JUDGMENT : K.Vinod Chandran, J. A single appeal is filed against the common order of the Tribunal in two OAs field by the father and son. The father is the applicant in OA No.28/2001 who is no more and hence the applicant in the other OA is impleaded as the legal representative. The applicants were concerned with two extents of property, 65 cents and 1.42 acres in R.S No.539 in Kuthanoor-I Village, Alathur Taluk, Palakkad District. It was the case of the applicant that the properties were set apart to the share of Viswanathanunni Achan in G schedule of the final decree of OS 23/1946; which was concerned with the partition of properties in the family of Kuthannur Padinjare Naduvath. Viswanathanunni Achan assigned the property in OA 28/2001 to the deceased applicant therein and his son obtained the property in OA 27/2001 from the another assignee of Viswanathanunni Achan. The title of the applicants is evident from A2 and A3, the tax receipts issued to the respective properties as per Ext.A4 (a) to (d) and Exts.A5 (a) to (c). Exts.A6 to A9 are proceedings of the Taluk Land Board, Alathur issued in the ceiling proceedings as against Viswanathanunni Achan. The proceedings indicate that though the property in Survey No. 539Pt was treated as vested, it was excluded when re-fixation was granted as per Ext.A9. The applicants claimed that they were cultivating the lands and that their predecessor-in-interest were entitled to exemption under S.3(2) & (3) of the Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (for short 'the Vesting Act'). The Divisional Forest Officer, Nemmara, claimed that the scheduled property forms part of Nallekavu Bit II Malavaram having a contiguous area of more than 100 acres falling within the purview of the Madras Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949 (for short 'the MPPF Act'). The land was surveyed and demarcated as VFC item No. 224/11 in 1976 and published as per notification dt. 11.01.1977 and gazetted as on 18.03.1978. Though the survey number had not been included in the notification an erratum notification is published. 2. The Tribunal raised question of limitation, nature of properties and entitlement to exemption. On the ground of limitation, it was found that the OAs are maintainable. 11.01.1977 and gazetted as on 18.03.1978. Though the survey number had not been included in the notification an erratum notification is published. 2. The Tribunal raised question of limitation, nature of properties and entitlement to exemption. On the ground of limitation, it was found that the OAs are maintainable. Looking at the order of the Taluk Land Board in the year 1976, it was found that if the land was a private forest it would not have been included in the ceiling proceedings. The plan submitted by the Commissioner as per Ext.C2 was also looked into to find that the properties are lying with bunds on the east, south and west. It was found that the disputed land does not lie as a forest and hence, not liable to be vested under the Vesting Act. The proceedings of the Taluk Land Board were also relied on to find that that the scheduled property held by Viswanathanunni Achan was not in excess of the ceiling limit. 3. We heard Sri. Nagaraj Narayanan, Special Government Pleader (Forest) appearing for the State and Sri.C Vinod Kumar appearing for the respondents. 4. We find no reason to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal that the OAs are maintainable especially since the survey number of the property was not available in the notification. However it has to be noticed that the vesting does not depend upon the notification and the nature and status of the property as on 10.05.1971, the appointed day under the Vesting Act, is relevant. If they are lands covered under the MPPF Act or lie as forest lands within the Malabar District or forests in other areas of the State, then the vesting occurs statutorily as on the appointed day, unless excluded or exempted under the Vesting Act. The Commissioner has visited the property in the year 2002 long after the appointed day under the Vesting Act. The Commissioner reported that the properties contain only few palmirah trees and on the three sides there are some shrubs and thick undergrowth, which separates the scheduled properties from vested forest on its outer margin on all the three sides, which forest land also lies at a higher level. The disputed property slopes a little and then lies as a level land. The disputed property slopes a little and then lies as a level land. The land at the plains is said to be ‘chola’ in the vernacular, meaning shaded portions or forests with a canopy), with capacity to retain water and there are also paddy fields situated in the margin abutting the ‘chola’. The appearance also indicates some human effort previously, in the distant past. The commission report does not at all help us in finding the status of the land as on 10.05.1971. 