ORDER : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the office order bearing no. PO/CH/DISC. Action/2007-08/480-88 dated 26.04.2007 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 3 – the Project Officer, Churi Project of CCL, Ranchi whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service of CCL with immediate effect. Further prayer has been made for quashing the show cause notice as contained in letter no. 4172-74 dated 10/11.01.2014 (Annexure-1 series to the writ petition) issued by the respondent no. 3, whereby explanation was sought from the petitioner as to why her retiral dues such as Gratuity, CMPF, Pension and leave encashment be not forfeited on the same ground of immoral conduct for which she was dismissed from service. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing the order dated 12.02.2013 communicated to her vide letter dated 16.02.2013 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) issued by the respondent no. 5 – the Director (Personnel), Appellate Authority, Central Coalfields Limited, Ranchi, whereby she was informed that her appeal filed against the dismissal order dated 26.04.2007 was rejected. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had been working as General Mazdoor, Category 1 at Churi Colliery under Churi Project, CCL, Ranchi. In the year 1994-95, she had applied for retirement under Special Female Voluntary Retirement Scheme (SFVRS) as well as requested for employment of her adopted son and accordingly her service was discontinued, however, her son was not given employment on the ground of irregularities and not being genuine. Subsequently, she was allowed to resume duty with effect from 27.07.1998 vide office order No. PO/CH/PD/Resumption Duty/98/861-72 dated 26.07.1998 on the intervention of R.C.M.S Union without paying any salary for three years during which her service remained discontinued. As soon as the petitioner started demanding salary for the said three years, she was issued chargesheet bearing no. PO/CH/C-Sheet/99/498-500 dated 30.04.1999 wherein following allegations were levelled against her: (i) That you are impersonator and your actual name is Smt. Ashwa Devi but you are working in the name of Smt. Salkho Mahto. Further, you had applied for employment of your son Sri Jagarnath Mahto under special F.V.R.S, who is also not your genuine son. (ii) You are fraud and have given false information and tried to cheat the company. 3. Further, you had applied for employment of your son Sri Jagarnath Mahto under special F.V.R.S, who is also not your genuine son. (ii) You are fraud and have given false information and tried to cheat the company. 3. It is further contended that in respect of the said chargesheet, the petitioner submitted an application dated 03.05.1999 to the respondent no. 4 –the Superintendent of Mines, Churi Colliery, CCL requesting inter alia to reconsider her matter as she had not committed any mistake. Subsequently, vide memo no. 1659-61 dated 25.06.1999 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition), Sri L. N. Prasad, Deputy General Manager was appointed as the enquiry officer and Sri A. K. Singh, Security Officer, Dakra was appointed as the management representative. The petitioner was directed to participate in the enquiry and to produce witnesses along with documentary evidence in support of her defence. The management representative was also directed to produce witnesses and to lead the evidence on behalf of the management before the enquiry officer. 4. It is also submitted that the enquiry against the petitioner was kept pending and, in the meantime, Shri Kumar Prasad, Personnel Manager, Dakra Bukbuka Colliery was appointed as the enquiry officer vide memo no. SOM/CH/C.sheet/ 03-04/3549-53 Dated 03/06.09.2003 and Umesh Singh, Personnel Manager (NK), Dakra was appointed as the representative of the management. The evidences of the management and the petitioner were recorded by the enquiry officer after about 8 years from the date of issuance of chargesheet to the petitioner which was started from 07.03.2007 and concluded on 05.04.2007 i.e., just few days before her date of superannuation. The petitioner got herself examined before the enquiry officer on 26.03.2007 and recorded her statement that her name was ‘Salkho Mahto’ whereas she was also called ‘Ashwa Mahto’ by her family members since childhood. She further stated that Lakshmi Nath Mahto, the husband of her sister namely, Jaswa Devi was also working as Dumper Operator at KDH Project of CCL. He had lodged false complaint against her as she was examined as witness in the maintenance case filed by her sister against Lakshmi Nath Mahto and on the basis of her statement, the court had ordered him to pay maintenance. Apart from the petitioner, six more witnesses were examined on her behalf who also supported her claim that her name was ‘Salkho Mahto’ and her alias name was ‘Ashwa Mahto’. Apart from the petitioner, six more witnesses were examined on her behalf who also supported her claim that her name was ‘Salkho Mahto’ and her alias name was ‘Ashwa Mahto’. They further deposed that the petitioner was appointed as wagon loader in the year 1974. She also filed several documents in support her claim that she was actually ‘Salkho Mahto’. However, enquiry officer submitted the report on 18.04.2007 observing that the actual name of the petitioner was ‘Smt. Ashwa Devi’ and she had made a false claim that the name of her son was Jagarnath Mahto. Thereafter, the petitioner was issued second show cause notice on 19.04.2007 enclosing a copy of the enquiry report and finally the impugned order dated 26.04.2007 was passed dismissing her from service of CCL with immediate effect. The appeal filed by the petitioner was also rejected by the respondent no. 5 vide order dated 12.02.2013. 5. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the appointment letter of the petitioner clearly indicates that there is no irregularity with respect to her name and she is originally known as Salkho Mahto W/o Mahabir Mahto. After regularization of the petitioner vide office order no. 6372-592 dated 28.05.1985 issued by the respondent no. 3, her service record was prepared on 04.08.1987 wherein the details of her family members were mentioned suggesting that the name of her husband was Mahabir Mahto and the name of her son was Jagarnath Mahto. 6. It is further submitted that vide office order dated 09.03.2007 issued from the office of the respondent no. 3, the petitioner was informed that she was going to retire on 30.04.2007 and accordingly, she was directed to comply the required formality essential for getting retiral dues etc., but to her utter surprise, the order of dismissal was passed on 26.04.2007. 7. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner had applied under the Special Female Voluntary Retirement Scheme (SFVRS) for employment of one Jagarnath Mahto misrepresenting him to be her son. In the meantime, a complaint was received from Laxmi Nath Mahto alleging that the petitioner was not a genuine person and her actual name was ‘Ashwa Devi’, however, she impersonating herself as ‘Salkho Mahto’ had entered into the employment of the respondent-Company. 8. In the meantime, a complaint was received from Laxmi Nath Mahto alleging that the petitioner was not a genuine person and her actual name was ‘Ashwa Devi’, however, she impersonating herself as ‘Salkho Mahto’ had entered into the employment of the respondent-Company. 8. It is further submitted that an enquiry was conducted in the matter and the enquiry officer submitted the report dated 18.04.2007 before the respondent no. 3 observing that the petitioner was not a genuine person, rather her actual name was ‘Smt. Ashwa Devi’ and she had no son. Hence, the information given by her about Jagarnath Mahto declaring him to be her son was also false. A second show cause notice was served upon the petitioner bearing no. PO/CH/07/376 dated 19.04.2007 asking her to submit explanation within three days from the date of receipt of the same, however, she, instead of submitting her reply, filed a petition dated 21.04.2007 before the respondent no. 3 for providing her a copy of the enquiry report in Hindi version seeking 10 days’ time for submitting her reply. The said request of the petitioner was found unsatisfactory as the issue regarding language of letter had never been raised by her in the past as she used to reply through her co-worker S.R. Sahi who was a Trade Union leader. Nonetheless, considering the urgency in the matter on account of her impending superannuation on 30.04.2007 and keeping in view the nature of misconduct, a Hindi version of the enquiry report was also served upon her immediately vide letter No. 454 dated 23.04.2007. Since the petitioner was going to superannuate within a week, no time extension was granted to her for filing reply to the second show cause notice. The petitioner did not file reply to the second show cause notice within the stipulated period and the disciplinary authority recommended for her dismissal from the services of the respondent-Company. The said recommendation was thereafter approved by the competent authority of the respondent-Company and accordingly, penalty of dismissal from services of the respondent-Company was passed by the respondent no. 3 vide impugned office order dated 26.04.2007. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents also submits that the appeal filed by the petitioner was subsequently rejected by the respondent no. 5 vide letter no. 575 dated 16.02.2013. 3 vide impugned office order dated 26.04.2007. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents also submits that the appeal filed by the petitioner was subsequently rejected by the respondent no. 5 vide letter no. 575 dated 16.02.2013. Since the petitioner has been dismissed from service on the ground of impersonation, the said dismissal can be termed as dismissal on the ground of moral turpitude and as such in view of Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, her gratuity is also liable to be forfeited. The petitioner has been dismissed from service after following all requirements of departmental proceedings as well as providing ample opportunity to her to defend her case. After dismissal of the departmental appeal, a show cause notice vide letter No.4172-74 dated 10/11.01.2014 was also issued to the petitioner asking her to explain as to why the terminal dues be not forfeited on ground of moral turpitude as she had been working with the company impersonating someone else. However, the petitioner reiterated the same statements in her reply which she had made in the past without giving any substantial reason to reconsider the decision of the management. 10. It is further submitted that delay in concluding the departmental enquiry occasioned due to non-cooperation and delaying attitude of the petitioner as well as on account of change of the enquiry officer after retirement of the previous one. It is a settled proposition of law that the writ court is not supposed to sit in appeal to re-apprise the evidences led in the course of departmental enquiry by recording a finding over and above the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the Appellate Authority. 