JUDGMENT : Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J. These appeals arise out of a common judgment dated 03rd February 2020 passed in W.P. (C) No. 1284 of 2014 and W.P. (C) No. 5057 of 2015. L.P.A. No. 140 of 2020 arises from W.P. (C) No. 5057 of 2015 and L.P.A. No. 143 of 2020 arises from W.P. (C) No. 1284 of 2014. 2. W.P. (C) No. 1284 of 2014 was filed by the then Jharkhand State Electricity Board (now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited and Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited) [hereinafter referred to as “Nigam”] and W.P. (C) No. 5057 of 2015 was filed by the Appellant. By the common impugned judgment, W.P. (C) No. 1284 of 2014 has been allowed and W.P. (C) No. 5057 of 2015 has been dismissed. 3. The appellant was having high tension electricity connection for a contract demand of 1500 KVA under 33 KV supply bearing consumer number HJAP-71. The dispute involved in both cases relates to ‘voltage rebate’. The total period involved in these cases is from May 2010 to July 2015. This period is governed by different tariffs as notified from time to time. W.P.(C) No.1284 of 2014 is covered by tariff 2010-11 (May 2010 to July 2011) and W.P.(C) No.5057 of 2015 is covered by tariff 2011-12 and 2012-13(August 2011 to July 2015). W.P.(C) No. 1284 of 2014 4. W.P.(C) No.1284 of 2014 was filed on behalf of Nigam for quashing the order dated 09th October 2013 passed by the Electricity Ombudsman, Jharkhand in Appeal No. EOJ/03/2013 and also for quashing the order dated 25th May 2013 passed by Vidyut Upbhokta Shikayat Nivaran Forum, Chaibasa at Jamshedpur in Case No. 33/2011/06/2012. By the orders impugned in the writ petition, the appellant was held entitled to ‘voltage rebate’ for the period May 2010 to July 2011 and Nigam was directed to revise the bills. 5. The appellant had initially filed a consumer case before the Vidyut Upbhokta Shikayat Niwaran Forum, Ranchi (hereinafter referred to as ‘Forum’). The case was transferred to Forum at Chaibasa and numbered as Case No.33 of 2011. In the consumer case, the appellant had prayed for a direction upon Nigam to allow ‘voltage rebate’ as per the tariff 2010-11 applicable for the period from May 2010 to July 2011. On notice, Nigam appeared before the Forum. The case was transferred to Forum at Chaibasa and numbered as Case No.33 of 2011. In the consumer case, the appellant had prayed for a direction upon Nigam to allow ‘voltage rebate’ as per the tariff 2010-11 applicable for the period from May 2010 to July 2011. On notice, Nigam appeared before the Forum. The stand taken by Nigam was that ‘voltage rebate’ was being allowed to the appellant in the light of letter dated 26th June 2004 with respect to the tariff order 2003-04 pursuant to which even the consumers in arrears were entitled for ‘voltage rebate’. However, after coming into force of tariff order 2010-11 issued by Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘Regulatory Commission’) both ‘voltage rebate’ and ‘load factor rebate’ are not available to the consumers who are in arrears. The consumer case was decided in favour of the appellant; the appeal filed by Nigam before the Electricity Ombudsman (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Ombudsman’) was also dismissed. It was the case of Nigam before the writ Court in W.P.(C) No.1284 of 2014 that the Forum as well as the Ombudsman had erroneously held that the appellant was entitled to get ‘voltage rebate’ under the tariff 2010-11 by erroneously interpreting the tariff order 2010-11 and by holding that the appellant was not in arrears on the basis of the judgment passed by the appellate authority in the case of another consumer namely M/s Usha Martin being Case No. 20 of 2006. 6. It was the case of Nigam that the amount of Rs. 9,91,621/- on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ and Rs.2,42,136/- on account of ‘annual minimum guarantee charges’ (AMG Charges) for the period 2000-01 along with ‘delayed payment surcharge’ (DPS) of Rs. 62,995/- was ‘kept in abeyance’ in the bill for the month of January 2003 related to the appellant, ‘voltage rebate’ was not to be allowed to the petitioner as per the provisions of tariff order 2010-11. But this contention was negated by the Forum. By order dated 25th May 2013 passed in Case No. 33 of 2011, it was decided in favour of the appellant and Nigam was directed to issue revised bills from May 2010 onwards by allowing ‘voltage rebate’ under the tariff 2010-11. Aggrieved with the order dated 25th May 2013, Nigam preferred an appeal before the Electricity Ombudsman, Jharkhand which was numbered as EOJ/03/2013. Aggrieved with the order dated 25th May 2013, Nigam preferred an appeal before the Electricity Ombudsman, Jharkhand which was numbered as EOJ/03/2013. The learned Electricity Ombudsman after hearing the parties decided the appeal by order dated 09th October 2013 and directed Nigam to issue revised bills to the appellant from May 2010 by allowing ‘voltage rebate’ under the tariff 2010-11. It has been contended that such direction was again issued ignoring the provision of tariff order 2010-11 issued by the Regulatory Commission. 7. Before the learned writ Court, it was submitted by Nigam that the appellant was in arrear of the ‘fuel surcharge’ amount which was paid after the disposal of the batch of matters of ‘fuel surcharge’ by the High Court reported in 2015 (4) JCR 88 (Tata Yodogawa Limited versus Jharkhand State Electricity Board and other analogous cases). For this, a reference was made to the order dated 03rd November 2015 passed in L.P.A. No. 616 of 2015 arising out of the judgment passed in the case of Tata Yodogawa (supra). 8. It was also submitted before the learned writ Court that in view of the general order for all the consumers passed by the High Court on 03rd August 1999 in C.W.J.C. No. 2112/99(R), the ‘fuel surcharge’ was not paid even by the appellant and the issue remained pending. Relying on the observation of the Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 616 of 2015 in order dated 03rd November 2015, it was submitted that the amount in question was paid in the year 2015 as recorded in the Division Bench order. It was submitted that the appellant had not produced any order of stay granted by the High Court upon demand of the principal amount of ‘fuel surcharge’. It was submitted that the consumers including M/s Usha Martin or the appellant have been paying lesser rates of ‘fuel surcharge’ in view of the order passed by the High Court from time to time which was exactly the same. The issue has been finally decided by the High Court in the judgment in “Jharkhand State Electricity Board Vs. It was submitted that the consumers including M/s Usha Martin or the appellant have been paying lesser rates of ‘fuel surcharge’ in view of the order passed by the High Court from time to time which was exactly the same. The issue has been finally decided by the High Court in the judgment in “Jharkhand State Electricity Board Vs. M/s Usha Martin Limited” in W.P.(C) No.3005 of 2011 a copy of which had been annexed in W.P.(C) No. 5057 of 2015 wherein it has been held that amount of fuel surcharge ‘kept in abeyance’ by virtue of interim order is to be treated as an arrear and on that ground, rebate was denied. 9. The points raised by Nigam before the learned writ Court were as under: (A) While interpreting the tariff 2010-11, it was submitted by the Nigam that two kinds of rebates, i.e. ‘voltage rebate’ and ‘load factor rebate’ were made permissible to the consumers upon conditions as prescribed in the tariff. After the head ‘voltage rebate’ and then ‘load factor rebate’, a note was given at the bottom mentioning “Note: The above rebate will be available only on monthly basis and consumer with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates”. By placing the said tariff 2010-11, it was submitted that the ‘voltage rebate’ as well as ‘load factor rebate’ was supposed to be provided to the consumers only on a monthly basis and that too with a condition that the said rebates shall not be available to the consumers who are in arrears. It was further submitted that there is no much difference in the tariff applicable between 01st May 2010 to 31st July 2011 as well as in the tariff applicable from 01st August 2011. In the tariff applicable from 01st May 2010, a common note was given below the head ‘voltage rebate’ and ‘load factor rebate’ which was made separate in the subsequent tariff applicable from 01st August 2011. The condition did not change. In the subsequent tariff order, a separate note was given under each head. (B) By referring to the judgment dated 30th April 2015 passed in W.P.(C) No.1682 of 2015, it was submitted that with regard to tariff order 2012-13, it was considered and held that a consumer with arrears shall not be eligible for the rebate. In the subsequent tariff order, a separate note was given under each head. (B) By referring to the judgment dated 30th April 2015 passed in W.P.(C) No.1682 of 2015, it was submitted that with regard to tariff order 2012-13, it was considered and held that a consumer with arrears shall not be eligible for the rebate. It was further submitted that this order has been affirmed in L.P.A. No. 254 of 2015. 10. The points raised by the appellant before the learned writ Court were as under: (i) The appellant submitted before the learned writ Court that the 2003-04 tariff schedule was issued by the Regulatory Commission for the licensee-Jharkhand State Electricity Board which was effective from 01st January 2004. In respect of HT consumers, a ‘voltage rebate’ was granted. (ii) In the tariff 2011-12, for the first time a condition was imposed so far as ‘voltage rebate’ is concerned to the effect that if there are any arrears, unless and until they are stayed by the competent Court of law, ‘voltage rebate’ will not be granted. It was submitted that there was no arrear with regard to the appellant and in the bill, it was shown to that effect, and a certain amount was shown as ‘kept in abeyance’. (iii) It was submitted by the appellant that the appellant never delayed the payment of a single bill; all the bills were paid on time and in each and every bill, the rebate on timely payment was provided to the appellant. It was further submitted that there was no arrear but a certain amount was ‘kept in abeyance’ which was in relation to ‘fuel surcharge’ in view of the general interim order passed by the High Court for all consumers to pay ‘fuel surcharge’ at particular rates and after the matter was finalized, the appellant made payment of the principal amount of ‘fuel surcharge’ and the demand on account of ‘delayed payment surcharge’ was stayed by the order of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court passed in L.P.A. No.616 of 2015. It was further submitted that the issue of ‘fuel surcharge’ has not been finalized and is still sub-judice before this Court. It was further submitted that the issue of ‘fuel surcharge’ has not been finalized and is still sub-judice before this Court. (iv) So far as the judgment passed in W.P.