JUDGMENT : Ajit Kumar, J. Heard Sri Vishesh Rajvanshi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri P.K. Dubey, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 2. The petitioner who was working with respondent Life Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ''Corporation'') as class I officer and was posted at the District Branch Office, Kanpur in the capacity of Senior Branch Manager was subjected to disciplinary proceedings in the matter of disbursement of maturity claim under police No. 058472150 in favour of Jagdip Kumar Anand and also payment of maturity claim under policy No. 058472329 in favour of one Pradeep Kumar Agarwal. 3. The charge-sheet issued to the petitioner in connection with payment made to Jagdip Kumar Anand was to the effect that surety form subject to which payment settlement was made, was signed by one Sri P.K. Gautam an agent of another branch and the indemnity bond and discharge voucher were signed by one Mr. S.C. Tiwari an agent also of another branch. Further these two documents were witnesses by one Dr. R.K. Gupta, Veterinary Officer of Kanpur. Since payment was issued by C.B.O. 4 (Kanpur Branch Office of Corporation), the issue was raised that beneficiary of the maturity stood impersonated. 4. Yet another ofshoot of the charge was that signatures of Jagdip Kumar Anand upon receipt were different from those made on the proposal form. 5. The second charge was that petitioner while working as Senior Branch Manager failed to verify the authenticity of the claim of policy holder before approving payment of Rs.64,975/- maturity amount vide cheque dated 6.3.2006 drawn in favour of Sri Jagdip Kumar Anand and so with the encashment of the said amount, Corporation suffered with financial loss. 6. The third charge was also similar in nature in respect of payment of maturity claim of Rs.57,700/- by issuing a cheque dated 1.6.2006 in favour of Sri P.K. Agarwal. Here in this charge, the issue was that policy bond and discharge vouchers were submitted by policy holder only on 16.6.2006 whereas claim voucher was issued on 28th March, 2006 stood encashed. The cheque was issued on 31st March, 2006 which would encashed on 2nd May, 2006. Thus in substance, the charge got impersonated and Corporation stood defrauded and suffered financial loss of Rs.57,700/-. 7. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet. The cheque was issued on 31st March, 2006 which would encashed on 2nd May, 2006. Thus in substance, the charge got impersonated and Corporation stood defrauded and suffered financial loss of Rs.57,700/-. 7. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet. In respect of charge No. 1, he stated that surety was signed by Sri P.K.Gautam who was a CM Club member with an authorized agency code bearing No. 67/23S registered at CBO 9 and had sound financial backing of 30,000/- monthly income as an agent, he owned independent house and car worth valuation of Rs.20,00,00/- for just a claim of Rs.64,975/-. The sureties were witness by a respectable citizen R.K. Gupta, a Veterinary Officer in Kanpur. Officer admitted that indemnity bond and discharge vouchers were witnessed by one Sri S.C. Tiwari, an another CM Club member with an authorized agency code being No. 05901/232 registered at CBO 1, and the charge was that these two agents did not belong to CBO-4 was not maintainable because there was no such requirement that such surety be filed and so also indemnity bond and discharge voucher be witnessed by an agent of the same branch. He referred to the claim manual and other instructions of the Corporation in that regard, and therefore, pleaded that charge was absolutely ill founded. He claimed to have taken protection while approving security regarding difference in signatures of Jagdip Kumar Anand on the claim document and that on the proposal form. He claimed that signatures as per his own eyes appeared to be identical and would be so visible from the naked eyes. He pleaded that in the month of 2006, he had settled more than 800 maturity as he claims, and therefore, involvement of the two CM Club members not belonging to the branch did not give him any reason to doubt about correctness of the claim. 8. He repelled the second charge for the same reason as second charge was sequel to the first charge and thus submitted that there was as a no question of any financial loss being caused to the Corporation. He asserted in his reply that documents were carrying correct address of the policy holder as both on the bond and the claim form were same and the cheque of claim was dispatched also at the same address. He asserted in his reply that documents were carrying correct address of the policy holder as both on the bond and the claim form were same and the cheque of claim was dispatched also at the same address. He also disclosed that later on he came to know that the cheque was received by one Sri V.K. Pandey a sub staff of CBO-4 itself, and therefore, any responsibility of misuse or abuse of cheque would be of V.K. Pandey and not of the petitioner. 9. Regarding charge No. 3, the petitioner claimed that entire papers were first verified by the officer and then were placed before him in respect of claim of one Sri P.K. Agarwal, he submitted that it was primary duty of the claim department to have checked all those papers and then to forward to the Senior Branch Manager for passing the same. He submitted that papers were placed before him with all documents in fact and it was upon that he had approved payment. The cheque of Rs.57,700/- after approval was prepared by accounts department and sent for dispatch. This cheque, he claimed was also received by Sri Uday Narayan Singh Chauhan, the Development Officer with Code 9025 of CBO-4, a third party and he put his signatures in endorsement of receipt upon dispatch register. Any use of misuse of cheque for payment if was by a third party then that real claimant would be a question of enquiry from Sri Uday Narayan Singh Chauhan only and not the petitioner. The enquiry officer Sri Anup Kumar Agarwal conducted an enquiry and in the enquiry report that he submitted, he had exonerated the petitioner from charge Nos. 1-B, 2 and 3 having found them not proved so the charge regarding payment of person other than the real claimant Sri Jagdip Kumar Anand and Sri Pradeep Kumar Agarwal were found not proved and hence there was no financial loss caused to the Corporation. 10. 1-B, 2 and 3 having found them not proved so the charge regarding payment of person other than the real claimant Sri Jagdip Kumar Anand and Sri Pradeep Kumar Agarwal were found not proved and hence there was no financial loss caused to the Corporation. 