JUDGMENT (PRAYER: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the CPC, against the judgement and decree dated 17.09.2003 passed in A.S.No.7 of the 1998 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Ponneri confirming the judgement and decree dated 24.02.1992 passed in OS.No.548/1985 on the file of the learned District Munsif, Ponneri.) 1. This is an interesting appeal which arises from proceedings initiated under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act. 2. O.S.No.548 of 1995, on the file of the learned District Munsif at Ponneri was initiated by two persons, namely, Ravanammal and Padmalakshmi. It was their case that they are the owners of the suit schedule property and one Kamalammal, the 1st defendant was their tenant. The monthly rent was Rs.8/- and the tenancy was oral. The 2nd defendant Valliammal is said to be the sub-tenant to the suit property. The property had been sub-let according to the plaintiff without their knowledge and consent. 3. The plaintiff further pleaded that the rent for over a period of 36 months had not been paid prior to the presentation of the plaint i.e. on 06.04.1985. The plaintiff further pleaded that the 1st defendant seem to have sold the superstructure to the 2nd defendant along with the leasehold rights and as such that the 2nd defendant was not entitled to the protection of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act of 1921 [Hereinafter referred to as (CTP Act)]. Prior to the presentation of the plaint, a notice had been issued on 03.05.1984 to the defendants terminating the tenancy. In the said notice, 3 months time was granted to vacate and hand over possession. The plaintiff sought for the following reliefs:- "1. direct the defendants to quit and deliver vacant possession of the property described in the schedule hereunder to the plaintiff after the removal of the superstructure thereon. 2. direct the defendant to pay a sum of Rs.288/- to the plaintiffs. 3. direct the defendants to pay the cost of the suit." 4. The 1st defendant, the tenant, remained exparte. The 2nd defendant alleged sub-tenant, entered appearance. She stated that the suit property belonged to the 1st plaintiff’s husband and the 2nd plaintiff’s father, late Ramakrishnan Naidu. The 2nd defendant admitted that the 1st defendant was the tenant under him. She denied the alleged sub-letting of the property. The 1st defendant, the tenant, remained exparte. The 2nd defendant alleged sub-tenant, entered appearance. She stated that the suit property belonged to the 1st plaintiff’s husband and the 2nd plaintiff’s father, late Ramakrishnan Naidu. The 2nd defendant admitted that the 1st defendant was the tenant under him. She denied the alleged sub-letting of the property. It was the clear and categorical case of the 2nd defendant that she had purchased the superstructure from the 1st defendant on 10 of July 1967 through a registered sale deed in Document No.1140 of 1967. 5. The 2nd defendant further pleaded that she had remitted the ground rent of Rs.3.50/- through money order and the same was refused by the aforesaid Ramakrishnan Naidu. The 2nd defendant further stated that the said Ramakrishnan Naidu had voluntarily attorned her tenancy and had been receiving rent of Rs.3.50/- till his life time. The 2nd defendant further pleaded that she substantially modified the superstructure and had spent huge amount of Rs.20,000/-. It was further pleaded that on the death of Ramakrishnan Naidu, the 2nd defendant sent the ground rent of Rs.63/- from December, 1962 till March 1967 but it was not received by the plaintiff. 6. The 2nd defendant further claimed the benefit of the CTP Act and pleaded that there was attornment in tenancy by the said Ramakrishnan, the original owner. Subsequently, on the basis of this written statement, on 20.02.1986, a petition was filed under the provision of Section 9 of the CTP Act, and the same was numbered as I.A.No.2286 of 1986. This application was returned stating an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been returned. Subsequently, the condone delay application was numbered as I.A.No.1105 of 1986. This was an application to condone the delay of 133 days in filing the petition under Section 9 of the CTP Act. 7. In order to satisfy myself, if these applications had been ordered, I have called for the records from the Trial Court. No orders seem to have been passed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in (IA.No.1105 of 1986) or in the application filed under Section 9 of the CTP Act. 7. In order to satisfy myself, if these applications had been ordered, I have called for the records from the Trial Court. No orders seem to have been passed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in (IA.No.1105 of 1986) or in the application filed under Section 9 of the CTP Act. The Trial Court had, in a very unique procedure and in contravention of the CTP Act as well as settled procedures, instead of taking up Section 5 of the Limitation Act first and then the application under Section 9 of the CTP Act later and on its disposal, taking up the suit, had curiously enough kept these applications pending and recorded the evidence in the suit. 8. Noticing the manner in which the case had proceeded, my predecessor had framed the following Substantial Questions of law:- 1. Whether the sub tenant with whom the appellant had no privity of contract was entitled to protection under Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act? 2. Whether failure to consider the application in IA.No.2286 of 1986 filed by the 2nd defendant forfeits the right of the first defendant to purchase the suit site? 3. Whether the tenant, who is seeking protection under Section 9 of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, should satisfy conditions prescribed under Section 9 of the said Act? 4. Whether there is no estoppel against statute since the appellant made a gesture and offered that if the first defendant could pay the sum of Rs.1,75,000/- within one month, the site can be sold to the first defendant in default the first defendant should deliver vacant possession of the site, which is contrary to the statutory provisions? " 9. I heard Mr.J.R.K.Bhavanantham, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr.G.Mohanraj, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 9 of the CTP Act 10. At the very outset, I should state that the procedure followed by the Trial Court and as confirmed by the lower Appellate Court is surprising. Until and unless, the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is taken up and disposed of, the application filed under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act could not have been taken on file. Only on the application under Section 5 being allowed, the application under Section 9 of the CTP Act could have been numbered. Only on the application under Section 5 being allowed, the application under Section 9 of the CTP Act could have been numbered. The records do not show any orders being passed in any of the Interlocutory Applications. 