(C) No.3005 of 2011 is concerned, the same was with regard to ‘load factor rebate’ and at that time it was a condition that if there were arrears, no ‘load factor rebate’ should be granted. The present case relates to ‘voltage rebate’. The period in question was under the 2003-04 tariff. It was further submitted that said condition was modified by stipulating that the rebates would be available if the arrears were stayed by the competent Court of law. The further grievance of the appellant was that before the issuance of the supplementary bill dated 17th September 2015, whereby the ‘voltage rebate’ was withdrawn for the period from August 2011, no show cause notice was given to the appellant and no opportunity for a hearing was provided. (v) He further submitted that the judgment relied by Nigam passed in “Jharkhand State Electricity Board Vs. M/s Usha Martin Limited” in W.P.(C) No.3005 of 2011 is on another rebate, i.e., ‘load factor rebate’ and for the tariff of the year 2003-04 and thus, that judgment is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. 2010-11 tariff is very clear which deals with ‘load factor rebate’ and the word rebates deals with three types of rebates. There is a distinction regarding the granting of ‘voltage rebate’. (vi) By way of placing Black’s Law Dictionary, the learned senior counsel had submitted before the learned writ Court that ‘abeyance’ means ‘a condition of being undetermined or in state of suspension or inactivity’. Relying on the said dictionary, he had submitted that the ‘arrears’ means money that is overdue and unpaid, e.g., overdue or rent payments. He further relied on the meaning of ‘abeyance’ and ‘arrear money’ and submitted that in view of this, the meaning of the two words in Law Lexicon and Black’s Law Dictionary is very clear. Thus, the argument of Nigam cannot be accepted. 11. The stand of the Regulatory Commission before the learned writ Court was that in the ‘Note’ of the relevant portion of the tariff order, it has been clearly mentioned that consumers with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates. Thus, the argument of Nigam cannot be accepted. 11. The stand of the Regulatory Commission before the learned writ Court was that in the ‘Note’ of the relevant portion of the tariff order, it has been clearly mentioned that consumers with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates. The words ‘above rebates’ are self-explanatory and may not be read in singular but have to be read together i.e. for ‘voltage rebate’ and ‘load factor rebate’. W.P.(C) No. 5057 of 2015 12. W.P.(C) No.5057 of 2015 was filed by the appellant for quashing the letter No.2347 dated 17th September 2015 and also the supplementary bill dated 17th September 2015 amounting to Rs. 22,19,900/- raised on account of alleged wrongly allowed ‘voltage rebate’ for the period August 2011 to July 2015. The letter and bill dated 17th September 2015 was issued for the realization of ‘voltage rebate’ availed by the appellant during the period from August 2011 to July 2015 on the ground that the appellant was in arrears in connection with fuel surcharge – ‘kept in abeyance’. The impugned bill and order were issued as a consequence of the judgment of M/s Usha Martin passed in W.P.(C) No. 3005 of 2011 wherein M/s Usha Martin was held to be in arrears in connection with ‘fuel surcharge’ in connection with which interim orders were passed by the Court. There was no dispute that under tariff-2011-2012 a consumer with arrears was not entitled to both, ‘voltage rebate’ and ‘load factor rebate’. 13. It was the case of the appellant that the appellant was not in arrears in terms of the condition of tariff 2011-12 and there is no bill in which any arrear has been reflected. 14. The learned writ Court framed the following issues for consideration: “a. Whether M/s BMC Metal Cast Limited (petitioner in W.P.(C) No.5057 of 2015) shall be treated to be ‘in arrears’ during August, 2010 to July, 2015 on account of it having not paid admitted amount of fuel surcharge throughout, and b. Whether in view of the provisions of the tariff effective from 1st May, 2010 and another applicable from 1st August, 2011 the said petitioner shall be held to be entitled to get the aforesaid ‘voltage rebate’ and load factor rebate or not?” 15. After having recorded that the applicable tariff would be High Tension Special Service (HTSS), both the issues were decided against the appellant. The findings of the learned writ Court are as under: “18. From the Note of the above tariff it is clear that the above rebate will be available only on monthly basis and the consumers with arrear shall not be eligible for the above rebates. Thus, there is no dispute that the above rebate will be available only on monthly basis and the consumers with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates. 19. The consumers who are in arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates this needs to be read in continuity and not bifurcating it for the said rebate. It takes this Court to correct interpretation of Note. In this regard, reference may be made to the case in “Grid Corporation of Orissa Limited And Others v. Eastern Metals And Ferro Alloys And Others”- (2011) 11 SCC 334 . “25. This takes us to the correct interpretation of Clause 9.1. The golden rule of interpretation is that the words of a statute have to be read and understood in their natural, ordinary and popular sense. Where however the words used are capable of bearing two or more constructions, it is necessary to adopt purposive construction, to identify the construction to be preferred, by posing the following questions: (i) What is the purpose for which the provision is made? (ii) What was the position before making the provision? (iii) Whether any of the constructions proposed would lead to an absurd result or would render any part of the provision redundant? (iv) Which of the interpretations will advance the object of the provision? The answers to these questions will enable the court to identify the purposive interpretation to be preferred while excluding others. Such an exercise involving ascertainment of the object of the and choosing the interpretation that will advance the object of the provision can be undertaken, only where the language of the provision is capable of more than one construction. (See Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan and generally Justice G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 12th Edn., published by Lexis Nexis, pp. 124 to 131, dealing with the rule in Heydon case)” 20. (See Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan and generally Justice G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 12th Edn., published by Lexis Nexis, pp. 124 to 131, dealing with the rule in Heydon case)” 20. This Note is reasonably capable of two interpretations that the above rebate will be available only on monthly basis and the second is the consumer with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates. These two interpretations arise only if it is not being read in entirety and if it is being read in its entirety it is clear that the above rebate will be available only on monthly basis and the consumers with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates. This has also been admitted by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission. Reference may be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Adoni Ginning Factory And Others v. Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board, Hyderabad And Ors.”- (1979) 4 SCC 560 wherein interim order passed by the Court has been considered at paragraph no.5 of the said judgment, which is quoted hereinbelow: “5. The primary submission of the learned counsel was that there was no default on the part of the appellants in view of the injunction granted by the Supreme Court. We are unable to agree. The injunction granted by this Court restrained the Government from realising the arrears of enhanced charges. For the purposes of these appeals we may proceed on the assumption that the order of injunction bound the Electricity Board also. All that the injunction did was to restrain the Board from realising the arrears which meant that the Board was restrained from taking any coercive action such as disconnection of supply of electricity etc. for the realisation of the arrears. The operation of GO No. 187 dated January 30, 1955, as such, was not stayed. Thus the obligation of the consumers to pay charges at the enhanced rates was not suspended though the Electricity Board was prevented from realising the arrears. It was up to the consumers to pay or not to pay the arrears. If they paid the arrears they relieved themselves against the liability to pay surcharge. Thus the obligation of the consumers to pay charges at the enhanced rates was not suspended though the Electricity Board was prevented from realising the arrears. It was up to the consumers to pay or not to pay the arrears. If they paid the arrears they relieved themselves against the liability to pay surcharge. If they did not pay the arrears they were bound to pay the surcharge if they failed in the appeals before the Supreme Court ” 21. In view of the observation of the Division Bench in L.P.A. No.616 of 2015, it transpires that M/s B.M.C Metal Cast Limited has deposited the principle amount in 2015 meaning thereby the petitioner-company was in arrears of the energy bill. The issue of tariff order 2012-13 has been considered by this Court in W.P.