JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant intra-court appeal, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 11.12.2018 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.2183 of 2013 whereby and whereunder the order dated 29.06.2009 issued by the Chief Division retail Sales Manager, Ranchi Division, Divisional Office of Indian Oil Corporation by which the respondent No.6 has been appointed as the retail dealer of COCO Petrol Pump at Adityapur has been declined to be interfered with by dismissing the writ petition. 2. Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ proceeding, which are required to be enumerated herein, read as under :- The case of the writ petitioner is that one Nikhil Kumar Singh was appointed as Managing and Handling contractor of Petrol Pump owned by M/s IBP in terms of the advertisement issued sometime in the year 1999-2000. The writ petitioner was appointed as nominee and was running the petrol pump. The writ petitioner, subsequently, was appointed on 24.05.2006 as Managing and Handling Contractor of said Petrol Pump owned by M/s IBP Company Ltd. 3. The petitioner/ appellant continued operating the said Petrol Pump as the Managing and Handling Contractor, when, all of a sudden, he received a Notice of Caveat filed on behalf of M/S IBP Company Limited from which he came to know that the respondents have decided to terminate his appointment as the Managing and Handling Contractor. 4. Thereafter the petitioner/ appellant immediately moved before this Hon'ble High Court by filing W.P. (C) No. 5930 of 2007 for a direction upon the respondents to immediately renew/ award Dealership to him for running the Petrol Pump outlet at Adityapur. 5. However, during the pendency of W.P. (C) No. 5930 of 2007, the respondents by exercising power under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 dispossessed the petitioner on 08.12.2011. 6. The petitioner/ appellant came to learn that while the Petrol Pump was in his possession and the matter was subjudice before this Hon'ble High Court, the respondents vide letter contained in Ref. No.RDO/RO/COCO/Adityapur dated 29.06.2009 appointed one Shri Rakesh Kumar Paswan (respondent no. 6) as the dealer of the said Petrol Pump and he was put in possession on 13.12.2011. 7. No.RDO/RO/COCO/Adityapur dated 29.06.2009 appointed one Shri Rakesh Kumar Paswan (respondent no. 6) as the dealer of the said Petrol Pump and he was put in possession on 13.12.2011. 7. The petitioner/ appellant challenged the letter dated 29.06.2009 by which Shri Rakesh Kumar Paswan was appointed as Dealer of the said Petrol Pump by filing an amendment application in W.P. (C) No. 5930 of 2007. In view of the subsequent developments W.P. (C) No. 5930 of 2007 was dismissed as withdrawn by order dated 3.01.2013 with liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh writ application challenging the appointment of Shri Rakesh Kumar Paswan as a dealer of the said Petrol Pump. 8. Thereafter, the writ petitioner – appellant filed writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 2183 of 2013 challenging the letter dated 29.06.2009 wherein the respondents filed counter affidavit stating that after completion of all the formalities, the respondents have followed Clause 3 (a) of the guidelines framed by the Ministry of Petroleum, Government of India. 9. The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties, has dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 11.12.2018 against which the present appeal has been preferred. 10. It appears from the factual aspect as referred hereinabove based upon the pleading that one Nikhil Kumar Singh was appointed as Managing and Handling contractor of Petrol Pump owned by M/s IBP in terms of the advertisement issued sometime in the year 1999-2000. The writ petitioner was appointed as nominee and was running the petrol pump. The writ petitioner, subsequently, was appointed on 24.05.2006 as Managing and Handling Contractor of said Petrol Pump owned by M/s IBP Company Ltd. The Company had issued a notice upon the writ petitioner in connection with the case which was said likely to be filed by the petitioner. Subsequent thereto, the petitioner came to know that the appointment of the petitioner as Managing and Handling Contractor was terminated. 11. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved, filed a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 5930 of 2007 seeking direction upon the M/s IBP Company Ltd. to immediately renew the status of the petitioner for running the said petrol pump and also for restraining the respondents from taking any action to discontinue the operation of the petrol pump by the petitioner. 12. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved, filed a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 5930 of 2007 seeking direction upon the M/s IBP Company Ltd. to immediately renew the status of the petitioner for running the said petrol pump and also for restraining the respondents from taking any action to discontinue the operation of the petrol pump by the petitioner. 12. However, during the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner was dispossessed from the property on 08.12.2011 by virtue of proceeding initiated under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. 13. M/s IBP Company Ltd. had merged with Indian Oil Corporation and was named as Indian Oil Corporation (IBP Division) on 02.05.2007. The Indian Oil Corporation had appointed the private respondent herein as a dealer of the Petrol Pump which was earlier run by the petitioner. 14. The writ petitioner, in such circumstances, had filed an amendment application in the writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 5930 of 2007. However, the same was permitted to be withdrawn by giving liberty to file fresh writ petition challenging the appointment of the private respondent herein as dealer of the said petrol pump. 15. The writ petitioner, thereafter, has filed a fresh writ petition being W.P.