JUDGMENT : 1. The legal issue involved in this petition is that “whether ad-hoc service of an employee can be counted for the purpose of determining his seniority?” 2. Instant petition has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayer:- “It is, therefore, most humbly prayed that this Hon’ble High court may graciously be pleased to admit and allow this writ petition and by an appropriate writ, order or direction the order dated 7.12.99 may kindly be ordered to be quashed and set aside and the order dated 14.08.98 may kindly be upheld. Any other reliefs or order which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper be also passed in favour of the humble petitioner.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that admittedly appointment was given to the respondent No. 2 on the post of Junior Instructor vide order dated 06.02.1989 on temporary basis for a period of six months under Rule 26 of the Rajasthan Technical Training Subordinate Rules, 1975 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1975’). Counsel submits that on completion of six months service, the services of the respondent No.2 were terminated against which the respondent No. 2 submitted S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4451/1989 before this Court. Counsel submits that during pendency of this petition regular selection process for appointment on the same post was initiated by the Department and the respondent No. 2 participated in the regular selection process and he was given regular appointment vide order dated 30.05.1992 under Rules 20 and 22 of the Rules of 1975. Counsel for the petitioners submits that respondent No. 2 is entitled to claim the benefits of seniority w.e.f. the date of his regular appointment i.e. 30.05.1992 but for getting the benefit of seniority respondent No. 2 approached the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur (for short, ‘Tribunal’) seeking seniority w.e.f. 06.02.1989 by way of filing an appeal. Counsel submits that Tribunal has allowed the appeal filed by the respondent No. 2, treating the appointment of the respondent No.2 as 06.02.1989 and accordingly, seniority has been granted to him from that date. Counsel submits that the initial appointment of the respondent No.2 was purely a temporary appointment which came to an end after completion of six months and thereafter regular appointment was given to him on 30.05.1992, so the respondent No. 2 is not entitled to claim any seniority w.e.f. 06.02.1989. Counsel submits that the initial appointment of the respondent No.2 was purely a temporary appointment which came to an end after completion of six months and thereafter regular appointment was given to him on 30.05.1992, so the respondent No. 2 is not entitled to claim any seniority w.e.f. 06.02.1989. Hence the Tribunal has committed an error in allowing the appeal filed by the respondent No. 2 vide impugned order dated 07.12.1999. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 opposed the arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioners and submitted that respondent No. 2 was given appointment on 06.02.1989 and he continued on the said post and his services were never terminated. Counsel submits that petitioner’s Department wanted to replace the petitioner from other candidate, so under that apprehension he approached this Court by way of filing SBCWP No. 4451/1989. Counsel submits that during the pendency of the said petition, the petitioner’s Department continued the appointment of the respondent No.2 by passing the order dated 30.05.1992. Counsel submits that under these circumstances, it is clear that respondent No.2 was appointed on the post of Junior Instructor on 06.02.1989, hence he is entitled to claim seniority w.e.f. his initial date of appointment. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of L. Chandrakishore Singh Vs. State of Manipur and Ors., reported in 1999 (8) SCC 287 has held that the service rendered as officiating appointment cannot be ignored for reckoning the length of continuous officiating service for determining the place in the seniority list. Counsel submits that under these circumstances, the Tribunal has not committed any error in passing the impugned order, hence interference of this Court is not warranted. 5. Heard and considered the submissions made at Bar and perused the material available on record. 6. Admittedly the respondent No. 2 was appointed as Junior Instructor vide order dated 06.02.1989 on temporary basis under Rule 26 of the Rules of 1975 purely for a period of six months only. Thereafter regular selection process for appointment on the same post was initiated under Rules 20 and 22 of the Rules of 1975 and the respondent No. 2 participated in this regular selection process and he was appointed vide order dated 30.05.1992. Thereafter regular selection process for appointment on the same post was initiated under Rules 20 and 22 of the Rules of 1975 and the respondent No. 2 participated in this regular selection process and he was appointed vide order dated 30.05.1992. The petitioner’s Department took a decision vide order dated 14.08.1998 to not to grant seniority to the respondent No. 2 w.e.f. 06.02.1989 because of his temporary appointment. The respondent No.2 challenged the said order before the Tribunal and the Tribunal quashed this order dated 14.08.1998 vide impugned order dated 07.12.1999 by holding that the temporary appointment order of the respondent No. 2 (i.e. 06.02.1989) was not cancelled and he continued on the same post and his regular appointment order was released on 30.05.1992 hence he is entitled to get seniority w.e.f. 06.02.1989 i.e. with effect from his initial date of appointment. 