10. Regarding charge No. 1-A, which was regarding the fact that surety was not of the same branch and so also witness being not agent of the same branch from where policy claim was to be disbursed, the enquiry officer while did not agree with the stand of the department that agent should be of the same branch from where payment was released, but he concluded that, had the original policy bond been there, the surety papers would not have been required to be submitted at all, and therefore, he claimed that payment was made upon maturity claim without original policy bond being there. The findings to certain extent virtually questioned of disbursal of claim even in the absence of policies bond. 11. The disciplinary authority while concurred with enquiry officer's report in respect of chargne No. 1-A, it disagreed with the findings of enquiry officer in respect of charge No. 1-B, 2 and 3 and held that from the perusal of the documents and other evidence on record, the charges stood established and accordingly a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner of the proposed penalty of lowering by a stage in time scale of pay applicable to his cadre and recovery of Rs.50,508/- in terms of Regulation 39 (1)(d)Regulation 39(1) (c) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Staff Regulation, 1960. The petitioner did submit his reply to the show-cause notice and reiterated stand already taken in reply to the charge-sheet. The disciplinary authority having found itself not satisfied with the reply submitted by the petitioner imposed penalty, as proposed, vide order dated 25th January, 2016. The petitioner unsuccessfully appealed against the said order before the appellate authority as his appeal also came to be dismissed vide order dated 2nd August, 2016 and hence this petition. 12. The disciplinary authority having found itself not satisfied with the reply submitted by the petitioner imposed penalty, as proposed, vide order dated 25th January, 2016. The petitioner unsuccessfully appealed against the said order before the appellate authority as his appeal also came to be dismissed vide order dated 2nd August, 2016 and hence this petition. 12. The argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is that once enquiry officer had returned a finding that charges 1-B, 2 and 3 were not proved, but it was necessary to have placed reliance and discussed those material and documents which compelled the disciplinary authority to disagree with the findings of the enquiry officer but disciplinary authority did not do so and merely by referring facts has established the charge holding petitioner guilty of those charges, which finding is, therefore, liable to be rendered perverse. 13. In support of his above argument, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that all those documents that have been referred to in the charge-sheet were very much before the enquiry officer and the departmental agents/officers who deposed before the enquiry officer in support of the charge could not establish firstly that surety and indemnity bond were fake surety and notarized indemnity bond were fake or that authorized agents may be of a different branch signing those documents as surety witnesses were not authorized agents, nor it could cite any rule or manual providing for a particular category of person to be surety and witness to the indemnity bond and were also required to belong to the same branch. He argued that CM Club membership is common to all and only registered and authorized agents are members. He further submitted that the enquiry officer while holding the petitioner guilty of charge No. 1-A only assigned a reason that policy bond in original was not available and had that been there, indemnity bond would have not been required. 14. He argued that the charge was not that the original policy bond was not available but the charge was that indemnity bond was signed by witnesses who belonged to another branch. 14. He argued that the charge was not that the original policy bond was not available but the charge was that indemnity bond was signed by witnesses who belonged to another branch. He submitted, therefore, that when a document of policy was not in issue, the enquiry officer could not have returned a finding against him, and on the question of surety, indemnity bond, no such rule was cited that such agent must belong to the same branch and this has been carefully noticed by enquiry officer in his report, and so, he could not have taken view in favour of the department. 15. Regarding charge No. 1-B, learned counsel argued that enquiry officer had tallied the signatures and admission of the own departmental witnesses and returned finding to the effect that style and flow of signature of two signatures was the same. The enquiry officer also returned a finding that there was gap of 21 years between execution of the policy bond and the indemnity bond, therefore, a little variance would not render the subsequent signature to be doubtful. He further argued that as far as charge No. 2 was concerned, verification regarding authenticity of the policy holder was not to be doubted because it was the claim department that was to forward papers. Had this formalities of verification etc. had not been done by the claim department, it would certainly not have processed file for approval before the petitioner. It is argued regarding third charge that enquiry officer returned a finding that payment of maturity claim was made on document P-16 which bore maturity paid stamp and the officer of the department failed to provide dispatch form which according to the banks' case had been received on 16.6.2006. He, therefore, submitted, when the crucial evidence relied upon by the bank was not produced before the enquiry officer, the enquiry officer could not have relied upon any such document not produced to hold the petitioner guilty of the charge. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that all these aspects were required to be dealt with by the disciplinary authority in the first instance, prima facie, while disagreeing with enquiry officer's report and requiring the petitioner to submit reply to the prima facie findings of the disciplinary authority, afresh. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that all these aspects were required to be dealt with by the disciplinary authority in the first instance, prima facie, while disagreeing with enquiry officer's report and requiring the petitioner to submit reply to the prima facie findings of the disciplinary authority, afresh. He submitted that in the entire show-cause notice all that was stated in the charge-sheet had been reiterated and petitioner had been held to be guilty of negligence as well, but no document had been discussed, which could be said to have escaped the scanning eyes of the enquiry officer. He submitted that in order to defer from the findings of the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority was not required to merely refer to the minutes of the proceedings but to take a prima facie view with reasons as to why it was deferring from the findings. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, summed up his arguments by submitting that disciplinary authority did not rely upon any departmental Life Insurance Corporation Manual or Rules, which would have held the surety signed by an agent of different branch or an indemnity bond by an agent of different branch would not be admissible so as to clear the maturity claims. Even on the question of difference in signatures, the disciplinary authority could not give a sound reasoning to disagree with the findings of the enquiry officer, more especially relating to the style and flow already admitted by its own witnesses to be the same in respect of both the signatures. The disciplinary authority according to learned counsel could not refer to any such document available with the department so as to create doubt about signatures and if any, it failed to supply copy thereof to the petitioner alongwith show-cause notice so as to enable him to defend the findings as far as charge No. 3 is concerned. 18. Assailing the order of the appellate authority, counsel for the petitioner has argued that appellate authority has simply affirmed the decision taken by the disciplinary authority without recording any independent finding as to the documents and report that could be said to be sufficient enough to bring the charges home so as to punish the petitioner. 18. Assailing the order of the appellate authority, counsel for the petitioner has argued that appellate authority has simply affirmed the decision taken by the disciplinary authority without recording any independent finding as to the documents and report that could be said to be sufficient enough to bring the charges home so as to punish the petitioner. One more argument has been advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is that, had it been a case of complaint at the end of the policy holders or their heirs or successors that maturity amount had been got encashed fraudulently by a third party, there would have arisen an occasion for the Corporation to take a suo motu notice of the disbursal of the claim styling it to be a fraudulent act on the part of the petitioner but it was not so. 19. He further argued that the loss would have been caused to the Corporation, had the maturity claim gone in favour of the petitioner who might not have been entitled to the same or in the event of any excess amount than due amount had been got paid. Neither of the situation being there, the department failed to make out a case of fraudulent payment by the petitioner. He, therefore, submitted that besides the fact that the charges could not be proved, even punishment was disproportionate to the charges made, there being no loss caused to the Corporation as there was not complaint as such. So the Corporation was not justified to assume loss and accordingly penalize the petitioner with recovery. He further submitted that in the entire service carrier of the petitioner he had cleared hundreds of maturity claims and never any finger was raised. Here also the maturity claim had been released, but the finger was raised for technical reason that surety bond was signed by an agent not belonging to the branch and so witness agent of indemnity bond was not belonging to the branch. He, therefore, argued that at the most, petitioner could have been visited with penalty of censure and caution and to be more responsible and careful in future. The punishment of reduction of one stage in the time scale was too excessive. He, therefore, argued that at the most, petitioner could have been visited with penalty of censure and caution and to be more responsible and careful in future. The punishment of reduction of one stage in the time scale was too excessive. He submitted that negligence if at all was there, it was not deliberate one and if, in the event Corporation could have proved that agent of different branch could not have executed surety, nor could have signed indemnity bond as witness, it would have been at the most on irregularity and illegality not to the extent of impunity because the persons who signed it both as executant of surety and then as a witness to the indemnity bond were not denied to be authorized agents of the Corporation though belonging to another branch in the same city. 20. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner has attained the age of superannuation and recovery has already been made pursuant to the order impugned. 21. Sri Sanjeev Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent in the first instance submits that the disciplinary authority had every right to disagree with the findings returned in enquiry report of enquiry officer and accordingly issued a show-cause notice. He submits that the findings of the enquiry officer on charge No. 1-A,-2 and 3 were even not correct for the sufficient material available on record. He argued that disciplinary authority in its final order imposing penalty has discussed all those documents and then assigned reasons why it disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and held the petitioner guilty of the charges. He submitted that no procedural flaw has been claimed by the petitioner in the entire disciplinary proceedings and merely because this Court may come to a different conclusion from what has been arrived at by the disciplinary authority on the basis of documents available before it, this Court would not sit in appeal over and above findings returned. He argued that both the disciplinary authority well as appellate authority have dealt in detail with every aspect of the matter and have correctly held petitioner to be guilty of the charges. 22. He argued that both the disciplinary authority well as appellate authority have dealt in detail with every aspect of the matter and have correctly held petitioner to be guilty of the charges. 