5. Hence, we look at Ext.A1, the final decree in the suit. In Ext.A1 the property in G schedule is said to be allotted to the share of the 7th respondent and Viswanathanunni Achan is the petitioner in the final decree application. Survey number of the property as stated in the application is 539 which is seen in G schedule described as a Muppuzhakad (meaning forest). In fact we looked at the description in the other items which were specifically indicated as field, garden lands etc. Hence as on the date of final decree the land should be considered to be a forest land and hence the decree dated January 1952 , indicates the land remained as forest as on 14.12.1949 which brings the coverage of the MPPF Act. The Tribunal has failed to notice the relevant aspect and considered the issue as if it is excluded from the applicability of the MPPF Act, in which circumstance alone the issue arises whether the land remains as a forest or not. 6. As far as lands which remain as private forest, without any cultivation as on 14.12.1949, the applicability of MPPF Act continues dehors the fact of whether any cultivation is commenced or continued in the property, after 14.12.1949. The definition of private forest under S.1(2)(i) of the MPPF Act, includes all private forests in the Malabar and South Kanara district, having a contiguous area of more than 100 acres. Explanation to S.1(2)(i) of the MPPF Act specifically indicates that any land which was brought under fugitive or other cultivation prior to 14.12.1949 makes inapplicable clause (i). As a corollary any land which remained as a private forest as on 14.12.1949, despite it having been cultivated after the said date; which also require the sanction of the District Collector under S.3 of the MPPF Act, continues to be covered by the MPPF Act. As a corollary any land which remained as a private forest as on 14.12.1949, despite it having been cultivated after the said date; which also require the sanction of the District Collector under S.3 of the MPPF Act, continues to be covered by the MPPF Act. The respondent specifically claimed that the malavaram in which the scheduled property is included has a contiguous area of more than 100 acres. 7. State of Kerala v Moosa Haji [ 1984 KLT 494 ] held that once the MPPF Act was applicable to an area as on 14.12.1949, nothing done by the owners or others was capable of putting an end to such applicability to that area. Now we look at the definition in the Vesting Act S.2(f)(1)(i) which applies to lands on which MPPF Act applies and is lying within the district of Malabar in the newly formed State of Kerala. There are exclusions provided to cultivations and sites of buildings by clauses (A) to (D) of S.2(f)(1)(i). Hence any land covered under the MPPF Act, even if not lying with the characteristics of a forest would come within the definition of a private forest under the Vesting Act. Exclusion from vesting would be available if the land did not have the characteristics of clause (A) or contained the principal cultivation as provided in clauses (B) & (C) or were sites of buildings as seen from clause (D). In the present case it has to be noticed that there is nothing produced to show any cultivation having been carried out in the property prior to or after 14.12.1949. After that date cultivation could have been commenced only with the permission of the District Collector under S.3 of the MPPF Act. As we noticed from Ext.A1 final decree, the property in Sy.No.539 was described as a forest. Even the Commission report which was prepared on an inspection conducted in 2002 does not indicate any cultivation in the property. For exempting the land under S.3(2) of the Vesting Act there should be personal cultivation in the land as on 10.05.1971 or under S.3(3), the owner as on 10.05.1971 should hold the land under a registered deed with intention to cultivate. 8. For exempting the land under S.3(2) of the Vesting Act there should be personal cultivation in the land as on 10.05.1971 or under S.3(3), the owner as on 10.05.1971 should hold the land under a registered deed with intention to cultivate. 8. Admittedly the applicants were not owners as on the appointed day under the Vesting Act since they obtained the ownership and possession of the property only by Ext.A2 in the year 1982 and Ext.A3 in the year 1985. As we noticed from the final decree we also do not see any title on the scheduled land, which are said to be included in G schedule in Ext.A1, on Viswanathanunni Achan, the petitioner in the final decree application, from whom the applicants are said to have purchased the property. 9. We also cannot accept the findings of the Tribunal based on the Taluk Land Board proceedings. Exts. A7 and A8 specifically includes the land in Sy.No.539Pt as lands liable to be surrendered. Ext.A9 however excludes it and the Tribunals finding is that it is included in the area entitled to be held by Viswanathanunni Achan. We find no such assumption possible on a reading of the proceedings. The land in Sy.No. 539 was excluded and it could as well be for the reason that it is a private forest or that it is not owned by Viswanathanunni Achan; the latter of which is the possible inference looking at the allotment of G schedule property as per Ext.A1 to the 7th respondent. On the above reasoning we find absolutely no ground to uphold the order of the Tribunal. We set aside the impugned order and reject the application filed before the Tribunal. The appeal of the State stands allowed, leaving the parties to suffer their respective costs.