(C) No.1682 of 2015 which has been affirmed up to the L.P.A which was numbered as L.P.A. No.254 of 2015. In the case of ‘M/s Usha Martin Ltd.’ in W.P.(C) No.3005 of 2011 it has already been held that in arrears for fuel surcharge are not entitled for getting the load factor rebate as admissible in the provision of tariff order of 2003-04. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussions the Note is very clear that the above rebate will be available only on the monthly basis and the consumers with the arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates which cannot be read by way of bifurcating it and if it is being read in its entirety it transpires that the consumer who are in arrear are not entitled for the rebate. 22. In view of the fact that M/s B.M.C Metal Cast Limited has cleared the amount in question in 2005 which has been observed in the Division Bench order in L.P.A. No.616 of 2015, this Court comes to conclusion that M/s B.M.C Metal Cast Limited was in arrear therefore not entitled for getting rebate as admissible under the provisions of tariff 2010-11 and in view of the above discussions, this Court allow the writ application being W.P.(C) No.1284 of 2014 and quash the judgment delivered by the Electricity Ombudsman, Jharkhand in Appeal No.EOJ/03/2013 and order dated 25.05.2013 passed by Vidyut Upbhokta Shikayat Nivaran Forum, Chaibasa at Jamshedpur in Case No.33/2011/06/2012 and dismissed the W.P.(C) No.5057 of 2015.” 16. Thus, the writ application being W.P.(C) No.1284 of 2014 was allowed; the judgment delivered by the Electricity Ombudsman, Jharkhand in Appeal No. EOJ/03/2013 and order dated 25th May 2013 passed by Vidyut Upbhokta Shikayat Nivaran Forum, Chaibasa at Jamshedpur in Case No. 33 of 201106 of 2012 were quashed. The writ petition W.P.(C) No.5057 of 2015 was dismissed. Arguments of the appellant. 17. The learned senior counsel for the appellant by referring to written submission has submitted as follows: - a. The impugned order is liable to be set-aside. The second question framed by the learned writ Court was erroneous as the issue of ‘load factor rebate’ was never there. The learned writ Court has not even referred or discussed the judgment passed by the Forum or the order of the Ombudsman while allowing the writ petition filed by the Nigam. b. The learned Single Judge did not appreciate that the impugned demand is based upon a judgment dated 10th July 2015 passed in W.P.(C) No. 3005 of 2011 which is factually different from the issues in question in the present cases inasmuch as – (i) the issue was in relation to ‘load factor rebate’ (ii) the period in question was of 2003-04 and (iii) There was no condition that if there is a stay, rebate should be granted. As a matter of fact, against the judgment in W.P.(C) No. 3005 of 2011 an L.P.A. No. 554 of 2015 is pending and as such, that judgment has also not attained finality. However, the said judgment is not applicable to the appellant on the basis of which the demand has been raised. c. When the 2010-11 tariff commenced i.e. from May 2010, there was no arrear in the bill of May 2010 which was the first bill of the 2010 tariff effective from 01st May 2010. As a matter of fact, never ever there was any arrear as the appellant always paid its bill on time. d. Though there were no arrears, but certain amount was ‘kept in abeyance’ (as would be evident from the bill) which was in relation to the ‘fuel surcharge’. There was a general interim order dated 03rd August 1999 in CWJC No. 2112 of 1999(R) passed by the High Court for all consumers to pay ‘fuel surcharge’ at a particular rate. d. Though there were no arrears, but certain amount was ‘kept in abeyance’ (as would be evident from the bill) which was in relation to the ‘fuel surcharge’. There was a general interim order dated 03rd August 1999 in CWJC No. 2112 of 1999(R) passed by the High Court for all consumers to pay ‘fuel surcharge’ at a particular rate. However, after the subsequent writ petitions in relation to the ‘fuel surcharge’ being CWJC No. 2758 OF 2000 (R) and analogous cases were dismissed vide order dated 08th May 2015, the Nigam issued a demand notice for the first time on 21st May 2015 demanding both the principal amount of ‘fuel surcharge’ and D.P.S. (interest) thereupon and the appellant paid the principal amount on 24th July 2015. The appellant consumer filed L.P.A. No. 616 of 2015 wherein Court stayed the payment of DPS (Interest). Even otherwise the LPAs regarding the issue of finalization of rates of ‘fuel surcharge’ are still pending for consideration before this Court. e. There is a difference between ‘kept in abeyance’ and ‘arrears’ which the learned writ Court has noted. The appellant has quoted from judgments and Black’s Law Dictionary wherein it has been stated that abeyance means ‘a condition of being undetermined or in a state of suspension or inactivity’. Relying on the said dictionary, it was submitted that the 'arrears' means ‘money which is overdue and unpaid’, e.g. overdue or rent payments. f. Learned Single Judge also did not appreciate that the judgment cited by the Nigam as a precedent namely W.P.(C) No. 1682 of 2015 was not applicable to the facts of the case. The said case was in relation to an Industry that started on 16th November 2013 when admittedly arrears were there since the consumer had sought instalment for payment of arrears. As a matter of fact, it was observed that if they want to avail rebate then they have to make payment of the entire energy bills. Therefore, this judgment was not applicable to the appellant. As a matter of fact, it was observed that if they want to avail rebate then they have to make payment of the entire energy bills. Therefore, this judgment was not applicable to the appellant. g. The learned Single Judge did not consider that before the respondents issued the impugned letter, no show cause notice was given as to why this ‘voltage rebate’ is being withdrawn and no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner (appellant herein) despite the fact that this contention as well as the case law in relation to this issue was noted in the judgment. h. The learned Single Judge also did not appreciate that in the 2010-11 tariff and subsequent tariff, there is a clear distinction regarding granting of ‘voltage rebate’ i.e., the condition in the 2011-12 tariff for grant of ‘voltage rebate’ is not there for 2010-11 tariff. i. The learned Single Judge did not appreciate that the condition in the 2010-11 tariff regarding rebate was only for ‘load factor rebate’ and not for the ‘voltage rebate’. The said condition with respect to ‘voltage rebate’ was incorporated for the first time in 2011-12 tariff but still the appellant did not have any arrears, rather some disputed amount was ‘kept in abeyance’. Arguments of the Nigam 18. The learned senior counsel for the Nigam by referring to written submissions has submitted as follows: - I. Tariff schedule of Nigam framed by Regulatory Commission for the period 2004-2010. (Applicable from 01st January 2004 to 30th April 2010) Clause 7.3 in the table for load factor with respect to ‘load factor rebate’, it was indicated with an asterisk mark: - “The above rebate will be available only on monthly basis and consumer with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates.” As per order dated 27th December 2003 of Regulatory Commission, Jharkhand State Electricity Board issued tariff schedule, effective from 01st January 2004. But in this Schedule for the HTS category of consumers so far ‘voltage rebate’ also has an asterisk mark like that for ‘load factor rebate’, which meant that for both the rebates there was the condition that consumers with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates. But in this Schedule for the HTS category of consumers so far ‘voltage rebate’ also has an asterisk mark like that for ‘load factor rebate’, which meant that for both the rebates there was the condition that consumers with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates. However, the Chief Engineer vide letter dated 26th June 2004 issued a corrigendum that there was a misprint in the tariff schedule and the ‘voltage rebate’ was to be allowed to consumers with arrears also. There is no dispute with respect to the period 01st January 2004 to 30th April 2010. II. Tariff schedule framed by Regulatory Commission for 2010-11 (Applicable from 01st May 2010 to 31st July 2011) Regarding ‘voltage rebate’ and ‘load factor rebate’ to HT consumers, there was no asterisk mark, rather just below the chart of voltage and load factor rebates, it was mentioned in the note: “The above rebate will be available only on monthly basis and consumer with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates.” In the bill for the month of May 2010, in the rebate Column, no ‘voltage rebate’ was given. The appellant being aggrieved moved the Forum vide Case No. 33 of 2011 for the grant of ‘voltage rebate’ and for revision of the bill. The applicant (appellant herein) admitted that they were in arrears toward ‘fuel surcharge’. It was submitted that despite the arrears they had been getting the ‘voltage rebate’ in the past therefore, they are entitled to the same under tariff schedule 2010-11 also. It was asserted that the issue of arrears was only with respect to the ‘load factor rebate’ under the 2010-11 tariff. III. Regulatory Commission issued tariff schedule for 2011-12 (applicable from 01st August 2011 to 31st July 2012) and also tariff schedule for 2012-15 (applicable from 01st August 2012 to 31st December 2015). Regarding ‘voltage rebate’ as well as ‘load factor rebate’ it was separately indicated in the note with regards to each of them - “the above rebate will be available only on monthly basis and consumer with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebate. However, the applicable rebates shall be allowed to consumers with outstanding dues, wherein such dues have been stayed by the appropriate authority/courts.” IV. However, the applicable rebates shall be allowed to consumers with outstanding dues, wherein such dues have been stayed by the appropriate authority/courts.” IV. Cause of action for filing W.P.