22. On the question of penalty imposed upon the petitioner, learned Senior Advocate argued that the penalty has been imposed as per relevant rules which authorized the authority to impose penalty and the nature of negligence that has been committed by the petitioner which can be taken to be quite serious lapse in nature because it involved disbursement of the maturity claim against a policy. It is always duty of officer in the rank which petitioner was to be doubly sure that in the absence of policy bond, indemnity bond was being signed alongwith maturity claim form by the same person who had signed the policy bond and that surety filed by an agent should have been very carefully examined and verified. Thus, he submitted that penalty imposed is commensurate to the charge levelled and findings returned upon the charges by the disciplinary authority. He further argued, alternatively, if the Court is of the view that penalty imposed is not proportionate to the charges proved, it may remand the matter to the disciplinary authority to take decision afresh as far as penalty part is concerned. 23. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the records relating to disciplinary proceedings brought on record and also the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority and the respective arguments raised across the bar, I am of the view that this Court would certainly be interfering in a case where findings returned by enquiry officer or disciplinary authority are found to be perverse for there being documents speaking otherwise or for there being no document at all to support the findings. 24. Normally the rule is that the matter is remitted to be decided afresh from the stage, it is found that procedural steps have gone wrong requiring interference by this Court or even in matters where the Court concludes that the matter required to be examined afresh by the disciplinary authority or by the appellate authority and also in matters of proportionality as to the penalty imposed considering the charge levelled and proved. 25. 25. I have no reason to disagree with the argument advanced by learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Corporation that in matters of disciplinary authority, the Court would not be interfering as a rule but there is no thumb rule either. If the findings of the enquiry officer is found to be perverse and disciplinary authority has agreed or concurred with the same, and resultant punishment/penalty such a situation would certainly require interference by this Court to arrest any miscarriage of justice. 26. In service jurisprudence there is no scope for an order by administrative authority to be sustained even if not well informed one. An employee is never in a bargaining position with the employer for the simple reason that its employer who offers appointment, it is he who lays down conditions, it is he who frames the rules and it is he who also controls the game, period of service. The employee once appointed stands virtually caged in, and therefore, every action of the employer is not only to be within the four corners of the rules but within the parameters laid in administrative law to test an action of administrative authority. When it comes to the state, its instrumentality, its agency, then an order has to pass testing anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution, and if it fails, it would be arbitrary action, which would be required to be arrested to avoid any miscarriage of justice. 27. In the present case since petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation, I proceed to decide the matter taking it not to be a case which should be remanded at this stage. 28. From the entire facts of the disciplinary proceedings, the charges that have been levelled against the petitioner can be reproduced as under : (a). One Jagish Kumar Anand ensured with Life Corporation of India, was paid the maturity claim under policy, on the basis of surety form signed by LIC agent of a different branch and witnessed by veterinary doctor and then on the basis of indemnity bond and discharge voucher witnessed by another agent of a different branch and so also witnessed by veterinary doctor. The payment was questioned on three grounds: (a). that surety and indemnity bonds were not properly executed and signatures of the ensured on the original policy proposal form were different from that of indemnity bond and discharge voucher; (b). The payment was questioned on three grounds: (a). that surety and indemnity bonds were not properly executed and signatures of the ensured on the original policy proposal form were different from that of indemnity bond and discharge voucher; (b). as a consequence of the above, it was claimed that there was lack of verification on the part of the petitioner regarding due verification of the authenticity of the policy holder who got paid the amount and resultantly Corporation suffered a loss of Rs.64,965/- the maturity amount; and (c). The claim of maturity amount in favour of P.K. Agarwal got cleared and encashed on 2.5.2006 whereas the policy bond and discharge voucher claim to have been submitted by policy holder subsequently on 16.6.2006 and so it was a case where Life Insurance Corporation is claimed again to have suffered loss of Rs. 57,700/- the claim amount. 29. In order to establish this above charges, the Corporation had no other document except those mentioned in the charges but a crucial document relating to the third charge, the discharge voucher dated 16.6.2006 was not produced. 30. Yet another aspect is equally important here to be noticed that Corporation did not turn up to show that any such claim made before it was complained of by either insured persons or their successors that maturity claim got encashed by a third party and they had been defrauded. It is equally worth noticing that during disciplinary enquiry, presenting officer of the Corporation did not produce any manual or rules which would have supported the charge that an agent to sign surety or to sign the indemnity bond and discharge voucher as witness must belong to the same branch from where maturity claim was to be issued. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Corporation, on a pointed query could not produce any such manual or the rules. 31. Now it is in the backdrop of the above, I proceed to examine the case, more especially relating to the findings returned by the Enquiry officer and disagreement expressed by the disciplinary authority so as to justify its stand in passing the order of punishment. 32. 31. Now it is in the backdrop of the above, I proceed to examine the case, more especially relating to the findings returned by the Enquiry officer and disagreement expressed by the disciplinary authority so as to justify its stand in passing the order of punishment. 