JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Piyush Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Atul Dayal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Manish Tandon, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Present petition has been for setting aside the impugned order dated 15.12.2022 passed by the Court of Judge, Small Causes Court, Kanpur Nagar in S.C.C. Suit No. 188 of 2014 (Mohd. Shahid vs. Rajendra and others) and impugned order dated 15.3.2023 passed by the District Judge, Kanpur in S.C.C. Revision No. 26 of 2023 (Rajendra & others vs. Mohd Shahid) 3. Since, only legal question is involved in the present petition, therefore, with the consent of parties, petition is being decided at the admission stage itself. 4. Learned counsel for petitioners submitted that plaintiff-respondent has served legal notice dated 10.4.2014 claiming himself to be the owner of house in question on the basis of sale deed executed on 31.3.2013 by Jasmeet Singh. On the very same basis, he has set up his case and filed suit. In the plaint, it is clearly mentioned that house in question has been purchased by Jasmeet Singh. He next submitted that under Section 20(2) (a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972), notice is required within 30 days. In the present case, as the notice was sent on the basis of ownership of sale deed executed by Jasmeet Singh, therefore, it is not fulfilling the requirement of Section 20(2)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, therefore, notice is bad. 5. He next submitted that during the course of cross examination, plaintiff-respondent has denied his signature on four pages and he was not aware about the fact written in the plaint as it was written in English. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the provision of Order 6 Rule 14 and 15 of CPC, which provides that every page required signatures of party and pleader. 6. He further submitted that petitioner has fully complied the provision of Order 15 Rule 5 of CPC as well as Section 20(4) of Act, 1972 by depositing the admitted arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 300/-per month, but benefit of Section 20(4) of Act, 1972 has not been given to him. 6. He further submitted that petitioner has fully complied the provision of Order 15 Rule 5 of CPC as well as Section 20(4) of Act, 1972 by depositing the admitted arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 300/-per month, but benefit of Section 20(4) of Act, 1972 has not been given to him. In support of his contention he has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Asha Rani Gupta vs. Sri Vineet Kumar passed in Civil Appeal No. 4682 of 2022 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 1319 of 2019. 7. He next submitted that once he has deposited the rent, he has entitled for benefit of Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of University Book Depot through Jagannath vs. Amit Mishra passed in Civil Revision No. 10 of 2009 decided on 29.5.2020. 8. He further submitted that he had deposited the rent on month to month basis at the admitted rate of Rs.300/-through out the proceedings and same has neither been considered nor any finding has been recorded by the Court below. He further submitted that in the notice, rent has been claimed at the rate of Rs. 750/-whereas in the sale deed, it is mentioned as Rs.800/-and as per defendant-petitioner, rate is 300/-. Respondent-plaintiff could not proof the rent at the rate of Rs. 750/-, therefore, order is also bad on this ground. 9. He lastly submitted that vide notification dated 21.2.2021 area in question has been declared as slum area under the provisions of Section 23 of U.P. Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1962, therefore, as per Section 23 of Act, 1962, no decree can be passed. He also submitted that once the KDA is acquired the land, plaintiff-respondent has losts its ownership from house in question. 10. Mr. Atul Dayal, learned Senior Advocate submitted that first of all legal notice dated 10.4.2014 was given for entire premises based upon the sale deed executed by Jasmeet Singh, which has never been disputed by the petitioner-defendant in its reply dated 1.5.2014, therefore, there is no illegality in the notice dated 10.4.2014. 10. Mr. Atul Dayal, learned Senior Advocate submitted that first of all legal notice dated 10.4.2014 was given for entire premises based upon the sale deed executed by Jasmeet Singh, which has never been disputed by the petitioner-defendant in its reply dated 1.5.2014, therefore, there is no illegality in the notice dated 10.4.2014. He next submitted that facts so mentioned in the legal notice dated 10.4.2014 about the house number, ownership, property in dispute alongwith boundary has not been disputed in its reply dated 1.5.2014. He further submitted that the same averment was also made in the plaint about the description of property, which was not disputed by the defendant-petitioner in written statement and application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC has been filed for amendment in written statement with regard to number of rooms in tenancy, which was also rejected and affirmed by the Revisional Court. He also submitted that no other application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC has been filed disputing the ownership based upon the sale deed dated 31.3.2013, therefore, same cannot be raised at this stage. He next submitted that in light of law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Parwati Bai vs. Radhika reported in 2003 (2) RCJ 4 & Apollo Zipper India Ltd. vs. W. Newman and Co. Ltd. Reported in 2018 (3) ARC 187 and if the validity of notice has not been challenged in written statement, the same cannot be challenged at belated stage. 