(C) No. 1284 of 2014 by Nigam Before the Forum energy bills from August 2011 to October 2011 were filed by the appellant to show that the Nigam has started to grant ‘voltage rebate’. The Forum decided the case in favour of the appellant in terms of the judgment dated 25th May 2013 for the period from 01st May 2010 to 31st July 2011. Order of the Forum dated 25th May 2013 was upheld by the Ombudsman in terms of the order dated 09th October 2013 and the Nigam challenged both the orders in W.P.(C) No. 1284 of 2014. V. Cause of action for filing of W.P.(C) No. 5057 of 2015 by the appellant. Under tariff schedule 2003-04 on account of the “arrear” clause when the Nigam did not give ‘load factor rebate’, M/s Usha Martin moved the Forum vide Case No. 20 of 2006 which was allowed on 09th October 2010 and the order was upheld by Ombudsman vide order dated 31st March 2011. Being aggrieved by both orders, the Board (now Nigam) moved W.P.(C) No. 3005 of 2011 and it has been held that in tariff order 2003-04, HTS consumer is entitled to get two types of rebates which were available to only those HTS consumer who were not in ‘arrears’ for ‘fuel surcharge’. M/s Usha Martin being in “arrears” for the financial year 2000-2001, was not entitled to get the ‘load factor rebate’. The issue having been decided, vide letter dated 17th September 2015 Nigam served a supplementary bill amounting to Rs. 22,19,900/- on account of wrongly allowed ‘voltage rebate’ for the period August 2011 to July 2015. The letter dated 17th September 2015 and connected electricity bills became the subject matter of W.P.(C) No. 5057 of 2015 filed by the appellant. VI. The issue of ‘arrears’ connected with ‘fuel surcharge’, which is relevant for both cases, has been explained by stating that the issue of ‘fuel surcharge’ was initially assailed before Hon’ble Patna High Court in CWJC No. 5542 of 1999 and analogous cases, and the same was decided vide Judgment dated 26th June 2000 [ 2000 (3) PLJR 552 ]. VI. The issue of ‘arrears’ connected with ‘fuel surcharge’, which is relevant for both cases, has been explained by stating that the issue of ‘fuel surcharge’ was initially assailed before Hon’ble Patna High Court in CWJC No. 5542 of 1999 and analogous cases, and the same was decided vide Judgment dated 26th June 2000 [ 2000 (3) PLJR 552 ]. Being aggrieved, the Board (now Nigam) challenged it before the Hon’ble Supreme Court through Civil Appeals, i.e. in “Bihar State Electricity Board Vs. Pulak Enterprises and others” (2009) 5 SCC 641 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 15th April 2009 dismissed the appeals filed by the Board (now Nigam). Before the then Patna High Court, Ranchi Bench, a set of writ petitions were filed concerning ‘fuel surcharge’ and this Hon’ble Court in CWJC No. 2112 of 1999(R) passed an interim order in the light of order passed at Patna and subsequently at Ranchi and further directed that the interim orders shall also apply to other consumers who are liable to pay ‘fuel surcharge’ as per the revised rate. After the judgment passed in the case of Pulak Enterprises (Supra) by Hon’ble Patna High Court, a batch of writ petitions were disposed of at Ranchi vide order dated 08th August 2000. Further, a set of writ petitions vide CWJC No. 2758 of 2000 (R) and analogous writ petitions were filed in High Court of Jharkhand when the rates of ‘fuel surcharge’ were fixed in compliance of Hon’ble Patna High Court’s order passed in Pulak Enterprises (Supra). The Hon’ble Court vide order dated 08th May 2015 dismissed all the writ petitions. VII. In view of the order passed in CWJC No. 2758 of 2000(R), Nigam vide disconnection notice dated 21st May 2015 called upon the appellant to deposit arrear of ‘fuel surcharge’ and ‘delayed payment surcharge’ accrued upon it amounting to Rs. 32,28,534/-. The appellant thereafter filed an interlocutory application in LPA No. 616 of 2015 which is related to ‘fuel surcharge’ and the Hon’ble Division Bench vide order dated 03rd November 2015 stayed the realization of the ‘delayed payment surcharge’ upon a submission that the principal amount was already paid. 32,28,534/-. The appellant thereafter filed an interlocutory application in LPA No. 616 of 2015 which is related to ‘fuel surcharge’ and the Hon’ble Division Bench vide order dated 03rd November 2015 stayed the realization of the ‘delayed payment surcharge’ upon a submission that the principal amount was already paid. It has been submitted that the principal amount was paid only upon receipt of the disconnection notice in the year 2015 which shows that the appellant was in arrears for the entire period involved in this case i.e. from May 2010 to July 2015. It is submitted that the appellant being in arrears for the entire period involved in this case i.e. from May 2010 to July 2015, the learned writ Court rightly allowed the writ petition of the Nigam and rightly dismissed the writ petition of the appellant in terms of order dated 03rd February 2020. The learned writ Court has rightly interpreted the provisions of the applicable tariff. Findings of this Court. 19. The factual background of the case and the cause of action for filing the two writ petitions have been mentioned above and the broad facts are not in dispute which need not be repeated. 20. Two issues arise for consideration by this Court: - (a) Whether the claim of ‘‘voltage rebate’’ was available to consumers with ‘arrears’ for the period May 2010 to July 2011 governed by tariff 2010-11? (b) Whether the “Kept in abeyance” amount concerning fuel surcharge can be treated as an arrear in the facts and circumstances of the present case? 21. The periods and the tariff schedules involved in these cases are as under: - LPA No. 143 of 2020 (arising out of W.P.(C) No. 1284 of 2014) LPA No. 140 of 2020 (arising out of W.P.(C) No.5057 of 2015) Period -May 2010 to July 2011. Tariff schedule- 2010-2011 for the period 01st May 2010 to 31st July 2011 Period- August 2011 to July 2015. Tariff schedule - 2011-2012 for the period 01st August 2011 to 31st July 2012 Tariff schedule- 2012-2015 for the period 01st August 2012 to 31st December 2015 Issue no. (a) 22. Right from the tariff of the year 2003-04 the consumers were, inter alia, entitled to ‘voltage rebate’ and ‘load factor rebate’. Tariff schedule - 2011-2012 for the period 01st August 2011 to 31st July 2012 Tariff schedule- 2012-2015 for the period 01st August 2012 to 31st December 2015 Issue no. (a) 22. Right from the tariff of the year 2003-04 the consumers were, inter alia, entitled to ‘voltage rebate’ and ‘load factor rebate’. In order to explain the import of tariff schedules with respect to ‘voltage rebate’, the parties have given the background right from the tariff schedule - 2003-04. 23. Under 2003-2004 tariff - effective from 1st of January 2004 The J.S.E.B had issued tariff schedule with effect from 01st January 2004 and for the HTS category the following provision was made applicable: - ‘voltage rebate’ for HT consumers* Load Factor ‘voltage rebate’ Supply at 33 KV 5% Supply at 132 KV 7.5% Load factor rebate for HT consumers* Load Factor Load factor rebate 40-60% 5% 60-70% 7.5% Above 70% 10% * The above rebate will be available only on monthly basis and Consumer with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates. However, a clarification was issued by the Chief Engineer (Commercial and Revenue) of JUVNL vide letter dated 26th June 2004 stating that there was a misprint in the tariff schedule with regards to asterix mark printed against – ‘voltage rebate’ for HT Consumers” which should be deleted. The letter dated 26th June 2004 is quoted as under: Letter No.266/C.E. Rev Dated 26.06.04 Sub: Misprint in the tariff schedule. Ref: i. This office letter 222/CE/Rev Dated 31.05.2004 Sir, There has been a printing mistake in tariff schedule regarding rebates being not allowable to consumers with arrears in Page No.-8 in category High Tension Service (HTS). The star mark printed against – ‘voltage rebate’ for HT Consumers” should be deleted. Accordingly the ‘voltage rebate’ for High Tension Consumers may be allowed to Consumers with arrears. This may be treated as most urgent and payment may be collected accordingly. Yours faithfully, s/d- (P.C. Verma) Chief Engineer (Commercial & Revenue)” 24. HT Special Service (HTSS) (HT Consumer with Induction furnace) tariff for 2003-04: ‘voltage rebate’ for HTSS consumers Load Factor ‘voltage rebate’ Supply at 33 kV 5% Supply at 33 kV 7.5% Load factor rebate for HTSS consumers Load Factor Load factor rebate 40-60% 5% 60-70 % 7.5% Above 70% 10% *Consumer with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates. The above rebate will be available only on monthly basis. The tariff 2003-04 continued till April 2010. Consequently, the appellant availed ‘voltage rebate’ till April 2010. There is no dispute till April 2010. 25. Under 2010-2011 tariff:- effective from 01st May 2010 ‘voltage rebate’: ‘voltage rebate’ to the HTSS consumers will be applicable as given below: Consumer category ‘voltage rebate’ HTSS – 33 KV 3.00 % HTSS – 132 KV 5.00% HTSS – 220 KV 5.50% HTSS – 440 KV 6.00% Load Factor Rebate: Load Factor rebate to the HTSS Consumers is proposed as given below: Load Factor Load Factor Rebate 40-60% Nil 60-70 % 7.5 % 70-100 % 10% Note: “The above rebate will be available only on monthly basis and consumer with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates.” 26. In this tariff 2010-11, there was no asterix mark to the Note. Accordingly, the ‘Note’ under this tariff was taken to qualify both ‘load factor rebate’ and ‘voltage rebate’ and consequently, it was interpreted by Nigam that ‘load factor rebate’ and also ‘voltage rebate’ would be available only to those consumers who have no arrears. Therefore, the appellant was, inter alia, denied ‘voltage rebate’ in the bill for the month of May 2010 and onwards alleging that there were arrears against the appellant. 