 and by order dated 31.3.2006, the Deputy Commissioner (Stamp) has clearly held that the property in question was a residential property; it is well settled law that while deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC the Court can only rely upon the averments made in the plaint. If for the sake of argument it is accepted that the property in suit is an agricultural land even then the suit filed by the plaintiff -opposite party was maintainable before the Civil Court on the ground of the principles of relief sought. Copy of the agreement for sale and delivery of possession alongwith order of Deputy Commissioner has been annexed with the counter affidavit. 11. From the perusal of record, it transpires that the defendant-revisionist has not claimed the property in suit on the basis of ownership or possession. At this stage only averment of the plaint has to be seen. Prima-facie it is not in dispute that the property in suit was purchased by Laxmi Sahkari Awas Samiti Limited in 1986 and its name was not mutated and the property in suit was not partitioned by way of consent and mutual oral partition. It is also prima-facie established that Laxmi Sahakari Awas Samiti sold the area of 1315.87 square yard on 14.6.2005 to Sarnath Infrastructure Private Limited, Bareilly, through registered sale-deed. It is also prima-facie established that Sarnath Infrastructure Private Limited executed an agreement for sale on 12.9.2012 in respect of the property in suit of an area of 815.44 square yard and also executed a notarized deed of delivery of possession on 29.10.2012 in favour of the plaintiff. It is also noteworthy that neither Sarnath Infrastructure Private Limited nor Laxmi Saharanpur Awas Samiti had any objections regarding the possession, agreement for sale and letter of delivery of possession executed in favour of the plaintiff. It is also noteworthy that neither Sarnath Infrastructure Private Limited nor Laxmi Saharanpur Awas Samiti had any objections regarding the possession, agreement for sale and letter of delivery of possession executed in favour of the plaintiff. Though the suit for permanent injunction can be filed on the basis of records of right but a suit for permanent injunction can also be maintained on the basis of possessory title atleast against a third person. 12. In Iqbal Basith and Others Vs. N. Subbalakshmi and Others, (2021) 2 SCC 718 , it has been held that “suit for permanent injunction can be maintained on the basis of possession and possessory title.” In Rame Gowda (dead) by L.Rs Vs. M V Naidu (dead) by L.Rs and Other, (2204) 1 SCC 769, it is held that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner of exercising peaceably the ordinary right of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. When the facts disclosed no title in either party, possession alone decides. The latine maxim “possessio contra omnes valet praeter eur cuei ius sit possessionis is important.” In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The Apex Court referred the following part of Salmond's book on jurisprudence and following judicial precedents which are as under : 5. Salmond states in Jurisprudence (Twelfth Edition), "few relationships are as vital to man as that of possession, and we may expect any system of law, however primitive, to provide rules for its protection.. . . . . . Law must provide for the safeguarding of possession. Human nature being what it is, men are tempted to prefer their own selfish and immediate interests to the wide and long-term interests of society in general. But since an attack on a man's possession is an attack on something which may be essential to him, it becomes almost tantamount to an assault on the man himself; and the possessor may well be stirred to defend himself with force. The result is violence, chaos and disorder." (at pp. 265, 266). "In English Law possession is a good title of right against anyone who cannot show a better. The result is violence, chaos and disorder." (at pp. 265, 266). "In English Law possession is a good title of right against anyone who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself. Many other legal systems, however, go much further than this, and treat possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true owner himself. Even a wrongdoer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner, who takes his own, may be forced in this way to restore it to the wrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it. He must first give up possession, and then proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing on the ground of his ownership. The intention of the law is that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law." (Salmond, ibid, pp. 294-295) "Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection of possession even against ownership are called possessory, while those available for the protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary. In the modern and medieval civil law the distinction is expressed by the contrasted terms petitorium (a proprietary suit) and possessorium (a possessory suit)." (Salmond, ibid, p.295) 6. The law in India, as it has developed, accords with the jurisprudential thought as propounded by Salmond. In Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. Vs. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy and Ors. 1924 PC 144, Sir John Edge summed up the Indian law by stating that in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. 7. The thought has prevailed incessantly, till date, the last and latest one in the chain of decisions being Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani (2003) 7 SCC 350 . In-between, to quote a few out of severals, in Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by his legal representative Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh and others (1968) 2 SCR 203 , this Court has held that a landlord did commit trespass when he forcibly entered his own land in the possession of a tenant whose tenancy has expired. In-between, to quote a few out of severals, in Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by his legal representative Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh and others (1968) 2 SCR 203 , this Court has held that a landlord did commit trespass when he forcibly entered his own land in the possession of a tenant whose tenancy has expired. The Court turned down the submission that under the general law applicable to a lessor and a lessee there was no rule or principle which made it obligatory for the lessor to resort to Court and obtain an order for possession before he could eject the lessee. The court quoted with approval the law as stated by a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Yar Mohammad Vs. Lakshmi Das ( AIR 1959 All. 1 ,4), "Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause." In the oft-quoted case of Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs. K.C. Alexander and Ors. (1968) 3 SCR 163 , this Court held that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. The court quoted Loft's maxim 'Possessio contra omnes valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis (He that hath possession hath right against all but him that hath the very right)' and said, "A defendant in such a case must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title, or probably a possession prior to the plaintiff's and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time. In Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his Lrs. Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao (1989) 4 SCC 131 , it was held that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. In Nagar Palika, Jind Vs. Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao (1989) 4 SCC 131 , it was held that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. In Nagar Palika, Jind Vs. Jagat Singh, Advocate (1995) 3 SCC 426, this Court held that disputed questions of title are to be decided by due process of law, but the peaceful possession is to be protected from the trespasser without regard to the question of the origin of the possession. When the defendant fails in proving his title to the suit land the plaintiff can succeed in securing a decree for possession on the basis of his prior possession against the defendant who has dispossessed him. Such a suit will be founded on the averment of previous possession of the plaintiff and dispossession by the defendant. In Nagar Palika, Jind Vs. Jagat Singh, Advocate (1995) 3 SCC 426, this Court held that disputed questions of title are to be decided by due process of law, but the peaceful possession is to be protected from the trespasser without regard to the question of the origin of the possession. When the defendant fails in proving his title to the suit land the plaintiff can succeed in securing a decree for possession on the basis of his prior possession against the defendant who has dispossessed him. Such a suit will be founded on the averment of previous possession of the plaintiff and dispossession by the defendant. In Fakirbhai Bhagwandas and Anr. Vs. Maganlal Haribhai and Anr., AIR 1951 Bombay 380 a Division Bench spoke through Bhagwati, J. (as his Lordship then was), and held that it is not necessary for the person claiming injunction to prove his title to the suit land. It would suffice if he proves that he was in lawful possession of the same and that his possession was invaded or threatened to be invaded by a person who has no title thereof. We respectfully agree with the view so taken. The High Court has kept the question of title open. Each of the two contending parties would be at liberty to plead all relevant facts directed towards establishing their titles, as respectively claimed, and proving the same in duly constituted legal proceedings. We respectfully agree with the view so taken. The High Court has kept the question of title open. Each of the two contending parties would be at liberty to plead all relevant facts directed towards establishing their titles, as respectively claimed, and proving the same in duly constituted legal proceedings. By way of abundant caution, we clarify that the impugned judgment shall not be taken to have decided the question of title to the suit property for or against any of the contending parties.” In Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594 , it has been held that- “the respondent having succeeded in proving possession over the suit property, and no evidence having been led by the petitioners to indicate to the contrary, or that the possession of the suit property by the respondent was wrongful, a simplicitor suit for injunction against forcible dispossession was maintainable without having to seek any titular rights over the suit property. In Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165 , it has been held that:- “this Court ruled that when the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. It was further held that if Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (corresponding to the present Section 6) is employed, the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him. When, however, the period of six month has passed, questions of title can be raised by the defendant and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. In other words, such a right is only restricted to possession in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (corresponding to the present Section 6) but does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years form the date of dispossession, and title need not be proved unless the defendant can provide one.” 13. The defendant-revisionist is a third party and has not been party to the sale-deeds and letter of the delivery. Till now he has not produced any deed of title about the property in suit, therefore, this Court is of the opinion that in such circumstances the suit of the plaintiff can be maintained against the defendant. The defendant-revisionist is a third party and has not been party to the sale-deeds and letter of the delivery. Till now he has not produced any deed of title about the property in suit, therefore, this Court is of the opinion that in such circumstances the suit of the plaintiff can be maintained against the defendant. Since the defendant is not claiming ownership over the property in the suit, it is not open for him to challenge the suit on the basis of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. It is also pertinent to mention that sometimes when there is a mixed question of fact and law, it can only be decided after taking evidences of the parties. The power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised at any stage by the trial Court. 14. In Popat and Ketecha Property Vs. SBI Staff Assessment, (2005) 7 SCC 510 , it has been held that “disputed question can not be contested in the application under 7 Rule 11 CPC.” 15. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid discussions this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. The revision is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 16. Accordingly, the revision is dismissed and the impugned order is affirmed. The stay order dated 10.2.20217 passed by this Court in this revision stands vacated. 17. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to the Court below for necessary compliance.