11. So far as applicability of Order 6 Rules 14 & 15 of CPC is concerned, he firmly submitted that as per Section 34 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 read with Rule 22 of Rules 1972, same shall not be applicable. In fact Sections 34 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 provides certain contingencies where the CPC is applicable. He also submitted that Section 38 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 provides that provision of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 shall prevail over the provisions of CPC & Transfer of Property Act. He further submitted that provision of Order 6 Rule 14 & 15 of CPC shall only be applicable in the civil suit filed under the provision of CPC and would not be applicable in summary proceedings initiated under the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. He further submitted that provision of Order 6 Rule 14 & 15 of CPC shall only be applicable in the civil suit filed under the provision of CPC and would not be applicable in summary proceedings initiated under the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. Further, petitioner has also not taken this ground in SCC Court as well as Revisional Court, therefore, he cannot raise this issue before this Court under Article 227 of Constitution of India. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that so far as benefit of Section 20(4) of Act No. 13 of 1972 is concerned, it is required on the part of petitioner-defendant to deposit the entire amount including the amount for time barred period. In the present case, as per admission of petitioner-defendant, he has not deposited rent from 1990 and further once the ex parte decree has been passed against him while filing the application under Order 15 Rule 5 of CPC in compliance of Section 17 of Small Causes Court Act, 1887, he has deposited the decretal amount only. 13. So far as deposit of rent on month to month basis is concerned, he submitted that he has not deposited the same regularly. This is also the finding of first court that amount was not deposited in accordance with Order 15 Rule 5 of CPC. This was also affirmed in revision. In support of his contention about the rent of time barred period, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Sanjay and another vs. Smt. Vimla Rani and 6 others reported in 2015 (3) ARC 741 . 14. He next submitted that in case of denial of title, petitioner-defendant cannot take benefit of Section 20 (4) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 in light of judgment of Apex Court in the case of Ghoorey Lal vs. Sheo Murti Gupta reported in 1994 (5) SCC 339 (Paragraph 1) 15. He next submitted that so far as rate of rent at the rate of Rs. 750/-is concerned, no doubt in the sale deed, it is mentioned only Rs. 800/-, but in the legal notice as well as plaint, he has claimed the rent at the rate of Rs. 750/-. Against which, petitioner-defendant could not produce any evidence about the rate of rent at the rate of Rs. 300/-. 16. 750/-is concerned, no doubt in the sale deed, it is mentioned only Rs. 800/-, but in the legal notice as well as plaint, he has claimed the rent at the rate of Rs. 750/-. Against which, petitioner-defendant could not produce any evidence about the rate of rent at the rate of Rs. 300/-. 16. He further submitted that there is concurrent finding of Courts, therefore, there is no scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Vs. Dinesh Kumar reported in 2017 (3) ARC 178 (Paragraph 18, 21, 22, 23 & 33) 17. He next submitted that even after declaration of slum area vide notification 21.2.2021 under Section 23 of Act, 1962, Court can pass the decree for eviction. Not only this even in case of acquirement of land after notification, suit is maintainable. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court as well as Apex Court in the case of Smt. Shakuntala and 3 others vs. Shaukat Ali and another passed in Matters Under Article 227 No. 6139 of 2022 decided on 6.8.2022, Smt. Phoola Devi and 4 others vs. Additional District Judge Court No. 14, Kanpur Nagar reported in 2020 (2) ARC 610 and Sheela Jawarai Nagori and Another v. Kantilal Nathmal Baldota and others reported in 2014 (3) ARC (5). 18. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record as well as judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties. 19. First issue raised by learned counsel for the petitioner about the service of legal notice dated 10.4.2014 based upon the sale deed dated 31.3.2013 executed by Jasmeet Singh. His argument is that it is based upon the sale deed executed by Jasmeet Singh, therefore, it is not fulfilling the requirement of Section 20(2) (a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The same was rebutted by Mr. Atul Dayal, learned Senior Counsel and he rightly submitted that there is no illegality in the notice dated 10.4.2014. The said legal notice is having detail of ownership, house number of property in dispute alongwith boundary, which is not disputed by the petitioner-defendant in its reply dated 1.5.2014. The same was rebutted by Mr. Atul Dayal, learned Senior Counsel and he rightly submitted that there is no illegality in the notice dated 10.4.2014. The said legal notice is having detail of ownership, house number of property in dispute alongwith boundary, which is not disputed by the petitioner-defendant in its reply dated 1.5.2014. He has written the very same fact in the plaint, which was also not disputed by petitioner-defendant, in fact, he is having some dispute about the number of rooms in tenancy for which he has filed amendment application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC in written statement, which was also rejected, but so far as ownership is concerned, no application for amendment in written statement has been filed. 