11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 12. The primary argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the chargesheet was issued to the petitioner in the year 1999, however, the departmental proceeding was not initiated till 2007 and suddenly the same was started just before her retirement and was concluded hurriedly within few months which caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “P.V. Mahadevan Vs. Md. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “P.V. Mahadevan Vs. Md. T.N. Housing Board” reported in (2005) 6 SCC 636 wherein the charge memo was issued to the delinquent employee in the year 2000 for an irregularity committed in the year 1990. Their Lordships in the said case held that there was no acceptable explanation of the respondent justifying the inordinate delay in initiating departmental disciplinary proceedings and as such it was observed that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceeding at such distance of time would be prejudicial to the appellant. It was further observed that keeping a higher government official under the charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. Their Lordships also held that the protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interest of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. Hence, it was considered necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry as the appellant had already suffered enough on account of long pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. It was further observed that for the procedural mistakes committed by the department in initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner also puts reliance on a judgment rendered by learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of “Smt. Sharmistha Adhikaari Vs. The State of Jharkhand” (L.P.A No. 368 of 2016), wherein disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent employee for unauthorized leave was initiated after an inordinate delay and the learned Division Bench quashed the said departmental proceeding by referring the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “P.V. Mahadevan” (supra) and “M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India” reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88 . 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner further puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. Union of India” reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88 . 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner further puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. T.T. Murali Babu” reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 and submits that the enquiry for the alleged charge was initiated after an inordinate delay which has not been properly explained and it is well settled that delay without proper justification cannot be ignored. 16. I have perused the judgment rendered in the case of “T.T. Murali Babu” (supra) wherein the respondent-employee was dismissed from service alleging that he unauthorizedly remained absent from service for one year and seven months. The respondent-employee challenged the order of dismissal after four years by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ court set aside the order of dismissal and learned Division Bench also affirmed the order of the writ court in appeal. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the employer observing as under: 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons — who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle”. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold. 17. This Court is of the view that the aforesaid judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner i.e., “P.V. Mahadevan” (supra), “Smt. Sharmistha Adhikaari (supra) and “T.T. Murali Babu” (supra) are not applicable in the facts and circumstance of the present case. In the case in hand, the charge against the petitioner was of impersonation and a chargesheet was issued to her immediately after the respondents got information about the said fact. So far as the delay of about eight years in completing the enquiry is concerned, it has been contended by the respondents that the same occasioned due to change of enquiry officer after retirement of the earlier one as well as delaying attitude of the petitioner. So far as the delay of about eight years in completing the enquiry is concerned, it has been contended by the respondents that the same occasioned due to change of enquiry officer after retirement of the earlier one as well as delaying attitude of the petitioner. Since the charge against the petitioner was of obtaining the job by impersonation, the delay in completing the enquiry cannot be a ground to vitiate the entire departmental proceedings. Moreover, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner due to delay in completing the enquiry, rather she has been benefitted by the said delay since during enquiry period, she was allowed to continue to work and was also getting salary for the same. 18. In the case of “Bank of India & Anr. Vs. Avinash D. Mandivikar & Ors.” reported in (2005) 7 SCC 690 as has been relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents, the fact was that the respondent employee had obtained employment by practicing fraud. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the conclusion of the High Court was contradictory since on the one hand the High Court faulted by referring the matter to the caste scrutiny committee after about ten years and on the other hand accepted the finding of the scrutiny committee that the respondent-employee did not belong to a scheduled tribe as was held by the scrutiny committee. It was further held that when fraud was perpetrated, the parameters of consideration would be different. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. 19. Thus, if the appointment is obtained by fraud, the delay committed in completing the enquiry cannot be a ground to vitiate the entire departmental proceedings. 20. The next limb of argument made on behalf of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity to counter the finding of the enquiry report. Learned counsel puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. K.K. Verma” reported in (2010) 13 SCC 494 wherein it has been held that the right to represent against findings of the enquiry report to prove one’s innocence is distinct from the right to represent against the proposed penalty. Vs. K.K. Verma” reported in (2010) 13 SCC 494 wherein it has been held that the right to represent against findings of the enquiry report to prove one’s innocence is distinct from the right to represent against the proposed penalty. It is only the second right to represent against the proposed penalty which is taken away by the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution. The right to represent against findings of the enquiry report is not disturbed in any way. 21. On perusal of the record, it would be evident that after submission of the enquiry report, the respondent no. 3 served a second show cause notice on 19.04.2007 to the petitioner along with a copy of the enquiry report providing her three days’ time to file reply and thereafter the petitioner vide letter dated 21.04.2007 sought 10 days’ time to file reply as well as demanded Hindi version of the enquiry report. The respondent no. 3 vide letter dated 23.04.2007 replied the petitioner’s letter stating that the demand of Hindi version of enquiry report was a delaying tactics as on earlier occasion also, the correspondence with her was made in English and she did not raise any objection. However, the Hindi translation of enquiry report was also served to the petitioner and she having failed to submit reply to the second show cause notice, the final order was passed on 26.04.2007. Since the petitioner was going to retire on 30.04.2007, the request for providing 10 days’ time to file reply to the second show cause was not accepted. 22. I am of the view that it is not the case where no opportunity was granted to the petitioner to counter the finding recorded in the enquiry report, rather it was the petitioner who had failed to avail the said opportunity even after receiving the second show cause notice. It is evident from the record that earlier also, the show cause notice was served to the petitioner in English version which was not objected by her, rather reply to the chargesheet on her behalf was drafted in English language though she had put her thumb impression on the same. I find substance in the argument of learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner by demanding Hindi version of the enquiry report was trying to delay the departmental proceeding as she was going to retire in few days. I find substance in the argument of learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner by demanding Hindi version of the enquiry report was trying to delay the departmental proceeding as she was going to retire in few days. Thus, the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable in the facts and circumstance of the present case. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also contended that the impugned order of termination from service as well as the appellate order have been passed without appreciating the evidences and the documents laid by the petitioner in the departmental proceeding. 24. I have perused the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of Karnataka & Anr. Vs. N. Gangaraj” reported in (2020) 3 SCC 423 as has been relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents wherein it has been held as under: 12. In [State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 ], this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 587-88, paras 7 & 10) “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 ], [Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 ] and [Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 ], [High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 ] .) *** 10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him.” 13. In another judgment reported as [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 ], this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings: (SCC p. 617, para 13) “13. In another judgment reported as [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 ], this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings: (SCC p. 617, para 13) “13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 25. Learned counsel for the respondents further puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Pravin Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.” reported in (2020) 9 SCC 471 , wherein it has been held that the constitutional courts while exercising their powers of judicial review should not assume the role of an appellate authority. Their jurisdiction is circumscribed by the limits of correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of the principles of natural justice. 