JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Anil Kumar, learned A.S.G.I., appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Sabyasanchi, learned counsel for the sole opposite party. 2. Seeing the urgency in the matter vide order dated 12.10.2023, notice was directed to be served upon the sole opposite party through Dasti, pursuant to that notice has been issued and served upon the opposite party and affidavit to that effect has been filed by the petitioner herein. Mr. Sabyasanchi has appeared on behalf of the sole opposite party. 3. This criminal revision petition has been preferred against the order dated 16.09.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge (PMLA), Ranchi rejecting the remand application filed under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. read with Section 65 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) for remand of the accused Sunil Yadav, who is the sole opposite party in this petition. 4. ECIR No. 03/2022 was registered on 08.03.2022 on the basis of FIR No.85/2020 dated 22.06.2020 registered by Barharwa Police Station, Sahibganj District, Jharkhand under Sections 147, 149, 341, 342, 323, 379, 504, 506 read with 120-B of the Indian Penal Code against Pankaj Mishra and others on the basis of the complaint of one Shri Sambhu Nandan Kumar, who was threatened and obstructed on 22.06.2020 by the persons accused in the FIR, to participate in the tender for Barharwa Toll. It was alleged by the complainant that he was asked by the accused Pankaj Mishra over the phone, not to participate in the tender, on the refusal of which, he was attacked by the mob at the behest of Pankaj Mishra. 5. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned A.S.G.I., appearing for the petitioner submits that the matter relates to illegal mining in the District of Sahibganj. He further submits that even the National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in the case of Sayyed Arshad Nasar v. Union of India & others noted the concern of illegal mining in the State of Jharkhand. He submits that there are several other FIRs lodged in the matter of the illegal mining in Sahibganj district and its adjoining areas, but still illegal activities have not stopped. He submits that the investigation revealed about huge illegal mining activities in Sahibganj along with transportation of such stolen minerals through roads, railways and inland vessels. He submits that there are several other FIRs lodged in the matter of the illegal mining in Sahibganj district and its adjoining areas, but still illegal activities have not stopped. He submits that the investigation revealed about huge illegal mining activities in Sahibganj along with transportation of such stolen minerals through roads, railways and inland vessels. He also submits that during the course of investigation, various persons were arrested by the Directorate of Enforcement, namely, Pankaj Mishra, Bachhu Yadav, Prem Prakash and Pashupati Yadav and others. He further submits that the petitioner filed a prosecution complaint under Section 45 read with Section 44 of the PMLA against accused Pankaj Mishra, Bachhu Yadav, Prem Prakash on 16.09.2022 and subsequently first supplementary prosecution complaint was filed against Pashupati Yadav on 19.06.2023 and second supplementary prosecution complaint was filed against other accused persons, in which, cognizance has been taken by the learned Court. He further submits that the sole opposite party namely Sunil Yadav was not apprehended and that is why on the application filed by the Directorate of Enforcement, learned Court has issued non-bailable warrant on 29.10.2022 and the Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj was directed to execute the same and in spite of that, he was not arrested and, therefore, proclamation under Sections 82 and 83 Cr.P.C. were directed to be issued on 14.12.2022 and 31.03.2023 respectively. He submits that finally the sole opposite party was arrested on 25.08.2023 by the Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj and he was produced before the learned Court of Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi on 26.08.2023 and later on sent to the judicial custody. He further submits that the brother of the sole opposite party, namely, Rajesh Yadav @ Dahu Yadav is still absconding and could not be traced till date. He submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed Rajesh Yadav @ Dahu Yadav to appear before the I.O. within a period of two weeks while rejecting his Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.6322 of 2023 vide order dated 18.08.2023, but Rajesh Yadav @ Dahu Yadav failed to appear till date. He submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed Rajesh Yadav @ Dahu Yadav to appear before the I.O. within a period of two weeks while rejecting his Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.6322 of 2023 vide order dated 18.08.2023, but Rajesh Yadav @ Dahu Yadav failed to appear till date. He also submits that on 05.09.2023, the petitioner filed an application under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. read with Section 65 of PMLA for custodial remand of 5 days and vide order dated 16.09.2023, the said application was decided by which the application of the Enforcement Directorate was rejected and the learned Court has not appreciated the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V.Senthil Balaji v.The State represented by Deputy Director and others, in Criminal Appeal Nos.2284-2285 of 2023 arising out of SLP (Criminal) Nos. 8939-8940 of 2023, vide judgment dated 07.08.2023. He submits that the matter with regard to remand the accused is set at rest in view of that judgment. He refers to paragraphs 62 and 88. Relying on this judgment, he submits that the learned Court has wrongly interpreted the said judgment on the ground that this judgment has been referred to a larger Bench in paragraph 91 of the judgment itself. He submits that 60 days' period is going to be expired on 25.10.2023 and in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V.Senthil Balaji (supra), if 60 days' period is not completed, remand to the investigating agency is not bar. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Sabyasanchi, learned counsel for the sole opposite party submits that the sole opposite party is ready to cooperate in the investigation. He further submits that from the date of initial arrest, 15 days' remand is a rule and that cannot be extended. He submits that this aspect of the matter has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in several judgments. He refers to the judgments passed in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Investigation Cell-I, New Delhi v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, reported in [ (1992) 3 SCC 141 ] as well as in the case of Satyajit Ballubhai Desai and others v.State of Gujarat, reported in [ (2014) 14 SCC 434 ] and in the case of Ashok Munilal Jain and another v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, reported in [ (2018) 16 SCC 158 ]. Relying on these judgments, he submits that there is no illegality in the impugned order and the learned Court has rightly passed the order. He further submits that the learned Court was available on the subsequent dates, however, belatedly that application has been pressed before the learned Court. On these grounds, he submits that this petition is fit to be dismissed. 7. The materials on the record clearly suggest that the matter relates to illegal mining in the District of Sahibganj in the State of Jharkhand and the accused are Pankaj Mishra, Bachhu Yadav, Prem Prakash and Pashupati Yadav and others and the sole opposite party is also an accused. What has been noted in the arguments of the learned A.S.G.I. appearing for the petitioner, clearly suggest that the sole opposite party was absconding and only on hectic efforts taken by the police, he was arrested and he was produced before the learned Court on 25.08.2023 and on 26.08.2023, he was remanded to judicial custody. On 05.09.2023, an application for 5 days' custody was made by the Enforcement Directorate and by the impugned order dated 16.09.2023, the said application was rejected on the ground that the judgment relied on behalf of the Enforcement Directorate is being considered by a larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in view of the reference made in the said judgment. 8. In view of the above, the only question requires to be answered in the present case when an accused person has been remanded to the judicial custody, he could still be interrogated or not? 9. 8. In view of the above, the only question requires to be answered in the present case when an accused person has been remanded to the judicial custody, he could still be interrogated or not? 9. The interpretations of Section 167 Cr.P.C. suggest as under: (i) If the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty four hours fixed by Section 57 Cr.P.C, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer marking the investigation not below the rank of a Sub-inspector shall (a) forward the accused to the nearest Magistrate, and (b) transmit to him a copy of the entries in the case diary; (ii) Such Magistrate may authorize the detention of the accused in the custody of the police for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; (iii) If such Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try the case or to transmit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may forward the accused to the Magistrate having jurisdiction; (iv) If the Magistrate is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for further detention of the accused, he may authorise his detention otherwise than in custody of the police-that is what is called a remand to judicial custody; (v) Such judicial custody cannot exceed 90 days where the offence is punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, and 60 days in case of other offences, and after the expiry of the said period the accused is entitled to be released on bail; (vi) No such custody whether police or otherwise, can be authorised unless the accused is produced before the Magistrate; and (vii) The Magistrate shall record reasons if he remands the accused to police custody. 10. In view of the above provisions and carefully looking into the interpretation of Section 167 Cr.P.C., it is settled that once the accused is remanded to the judicial custody, he cannot be sent back to the police custody in connection with or in continuation of the same investigation. 10. In view of the above provisions and carefully looking into the interpretation of Section 167 Cr.P.C., it is settled that once the accused is remanded to the judicial custody, he cannot be sent back to the police custody in connection with or in continuation of the same investigation. Further, the said section provides procedure where investigation cannot be completed in twenty four hours, it obviously follows that the detention authorised by this section whether in police custody or otherwise, is for the duration of the investigation of which interrogation of the accused forms an important ingredient. In view of the above interpretation at serial no.(iv), the accused even after his remand to judicial custody, can subject to his right to silence, be questioned by the police with the permission of the Magistrate in any place and manner which do not amount to custody in the police. In view of that, even if a person is taken to the judicial custody, the investigation is not bar and that can be at any place with the permission of the learned Magistrate. 