20. Law is very well settled by the Apex Court in the case of Parwati Bai (supra) on the point that after receiving legal notice, it is required on the part of petitioner-defendant to raise objection about the invalidity or infirmity of notice at the earliest otherwise, it would deemed to have been waved. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:- “6. The singular question to be examined in the present case is whether the tenancy was terminated in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The receipt of notice by the defendant is admitted in the written statement. The defendant has not raised any specific objection as to the validity of the notice. An objection as to invalidity or infirmity of notice under Section 106 T.P. Act should be raised specifically and at the earliest; else it will be deemed to have been waived even if there exists one. It cannot, therefore, be said that the notice in the present case suffered from any infirmity. A copy of the notice was exhibited and proved by the plaintiff as Exh. P-4.” 21. From perusal of above paragraph, it is apparently clear that once the content of legal notice has not been disputed in its reply dated 1.5.2014 and further not raised objection while filing written statement, same cannot be raised at this stage, therefore, argument of petitioner is having no substance on this point. 22. P-4.” 21. From perusal of above paragraph, it is apparently clear that once the content of legal notice has not been disputed in its reply dated 1.5.2014 and further not raised objection while filing written statement, same cannot be raised at this stage, therefore, argument of petitioner is having no substance on this point. 22. Secondly, learned counsel for the petitioner raised issue about the applicability of Order 6 Rule 14 & 15 of CPC in light of fact that four pages of plaint was not signed by the plaintiff-respondent and he could not understood the same as it was written in English. It was also rebutted by learned Senior Counsel with the submission that Order 6 Rule 14 & 15 of CPC shall not be applicable in the present case in light of Section 34 of U.P Act No.13 of 1972 read with Rule 22 of Rules, 1972. He also argued that provision of Section 38 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 shall prevail over provisions of CPC & Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, Sections 34 & 38 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is mandatory provisions and same are quoted herebelow:- Section 34 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 34. Powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them (1) The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or any 1 [appellate or revising authority] shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing 2[any appeal or revision] under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No.V of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters namely- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) receiving evidence on affidavits; (c) inspecting a building or its locality, or issuing commission for the examination of witnesses or documents or local investigation; (d) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (e) awarding, subject to any rules made in that behalf, costs or special costs to any parts or requiring security for costs from any party; (f) recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith; (g) any other matter which may be prescribed. (2) The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or 3[appellate or revising authority], while holding an inquiry or hearing 4[any appeal or revision] under this Act, shall be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of 5[Sections 345 and 346 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973]and any proceeding before him or it to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. XLV of 1860). (3) Where any costs or other sum of money awarded under this Act by the District Magistrate or the prescribed authority or 1[the appellate or revisional authority] remains unpaid, he or it may issue a certificate of recovery in respect thereof in the prescribed form, and any person in whose favour such certificate is issued may apply to the Court of Small Causes having jurisdiction under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (Act No. IX of 1887) for recovery of the amount specified in the certificate. Such court shall thereupon execute the certificate or cause the same to be executed in the same manner and by the same procedure as if it were a decree for payment of money made by itself in a suit. (4) Where any party to any proceeding for the determination of standard rent of or for eviction from a building dies during the pendency of the proceeding, such proceeding may be continued after bringing on the record: (a) in the case of the landlord or tenant, his heirs or legal representatives; (b) in the case of unauthorised occupant, any person claiming under him found in occupation of the building. (5) Where any person has been evicted from a building in pursuance of any order of the District Magistrate or the prescribed