32. In order to establish that surety bond could not have been signed by the agent not belonging to the branch from where maturity claim was to be disbursed and/or an indemnity bond and discharge voucher could not have been witnessed by an agent who did not belong to the said branch, it was primarily a duty of the Corporation to have presented the relevant provisions of the manual/or the rules of the Corporation and in the in the absence thereof or if there was no rule and manual, the Corporation was required to prove that these agents were fraudulent persons. In the enquiry report regarding this aspect of the matter, a finding returned is that '' P.O.' has also confirmed that there is no circular that states that the agent should be of the same branch''. In other words, no guidelines/circular that may have prohibited the agent of other branch to be of surety was produced. The enquiry officer recorded that P.O. (Presenting Officer) sought to frame a new charge of indemnity bond by the surety. The enquiry officer refused to give any acknowledgement to such new charge, it not being part of the charge-sheet. 33. On the question of indemnity bond, the reply by the petitioner was ''in view of document P-1 (i.e. copy of the original policy bond already available with the Corporation) submitted by P.O. itself, the lapse in execution of indemnity bond has no meaning at all.'' The enquiry officer held ''if policy bond was there, the surety papers would not have been submitted at all'' but he found it to be not clear as to when policy bond was submitted and so observed ''I am constrained to accept when policy bond was available at the time of settling maturity claim''. 34. This above finding does not hold the document of policy bond bearing insurance stamp to be bad. This rather strengthens petitioner's case that maturity was claimed in respect of genuine bond. 34. This above finding does not hold the document of policy bond bearing insurance stamp to be bad. This rather strengthens petitioner's case that maturity was claimed in respect of genuine bond. Still further, enquiry officer has not held indemnity bond and the surety to be forged or fake document and so charge 1-A cannot be said to have been proved at all. The only conclusion in regard to this charge by enquiry officer is that it was not acceptable that policy bond was available at the time of settling maturity claim. 35. Regarding charge 1-B, the enquiry officer held that ''presenting officer (of the bank) could not find out any difference particularly in the letter 'K'' in its style and flow from one signature to the other signature''. Moreover, he held that '' here is important to mention that P.O. himself has admitted that style of signature appears to be same'' Moreover a period of 21 years has elapsed from the date of first signature (on the proposal form) and second signature and naturally both the signatures cannot match in to to, may be similar (similarity on style) has been acknowledged by P.O. but exact match of signature was not possible. Thus, charge 1-B was also held as not proved. 36. Regarding charge No. 2, the enquiry officer held that ''cheque was prepared by accounts department favouring policy holder and forwarding letter carries address given in he policy bond/discharge cheque and then sent the dispatch through moment register.'' It was Sri V.K. Pandey (sub staff) who received this cheque (referred the document as D-5) without any authority or any approval from the competent authority that can at the most be said to have led fraudulent misappropriation for which petitioner could not be blamed. Thus, charge 2 was also held as not proved. 37. Regarding charge No. 3, the enquiry officer held that in March, 2006, the claim was processed whereas discharge form No. 3825, and the policy bond was received only on 16.6.2016 but the presenting officer of the Corporation failed to produce any such discharge form which was claimed to have been presented on 16.6.2006. The enquiry officer further held that as per presenting officer's own document, P-16, it bore maturity paid stamp. Thus, charge No. 3 was also held as 'not proved'. 38. The enquiry officer further held that as per presenting officer's own document, P-16, it bore maturity paid stamp. Thus, charge No. 3 was also held as 'not proved'. 38. The disciplinary authority while agreed with the findings of enquiry officer on charge 1-A disagreed with the findings on other charges and observed that there was some difference in signatures which was noticeable to prove the charge 1-B and then proceeded to prove charge 2 merely on the basis that surety form No. 3507 was approved by the petitioner and indemnity bond also without verifying credentials of the policy holder. Thus petitioner was held to be guilty of facilitating perpetration of fraud and resultant fraudulent acknowledgement of cheque. 39. Regarding charge No. 3, disciplinary authority has expressed its view that policy bond and discharge voucher having been received on 16.6.2006 the maturity claim could not have been released in March, 2006 and again negligence was cited on the part of the petitioner. 40. These above are bare statements made in the show-cause notice to defer with the findings. The reply of the petitioner has been noticed in the show-cause notice and then a reference has been made to the findings on charge No. 1-A of the enquiry officer to the following effect : ''1. There is no documentary evidence of the financial status of the surety, in this case, agent Shri P.K. Gautam. 2. Indemnity Bond though notarized, has not been executed by the surety.'' 41. Regarding charge Nos. 2 and 3, no further documents have been referred to so as to justify that findings returned by the enquiry officer were not worth to be reckoned with. The petitioner's reply as usual has not been held to be satisfactory to the show-cause notice. Despite statement made by the petitioner in his reply that both the cheques were received by the persons of Corporation whose identity was well established and yet they were not questioned. 42. Regarding execution of the surety and signing of the indemnity bond and discharge voucher, same legal plea was taken by the petitioner. Despite statement made by the petitioner in his reply that both the cheques were received by the persons of Corporation whose identity was well established and yet they were not questioned. 