11. The relevant adjudication for the case on hand are as follows:- i) “Petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the petitioner/defendant to excuse the delay of 133 days in filing the enclosed petition under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act.” Notice to other side given, counter by 10.09.1986. ii) On 10.09.1986, counter finally by 01.10.1986. iii) On 01.10.1986, counter by 20.11.1986. iv) On 20.11.1986, counter filed. Post along with case. 12. On 20.11.1986, it is seen that a counter had been filed but no order had been passed by the Court on the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If this is the lacunae with respect to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, even more, serious lacunae is noticed with respect to the application filed under the provisions of Section 9 of the CTP Act. 13. The following are the adjudications with respect to the petition filed under Section 9 of the CTP Act. i) Deficit Court fee of Rs.0.25 to be affixed. ii) Since, Section 5 application is returned as defective, this petition is also returned, time 10 days. Signed iii) Complied with and represented that is the endorsement made by the counsel. Office endorsement, returned. Previous return not complied with. Fresh docket sheet to be affixed, time 10 days. Signed District Munsif, dated 27.03.1986. Complied with and represented Counsel for the petitioner. Petition filed under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act by the petitioner/2nd defendant to direct the respondent/plaintiff to sell the schedule mentioned property to her at a price fixed by the Court. i) I.A.No.1105 of 1986 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is pending, call on 10.09.1986. ii) On 10.09.1986, call on 01.10.1986. iii) On 01.10.1986, call on 20.11.1986 iv) On 20.11.1986, Court endorsement is petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is pending. Counter filed, for enquiry on 13.11.1987. i) I.A.No.1105 of 1986 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is pending, call on 10.09.1986. ii) On 10.09.1986, call on 01.10.1986. iii) On 01.10.1986, call on 20.11.1986 iv) On 20.11.1986, Court endorsement is petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is pending. Counter filed, for enquiry on 13.11.1987. v) From 13.11.1987 the case was adjourned for enquiry on the following dates:- "12.03.1987, 07.07.1989, 28.07.1989, 11.08.1989, 07.09.1989, 06.10.1989, 14.12.1989, 19.01.1990, 23.03.1990,22.06.1990, 12.09.1990 02.01.1991, 30.01.1992, 03.02.1992, 06.02.1992, 12,02,1992, 21.02.1992, 24.02.1992." xiii) On 24.02.1992, the petition seems to have been disposed of without any adjudication. 14. I have gone through the original bundles searched for the orders. I could not find the fair and decreetal order either in the application disposing of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act. This aspect looms large with respect to the manner of disposal because of the categorical views taken by this Court and the Supreme Court. In M.Arasan Chettiar Vs. Narasimhalu Naidu Trust Estate, Coimbatore - 1993 LW 392 : AIR 1980 MAD 305 the Court was pleased to deal with a matter under the provisions of the CTP Act. It held :- "13. From the above conclusion of ours on the interpretation and scope of Section 9, the following consequences will follow:- 1. If a controversy arises whether a particular tenant is entitled to the benefits of the Act or not in the sense that  he is a tenant complying with the definition of the term "tenant" in Section 2 (4), that question has necessarily to be considered by the Court, because, an affirmative decision in favour of the ,tenant alone will enable the Court to proceed further with the application made under Section 9 (1) (a) of the Act and a negative decision against the tenant will render any application filed by the tenant, under Section 9 (1) (a) as not maintainable and such an order is not an order, under Section 9, and the date of that order has no relevancy to the fixation of the price of the land to be sold by the landlord to the tenant; 2. When once the Court has decided that the tenant is entitled to the benefits of the Act or there is no controversy that the tenant is entitled to the benefits of the Act, the- Court will have to dispose of the application filed by the tenant under Section 9 (1) (a); 3. For the purpose of disposing of this application, the Court, must first decide upon the minimum extent of the land which may be necessary for the convenient enjoyment  by the tenant Any such decision of the Court, from the very nature of the case, can only be by means of an order and the date of that order will be the relevant date for the purpose of fixing the price mentioned in the third sentence in Section 9 (1) (b). If the decision of the Court on the minimum extent is, taken up further by way of appeal or revision and that decision is either affirmed or modified and if there had been a stay of further proceedings during the pendency of such appeal or revision, naturally, the date of the order contemplated in the third sentence in Section 9 (1) (b) will be the date of the order of the appellate or revisional Court; 4. After having determined the minimum extent of the land or if such determination had been the subject matter of further proceedings and those proceedings have concluded the Court will then proceed to fix the price of the land; 5. For