authority or made on appeal under this Act, the District Magistrate or the prescribed authority, as the case may be, may after service or publication of a notice in that behalf on such persons and in such manner as may be prescribed, remove or cause to be removed or dispose of, in such manner as may be prescribed, any specific property remaining on such building. (6) Affidavits to be filed in any proceeding under this Act shall be made in the same manner and conform to the same requirements as affidavits filed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. V of 1908), and may be verified by any officer or other person appointed by the High Court under clause (b) or by an officer appointed by any other court under clause (c) of Section 139 of the said Code. (7) The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or 2[the appellate or revisional authority] shall record reasons for every order made under this Act. (8) For the purposes of any proceedings under this Act and for purposes connected therewith the said authorities shall have such other powers and 3[shall follow such procedure, principles of proof, rules of limitatin and guiding principles as may be prescribed.” Rule 22 of Rules, 1972. 22. (8) For the purposes of any proceedings under this Act and for purposes connected therewith the said authorities shall have such other powers and 3[shall follow such procedure, principles of proof, rules of limitatin and guiding principles as may be prescribed.” Rule 22 of Rules, 1972. 22. Powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Section 34(1) (g).-[The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate or Revising Authority shall, for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under the Act, shall have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. V of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely- (a) the power to dismiss an application, appeal or revision for default and to restore it for sufficient cause; (b) the power to proceed ex-parte and to set aside, for sufficient cause, an order passed ex parte; (c) the power to award costs and special costs to any successful party against an unsuccessful party; (d) the power to allow amendment of an application, memorandum of appeal or revision; (e) the power to consolidate two or more cases of eviction by the same landlord against different tenants; (f) the power referred to in Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. V of 1908) to make an y order of the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned.] Section 38 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 “Act to override Transfer of Property Act and Civil Procedure Code:- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act (ACT No.IV of 1882), or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No.V of 1908).” 23. Section 34 of U.P Act No.13 of 1972 read with Rule 22 of Rules, 1972 provides certain contingencies upon which CPC is applicable, which does not contemplate any such contingencies, which invites attention of Order 6 Rule 14 & 15 of CPC. 24. From perusal of the Sections 34 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, it is apparently clear that provisions of CPC shall be applicable in those circumstances, which are referred in Section 34 read with rules 22 of Rules, 1972. 25. 24. From perusal of the Sections 34 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, it is apparently clear that provisions of CPC shall be applicable in those circumstances, which are referred in Section 34 read with rules 22 of Rules, 1972. 25. Further, from perusal of Section 38 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, it is clear that provision of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 shall prevail over the provisions of CPC & Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, in light of provision of Sections 34 read with Rules 22 of Rules, 1972 & 38 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, provision of Order 6 Rule 14 & 15 shall not be applicable in the present case. 26. Not only this, petitioner has not taken this ground before the SCC Court as well as Revisional Court, therefore, no liberty can be granted to petitioner-defendant to raise this issue at this belated stage. 27. The third issue raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner about the compliance of Order 15 Rule 5 of CPC read with Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. It is argued that he has deposited the rent on month to month basis at the admitted rate of Rs.300/-, therefore, in light of judgment of Apex Court in the case of Asha Rani Gupta (supra) & University Book Depot (supra), he is entitled for benefit of Order 15 Rule 5 read with Section 20(4) of U.P. Act, 1972. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:- “9.1 A few basic factors related with the provisions of Order XV Rule 5 CPC could be noticed at once. As per these provisions, in a suit by a lessor for eviction of a lessee after the determination of lease and for recovery of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defendant is under the obligation: (1) to deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum on or before the first hearing of the suit; and (2) to regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week of its accrual throughout the pendency of the suit. The consequence of default in making either of these deposits is that the Court may strike off his defence. The consequence of default in making either of these deposits is that the Court may strike off his defence. The expression ‘first hearing’ means the date for filing written statement or the date for hearing mentioned in the summons; and in case of multiple dates, the last of them. The expression ‘monthly amount due’ means the amount due every month, whether as rent or damages for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent after making no other deduction except taxes, if paid to the local authority on lessor’s account. It is, however, expected that before making an order striking off defence, the Court would consider the representation of the defendant, if made within 10 days of the first hearing or within 10 days of the expiry of one week from the date of accrual of monthly amount.” Relevant paragraph of the judgment of University Book Depot (supra) is quoted hereinbelow:- “In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that the Court below erred in relying upon the decision in Bhragu Dutt Singh(Supra) to reject the plea of the revisionist for treating the amount deposited by him under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 as a deposit referred in Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972. The legal position is settled that it was permissible to treat such deposit as one under Section 20 (4). After treating it to be so, how far the requirements of Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972 were satisfied was another aspect which was required to be considered by the Court below but it has not done so. As regards the contention of learned Counsel Mohd. Sayeed that no application had been filed by the revisionist for treating the aforesaid amount as one under Section 20 (4), in view of the decision in Lacchhi Ram, such request could be oral or written. The essence of the matter is as to whether there was a deposit with the Court (custodia legis) on or prior to the date of hearing or not. If it was, then intimation of such deposit with a request to treat it as a deposit under Section 20 (4) and adjust it accordingly is sufficient. This intimation and request could be made in writing or orally. If it was, then intimation of such deposit with a request to treat it as a deposit under Section 20 (4) and adjust it accordingly is sufficient. This intimation and request could be made in writing or orally. In fact, it would be better if it is made in writing as it would avoid unnecessary disputes on this issue, but even if an oral request is made as was done in this case at the time of arguments as has been mentioned in the judgment itself, then, in such an event, once cognizance of such request has been taken by the Court below, as has been done in this case, then, there was no way this plea could be rejected as impermissible. 28. From perusal of the same, it is apparent that petitioner-defendant is required to deposit the rent at the admitted rate. 29. Learned Senior Counsel disputed the same and argued that petitioner-defendant is required to pay entire amount including the amount for time barred period. Petitioner-defendant has not deposited the rent from 1990 and after passing the ex parte decree, he has deposited decretal amount only in compliance of Section 17 of SCC Act, 1887. He placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Sanjay and another vs. Smt. Vimla Rani (supra) relying upon the judgment of Apex Court and this Court. Relevant paragraph of the said judgement is quoted hereinbelow:- “12. In the plaint, though municipal taxes was claimed since 1.10.1970, but for purposes of valuation and court fees, the arrears of last 3 years alone was taken into consideration, as rest of the amount had since become barred by limitation. It is now no more res integra that for taking benefit of provision of Section 20(4) of the Act, the tenant has to deposit even time barred rent. The phrase "entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from the tenant" employed in Section 20(4) of the Act includes even the claim in respect of time barred rent as held by the Supreme Court in Subhash Chandra vs. Additional District & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur and in the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Mahesh Chandra vs. II Addl. District Judge, Meerut and others. District Judge, Meerut and others. Concededly, Rs.1080/-deposited on 11.2.1997 represented the taxes of last three years preceding the date of institution of the suit in the year 1997. The house tax @ 10% on the annual value was levied since 1970. However, the liability to pay water tax @ 10% of the annual value accrued since 15.7.1972, the date on which 'Act' came into force. The arrears of municipal taxes for the period between 15.7.1972 until before three years of the institution of the suit, represents a huge sum, much more than several months rent. The said amount was admittedly not deposited at or before the first date of hearing. Consequently, this Court does not find any illegality in concurrent findings entered by the courts below that the petitioners have not deposited the entire arrears of municipal taxes and were thus not entitled to benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act.” 30. From perusal of the above paragraph of the aforesaid judgment, it is apparently clear that for taking benefit of Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, it is required on the part of petitioner-defendant to deposit entire dues including amount for time barred period. It is admitted case of petitioner that he has not deposited the rent from 1990 and after ex parte decree while filing application under Order 15 Rule 5 of CPC complying of Section 17 of SCC Act, 1887, he had