42. Regarding execution of the surety and signing of the indemnity bond and discharge voucher, same legal plea was taken by the petitioner. The disciplinary authority in its ultimate final order has though referred to the reply of the petitioner to the charge-sheet but has failed to reverse the findings of enquiry officer on the issue of execution of surety and signing of indemnity bond and discharge voucher by witnesses who were authorized agents of the Corporation though belonging to the other branch, whereas it was fair admission on the part of presenting officer that there was no such rule or manual available that such agent should of the same branch. 43. The disciplinary authority could not refer to any document by which it could be said that the surety was not duly executed and signed by the authorized person or that indemnity bond and discharge vouchers were not signed by the policy holder and not witnessed by the authorized persons. Thus reply of petitioner has been repelled for no justifiable reason. A mere statement that the officer should shoulder his share of responsibility very consciously would not bring home the charge. The disciplinary authority, instead, was required to rely upon the rule that such surety and indemnity bond could not have been signed by a agent of another branch and should have held that such surety and indemnity bond and discharge voucher were forged documents. The disciplinary authority was also required to test finding addressing the question, whether merely for indemnity bond that was filed, it would have dis-entitled the policy holder of the maturity claim. Having not held so, neither findings of enquiry officer on charge No. 1-A nor, of the disciplinary authority on such charge would be said to have been well informed with the reasons and supported by documents and rules. 44. Regarding charge Nos. 2 and 3, the disciplinary authority has not been able to assign any reason for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer as to difference in signatures. The disciplinary authority has not been able to establish as to how it finds that the signatures upon the discharge voucher of the policy claimants Mr. J.K. Anand were forged. 2 and 3, the disciplinary authority has not been able to assign any reason for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer as to difference in signatures. The disciplinary authority has not been able to establish as to how it finds that the signatures upon the discharge voucher of the policy claimants Mr. J.K. Anand were forged. Similarly, therefore, the question of verification of indemnity bond and surety would arrive provided the insured/policy holder or his legal heirs and successors come to lodge complaint that they have not received payments and that they had not executed such bond and that agents have virtually committed fraud. In the absence of any such finding, petitioner has rightly replied that the entire papers processed through a different department, namely claim department were placed before him for final approval. He would see the documents placed and would believe the noting done by the claim department to approve the same. Once the approval is accorded, the duty of payment is of accounts department and if the cheque had been received by a third party, petitioner could not have been held liable for the same. 45. Similarly, again in respect of charge No. 3 the disciplinary authority failed to record a findings that report of the enquiry officer was perverse and that discharge voucher and policy bond were received on 16.6.2006 and he had perused the same and that enquiry officer failed to notice this document. On this aspect, regarding charge No. 3, there is no finding by disciplinary authority. Thus, in my considered view the disciplinary authority had disagreed with the findings returned by the enquiry officere without recording any independent finding of fact relying upon any material which may be said to have gone unnoticed by the enquiry officer or noticed but was ignored by the enquiry officer. There being no such finding, the disciplinary authority was not justified in taking a different view from that of the enquiry officer. 46. Coming to the order of the appellate authority, I find that the appellate authority has proceeded to hold that the enquiry officer had held that policy bond was not available, therefore, in the absence of policy bond, the correctness of the indemnity bond was to be verified. 46. Coming to the order of the appellate authority, I find that the appellate authority has proceeded to hold that the enquiry officer had held that policy bond was not available, therefore, in the absence of policy bond, the correctness of the indemnity bond was to be verified. The appellate authority has failed to record any reason as to what compelled him to hold that surety and indemnity bonds were forged documents and were not duly executed. It is worth noticing that neither disciplinary authority, nor the appellate authority has held that those documents to be forged documents. Regarding difference in signatures also the appellate authority came to conclusion that it had come to observe that there was difference in signatures and whether there was slight or major difference, it was quite noticeable which should not have been ignored by the petitioner and had he been vigilant, he would have arrested the fraud. 47. In my considered view, this above finding is not tenable for the simple reason that the bank's presenting officer himself has found style and flow of the signatures to be same. What difference it found/noticed to record finding to the contrary has not been mentioned either in the order of disciplinary authority or the decision of the appellate authority that has affirmed the findings of disciplinary authority. 47-A. Supporting the plea of differences in signatures vide paragraph 45 of the counter-affidavit, it has been averred as under : ''That the contents of paragraph No. 51 of the writ petition are vehemently denied. It is further stated that the charges were levelled against the petitioner for having checked the claim payment Vr. No. 998 dated 6.3.2006 for Rs.64,975 under Policy No. 058472150 where signatures of Shri Jagdip Kumar Anand the policy holder in the Indemnity Bond and Discharge Voucher was different from the one on the proposal form. On the basis of the documents adduced during the enquiry proceedings it has been observed that there was difference in the questioned signatures. Difference being slight or major, the fact is that difference in signature was noticeable, which was ignored by the petitioner at the time of checking of the voucher. The entire allegations contrary to the facts stated above are vehemently denied.'' 