(C) No.2183 of 2013, the present litigation, challenging the appointment of the private Respondent No.6 as a dealer of the said Petrol Pump on the ground that such appointment based upon policy decision of the year 2006 is absolutely incorrect and illegal. 16. However, the learned Single Judge has not accepted the ground of the writ petitioner and by taking into consideration the fact that the agreement entered in between the petitioner and the erstwhile Company, i.e., M/s. IBP Ltd. was terminated vide order dated 24.07.2009 and the said order attained finality and further, on the ground that the writ petitioner was never appointed as the authorized dealer to carry out the outlet, rather, he was only appointed as managing and Handling Contractor of the Petrol Pump, and has dismissed the writ petition, against which the present appeal. 17. Mrs. 17. Mrs. Ritu Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact in right perspective by applying the guidelines of the year 2006 even though the same was not applicable, in the facts and circumstances, based upon which the Respondent No.6 was appointed as the authorized dealer of the Company to run the outlet at Adityapur. 18. It has been contended that LOI was issued in favour of the Respondent No.6 for the Kanke area in the district of Ranchi and even if the policy decision of the Respondent Corporation held to be applicable, then also the same cannot be said to be applicable in the facts and circumstances that the LOI was issued in favour of Respondent No.6 for the area of Kanke falling within the jurisdiction of Ranchi district while the Respondent No.6 has been appointed as the authorized dealer to run the outlet at Adityapur which was being run by the writ petitioner. 19. It has further been contended that the guideline of the year 2006, i.e., dated 21.12.2006, provides that the pending LOI holders on dealership basis is to be given the outlet to their temporary COCOs. Herein, even though, according to the writ petitioner, he was not having the temporary COCOs, then also the said policy decision has been applied. 20. It has further been submitted that the policy decision dated 21.12.2006 clearly lays down that the location will be offered to the pending LOI holders of the same location without involving change in class of market or within the same class of market but the respondents have changed the district of allotment in favour of the Respondent No.6. 21. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner-appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in coming to a finding that the respondents have acted pursuant to the uniform policy adopted by them in connection with allocation of dealership to pending LOI holders and no case of arbitrariness has been made out by the petitioner. 22. Learned counsel for the appellant, in view of the aforesaid, has submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is bad in law and may be quashed and set aside. 23. Per contra, Mr. 22. Learned counsel for the appellant, in view of the aforesaid, has submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is bad in law and may be quashed and set aside. 23. Per contra, Mr. Rahul Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Corporation, has defended the impugned order by making submission that the writ petitioner has got no locus to question the decision taken by the Corporation in favour of the Respondent No.6. The reason is that the writ petitioner was never appointed as authorized dealer, as would appear from agreement dated 26th May, 2006 as appended as Annexure-5 to the paper book, whereby and whereunder the appellant has only been appointed as the Maintenance and Handling Contractor for retail sale of the products to the customers that too, the same is for the period of two years as per the terms and conditions of the aforesaid agreement, however, subject to the renewal by one year at the Company’s option at the same rates and on the same terms and conditions as contained in the agreement. The said agreement, subsequently, was terminated vide order dated 24.07.2009, as would be evident from Annexure-6 appended to the paper book. 24. It has been contended, based upon the aforesaid premise, that the writ petitioner was never appointed as authorized dealer, rather, he was only the Maintenance and Handling Contractor that too for the period of two years subject to the extension of one year. Subsequent thereto, the aforesaid agreement dated 26th May, 2006 has also been terminated, hence the writ petitioner has got no locus to question the decision taken by the Corporation which has been taken in the light of the policy decision dated 21.12.2006. 25. So far as the contention that the dealership has been given in favour of Respondent No.6 without any advertisement is concerned, the same is not applicable in view of the policy decision dated 21.12.2006 wherein the procedure for handing over Temporary COCOs to the pending LOI holders on Dealership Basis was taken under which it was decided that temporary COCOs without involving court cases or complaints is to be allotted in favour of the pending LOI holders on dealership basis as per the priority as stipulated therein. 26. 26. The LOI was issued in favour of the Respondent No.6 for the area Kanke falling within the district of Ranchi and by taking into consideration the policy decision dated 21.12.2006, the Respondent No.6 was found to be fit, since the LOI was already issued in his favour to allot the dealership, hence, since the decision of allotment of dealership in favour of Respondent No.6 is on the basis of the policy decision dated 21.12.2006, as such, there was no requirement for advertisement. 27. Learned counsel for the respondents, based upon the aforesaid premise, has submitted that if in such circumstances the learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the decision taken by the respondent Corporation, it cannot be said to suffer from an error. 28. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 29. At the outset, it requires to refer herein that Rakesh Kumar Paswan in whose favour the dealership has been allotted for the area in question, has been impleaded as Respondent No.6. Notice was issued to him, as would appear from the order dated 16.03.2023 passed by the Coordinate Division Bench. 30. It further appears from the order dated 16.06.2023 passed by the Coordinate Division Bench that the notice upon Respondent No.6 has been accepted to be validly served. 31. However, none appears for him to oppose the Letters Patent Appeal and accordingly, the matter was posted on 21.07.2023. 32. The Coordinate Division Bench thereafter has condoned the delay by allowing the delay condonation application being I.A. No.2798 of 2020. 33. Since notice has been validly served but even then the Respondent No.6 has chosen not to appear, as such, this Court is proceeding to decide the issue based upon the argument advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner and the Respondent Corporation, as referred hereinabove. 34. The undisputed fact in this case is that an agreement was entered on 26th May, 2006 in between M/s IBP Company and the writ petitioner for Maintenance and Handling of the outlet situated at Adityapur. 35. It appears from the condition No.48 that the said agreement was for the period of two years subject to renewal for one year on the same terms and conditions. 36. 35. It appears from the condition No.48 that the said agreement was for the period of two years subject to renewal for one year on the same terms and conditions. 36. It is further admitted fact that the said contract was terminated vide communication dated 24.07.2009, as would appear from Annexure-6 appended to the paper book. 37. The reference of writ petition being W.P.(C) No.5930 of 2007 needs to be made herein, wherein the direction was sought for commanding upon M/s. IBP Company Limited for renewal of the status of the writ petitioner for running the said Petrol Pump. 38. However, in the meanwhile, since the contract was terminated and the writ petitioner was evicted from the premises under the provision of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, hence the said writ petition was withdrawn with a liberty to file afresh. 39. The writ petitioner, in pursuance to the said liberty, has filed writ petition being W.P.(C) No.2183 of 2013, which is the subject matter of the present appeal. 40. The grievance of the writ petitioner that the dealership has been allotted in favour of the Respondent No.6 that too without any advertisement. 41. The respondents have relied upon the guidelines issued on 21.12.2006 laying down the procedure for handing over the temporary COCOs (Company Owned Company Operated) to the pending LOI holders on dealership basis meaning of which is that the fuel outlets are to be run by the oil company itself. 42. It appears from the premise upon which the aforesaid policy decision has been taken which is based upon the broad guidelines in COCO policy. 43. In accordance with these broad guidelines, while companies have been directed to offer their temporary COCOs without involving court cases or complaints to the pending LOI holders on dealership basis as per the priority given below :- (i) LOI Holders under Special Scheme (Operation Vijay – Kargil) (ii) Discretionary Quota Allottees (iii) Pending Allottees (LOI Holders) of Corpus Fund Scheme (SC/ST category of Dealerships, Widows and Unmarried Women above 40 years of age without earning parent) (iv) Pending LOI Holders of other Categories. 44. The allotment of Temporary COCOs to the pending LOI holders is to be given as per the priority stipulated in Clause 2, i.e., Priority No.1, 2 and 3. 45. 44. The allotment of Temporary COCOs to the pending LOI holders is to be given as per the priority stipulated in Clause 2, i.e., Priority No.1, 2 and 3. 45. It appears from the guidelines that the balance temporary COCOs, under 2(a) and (b) above will be offered to the pending allottees under this priority, for ready reference, the condition stipulated under Condition No.2 of the said guidelines is being referred hereunder as :- “2. Allotment of Temporary COCOS to the pending LOI holders as per following priority: (a) Priority No. 1 - LOI Holders under Special Scheme (Operation Vjay-Kargil) And (b) Priority No. 2 - Discretionary Quota Allottees: The allotment of temporary COCOS to pending LO: holders under Operation Vijay Special Scheme (OVSS) & Discretionary Quota (DQ) wil! be decided in the order of above priority and for this even COCOS of Other Marketing Companies can be offered, with the consent of concerned Oil Company, in line with MOP&NG's letter dated 06.09.06. (c) Priority No. 3 - Pending Allottees (LOI Holders) of Corpus Fund Scheme (SC/ST category of Dealerships, Widows and Unmarried Women above 40 years of age without earning parent): The balance temporary COCOS, after allotment under 2 (a) and (b) above, will be offered to the pending allottees under this priority, as under: Phase I: COCO at a location will be offered to the pending LOI holders of the same location without involving change in class of market. Phase II: Balance COCOS, in the District will be offered to the balance pending LOI holders from the same District, within the same class of market. Phase III: Balance COCOS, in the State will be offered to the balance pending LOI holders from the same State, within the same class of market. (d) Priority 4 - Pending LOI Holders of other Categories The balance temporary COCOS, after allotment under 2 (c) above, will be offered to the pending LOI holders of Other categories, only in cases not involving any change of location of Class of market.” 46. It is evident from Phase 1 that COCO at a location will be offered to the pending LOI holders of the same location without involving change in class of market. 