7. Now the question which remains for adjudication and consideration of this Court is “whether the period of ad hoc service rendered by the Respondent No. 2 can be counted for the purpose of determining his seniority?” 8. Before answering this issue it is gainful to the quote the relevant rules which deals with the provisions and the procedure for temporary and regular appointment. 9. Rule 26 of the Rules of 1975 deals with the provisions and procedure for urgent temporary appointment which reads as under : “26. Before answering this issue it is gainful to the quote the relevant rules which deals with the provisions and the procedure for temporary and regular appointment. 9. Rule 26 of the Rules of 1975 deals with the provisions and procedure for urgent temporary appointment which reads as under : “26. Urgent temporary appointment-A vacancy in the Service which cannot be filled in immediately either by direct recruitment or by promotion under the rules may be filled in by the Appointing Authority or by the authority competent to make appointments, as the case may be, by appointing in an officiating capacity thereto an officer eligible for appointment to the post by promotion or by appointing temporarily thereto a person eligible for direct recruitment to the Service, where such direct recruitment has been provided under the provisions of these Rules: Provided that such an appointment will not be continued beyond a period of one year without referring the case to the Commission for concurrence, where such concurrence is necessary, and shall be terminated immediately on its refusal to concur; Provided further that in respect of the Service or a post in the Service for which both the above methods of recruitment have been prescribed, the Appointing Authority or the Authority competent to make appointment, as the case may be, shall not, save with the specific permission of the Government in the Administrative Department, fill the temporary vacancy against the direct recruitment quota by whole time appointment for a period exceeding three months otherwise than out of persons eligible for direct recruitment and after a short-term advertisement. "(2) In the event of non-availability of suitable persons, fulfilling the requirements of eligibility for promotion, Government may, not withstanding the condition of eligibility for promotion required under sub-rule (1) above, lay down general instructions for grant of permission to fill the vacancies on urgent to temporary basis subject to such conditions and restrictions regarding pay and other allowances as it may direct. Such appointments shall however, be subject to concurrence of the Commission as required under the said sub-rule." 10. Similarly Rule 20 deals with the provision for recommendations of the Commission of the Appointing Authority and Rule 22 deals with the provision of selection by the Appointing Authority. These Rules are quoted as under : “20. Such appointments shall however, be subject to concurrence of the Commission as required under the said sub-rule." 10. Similarly Rule 20 deals with the provision for recommendations of the Commission of the Appointing Authority and Rule 22 deals with the provision of selection by the Appointing Authority. These Rules are quoted as under : “20. Recommendations of the Commission or the Appointing Authority.-The Commission or the Appointing Authority, as the case may be, shall prepare a list or the candidates whom it/them consider suitable for appointment to the posts concerned and arrange in the order of merit. The Commission shall forward the list to the Appointment Authority: Provided that the Commission or the Appointing Authority, as the case may be, may to the extent of 50% of the advertised vacancies, keep names of suitable candidates on the reserve list. The commission may, on requisition recommend the names of such candidates in the order of merit to the Appointing Authority within six months from the date on which the original list is forwarded by the Commission to the Appointing Authority. 22. Selection by the Appointing Authority-Subject to the provisions of rule 7, the Appointing Authority shall select candidates who stand highest in the order of merit in the list prepared under rule 20: Provided that the inclusion of a candidate’s name in the list confers no right to appointment unless the Appointing Authority is satisfied after such enquiry, as may be considered necessary, that such candidates are suitable in all other respects for appointment to the post concerned.” 11. From bare perusal of the Rules 20, 22 and 26 of the Rules of 1975 and the facts pleaded before the Tribunal and before this Court, it is clear that the initial appointment order dated 06.02.1989 of the respondent No. 2 was purely on temporary ad-hoc basis while the subsequent appointment order dated 30.05.1992 was his regular appointment. 12. The law on the issue as the period of the ad-hoc service can be counted for the purpose of determining seniority has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the multiple cases. 13. In the case of Direct Recruit Class – II Engineering Officer’s Association vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1990 (2) SCC 715 the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in para 13 as under : “13. 