11. Coming to the case in hand, the matter is arising out of PMLA and identical was the situation in the case of V.Senthil Balaji(supra) and in that case, it has been decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the period of remand should be 60 days or 90 days. 12. In the case in hand, 60 days' period is going to be completed on 25.10.2023. Further in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Investigation, New Delhi v.Anupam Kulkarni, reported in [ (1992) 3 SCC 141 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if further investigation is required to be conducted in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, interrogation cannot be denied. 13. In the case in hand, the case of the petitioner is covered in light of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V.Senthil Balaji (supra). The learned Magistrate has only not considered this judgment on the ground that it has been sent to a larger Bench by the said judgment. 14. It is well settled that law is existing on the day, i.e. the law unless it is reversed by the larger Bench of the High Court or the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 15. The learned Magistrate has only not considered this judgment on the ground that it has been sent to a larger Bench by the said judgment. 14. It is well settled that law is existing on the day, i.e. the law unless it is reversed by the larger Bench of the High Court or the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 15. In any case, when faced with conflicting judgments by Benches of equal strength of the Court, it is the earlier one which is to be followed by the High Courts, as held by a 5-Judge Bench in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, reported in [(2017) 16 SCC 6805] and only requirement is that the High Court should carefully pass the order. 16. Recently also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the High Court cannot refuse to follow the judgment on the ground review of the reference pending against it and earlier judgment is required to be followed and on that ground, the case cannot be preferred, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union Territory of Ladakh and others v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and another, in Civil Appeal No.5707 of 2023 [arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 18727 of 2023]. 17. Admittedly, no custody has been granted to the investigating agency in the present case and further 60 days' time is going to be lapsed on 25.10.2023. The prayer was made by the said petition for 5 days' custody. The investigating agency is permitted to have the custody of the sole opposite party for 5 days and that 5 days' custody must be completed within 25.10.2023 from the date of handing it over. 18. The judgment relied by the learned counsel for the sole opposite party is not in dispute i.e. well settled proposition of law and this Court has also taken note of spirit of Section 167 Cr.P.C. However, the case of the petitioner is covered in view of the recent judgment arising out under PMLA in the case of V.Senthil Balaji (supra) 19. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The State through the CBI v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar and others, reported in [ (2000) 10 SCC 438 ] in paragraph 11, which reads as under: “11. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The State through the CBI v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar and others, reported in [ (2000) 10 SCC 438 ] in paragraph 11, which reads as under: “11. There cannot be any manner of doubt that the remand and the custody referred to in the first proviso to the above sub-section are different from detention in custody under Section 167. While remand under the former relates to a stage after cognizance and can only be to judicial custody, detention under the latter relates to the stage of investigation and can initially be either in police custody or judicial custody. Since, however, even after cognizance is taken of an offence the police has a power to investigate into it further, which can be exercised only in accordance with Chapter XII, we see no reason whatsoever why the provisions of Section 167 thereof would not apply to a person who comes to be later arrested by the police in course of such investigation. If Section 309(2) is to be interpreted — as has been interpreted by the Bombay High Court in Mansuri [From the Judgment and Order dated 1-8-1996 of the Designated Court for Bomb Blast Cases, Brihat Mumbai in Misc. Applications Nos. 201, 210 and 211 of 1996] — to mean that after the Court takes cognizance of an offence it cannot exercise its power of detention in police custody under Section 167 of the Code, the Investigating Agency would be deprived of an opportunity to interrogate a person arrested during further investigation, even if it can on production of sufficient materials, convince the Court that his detention in its (police) custody was essential for that purpose. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the words “accused if in custody” appearing in Section 309(2) refer and relate to an accused who was before the Court when cognizance was taken or when enquiry or trial was being held in respect of him and not to an accused who is subsequently arrested in course of further investigation. So far as the accused in the first category is concerned he can be remanded to judicial custody only in view of Section 309(2), but he who comes under the second category will be governed by Section 167 so long as further investigation continues. So far as the accused in the first category is concerned he can be remanded to judicial custody only in view of Section 309(2), but he who comes under the second category will be governed by Section 167 so long as further investigation continues. That necessarily means that in respect of the latter the Court which had taken cognizance of the offence may exercise its power to detain him in police custody, subject to the fulfilment of the requirements and the limitation of Section 167.” 20. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Investigation Cell-I (supra) in paragraphs 7, 10 and 13, which read as under: “7. The learned Additional Solicitor-General submitted that the observations made by Hardy, J. in Mehar Chand case [ (1969) 5 DLT 179 ] would indicate that during the investigation of the same case in which the accused is arrested and is already in custody if more offences committed in the same case come to light there should be no bar to turn over the accused to police custody even after the first period of fifteen days and during the period of ninety days or sixty days in respect of the investigation of the cases mentioned in provisos (a)(i) and (ii) respectively. It may be noted firstly that the Mehar Chand case [ (1969) 5 DLT 179 ] was decided in respect of a case arising under the old Code. If we examine the background in enacting the new Section 167(2) and the proviso (a) as well as Section 309 of the new Code it becomes clear that the legislature recognised that such custody namely police, judicial or any other custody like detaining the arrested person in Nari Sadans etc. should be in the whole for fifteen days and the further custody under the proviso to Section 167 or under Section 309 should only be judicial. should be in the whole for fifteen days and the further custody under the proviso to Section 167 or under Section 309 should only be judicial. In Chaganti Satyanarayana v. State of A.P. [ (1986) 3 SCC 141 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 321] this Court examined the scope of Section 167(2) provisos (a)(i) and (ii) and held that the period of fifteen days, ninety days or sixty days prescribed therein are to be computed from the date of remand of the accused and not from the date of his arrest under Section 57 and that remand to police custody cannot be beyond the period of fifteen days and the further remand must be to judicial custody. Though the point that precisely arose before this Court was whether the period of remand prescribed should be computed from the date of remand or from the date of arrest under Section 57, there are certain observations throwing some light on the scope of the nature of custody after the expiry of the first remand of fifteen days and when the proviso comes into operation. It was observed thus: (SCC pp. 148-49, para 16) “As sub-section (2) of Section 167 as well as proviso (1) of sub-section (2) of Section 309 relate to the powers of remand of a magistrate, though under different situations, the two provisions call for a harmonious reading insofar as the periods of remand are concerned. It would, therefore, follow that the words ‘15 days in the whole’ occurring in sub-section (2) of Section 167 would be tantamount to a period of ‘15 days at a time’ but subject to the condition that if the accused is to be remanded to police custody the remand should be for such period as is commensurate with the requirements of a case with provision for further extensions for restricted periods, if need be, but in no case should the total period of remand to police custody exceed 15 days. Where an accused is placed in police custody for the maximum period of 15 days allowed under law either pursuant to a single order of remand or to more than one order, when the remand is restricted on each occasion to a lesser number of days, further detention of the accused, if warranted, has to be necessarily to judicial custody and not otherwise. The legislature having provided for an accused being placed under police custody under orders of remand for effective investigation of cases has at the same time taken care to see that the interests of the accused are not jeopardised by his being placed under police custody beyond a total period of 15 days, under any circumstances, irrespective of the gravity of the offence or the serious nature of the case.” (emphasis supplied) These observations make it clear that if an accused is detained in police custody the maximum period during which he can be kept in such custody is only fifteen days either pursuant to a single order or more than one when such orders are for lesser number of days but on the whole such custody cannot be beyond fifteen days and the further remand to facilitate the investigation can only be by detention of the accused in judicial custody. xxx xxx xxx 10. The learned Additional Solicitor-General however submitted that in some of the cases of grave crimes it would be impossible for the police to gather all the materials within first fifteen days and if some valuable information is disclosed at a later stage and if police custody is denied the investigation will be hampered and will result in failure of justice. There may be some force in this submission but the purpose of police custody and the approach of the legislature in placing limitations on this are obvious. The proviso to Section 167 is explicit on this aspect. The detention in police custody is generally disfavoured by law. The provisions of law lay down that such detention can be allowed only in special circumstances and that can be only by a remand granted by a Magistrate for reasons judicially scrutinised and for such limited purposes as the necessities of the case may require. The scheme of Section 167 is obvious and is intended to protect the accused from the methods which may be adopted by some overzealous and unscrupulous police officers. The scheme of Section 167 is obvious and is intended to protect the accused from the methods which may be adopted by some overzealous and unscrupulous police officers. Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 57 of CrPC give a mandate that every person who is arrested and detained in police custody shall be produced before the nearest Magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of the arrest to the court of the Magistrate and no such person shall be detained in the custody beyond the said period without the authority of a Magistrate. These two provisions clearly manifest the intention of the law in this regard and therefore it is the Magistrate who has to judicially scrutinise circumstances and if satisfied can order the detention of the accused in police custody. Section 167(3) requires that the Magistrate should give reasons for authorising the detention in the custody of the police. It can be thus seen that the whole scheme underlying the section is intended to limit the period of police custody. However, taking into account the difficulties which may arise in completion of the investigation of cases of serious nature the legislature added the proviso providing for further detention of the accused for a period of ninety days but in clear terms it is mentioned in the proviso that such detention could only be in the judicial custody. During this period the police are expected to complete the investigation even in serious cases. Likewise within the period of sixty days they are expected to complete the investigation in respect of other offences. The legislature however disfavoured even the prolonged judicial custody during investigation. That is why the proviso lays down that on the expiry of ninety days or sixty days the accused shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. If as contended by the learned Additional Solicitor-General a further interrogation is necessary after the expiry of the period of first fifteen days there is no bar for interrogating the accused who is in judicial custody during the periods of 90 days or 60 days. We are therefore unable to accept this contention. xxx xxx xxx 13. If as contended by the learned Additional Solicitor-General a further interrogation is necessary after the expiry of the period of first fifteen days there is no bar for interrogating the accused who is in judicial custody during the periods of 90 days or 60 days. We are therefore unable to accept this contention. xxx xxx xxx 13. Whenever any person is arrested under Section 57 CrPC he should be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours as mentioned therein. Such Magistrate may or may not have jurisdiction to try the case. If Judicial Magistrate is not available, the police officer may transmit the arrested accused to the nearest Executive Magistrate on whom the judicial powers have been conferred. The Judicial Magistrate can in the first instance authorise the detention of the accused in such custody i.e. either police or judicial from time to time but the total period of detention cannot exceed fifteen days in the whole. Within this period of fifteen days there can be more than one order changing the nature of such custody either from police to judicial or vice-versa. If the arrested accused is produced before the Executive Magistrate he is empowered to authorise the detention in such custody either police or judicial only for a week, in the same manner namely by one or more orders but after one week he should transmit him to the nearest Judicial Magistrate along with the records. When the arrested accused is so transmitted the Judicial Magistrate, for the remaining period, that is to say excluding one week or the number of days of detention ordered by the Executive Magistrate, may authorise further detention within that period of first fifteen days to such custody either police or judicial. After the expiry of the first period of fifteen days the further remand during the period of investigation can only be in judicial custody. There cannot be any detention in the police custody after the expiry of first fifteen days even in a case where some more offences either serious or otherwise committed by him in the same transaction come to light at a later stage. But this bar does not apply if the same arrested accused is involved in a different case arising out of a different transaction. But this bar does not apply if the same arrested accused is involved in a different case arising out of a different transaction. Even if he is in judicial custody in connection with the investigation of the earlier case he can formally be arrested regarding his involvement in the different case and associate him with the investigation of that other case and the Magistrate can act as provided under Section 167(2) and the proviso and can remand him to such custody as mentioned therein during the first period of fifteen days and thereafter in accordance with the proviso as discussed above. If the investigation is not completed within the period of ninety days or sixty days then the accused has to be released on bail as provided under the proviso to Section 167(2). The period of ninety days or sixty days has to be computed from the date of detention as per the orders of the Magistrate and not from the date of arrest by the police. Consequently the first period of fifteen days mentioned in Section 167(2) has to be computed from the date of such detention and after the expiry of the period of first fifteen days it should be only judicial custody.” 21. In the judgment relied by the learned counsel for the sole opposite party in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Investigation Cell-I (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that after expiry of the period of 15 days, there is no bar of interrogation of the accused who is in judicial custody during the period of 60 days or 90 days. In view of that judgment also, further interrogation is not barred. 22. Seeing the time constraints, the sole opposite party shall be given to the investigating agency for 5 days from 18.10.2023 till 22.10.2023 and the sole opposite party will be sent back to the judicial custody on 23.10.2023. 23. Accordingly, this petition is allowed in above terms and disposed of.