deposited decretal amount only, therefore, in light of aforesaid judgment, benefit of Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 cannot be extended in favour of petitioner-defendant. Therefore, judgment of Asha Rani Gupta & Universal Book (Supra) is of no use in present controversy as well as in such facts of the case. 31. Another argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that in the sale deed rent was mentioned at the rate of Rs. 800/-whereas in the legal notice as well as plaint, it was claimed at the rate of Rs. 750/-, but respondent-plaintiff could not proof the rent at the rate of Rs. 750/-, therefore, order is bad on this ground. This was also rightly rebutted by learned Senior Counsel for respondent-plaintiff and submitted that though in sale deed, rent was mentioned at the rate of Rs. 800/-, but in the legal notice as well as in plaint, it was claimed at the rate of Rs. 750/-. 750/-, therefore, order is bad on this ground. This was also rightly rebutted by learned Senior Counsel for respondent-plaintiff and submitted that though in sale deed, rent was mentioned at the rate of Rs. 800/-, but in the legal notice as well as in plaint, it was claimed at the rate of Rs. 750/-. Against which, petitioner-defendant could not produce any evidence about the rate of rent at the rate of Rs.300/-as per his case. 32. He further submitted that there is concurrent finding of Courts about the rate of rent at the rate of Rs.750/-and in light of law laid down by this Court in the case of Anand Kumar (Supra), Court may not interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:- “18. Article 227 of the Constitution confers a supervisory jurisdiction on the High Courts over sub-ordinate courts. The scope of judicial review is limited and narrow. It is not to correct the errors in the orders of the courts below but to remove manifest and patent errors of law and jurisdiction without acting as an appellate authority. Under this constitutional provision, a duty has been cast upon the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and they do it in a legal manner. Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention, it is not for the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere. In Waryam Singh and another Vs. Amarnath and another AIR 1954 SC 215 , (at Page-571), Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vs. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal. 193 , to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors". 22. This power is not in the nature of power of appellate power enabling the Court for re-appreciation of evidence. The Court cannot alter the conclusion reached by the Competent Statutory Authority merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence vide: Union of India & ors. Vs. 22. This power is not in the nature of power of appellate power enabling the Court for re-appreciation of evidence. The Court cannot alter the conclusion reached by the Competent Statutory Authority merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence vide: Union of India & ors. Vs. Himmat Singh Chahar, (1999) 4 SCC 521 . 33. In the present set of facts, concurrent findings of fact has been recorded by both the courts below based on consideration of oral and documentary evidences that the disputed shop was constructed in the year 1987/1988 and first assessment was made effective from the year 1992 and that the petitioner defendant defaulted in payment of rent. These findings are findings of fact based on consideration of material on record. The findings so recorded in the impugned judgment, do not suffer from any manifest error to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the petitioner defendant has completely failed to demonstrate that the findings are so perverse or so unreasonable that no Court could ever have reached them. The power under Article 227 is not in the nature of appellate power enabling High Court to re-appreciate evidence and to alter the conclusion reached by the court below merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. No evidence could be pointed by the petitioner defendant to demonstrate that the findings recorded by the Trial Court are perverse. Therefore, the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be invoked to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the courts below. At any rate, as long as the findings are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose, no interference can be made. Reference to various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court as made above would clearly indicate that no interference can be made on the facts of the present case.” 33. It is undisputed that there is concurrent finding of Courts on this issue in favour of respondent-plaintiff. From perusal of above paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment, it is clear that there is concurrent finding of Court that scope of judicial review is limited and narrow, therefore, no interference is required under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 34. It is undisputed that there is concurrent finding of Courts on this issue in favour of respondent-plaintiff. From perusal of above paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment, it is clear that there is concurrent finding of Court that scope of judicial review is limited and narrow, therefore, no interference is required under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 34. The last argument of learned counsel for the petitioner about the declaration of property in question is notified as slum area under the provisions of Section 23 of Act, 1962, therefore, no decree can be passed. This was validly opposed by learned Senior Counsel and submitted that not only after declaration of slum area, but even after acquiring the property in dispute after notification, suit is maintainable and decree can be passed. He supported his argument of the judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Phoola Devi (supra) & Smt. Shakuntala (supra). 