13. In the case of Direct Recruit Class – II Engineering Officer’s Association vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1990 (2) SCC 715 the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in para 13 as under : “13. When the cases were taken up for hearing before us, it was faintly suggested that the principle laid down in Patwardhan's case was unsound and fit to be over-ruled, but no attempt was made to substantiate the plea. We were taken through the judgment by the learned counsel for the parties more than once and we are in complete agreement with the ratio decidendi, that the period of continuous officiation by a government servant, after his appointment by following the rules applicable for substantive appointments, has to be taken into account for determining his seniority; and seniority cannot be determined on the sole test of confirmation, for, as was pointed out, confirmation is one of the inglorious uncertainties of government service depending neither on efficiency of the incumbant nor on the availability of substantive vacancies. The principle for deciding inter se seniority has to conform to the principles of equality spelt out by articles 14 and 16. If an appointment is made by way of stop-gap arrangement, without considering the claims of all the eligible available persons and without following the rules of appointment, the experience on such appointment cannot be equated with the experience of a regular appointee, because of the qualitative difference in the appointment. To equate the two would be to treat two unequals as equal which would violate the equality clause. But if the appointment is made after considering the claims of all eligible candidates and the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules made for regular substantive appointments, there is no reason to exclude the officiating service for purpose of seniority. Same will be the position if the initial appointment itself is made in accordance with the rules applicable to substantive appointments as in the present case……..” 14. Following the decision of the Direct Recruit (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case Malook Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors. Same will be the position if the initial appointment itself is made in accordance with the rules applicable to substantive appointments as in the present case……..” 14. Following the decision of the Direct Recruit (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case Malook Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors. Reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 876 has held that ad-service cannot be counted for determining the seniority if the initial appointment has been made a stop gap arrangement and not according to Rules. It has been held that in Para 21, 22 and 23 as under:- “21. The decision in Direct Recruits (supra) stands for the principle that ad hoc service cannot be counted for determining the seniority if the initial appointment has been made as a stop gap arrangement and not according to rules. The reliance placed by the Single Judge in the judgement dated 6 December 1991 on Direct Recruits (supra) to hold that the ad hoc service should be counted for conferring the benefit of seniority in the present case is clearly misplaced. This principle laid down in Direct Recruits (supra) was subsequently followed by this Court in Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India. Recently a two judge Bench of this Court in Rashi Mani Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, of which one of us (Justice DY Chandrachud) was a part, observed that the services rendered by ad hoc employees prior to their regularization cannot be counted for the purpose of seniority while interpreting the Uttar Pradesh Regularization of Ad Hoc Appointment Rules. This Court noted that under the applicable Rules, “substantive appointment” does not include ad hoc appointment and thus seniority which has to be counted from “substantive appointment” would not include ad hoc service. This Court also clarified that the judgement in Direct Recruits (supra) cannot be relied upon to confer the benefit of seniority based on ad hoc service since it clearly states that ad hoc appointments made as stop gap arrangements do not render the ad hoc service eligible for determining seniority. This Court speaking through Justice MR Shah made the following observations: “36. This Court speaking through Justice MR Shah made the following observations: “36. The sum and substance of the above discussion would be that on a fair reading of the 1979 Rules, extended from time to time; initial appointment orders in the year 1985 and the subsequent order of regularization in the year 1989 of the ad hoc appointees and on a fair reading of the relevant Service Rules, namely Service Rules, 1993 and the Seniority Rules, 1991, our conclusion would be that the services rendered by the ad hoc appointees prior to their regularization as per the 1979 Rules shall not be counted for the purpose of seniority, vis-à-vis, the direct recruits who were appointed prior to 1989 and they are not entitled to seniority from the date of their initial appointment in the year 1985. The resultant effect would be that the subsequent re-determination of the seniority in the year 2016 cannot be sustained which was considering the services rendered by ad hoc appointees prior to 1989, i.e., from the date of their initial appointment in 1985. This cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and the seniority list of 2001 counting the services rendered by ad hoc appointees from the date of their regularization in the year 1989 is to be restored. 37. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. (supra), relied upon by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the ad hoc appointees is concerned, it is required to be noted that even in the said decision also, it is observed and held that where initial appointment was made only ad hoc as a stop gap arrangement and not according to the rules, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority. In the case before this Court, the appointments were made to a post according to rule but as ad hoc and subsequently they were confirmed and to that this Court observed and held that where appointments made in accordance with the rules, seniority is to be counted from the date of such appointment and not from the date of confirmation. In the present case, it is not the case of confirmation of the service of ad hoc appointees in the year 1989. In the present case, it is not the case of confirmation of the service of ad hoc appointees in the year 1989. In the year 1989, their services are regularized after following due procedure as required under the 1979 Rules and after their names were recommended by the Selection Committee constituted under the 1979 Rules. As observed hereinabove, the appointments in the year 1989 after their names were recommended by the Selection Committee constituted as per the 1979 Rules can be said to be the “substantive appointments”. Therefore, even on facts also, the decision in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. (supra) shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that the decision of this Court in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. (supra) was considered by this Court in the case of Santosh Kumar (supra) when this Court interpreted the very 1979 Rules.” 22. The notification dated 3 May 1977 stated that the ad hoc appointments were made in administrative interest in anticipation of regular appointments and on account of delay that takes place in making regular appointment through the concerned agencies. In this regard, the vacancies were notified to the Employment Exchange or advertisements were issued, as the case maybe, by appointing authorities. The appointments were not made on the recommendation of the Punjab Subordinate Service Selection Board. However, subsequently a policy decision was made to regularize the ad hoc appointees since their ouster after a considerable period of service would have entailed hardship. Thus, the initial appointment was supposed to be a stop gap arrangement, besides being not in accordance with the rules, and the ad hoc service cannot be counted for the purpose of seniority. 23. Now the question that remains is that who would be bound by the judgment given in Malook Singh judgment which was subsequently overruled in Gurmail Singh. Thus, the initial appointment was supposed to be a stop gap arrangement, besides being not in accordance with the rules, and the ad hoc service cannot be counted for the purpose of seniority. 23. Now the question that remains is that who would be bound by the judgment given in Malook Singh judgment which was subsequently overruled in Gurmail Singh. In State of Rajasthan v. Nemi Chand Mahela a two judge Bench of this Court has elucidated the difference between the doctrine of res judicata and law of precedent in the following terms: “11…The reasoning given in paras 22 and 23 in Manmohan Sharma case [Manmohan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 5 SCC 782 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 8] relating to the case of Danveer Singh would reflect the difference between the doctrine of res judicata and law of precedent. Res judicata operates in personam i.e. the matter in issue between the same parties in the former litigation, while law of precedent operates in rem i.e. the law once settled is binding on all under the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court. Res judicata binds the parties to the proceedings for the reason that there should be an end to the litigation and therefore, subsequent proceeding inter se parties to the litigation is barred. Therefore, law of res judicata concerns the same matter, while law of precedent concerns application of law in a similar issue. In res judicata, the correctness of the decision is normally immaterial and it does not matter whether the previous decision was right or wrong, unless the erroneous determination relates to the jurisdictional matter of that body.” 15. To sum up this Court held that the respondent No.2 was appointed on the post of Junior Instructor on 06.02.1989 purely on urgent temporary basis under Rule 26 of the Rules of 1975 for a period of six months and his temporary service remain continue for extended period and the Department wanted to replace his temporary service from appointing other temporary employee, for which he filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4451/1989 before this Court and in the meantime regular selection process was initiated under Rules 20 and 22 of the Rules of 1975 and the respondent No. 2 participated in that process and regular appointment was given to him on 30.5.1992. Hence his initial appointment was a stop gap arrangement only. Hence his initial appointment was a stop gap arrangement only. Hence, the respondent No.2 is not entitled to get seniority w.e.f. 06.02.1989. The respondent No. 2 is not entitled to get seniority for the service period which he rendered as an ad-hoc temporary employee. 16. In view of the reasons stated above, the petition succeeds and the impugned order dated 07.12.1999 passed by the Tribunal is quashed and set aside. The writ petition stands allowed. 17. Stay application and all pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. 18. No order as to costs.