48. The stand of the authority is that difference between two signatures slight or major would not weigh much if difference is apparent to naked eyes. The entire allegations contrary to the facts stated above are vehemently denied.'' 48. The stand of the authority is that difference between two signatures slight or major would not weigh much if difference is apparent to naked eyes. In my view once the presenting officer of Corporation himself noticed flow and style of this signatures to be same before enquiry officer and finding has been returned accordingly, the disciplinary authority could not have deferred merely because it appeared to him so without calling for an expert opinion. Even if the authority had its conviction, it must have penned down the difference in the backdrop of the fact that two signatures were with the gap of 21 years and there was no complaint by the insured. Thus vide paragraph 23, this has been reiterated in rejoinder-affidavit as under : ''That the contents of paragraph 45 of the counter-affidavit are wholly wrong and are denied and the contents of paragraph 51 of the writ petition are reiterated and reaffirmed. The signature of Jagdip Kumar Anand was strikingly similar. The flow and style of signature was the same to the naked eyes. The difference, if any, was due to a gap of 21 years and all these aspects were considered by the enquiry officer who has held the charge No. 1 (b) as not proved.'' 49. Regarding other charges, I find that the appellate authority has concurred with the findings of the disciplinary authority, holding petitioner to be guilty of negligence in discharge of his official duty but failed to give one independent reason to justify such a reasoning despite good grounds taken by the appellant-petitioner to assail the findings of disciplinary authority. 50. Regarding payment made in respect of Mr. Agarwal of the maturity claim, the appellate authority could also not disclose as to where the discharge voucher and policy bond alleged to have been received on 16.6.2006, had gone. This would have been the only statement of fact without there being any evidence on record that such a bond was received on 16.6.2006 subsequent to the disbursement of the maturity claim. This would have been the only statement of fact without there being any evidence on record that such a bond was received on 16.6.2006 subsequent to the disbursement of the maturity claim. Besides above, the appellate authority has also not discussed anywhere as to why those two employees, namely, V.K. Pandey and Uday Narayan Singh Chauhan who were employees of the Corporation and their identity was known, were not enquired by the Corporation for receiving cheques and no enquiry was held against them. 51. In view of above, therefore, I find that the orders passed by the appellate authority as well disciplinary authority cannot be sustained in law. As far as enquiry officer is concerned, though, I am not satisfied with the findings returned by the enquiry officer that, had the original policy bond been filed, there would have been no occasion to file indemnity bond as this by itself would not be sufficient enough to question the disbursement of maturity claim. It was never an issue as far as charge Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned that payment was made without there being original policy bond. The payment was made on indemnity bond because original policy bond was not presented and charge was only that surety and indemnity bond was not properly executed as the agents were from a different branch. Since the Corporation failed to place any rule or provision under manual either before enquiry officer or even before this Court, which would have disclosed an act of fraud in execution of surety and indemnity bond and resultant discharge voucher to be illegal, I hold that that there was no finding of the enquiry officer that indemnity bond and surety were not properly executed. There is a finding in favour of the petitioner and not against the petitioner in enquiry report. In such circumstances, therefore, the disciplinary authority was required to record a cogent and convincing finding to bring the charge home. Now, in this case, I find therefore, that the charges could not be established by the Corporation and findings returned by the appellate authority as well disciplinary authority are perverse for want of substantive piece of evidence. In the counter-affidavit, nothing has been disclosed additionally in support of the findings returned so as to compel this Court to remand the matter. In the counter-affidavit, nothing has been disclosed additionally in support of the findings returned so as to compel this Court to remand the matter. The most relevant paragraph of the counter-affidavit is paragraph No. 44 that runs as under : ''That the contents of paragraph No. 49 and 50 of the writ petition are vehemently denied. It is further stated that the charge I was levelled against the petitioner that without proper verification and identification he allowed and approved the Surety Form 3807 and Indemnity Bond filled in the name of Shrie Jagdip Kumar Anad for payment of Maturity Claim under Policy No. 058472150. While allowing and approving the Surety Form No. 3807 and Indemenity Bond petitioner had verified the witness who did not belong to the Branch concerned. He should have been vigilant and raised doubt. The contentions raised by him do not alter the fact that based on his approval the maturity claim was passed and fraudulently encashed by person other than the policy holder. Further as per the documents adduced during the enquiry proceeding P-15 (Guidelines for Maturity Claim payment in case of lost Policy) Indemnity bond was also not executed by Surety. The entire allegations contrary to the facts stated above are vehemently denied.'' 