35. To appreciate the controversy Section 23 of Act is quoted hereinbelow:-Section 23 of Act, 1962 23- Tenant in slum areas not to be evicted without permission of the Competent Authority.- (1) No decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or landin a slum area shall, except as hereinafter provided and till such time the declarationunder section 3 is in force, be capable of being executed ; anything contained in any other law for the time being in force to the contrary notwithstanding. (2) A decree or order referred to in sub-section (1) may be put into execution afterobtaining the permission of the Competent Authority in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3). (3) An application for obtaining the permission of the Competent Authority under sub-section (2) shall be made in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed. (4) On receipt of such application the permission of the Competent Authority, after affording reasonable opportunity to the applicant and the tenant of being heard and after making such inquiry into the circumstances of the case as it thinks fit, may, where it is of the opinion that the execution of the decree or order shall defeat or be detrimental to the enforcement of the provisions of the Act, reject the application but in all other cases grant it. (5) Where the Competent Authority refuses to grant the permission, it shall record in brief its reasons for such refusal and make available a copy thereof to the applicant. 36. This was interpreted in the judgment of this Court in the case of Phoola Devi (supra). Relevant Paragraph of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:- “22. It would also be pertinent to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sheela Jawarlal Nagori & Another Vs. Kantilal Nathmal Baldota & Others 2014 (3) ARC (5) wherein Apex Court has held that landlord can maintain a suit for eviction against tenant even if the tenanted property has been acquired and an award has been passed in respect thereof under the provision of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Further, this court in the case of Raju Savita (supra) has held that in a suit for eviction, only the relationship of landlord and tenant is to be seen. 23. It is evident from the aforesaid discussion that the relationship of landlord and tenant is established between the respondent and the petitioner, therefore, the suit of the respondent was maintainable. Consequently, this court does not find any merit in the submission of the counsel for the petitioner that the suit was not maintainable as on the acquisition of the suit property by KDA, the tile of respondent over suit property had vanished and the relationship of landlord and tenant had ceased to exist between the parties.” 37. Ratio of law is also followed in the judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Shakuntala (Supra). Relevant paragraph of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:- “The contention of the petitioners is not acceptable. The declaration of an area as slum area under Section 3 of the Act, 1962 does not automatically result in acquisition of the properties situated in the said area. Section 23 of the Act, 1962 only provides that a decree or order can be put in execution only after obtaining the permission of the competent authority. Section 23 of the Act, 1962 does not prohibit the institution of any suit. Apart from the aforesaid even if the claim of the petitioners that the land in the slum area stood acquired, the building situated in the said land does not automatically vest in the acquiring authority. Section 23 of the Act, 1962 does not prohibit the institution of any suit. Apart from the aforesaid even if the claim of the petitioners that the land in the slum area stood acquired, the building situated in the said land does not automatically vest in the acquiring authority. In my aforesaid views, I am supported by the judgment dated 21.5.2014 passed by the Court in Writ-A No. 28288 of 2014 and judgment of this Court reported in Smt. Bano Vs. Ashad Ulla Khan and 4 others, 2017(3) ARC 807 as well as the judgment of this Court reported in Smt. Phoola Devi and 4 others Vs. Additional District Judge Court No.14, Kanpur Nagar and 2 others, 2020(2) ARC 610. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition lacks merits and is dismissed.” 38. From perusal of the Section 23 of Act, 1962, it is apparently clear that eviction cannot be made without permission of Competent Authority, but so far as decree or order for eviction is concerned, there is no such provision in Section 23 of Act, 1962. 39. From conjoint perusal of the Section 23 of Act, 1962 and judgments of this Court in the case of Smt. Shakuntala Devi & Phoola Devi (supra), it is very much clear that suit is maintainable and judgment and decree can be passed. Therefore, this argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is also having no force. 40. In light of facts and circumstances of the case as well as law discussed hereinabove, no case is made out for interference in the impugned orders. The petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.