47. The Phase 2 speaks with respect to balance COCOS, in the District will be offered to the balance pending LOI holders from the same District, within the same class of market. 47. The Phase 2 speaks with respect to balance COCOS, in the District will be offered to the balance pending LOI holders from the same District, within the same class of market. 48. The Phase 3 is to deal with the balance COCOS, in the State which is to be offered to the balance pending LOI holders from the same State, within the same class of market. 49. It is thus evident that the procedure has been laid down to allot the dealership in favour of the pending LOI holders (i) in the same location, (ii) in the same district and (iii) across the State. 50. Here, the serious objection has been raised on behalf of the writ petitioner for the purpose of making out a case that the LOI was in favour of Respondent No.6 for Kanke area falling within the district of Ranchi and, as such, the dealership which is the subject matter of the lis herein since is situated in Adityapur which is in the district of Singhbhum East, hence, the dealership of Adityapur Outlet ought not to have been offered under the COCOs policy. 51. But, this Court, having considered the categorization made in the said policy decision for the purpose of allotment of the dealership to the allottees of the LOI, one of the phase is to allot the dealership in favour of the holders of pending LOIs of the outlets across the State also as per Phase 3, as referred hereinabove. 52. Therefore, merely because the Respondent No.6 in whose favour the LOI was issued for the Kanke area within the district of Ranchi and in whose favour the dealership was allotted for Adityapur area, the same cannot be said to be contrary to the said policy decision, rather, according to our considered view, will be said to be in consonance with the policy decision as per Phase 3 condition stipulated under Clause 2(c) thereof. 53. The second ground has been agitated on behalf of the writ petitioner that the allotment in favour of Respondent No.6 has been made without any advertisement. 54. But, we are not impressed with such argument reason being that the allotment of the outlet is in consequence of the policy decision taken by the Oil Company dated 21.12.2006. 55. 53. The second ground has been agitated on behalf of the writ petitioner that the allotment in favour of Respondent No.6 has been made without any advertisement. 54. But, we are not impressed with such argument reason being that the allotment of the outlet is in consequence of the policy decision taken by the Oil Company dated 21.12.2006. 55. It further appears that it is not the case that the dealership of the Adityapur outlet was issued in favour of the person in whose favour there was no LOI, rather, it is admitted case that the LOI was issued in favour of Respondent No.6 and since the same was pending, hence, as per the policy decision dated 21.12.2006 the Respondent No.6 was allotted the outlet at Adityapur under the COCOs. 56. This Court, based upon the aforesaid reason, is of the view that if the decision has been taken based upon the aforesaid policy decision, the decision so taken by the respondent Corporation cannot be said to suffer from an error. 57. Further, the said policy decision has not been challenged by the writ petitioner and in absence thereof the policy decision will be said to be intact and if on the basis of the policy decision any decision has been taken, the same cannot be said to suffer from an error so far as the decision making process is concerned. 58. The prayer has also been made for quashing of the termination of the contract dated 24.07.2009. 59. However, it appears from the impugned order that the specific issue regarding the propriety of the decision of termination of contract has been raised before the learned Single Judge but as would appear from the impugned order that there is no adjudication of the said issue. 60. This Court, however, considering the fact that the intra-court appeal is the furtherance of the writ proceeding and, as such, it is the bounden duty of this Court to also delve upon the said issue. 61. 60. This Court, however, considering the fact that the intra-court appeal is the furtherance of the writ proceeding and, as such, it is the bounden duty of this Court to also delve upon the said issue. 61. This Court is of the view that since the said contract is absolutely a private contract based upon bilateral contract dated 26.05.2006 with specific condition that the same will be valid for a period of two years subject to renewal for one year for the purpose of maintaining and handling the outlet and if in that circumstances the contract has been terminated, the same cannot be interfered by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board and Another v. Kurien E. Kalathil and Others reported in (2000) 6 SCC 293 wherein at paragraph 11 it has been held which is quoted hereunder as :- “11. A statute may expressly or impliedly confer power on a statutory body to enter into contracts in order to enable it to discharge its functions. Dispute arising out of the terms of such contracts or alleged breaches have to be settled by the ordinary principles of law of contract. The fact that one of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body will not by itself affect the principles to be applied. The disputes about the meaning of a covenant in a contract or its enforceability have to be determined according to the usual principles of the Contract Act. Every act of a statutory body need not necessarily involve an exercise of statutory power. Statutory bodies, like private parties, have power to contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise any issue of public law. In the present case, it has not been shown how the contract is statutory. The contract between the parties is in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by a civil court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by a civil court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. Whether any amount is due and if so, how much and refusal of the appellant to pay it is justified or not, are not the matters which could have been agitated and decided in a writ petition. The contractor should have relegated to other remedies.” 62. Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India and Another, reported in (2020) 16 SCC 489 has observed at paragraph 19 that the Court is normally loathe to interfere in contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out, for ready reference paragraph – 19 of the aforesaid judgment is being referred and quoted hereunder as :- “19. This Court being the guardian of fundamental rights is duty-bound to interfere when there is arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides and bias. However, this Court in all the aforesaid decisions has cautioned time and again that courts should exercise a lot of restraint while exercising their powers of judicial review in contractual or commercial matters. This Court is normally loathe to interfere in contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out. One must remember that today many public sector undertakings compete with the private industry. The contracts entered into between private parties are not subject to scrutiny under writ jurisdiction. No doubt, the bodies which are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution are bound to act fairly and are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of superior courts but this discretionary power must be exercised with a great deal of restraint and caution. The courts must realise their limitations and the havoc which needless interference in commercial matters can cause. In contracts involving technical issues the courts should be even more reluctant because most of us in Judges' robes do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon technical issues beyond our domain. The courts must realise their limitations and the havoc which needless interference in commercial matters can cause. In contracts involving technical issues the courts should be even more reluctant because most of us in Judges' robes do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon technical issues beyond our domain. As laid down in the judgments cited above the courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders and make every small mistake appear like a big blunder. In fact, the courts must give “fair play in the joints” to the government and public sector undertakings in matters of contract. Courts must also not interfere where such interference will cause unnecessary loss to the public exchequer.” 63. Further, the policy decision since has taken on 21.12.2006 whereby and whereunder the outlet is to be allotted which is being run under COCO, in favour of the pending LOI holders and in that view of the matter if the decision has been taken for terminating the contract entered in between the writ petitioner and the respondent Corporation which is only for the purpose of maintaining and handling at the time when there was no policy decision, rather, the policy was to run the outlet under Company Owned Company Operated (COCO) and that is the reason the outlet since was run by the company on its own, hence, requirement was to maintain and handle the outlet of the oil companies for which purpose the agreement was entered. 64. After coming out of the policy decision dated 21.12.2006, the very purpose of maintaining and handling the outlet is no more required to be looked into by the oil companies since the same is to be operated by the LOI holders and once the LOI holders have been allotted then all responsibility including maintenance and handling will be upon the allottees of the outlet. 65. It further requires to refer herein that the agreement dated 26.05.2006 was in pursuance to the need of the time and when the policy decision was taken to allot the outlet in favour of pending LOI holders based upon the policy decision and in that view of the matter if the contract of maintenance and handling which was entered with the writ petitioner, if has been cancelled, the same, according to our considered view, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 66. 66. Further, the termination of the said contract is based upon a specific condition as under Condition No.48 wherein the parties have agreed for renewal of the contract for a period of one year only and after completion of the said period if the contract has been terminated, the same cannot be said breach of the contract, for ready reference Condition No.48 is being referred hereunder as :- “48. The agreement will be for a period two years, effective from 26.05.2006, subject to the renewal by one year at the Company’s option at the same rates, and on the same terms and conditions as are herein contained. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, this Agreement may be terminated at the option of either party by giving at least one month’s notice in writing to the other party, without assigning any reason whatsoever. In case of breach of contract, the Company reserves the right to terminate this Agreement forthwith. Unless otherwise mentioned or renewed in writing this Agreement stands automatically terminated at the end of the agreement period. If any information given by the M & H Contractor in his application for appointment shall be found to be untrue or incorrect, in material respect, the Company reserves the right to terminate this Contract forthwith.” 67. This Court, having discussed the factual aspect and coming back to the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, is of the view that the finding so recorded by the learned Single Judge is based upon the discussion made hereinabove and by taking into consideration the policy decision dated 21.12.2006, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 68. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.