26. Thus, it is well settled that the High Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is neither a court of appeal to sit over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant as well as to reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor supposed to interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the basis of material available on record. The High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction is primarily concerned with determining as to whether the enquiry has been held by an authority competent in that behalf following the procedure prescribed for the same and whether the rules of principles of natural justice have been followed. The High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction is primarily concerned with determining as to whether the enquiry has been held by an authority competent in that behalf following the procedure prescribed for the same and whether the rules of principles of natural justice have been followed. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of evidence or reliable nature of the evidence is not the ground for interfering with the findings of departmental enquiries. If the disciplinary authority records a finding which is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the writ court may interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings, however, the discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. 27. I have also perused the enquiry report (Annexure-B to the counter affidavit) which reveals that the management had examined altogether four witnesses including the complainant namely, Laxmi Nath Mahto. They had claimed that ‘Salkho Mahto’ was the wife of Situ Mahto and she was working in Churi Siding since 1974. She remained sick for a long period and thereafter died. Subsequently, the petitioner whose name is ‘Ashwa Devi’ started working in the name of ‘Salkho Mahto’. They further deposed that the petitioner had no son and Jagarnath Mahto was the son-in-law of ‘Ashwa Devi’. The enquiry officer found that the statement of the complainant, who was the relative of the petitioner, was corroborated by the statements of Kamalnath Mahto and his wife Shalwa Mahto who were the relatives of ‘Salkho Mahto’ W/o Situ Mahto. The enquiry officer also found that the defence witnesses nos. 1, 2 and 3 were not knowing the petitioner before 1974 and the statements of the defence witnesses nos. 5 and 6 were contradictory to each other. The enquiry officer further observed that all the documents produced by the petitioner had been constructed after 1985 and as such, the same were not found reliable. 28. Thus, I am of the view that the enquiry officer had duly considered the evidences produced on behalf of both the parties and only thereafter submitted his enquiry report to the disciplinary authority. The petitioner failed to submit reply to the second show cause notice and thereafter the impugned order of her dismissal was passed. The respondent no. 28. Thus, I am of the view that the enquiry officer had duly considered the evidences produced on behalf of both the parties and only thereafter submitted his enquiry report to the disciplinary authority. The petitioner failed to submit reply to the second show cause notice and thereafter the impugned order of her dismissal was passed. The respondent no. 5 being the appellate authority also dismissed the appeal of the petitioner by passing a reasoned order. Hence, in exercise of the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, I do not find any ground to interfere with the order of termination/dismissal of the petitioner from service of CCL passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority. 29. So far as the claim for payment of retiral benefits to the petitioner is concerned, the argument made on behalf of the respondents is that since the petitioner had continued to work in the respondent-CCL by committing fraud, she is not entitled to get any of the retiral benefits. 30. In support of the said argument, learned counsel for the respondents has put reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “R. Vishwanatha Pillai Vs. State of Kerala & Ors.” reported in (2004) 2 SCC 105 , wherein it has been held that a person who has got appointment by playing fraud, is not entitled to claim to be dealt with in terms with Article 311 of the Constitution of India and the rules farmed thereunder and his/her appointment has to be treated as void and non est in the eye of the law as well as the person concerned cannot claim pension and other monetary benefits as the right to salary or pension after retirement flows from a valid and legal appointment. It has further been held that equity or compassion cannot be allowed to bend the arms of law in a case where an individual had acquired a status by practising fraud. 31. Learned counsel for the respondents has put further reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Devendra Kumar Vs. It has further been held that equity or compassion cannot be allowed to bend the arms of law in a case where an individual had acquired a status by practising fraud. 31. Learned counsel for the respondents has put further reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Devendra Kumar Vs. State of Uttaranchal & Ors.” reported in (2013) 9 SCC 363 , wherein it has been held that if an applicant gets an office order by misrepresenting the facts or by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 32. In the case in hand, the petitioner was working under the respondent-CCL as an imposter and as such I also do not find any ground to interfere with the show cause notice issued to the petitioner vide letter no. 4172-74 dated 10.01.2014. However, it seems that no final order on forfeiture of retiral dues of the petitioner has yet been passed by the respondents and as such, the respondents are at liberty to pass a final order on the said show cause notice after providing due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, if the same has not yet been passed. 33. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with aforesaid observations.