27. The appellant filed a case before the Forum claiming ‘voltage rebate’ and seeking a direction upon the Nigam to allow ‘voltage rebate’ under tariff 2010-2011 by stating that they have been claiming ‘voltage rebate’ throughout irrespective of any arrears and also asserted that the appellant had no arrears. Nigam appeared and referred to the aforesaid letter dated 26th June 2004 and submitted that after coming into force of tariff order 2010-2011, the ‘voltage rebate’ and ‘load factor rebate’ are barred to the consumers having arrears although the said letter dated 26th June 2004 was in connection with HTS consumers and appellant is HTSS consumer. 28. It was specifically submitted by Nigam before the Forum that an amount of Rs.9,91,621/- on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ and Rs.2,42,136/- on account of ‘annual minimum guarantee charges’ for the period of 2000-2001 along with ‘delayed payment surcharge’ of Rs.62,995/- only was ‘kept in abeyance’ in the month of January 2003 and, therefore, ‘voltage rebate’ was not being allowed to the appellant as per the provisions of tariff order 2010-2011. However, the Forum allowed the petition and recorded its finding as under: “ On the basis of rival cases of the parties the only issue is to be decided that as to whether the petitioner is entitled to get ‘voltage rebate’ under the tariff order 2010-11. Findings 5. The J.S.E.B. had issued tariff schedule w.e.f. 1.1.2004 and for the category of HTS the following provision was made applicable………………. On perusal it was clear that ‘voltage rebate’ and L.F. rebate was not be allowed to the consumers who were in arrears. But a letter No.266/C.E. Rev. dated 26.06.04 was issued from the office of Chief Engineer (Commercial & Revenue) and clarified that there has been a printing mistake in tariff schedule regarding rebates. The star mark printed against ‘voltage rebate’ for H.T. consumers should be deleted and accordingly the ‘voltage rebate’ may be allowed to HTS consumer with arrears. This clarification has clarified that ‘voltage rebate’ was allowed to H.T.S. Consumer who were having arrears also. The petitioner was also getting ‘voltage rebate’ prior to the induction of new tariff schedule. 6. New tariff schedule has been notified and made applicable from 01.05.2010. According to the new tariff schedule the following provisions have been made relating to ‘voltage rebate’ and L.F. rebate for the H.T.S. consumers. ‘voltage rebate’- ‘voltage rebate’ to the HTS consumers will be applicable as given below- Consumer category ‘voltage rebate’ HTS – 33 KV 3% HTS – 132 KV 5% HTS – 220 KV 5.50% HTS – 440 KV 6.00% L.F. Rebate – Load factor rebate to the H.T. consumers is proposed as given below – Load Factor L.F. Rebate 40-60% Nil 60-70% 7.5% 70-100% 10% Note – The above rebate will be available only on monthly basis and consumer with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates. On perusal of this provision, it is clear that no condition has been mentioned for giving ‘voltage rebate’ to the HTS consumers. Prior to the new tariff schedule this petitioner was getting ‘voltage rebate’ irrespective of the fact that there was dues for the fuel surcharge. The learned lawyer of the petitioner has argued that the matter of dues of fuel surcharge is subjudice. This fact has not been objected by the respondents. So, in this circumstance the forum is of the view that the petitioner cannot be treated in arrears. The learned lawyer of the petitioner has argued that the matter of dues of fuel surcharge is subjudice. This fact has not been objected by the respondents. So, in this circumstance the forum is of the view that the petitioner cannot be treated in arrears. During the argument on behalf of the petitioner photo copies of the energy bills from Aug 2011 to Oct 2011 has been filed. On perusal of these bills it transpires that the Board has started to grant ‘voltage rebate’ to the petitioner. So, there was no reason to disallow ‘voltage rebate’ to the petitioner from May 2010. 7. considering the facts and circumstances of the case we are of the view that the petitioner is entitled to get ‘voltage rebate’ under new tariff schedule 2010-11 from the month of May 2010 onwards. Order Accordingly, the petition of the petitioner is hereby allowed. The respondents are directed to issue revised bill to the petitioner from May 2010 by allowing ‘voltage rebate’ under new tariff 2010-11. Let a copy of the order be served on both parties.” 29. Thus, the Forum decided the case in favour of the appellant primarily on three grounds: - (i) On perusal of tariff 2010-2011 made applicable from 01st May 2010 no condition has been mentioned for giving ‘voltage rebate’ to the HTS consumers. Meaning that the Note at the end of the ‘load factor rebate’ was only for ‘load factor rebate’ and not for ‘voltage rebate’. For this the Forum relied upon the earlier tariff for the period 2003-04 and the aforesaid clarificatory circular issued by the electricity board. (ii) It was observed that the matter of dues of the ‘fuel surcharge’ was sub-judice, so, the appellant cannot be treated in arrears. (iii) During the argument the appellant had filed photocopies of the energy bills from August 2011 to October 2011 whereby the Nigam had started to grant ‘voltage rebate’ to the appellant. So, there was no reason to disallow ‘voltage rebate’ to the appellant from May 2010. 30. Being aggrieved by the order of the Forum, the Nigam preferred an appeal before the Ombudsman. The appeal was dismissed vide order dated 09th October 2013 although it was argued by Nigam that as per tariff order 2010-2011, ‘voltage rebate’ as well as ‘load factor rebate’ are barred for consumers who are in arrears. 31. 30. Being aggrieved by the order of the Forum, the Nigam preferred an appeal before the Ombudsman. The appeal was dismissed vide order dated 09th October 2013 although it was argued by Nigam that as per tariff order 2010-2011, ‘voltage rebate’ as well as ‘load factor rebate’ are barred for consumers who are in arrears. 31. At this stage it would be relevant to refer to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with Electricity Act, 2003, Powers of Regulatory Commission and matters relating to fixation of tariff. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “PTC India Ltd. Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission” (2010) 4 SCC 603 has held that under the 2003 Act, if one reads section 62 with section 64, it becomes clear that although tariff fixation like price fixation is legislative in character, the same under the Act has been made appealable vide section 111. These provisions, namely, sections 61, 62 and 64 indicate the dual nature of functions performed by the Regulatory Commissions viz. decision-making and specifying terms and conditions for tariff determination. Fixation of tariff is a long-drawn process includes participation of conflicting interest etc. Paragraph nos. 17, 26, 50 and 51 of the judgment of PTC India Ltd (supra) are quoted as under: - “17. The 2003 Act is enacted as an exhaustive code on all matters concerning electricity. It provides for “unbundling” of SEBs into separate utilities for generation, transmission and distribution. It repeals the Electricity Act, 1910; the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998. The 2003 Act, in furtherance of the policy envisaged under the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 (the 1998 Act), mandated the establishment of an independent and transparent regulatory mechanism, and has entrusted wide-ranging responsibilities with the Regulatory Commissions. While the 1998 Act provided for independent regulation in the area of tariff determination; the 2003 Act has distanced the Government from all forms of regulation, namely, licensing, tariff regulation, specifying Grid Code, facilitating competition through open access, etc. 26. The term “tariff” is not defined in the 2003 Act. The term “tariff” includes within its ambit not only the fixation of rates but also the rules and regulations relating to it. 26. The term “tariff” is not defined in the 2003 Act. The term “tariff” includes within its ambit not only the fixation of rates but also the rules and regulations relating to it. If one reads Section 61 with Section 62 of the 2003 Act, it becomes clear that the appropriate Commission shall determine the actual tariff in accordance with the provisions of the Act, including the terms and conditions which may be specified by the appropriate Commission under Section 61 of the said Act. Under the 2003 Act, if one reads Section 62 with Section 64, it becomes clear that although tariff fixation like price fixation is legislative in character, the same under the Act is made appealable vide Section 111. These provisions, namely, Sections 61, 62 and 64 indicate the dual nature of functions performed by the Regulatory Commissions viz. decision-making and specifying terms and conditions for tariff determination. 50. Applying the above test, price fixation exercise is really legislative in character, unless by the terms of a particular statute it is made quasi-judicial as in the case of tariff fixation under Section 62 made appealable under Section 111 of the 2003 Act, though Section 61 is an enabling provision for the framing of regulations by CERC. If one takes “tariff” as a subject-matter, one finds that under Part VII of the 2003 Act actual determination/fixation of tariff is done by the appropriate Commission under Section 62 whereas Section 61 is the enabling provision for framing of regulations containing generic propositions in accordance with which the appropriate Commission has to fix the tariff. This basic scheme equally applies to the subject-matter “trading margin” in a different statutory context as will be demonstrated by discussion hereinbelow. 51. In Narinder Chand Hem Raj v. Lt. Governor, H.P. this Court has held that power to tax is a legislative power which can be exercised by the legislature directly or subject to certain conditions. The legislature can delegate that power to some other authority. But the exercise of that power, whether by the legislature or by the delegate will be an exercise of legislative power. The fact that the power can be delegated will not make it an administrative power or adjudicatory power. The legislature can delegate that power to some other authority. But the exercise of that power, whether by the legislature or by the delegate will be an exercise of legislative power. The fact that the power can be delegated will not make it an administrative power or adjudicatory power. In the said judgment, it has been further held that no court can direct a subordinate legislative body or the legislature to enact a law or to modify the existing law and if courts cannot so direct, much less the tribunal, unless power to annul or modify is expressly given to it.” 32. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment that under the Electricity Act, 2003, although tariff fixation like price fixation is legislative in character and has been made appealable vide section 111, sections 61, 62 and 64 indicate the dual nature of functions performed by the Regulatory Commissions, that is, decision-making and specifying terms and conditions for tariff determination. Thus, framing of tariff is an exercise for fixation of rates for the supply of electricity and prescribes the mode and manner of payment. Tariff also prescribes incentives for timely payment of bills and also conditions for availing one or the other benefit under the tariff. Tariff is framed after undertaking a long-drawn procedure of adjusting rival interests by giving opportunities to rival parties. If a condition has been prescribed to avail one or the other benefit of ‘voltage rebate’ the same is strictly required to be satisfied for availing such a benefit. 33. At first, the plain meaning of the tariff 2010-11 is to be looked into keeping in mind that none of the words should be rendered otiose. 34. On the plain reading of the aforesaid extract of the tariff order 2010-11, it is apparent that the ‘Note’ has two impacts, firstly, the rebate is to be given on a monthly basis and secondly, both rebates are not available to consumers with arrears. 35. Both, ‘voltage rebate’ and ‘load factor rebate’ are to be availed on monthly basis and, therefore, the first part of the ‘Note’ has been complied. 35. Both, ‘voltage rebate’ and ‘load factor rebate’ are to be availed on monthly basis and, therefore, the first part of the ‘Note’ has been complied. There is no dispute that the 2nd part of the ‘Note’ is required to be complied with for availing ‘load factor rebate’, that is, consumers with arrears are not entitled to ‘load factor rebate.’ The dispute is with regards to the applicability of the 2nd part of the ‘Note’ to ‘voltage rebate’ ; whether the consumers with arrears can avail ‘voltage rebate’. 36. This Court is of the considered view that once 1st part of the ‘Note’ i.e. rebate on monthly basis is applicable for both the rebates, the 2nd part of the same ‘Note’ cannot be said to be applicable only to ‘load factor rebate’ and not applicable in case of ‘voltage rebate’. Further, the word ‘rebates’ in the 2nd part cannot be read as ‘rebate’. On a plain reading of the ‘Note’ which has been placed in continuity to the provisions for ‘voltage rebate’ and ‘load factor rebate’, it has to be applied to both the rebates, that is, ‘voltage rebate’ and ‘load factor rebate’. 37. This Court is of the considered view that the learned writ Court has rightly held that in order to avail ‘voltage rebate’ under tariff - 2010-11, the consumer should not be in arrears which is also the position with regards to ‘load factor rebate’. 38. So far as the ‘voltage rebate’ availed by the appellant for the subsequent period from August 2011 to July 2015 is concerned, the same has been subsequently disallowed, and a supplementary bill has been raised which was the subject matter of the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.5057 of 2015. The said writ petition has been dismissed and is the subject matter of L.P.A. 140 of 2020 filed by the appellant. 39. The issue no.(a) is accordingly decided against the appellant and in favour of Nigam. Issue no.(b) 40. Having decided that in order to avail benefits of ‘voltage rebate’ under tariff-2010-11 the consumer should fulfil the condition not to be in arrears, it is to be seen as to whether the consumer can be said to be in arrears under the facts and circumstances of this case. Issue no.(b) 40. Having decided that in order to avail benefits of ‘voltage rebate’ under tariff-2010-11 the consumer should fulfil the condition not to be in arrears, it is to be seen as to whether the consumer can be said to be in arrears under the facts and circumstances of this case. For the period 2010-11, the condition as per the ‘Note’ to ‘voltage rebate’ was that the consumer should not be in arrears; for the period 2011-12 onwards, there was a clear stipulation in the tariffs that the consumers would be entitled to avail the benefits of the rebates in spite of arrears, if the consumer had an order of stay from a competent Court or authority. 41. Upon receipt of the bill for the month of May 2010 which showed ‘kept in abeyance’ amount to the extent of Rs. 62,995/-, the appellant requested for revision of the bill vide letter dated 18th June 2010 with regards to two points: - “1) THERE IS A DEVIATION FROM THE AGE OLD PRACTICE OF ALLOWING 2% REBATE FOR TIMELY PAYMENT. 2) NOT TREATING KEPT IN ABEYANCE AMOUNT AS “A NON-ARREAR AMOUNT OR A DISPUTED AMOUNT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ALLOWING ‘VOLTAGE REBATE’ & LOAD FACTOR REBATE.” 42. Before the Forum and Ombudsman, reliance was placed on an order passed by learned Ombudsman in the case of M/s Usha Martin being Case No. 20 of 2006 wherein it was held that bill on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ for the period 2000-01 having been stayed by the High Court in a writ petition filed by M/s Usha Martin has to be treated as an amount ‘kept in abeyance’ and cannot be treated as ‘arrears’ so as to deny the benefit of ‘load factor rebate’ under tariff 2003-04. The orders passed by the Forum and Ombudsman in the case of M/s Usha Martin has been produced by the appellant during the course of hearing. The orders of the Forum as well as the Ombudsman were challenged by the Nigam in W.P.(C) No. 3005 of 2011 which were set-aside vide judgment dated 10th July 2015. Under such circumstances, the appellant tried to distinguish the case of M/s Usha Martin and the Nigam relied upon the same before the learned writ Court. The orders of the Forum as well as the Ombudsman were challenged by the Nigam in W.P.(C) No. 3005 of 2011 which were set-aside vide judgment dated 10th July 2015. Under such circumstances, the appellant tried to distinguish the case of M/s Usha Martin and the Nigam relied upon the same before the learned writ Court. The learned writ Court was of the view that the case of M/s Usha Martin is applicable and allowed the writ petition filed by the Nigam being W.P.(C) No. 1284 of 2014. The order of the writ Court is under challenge in L.P.A. No. 143 of 2020. Since the appellant was held to be in arrears, the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5057 of 2015 challenging denial of ‘voltage rebate’ and raising of the supplementary bill on that count, was dismissed in the absence of any order of stay on ‘fuel surcharge’ during the period August 2011 till July 2015. The order dismissing the writ petition is under challenge in L.P.A. No. 140 of 2020. 43. On the face of the bill issued to the appellant for the month of May 2010, the entry against the column ‘arrear’ was ‘zero’ but an amount of Rs. 62,955/- was projected as ‘amount kept in abeyance’ and ‘voltage rebate’ was not granted in the bill. When this bill was challenged before the Forum on account of non-mentioning of ‘voltage rebate’, a stand was taken by the Nigam that the appellant was in arrears to the extent of an amount of Rs. 9,91,621/- on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ and Rs. 2,42,136/- on account of ‘annual minimum guarantee charges’ for the period 2000-01 along with ‘delayed payment surcharge’ of Rs. 62,995/- which were ‘kept in abeyance’ in the bill for the month of January 2003 and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to ‘voltage rebate’. 44. The bill for the month of January 2003 has not been placed on record by either party. Neither any bill has been produced by the Nigam in connection with any outstanding amount on account of ‘annual minimum guarantee charges’ nor any stay or interim order relating to ‘annual minimum guarantee charges’ has been placed on record which might have compelled the Nigam to keep any amount on account of ‘annual minimum guarantee charges’ in abeyance as back as in the month of January 2003. It is totally unexplained as to how the amount ‘kept in abeyance’ in the bill for the month of May 2010 was reduced to an amount of Rs. 62,955/- only. Moreover, the claim of Nigam is apparent from disconnection notice issued on 21st May 2015 which relates only to alleged arrears on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ for the period 09/2000 to 11/2002 and ‘delayed payment surcharge’ thereon for the period from January 2003 to April 2015 which shows that the alleged arrear relates only to ‘fuel surcharge’. 45. Both the parties have also advanced their arguments regarding alleged arrears on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ only. 46. Now, the point for consideration is as to whether the appellant can be treated to be in arrears in connection with ‘fuel surcharge’ which was ‘kept in abeyance’ by the Nigam, in order to deny ‘voltage rebate’ during the period May 2010 to July 2011 covered by tariff-2010-11 and during the period August 2011 to July 2015 covered by subsequent tariffs. As held above, the appellant should not be in ‘arrears’ in order to avail ‘voltage rebate’ under tariff -2010-11; for period covered by subsequent tariff, the appellant could avail the ‘voltage rebate’ if the recovery of the arrear was stayed by competent Court or authority. At this stage, it would be useful to quote the provisions of tariff-2011-12 onwards: - Under 2011-2012 Tariff:- ‘voltage rebate’: ‘voltage rebate’ to the HTSS consumers will be applicable as given below: Consumer Category ‘voltage rebate’ HTSS – 33 KV 3.00 % HTSS – 132 KV 5.00% HTSS – 220 KV 5.50% HTSS – 440 KV 6.00% Note: The above rebate will be available only on monthly basis and consumer with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates. However, the applicable rebate shall be allowed to consumers with outstanding dues, wherein such dues have been stayed by the appropriate authority/Courts. Under 2012-2015 Tariff:- (Applicable from 01.08.2012 to 31.12.2015) High Tension Voltage Supply Service (HTSS) Applicability: Clause V: ‘voltage rebate’ ‘voltage rebate’ will be applicable on both demand and energy charges as given below: Consumer Category ‘voltage rebate’ HTS- 33 Kv 3.00% HTS- 132 kV 5.00% HTS- 220 kV 5.50% HTS- 400 kV 6.00% Note: The above rebate will be available only on monthly basis and consumer with arrears shall not be eligible for the above rebates. However, the applicable rebates shall be allowed to consumers with outstanding dues, wherein such dues have been stayed by the appropriate authority/ Courts. 