52. This paragraph has been sworn on the basis of perusal of record but no record has been annexed. Upon repeated querry being made, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Corporation could not place any rule/regulation or manual for executing indemnity/surety bonds, in support of the allegations made. In so far as allegations regarding fact of Policy not being placed, in my considered view when this was not the charge, this aspect was not open to be enquired into. Even otherwise, the Corporation failed to make out a case that even while original policy bond was available, there was no need to furnish surety bond and indemnity bond. So even this ground was not available to the disciplinary authority. There was no such charge that persons executing surety and indemnity bond where fraudulent persons. A very correct reply has been submitted in the rejoinder-affidavit vide paragraph 25 that runs as under : ''25. That the contents of paragraph 47 of the counter-affidavit are wholly wrong and are denied and the contents of paragraph 53 of the writ petition are reiterated and reaffirmed. A very correct reply has been submitted in the rejoinder-affidavit vide paragraph 25 that runs as under : ''25. That the contents of paragraph 47 of the counter-affidavit are wholly wrong and are denied and the contents of paragraph 53 of the writ petition are reiterated and reaffirmed. The verification and identification was proper and there was nothing wrong in it. Further, when the original policy bond was itself submitted on 6.3.2006, there was no necessity of submitting the Surety Form and Indemnity Bond. After due process of the maturity claim the cheque was prepared and subsequently if cheque is fraudulently encashed the petitioner cannot be punished by searching fault in the approval of Surety Form and Indemnity Bond.'' 53. Thus the case in hand is one such case where I find that the enquiry officer having found no evidence to support the charges exonerated the petitioner from all the cahrges except one charge being No. 1-A. Even though, this care was also not proved by evidence but the enquiry officer expressed his view, had original insurance policy been there, indemnity and surety bonds would not have been required. This in my view there is no finding to bring home the charge as even a man of ordinary prudence would not come to conclude that charge No. 1-A stood proved upon the available evidence. Regarding other charge, if the disciplinary authority was taking the view contrary to the findings of enquiry officer, it was required to appreciated the same evidence as substantial piece of evidence but there has been no appreciation worth calling it as such. I have discussed the findings in detail for not appreciate or re-appreciate but to find out as to whether there was any evidence to support findings or legal provision in support of the charge as to witnesses to indemnity/surety bonds were required to belong to same branch that had issued the Insurance Policy and I found there to none. Under the circumstances findings if sustained would only lead to miscarriage of justice. 54. Constraints and self discipline in exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are sine qua non as principle to be followed when it comes to judicial review of an administrative or executive action. Under the circumstances findings if sustained would only lead to miscarriage of justice. 54. Constraints and self discipline in exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are sine qua non as principle to be followed when it comes to judicial review of an administrative or executive action. One must remember that judicial review is a legal process through which the Courts examine the action or decision to ensure that they are lawful and constitutional. This process allows judiciary to assess the legality of actions taken by the Government and its instrumentalities and determine if they complied with constitution or other laws. So judicial review is a fundamental principle that provides a system of cheques and balances. It enables judiciary to safeguard individual rights uphold the rule of law and prevent abuse of power by execute/Government or its instrumentalities. When a person or organization challenges an action through judicial review, to be specific under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court is under obligation to evaluate whether action is consistent with law and constitution. If the Court finds that action is unconstitutional or unlawful, it may declare action null and void or may pass appropriate order to rectify situation. 55. It is true that power of judicial is not akin to the power of appeal and in exercise of power High Court cannot appreciate evidence to arrive at its own findings to substitute findings of the enquiry officer in a disciplinary proceeding. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of fact but in the event conclusion of finding by the disciplinary authority is barred as no evidence or conclusion of finding is such that a reasonable person would have reached, this Court may interfere with the conclusion or finding (B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 ). 56. Supreme Court in its recent judgment in the case of Union of India and others v. Subrata Nath (Special Leave to Appeal Nos. 3524- 25 of 2022 decided on 23.11.2022) referred to the judgment of Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 , wherein it was held that ''if conclusion drawn by the disciplinary authority is perverse or suffers from error on the face of record or barred as no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari will be issued.'' 57. In view of above, I am not able to sustain the action of disciplinary authority. Accordingly, since I am not able to uphold the findings of disciplinary authority and consequential orders of punishment. The Court would have in ordinary circumstances remitted the matter to the stage of enquiry officers or at disciplinary authority as held by the Constitution bench that ''where after following the above procedure the Courts/Tribunals sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority, management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome (Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and others, (1993) 4 SCC 727 ),'' but since petitioner has already retired from service so no useful purpose now would be served to remand the matter to be examined afresh. 58. In my considered view, there was no material available which would have established the charge, nor was there any complaint by ensured persons that claim had been got disbursed to a third party to their disadvantage and that they had been defrauded. 59. In view of above, writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority dated 25th January, 2016 and 2nd August, 2016 are hereby quashed. The petitioner is held entitled to all consequential benefits treating him to in service in the same pay grade and pay scale in which he was at the time of passing of the order dated 25th January, 2016 and all consequential benefits in terms of pay fixation etc. and arrears of pay. Further the amount already recovered from the petitioner under the order dated 25th January, 2016 shall also be refunded to him.