47. With respect to the period May 2010 to July 2011, it is the specific case of the Nigam that on account of interim order dated 3rd August 1999 which was made applicable to all the consumers passed by the High Court in CWJC No. 2112 of 1999(R), the demand on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ was ‘kept in abeyance’. With respect to the period from August 2011 till July 2015 governed by tariff-2011-12 and 2012-15, it is the specific case of the Nigam that the appellant has not produced any interim order of stay and the appellant has deposited the principal amount of ‘fuel surcharge’ only in the year 2015 as is reflecting from the order passed in L.P.A. No. 616 of 2015 where only the demand on account of ‘delayed payment surcharge’ on ‘fuel surcharge’ has been stayed. On the other hand, it is the case of the appellant that no demand on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ was ever raised upon the appellant and immediately upon receipt of the demand through the disconnection notice, the appellant has deposited the principal amount on account of ‘fuel surcharge’. 48. The argument of the respondents is based on the judgment passed in the case of M/s Usha Martin (Supra) in W.P.(C) No. 3005 of 2011 by stating that the ‘amount kept in abeyance’ is to be treated as arrear. As per the appellant, the case of M/s Usha Martin is not applicable. 49. While allowing the writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 3005 of 2011 filed by the Nigam against the order of Ombudsman in case No. 12 of 2006 relating to M/s Usha Martin, the learned writ Court took into consideration the following interim order passed in another writ petition filed by the M/s Usha Martin challenging various notifications and bills relating to ‘fuel surcharge’: - “During the pendency of the case, if the petitioners deposit 50% of impugned 3 bill amount in respect to fuel surcharge of the year 2000-2001, the respondent will not take coercive step against the petitioners. This order, however, will not be applicable in respect to arrears of earlier period, current bill and other dues, if any.” The petitioners may also deposit the fuel surcharge for the period April, 2001 onwards at the same rate which it has been charged or paid up-to March, 2001 till final decision is taken by the Board.” 50. It was also brought to the notice of the Court dealing with the case of M/s Usha Martin that the writ petition filed by M/s Usha Martin relating to ‘fuel surcharge’ was dismissed and it was the specific case of the Nigam that the interim order passed earlier merged with the final order and therefore M/s Usha Martin was in arrears with regards to ‘fuel surcharge’ and was not entitled to get ‘load factor rebate’ as stipulated under tariff order 2003-04. On the other hand, M/s Usha Martin had argued that during the operation of stay order, M/s Usha Martin could not have been treated in arrears and therefore ‘load factor rebate’ was admissible. In the case of M/s Usha Martin, the following issue was framed for consideration in paragraph 8 of the judgment: “8. Having heard the submissions, I have gone through the record of the case. The only question in dispute is – “Whether the respondent (Usha Martin Limited) is said to be running 'in arrears' for non-payment of 50% bill amount of the fuel surcharge for the year 2000-2001, in view of the fact that a Bench of this Court has directed the petitioner-Board for not taking any coercive step against the respondent for realization of the aforesaid amount?” Findings in the case of M/s Usha Martin have been recorded in paragraph Nos. 10, 13 and 15 of the judgment which are quoted as under: - “10. In the instant case also, from perusal of the ad-interim order as quoted above, it is clear that this Court has not stayed the bill, rather it said that if respondent deposits 50% amount of the impugned bill in respect to fuel surcharge for the year 2000-2001, then the petitioner-Board will not take coercive step against the respondent-consumer. Meaning thereby, the respondent was not restrained from paying the remaining 50% of the fuel surcharge for the year 2000-2001, rather petitioner-JSEB was restrained from taking any coercive step for realizing the aforesaid amount. Meaning thereby, the respondent was not restrained from paying the remaining 50% of the fuel surcharge for the year 2000-2001, rather petitioner-JSEB was restrained from taking any coercive step for realizing the aforesaid amount. In that view of the matter, 50% bill amount remain arrears and this has been shown by the petitioner-JSEB in different bills raised by it. Thus, it was open for the respondent-consumer to pay the aforesaid amount and get the load factor rebate. If the respondent did not pay the arrears, then such rebate is not available to it. 13. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that even if an amount is not recoverable, being barred by the statute and/or by the order of the Court, then also the due will not be extinguished. Accordingly, in the instant case, 50% amount of the bill, in respect of the fuel surcharge of the year 2000-2001 is not recoverable, but the same remain a due. Therefore, the petitioner has all rights to deny the benefit of the load factor rebate to the respondent as the aforesaid dues never extinguished even during the operation of ad-interim order. 15. Thus, in view of the aforesaid law laid down by their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I have no hesitation in holding that the respondent-consumer is 'in arrears' for fuel surcharge for the financial year 2000-2001, therefore, not entitled for getting the load factor rebate, as admissible under the provisions of the tariff order of 2003-04.” (emphasis supplied) 51. In the case of M/s Usha Martin, the bill on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ was raised and was challenged in a writ petition and upon payment of 50% of the bill amount on account of ‘fuel surcharge’, M/s Usha Martin enjoyed the interim relief and 50% bill amount of ‘fuel surcharge’ remained not recoverable but it remained ‘due’ and, therefore, the Nigam was held to have all rights to deny the benefit of the ‘load factor rebate’ to M/s Usha Martin by holding that the ‘dues’ never extinguished even during the operation of ad-interim order. Consequently, in W.P.(C) No. 3005 of 2011 filed by Nigam against M/s Usha Martin the writ petition was allowed and M/s Usha Martin was held to be in arrear with respect to ‘fuel surcharge’ in spite of interim order granted in respect of payment of 50% ‘fuel surcharge’. Consequently, in W.P.(C) No. 3005 of 2011 filed by Nigam against M/s Usha Martin the writ petition was allowed and M/s Usha Martin was held to be in arrear with respect to ‘fuel surcharge’ in spite of interim order granted in respect of payment of 50% ‘fuel surcharge’. 52. It is required to be examined in the present case as to whether any bill/demand on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ was ever raised upon the appellant; whether there was any impediment for the Nigam to raise bill/demand on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ when it was shown to have been ‘kept in abeyance’ in the bill for the month of January 2003, during the period from May 2010 till July 2015. 53. It is not the case of the either party that the appellant filed any case before the High Court challenging the Circular or any bill raised on account of ‘fuel surcharge’. However, in view of order dated 3rd August 1999 passed by the High Court in CWJC No. 2112 of 1999(R), the interim order passed in writ petitions filed by other consumers was made applicable to all the consumers including the appellant. CWJC No. 2112 of 1999(R) filed by one Samrath Engineering Co. Private Limited related to payment of ‘fuel surcharge’ in terms of Circular dated 31st May 1999. The general interim order dated 3rd August 1999 passed in CWJC No. 2112 of 1999(R) made applicable to all consumers is quoted as under: “In order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, I direct that the interim order dt. 13.7.99 passed in CWJC no. 1501/99R shall also apply to other consumers who are liable to pay fuel surcharge as per the revised rate. It is made clear that if the consumers pay all other dues other than the fuel surcharge at the new rate then the Board shall not disconnect the supply of electricity for non-payment of fuel surcharge at new rate.” 54. The interim order dated 13th July 1999 passed in CWJC No. 1501 of 1999 (R) is quoted as under: “It appears that in most of the writ petitions interim orders have been passed in terms of order passed at Patna. The interim order dated 13th July 1999 passed in CWJC No. 1501 of 1999 (R) is quoted as under: “It appears that in most of the writ petitions interim orders have been passed in terms of order passed at Patna. It is hereby directed that all those writ petitions were interim order have not been passed till further order is passed petitioners will continue to pay fuel surcharge at the old rate so far period 1996-97 and 1997-98 and onwards is concerned. The bill regarding earlier period shall be paid by the petitioner, if not already paid in accordance with order passed by this court in the earlier writ petition.” 55. The lead case at Patna was filed by M/s Pulak Enterprises being CWJC No. 5542 of 1999 which was disposed of with batch of cases vide judgment dated 26th June 2000 reported in 2000 (3) PLJR 552 . The operative portion of the said judgment is quoted as under: “44. In the result, the Board is directed to re-work out of rates of fuel surcharge for the years 1996-97 onwards after (a) deleting the purchase of electricity supply i.e. the supply of electricity of H3, and (b) treating the so called ‘deemed supply’ i.e. the supply of electricity by DVC to Tisco as supply made by DVC to the Board, as an element of D 3. After re-working out the rates the Board will serve fresh bills on the concerned consumers which they shall pay within the stipulated period, failing which, their electric line (s) will be disconnected in accordance with law.” 56. The respondents have relied upon the order dated 3rd of August 1999 passed in CWJC No. 2112 of 1999 (R) [Samrath Engineering Co. Private Limited versus B.S.E.B] to submit that there was a general order made applicable to all consumers that interim order dated 13.07.1999 passed in CWJC No. 1501 of 1999 would apply to the other consumers also and consequently on account of interim order of stay granted by the High Court made applicable to all consumers, the amount on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ was ‘kept in abeyance’. Such stand taken by the respondents is prima-facie not acceptable on account of two reasons. Firstly, the said writ petition being CWJC No. 2112 of 1999 (R) [Samrath Engineering Co. Such stand taken by the respondents is prima-facie not acceptable on account of two reasons. Firstly, the said writ petition being CWJC No. 2112 of 1999 (R) [Samrath Engineering Co. Private Limited versus B.S.E.B] was already disposed of on 8th August 2000 in terms of the judgment dated 26th June 2000 passed in the case of CWJC No. 5542 of 1999 [ Pulak Enterprises] and other analogous cases with a direction to consider the case of the petitioners and raise fresh bill in connection with ‘fuel surcharge’. Further the writ petition being CWJC No. 1501 of 1999 (R) which was referred in the interim order passed in CWJC No. 2112 of 1999 (R) was also disposed of on 1st August 2000 in similar terms with an observation that the authorities were to consider individual cases in the light of the judgment and order passed in CWJC No. 5542 of 1999 [Pulak Enterprises]. Upon disposal of the case of CWJC No. 2112 of 1999(R) [Samrath Engineering (supra)], the interim order made applicable to all the consumers did not survive and there was no impediment for the Nigam to raise and realise the bill of ‘fuel surcharge’ from the appellant. No interim order regarding ‘fuel surcharge’ or any other amount has been brought on record which compelled the Nigam to keep realisation of any amount in abeyance in the month of January 2003 or even during the period from May 2010 to July 2011 and subsequent periods till July 2015. There was no legal impediment or legal disability on the Nigam to raise/realise bill on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ but the Nigam kept the amount in abeyance on their own instead of raising a bill or demand upon the appellant. In such circumstances, the appellant cannot be said to be in arrears. In order to treat a person in arrears, there has to be a demand or any legal impediment or legal disability must be shown in the matter of raising or realising a demand, which are totally absent in these cases. 57. The aforesaid aspect of the matter clearly distinguishes the case of the appellant from that of the case of M/s Usha Martin where there was a specific interim order passed by the Court that no coercive steps were to be taken upon payment of only 50% amount of bill raised for ‘fuel surcharge’ for the period 2000-01. 57. The aforesaid aspect of the matter clearly distinguishes the case of the appellant from that of the case of M/s Usha Martin where there was a specific interim order passed by the Court that no coercive steps were to be taken upon payment of only 50% amount of bill raised for ‘fuel surcharge’ for the period 2000-01. Though the amount of ‘fuel surcharge’ was not payable on account of interim order but was still shown as arrear and this Court interpreted the interim order and held that M/s Usha Martin was in ‘arrear’ and not entitled to ‘load factor rebate’. 58. So far as the judgment passed in the case of W.P.(C) No. 1682 of 2015 (M/s Gautam Ferro Alloys versus Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Company Limited) is concerned, it does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. In the said case the bills were raised and, on a request, the consumer was permitted to make payment of the bill in 15 equal instalments on certain terms and conditions. The claim of ‘load factor rebate’ and ‘voltage rebate’ under tariff order 2012-13 was denied on account of arrears. It was held by this Court that if the consumer intended to avail of the rebates, it was open to the consumer to make the entire payment of the bill and then seek ‘rebates’. 59. In the absence of any bill raised on account of ‘fuel surcharge’ for the period September 2000 to December 2002 for which the appellant is alleged to be in arrears and Nigam having failed to substantiate any reason to keep the amount in abeyance, the appellant cannot be said to be in ‘arrears’ so as to deny the benefit of ‘voltage rebate’ during the aforesaid period May 2010 to July 2015. Thus, the appellant has been wrongly treated to be in arrear and denied ‘voltage rebate’ for the period May 2010 to July 2015 by the learned writ Court relying on the judgment rendered in the case of M/s Usha Martin. 60. The issue no. (b) is accordingly decided in favour of the appellant and against the Nigam. 61. After the writ petition filed by Nigam against M/s Usha Martin being W.P.(C) No. 3005 of 2011 was allowed vide order dated 10th July 2015, the appellant was served with letter no.2347 dated 17th September 2015 with a supplementary bill amounting to Rs. The issue no. (b) is accordingly decided in favour of the appellant and against the Nigam. 61. After the writ petition filed by Nigam against M/s Usha Martin being W.P.(C) No. 3005 of 2011 was allowed vide order dated 10th July 2015, the appellant was served with letter no.2347 dated 17th September 2015 with a supplementary bill amounting to Rs. 22,19,900/- withdrawing ‘voltage rebate’ already availed by the appellant during the period August 2011 to July 2015 (under Tariff Notification 2011-2012, 2012-2015) solely on account of the judgment passed in the case of M/s Usha Martin. Such action was taken without giving any opportunity of hearing to the appellant and, consequently, the other writ petition W.P. (C) No. 5057 of 2015 was filed challenging the letter No. 2347 dated 17th September 2015 and asserting that the appellant cannot be treated to be in arrears. The writ petition was dismissed by the impugned order which is subject matter of consideration in L.P.A. No.140 of 2020. The content of letter No. 2347 dated 17th September 2015 is quoted as under: To, M/s B.M.C. Metal Cast Ltd. A-18, 19, 2nd Phase, Industrial Area, Adityapur Jamshedpur – 832109, Jharkhand Sub: - Supplementary bill amounting to Rs.22,19,900/- only on account of wrongly allowed voltage – rebate for the period 08/2011 to 07/2015. Ref:- Order passed by Hon’ble High Court dated 10.07.2015 in W.P.(C) No.3005 of 2011. Sir, With reference to the above it is to serve supplementary bill amounting to Rs.22,19,900/- only along with month wise details on account of wrongly allowed voltage-rebate for the period August – 2011 to July - 2015 for payment on or before the due date as Hon’ble High Court, Ranchi has allowed the writ petition No.3005 of 2011 filed by Jharkhand State Electricity Board vide order dated 10.07.2015, in which arrear of fuel surcharge has been held that consumer is “In arrear” for fuel – surcharge, so he is not entitled for getting load factor – rebate as well as voltage – rebate as admissible under the provisions of prevailing tariff orders. The order passed by learned Forum and Ombudsman has also been quashed by Hon’ble High Court. As such your are not entitled for getting voltage – rebate for the period 08/2011 to 07/2015, so ‘voltage rebate’ wrongly allowed for the above period is payable by you. The order passed by learned Forum and Ombudsman has also been quashed by Hon’ble High Court. As such your are not entitled for getting voltage – rebate for the period 08/2011 to 07/2015, so ‘voltage rebate’ wrongly allowed for the above period is payable by you. Hence it is requested to make payment of supplementary bill amounting to Rs.22,19,900/- only on or before the due date. Copy of order under reference is also being annexed for ready reference. Encl: as above Yours faithfully s/d- (R.J. Singh) Electrical Superintending Engineer” 62. As held above, the judgment passed by this Court in the case of M/s Usha Martin does not apply to the facts of this case and the appellant cannot be treated to be in arrears, the letter No.2347 dated 17th September 2015 withdrawing ‘voltage rebate’ already availed by the appellant for the period August 2011 to July 2015 as well as the consequential supplementary bill dated 17th September 2015 are quashed; the impugned judgment dated 03rd February 2020 passed in W.P. (C) No. 5057 of 2015 dismissing the writ petition is set-aside and L.P.A. No. 140 of 2020 is allowed. 63. As the issue no. (a) has been decided against the appellant, the finding of the learned writ Court in W.P.(C) No. 1284 of 2014 which is the subject matter of L.P.A. No. 143 of 2020 is upheld to the extent it relates to the interpretation of 2010-11 tariff holding that in order to claim ‘voltage rebate’ the consumer should not be in arrears. As the issue no. (b) has been decided in favour of the appellant by holding that the appellant cannot be said to be in arrears, the impugned judgment passed in W.P.(C) No. 1284 of 2014 denying ‘voltage rebate’ to the appellant on the ground that the appellant was in arrears, is set-aside to the aforesaid extent. Consequently, the Nigam is directed to raise revised bills for the period May 2010 to July 2011 granting ‘voltage rebate’ to the appellant. L.P.A. No. 143 of 2020 is partly allowed. Shree Chandrashekhar, J. : I Agree.