the purpose of deciding upon the minimum extent of the land or for the purpose of fixing the price of the land certainly it is open to the Court to appoint a Commissioner to record evidence and submit a report to the Court; 6. After the price to be paid by the tenant to the landlord for the purchase the land has been determined, the Court will have to pass an order directing the tenant, within a period to be determined by the Court, not being less than three months and not more than three years from the date of such order, to Pay into Court or otherwise as directed by it, the price so fixed in one or more instalments with or without interest, 7. If the tenant complies with such a direction, then the Court will pass a final order under Section R (3) (a)of the Act directing the landlord to convey the extent of the land decided to the tenant for the price so fixed and in the same order directing the tenant to put the landlord into possession of the remaining extent of the land, if any; 8. If on the other hand the tenant commits default in the payment of the amount as directed and the Court itself had not excused the delay by giving further opportunity, the application filed by the tenant under Section 9 (1) (a) shall stand dismissed; and 9. If the tenant has fulfilled the directions given by the Court and the Court has passed the order under Sec. 9 (3) (a), then the suit or proceeding shall stand dismissed and any decree or order in ejectment that might have been passed therein but which has not been executed shall be vacated. If, on the other hand, the tenant has committed default and the application filed by him under Section 9 (1) (a) stands dismissed under Section 9 (2), then the suit or proceedings will proceed or any decree or order in ejectment that may have been passed therein shall stand." 15. Following this principle in Pudukkulam alias Kuttikulam Vaharaya Trust, Pattukottai by its Managing Trustees V.Veerasami Chettiar Vs. T.Kamalambal 1988 1 MLJ 353 , the Hon’ble Mr.Justice, M. Srinivasan, (As His Lordship then was) held that as long as an application under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act is pending, the suit should be kept pending. This view of Justice M.Srinivasan has been followed in the case of V.M. Subramania Mudaliar & Sons a Joint Family partnership by its Managing Partner and two others Vs. Sri Bhavasarakshriya Seva Samaj rep. by its Managing Trustee Rejamant Rao - 1997 (1) CTC 102 : 1997 (1) MLJ page 414. This view of Justice M.Srinivasan has been followed in the case of V.M. Subramania Mudaliar & Sons a Joint Family partnership by its Managing Partner and two others Vs. Sri Bhavasarakshriya Seva Samaj rep. by its Managing Trustee Rejamant Rao - 1997 (1) CTC 102 : 1997 (1) MLJ page 414. The Hon''ble Mr.Justice P.Sathasivam, as his lordship then was, pleased to hold as follows:- “ In the light of the factual position in our case, namely, ''the tenant has filed the proper application under Section 9 of the Act in the suit in view of the law laid down by this Court in the above referred to decision which in turn refers to the Division Bench judgment of this Court, I am of the opinion that the application filed under Section 9 of the Act has to be disposed of prior to the disposal of the main suit. Since after passing the order under Section 9 of the Act the successful tenant has to comply with some conditions as per the statute and as construed by the above decision, it is better that the said application has to be disposed of initially and thereafter depending on the outcome of the order in the said application, the main suit has to be disposed of.” 16. The binding verdict of this Court has been given a go by and as pointed out above, the Court has not passed an order either under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (whether it is maintainable or not is another issue) or under Section 9 of the CTP Act. When a statute prescribes a particular manner of disposal of an application, the case has to be disposed off in that way and in no other manner. The right under Section 9 of the CTP Act is a right given to a tenant by virtue of the said statute. When that statute prescribes a particular manner of disposal of the application, it is the duty of the Court to strictly adhere to the said manner. Surprisingly, it has not been followed in this particular case. I feel this is not a mere procedural lapse. In this case, an issue has been raised by the appellant that the respondent is not a tenant. Without dealing with that issue, the Court ought not to have disposed off the suit. Surprisingly, it has not been followed in this particular case. I feel this is not a mere procedural lapse. In this case, an issue has been raised by the appellant that the respondent is not a tenant. Without dealing with that issue, the Court ought not to have disposed off the suit. It should have decided if the 2nd defendant is a “tenant” entitled to the benefits of the CTP Act. As pointed out earlier, it is a right conferred by a special statute. Without deciding that issue, the question of proceeding further does not arise at all. ADMISSION BY PLAINTIFF :- 17. The learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the appellant/plaintiff had conceded that on receipt of Rs.40,000/-, she has no objection for the suit being dismissed and the superstructure being purchased by his client. In this particular case, that plea cannot be heard and accepted for the reason, the landlord filed a detailed counter questioning the maintainability of the CTP application filed by the tenant. It is the clear and categorical case in the plaint as well as in the counter filed under Section 9 of the CTP Act, that there was no tenancy between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant. The parties proceeded before the Court that it was only the 1st defendant Kamalammal, who was the tenant and she had unauthorisedly sold the property to the 2nd defendant, Valliammal. Nonetheless, in order to satisfy myself, I went through the evidence of P.W.1 wherein she has stated as follows:- This shows that the plaintiff out of frustration, that her suit for ejectment has been pending for more than 6 years without any progress had said that if the amount of Rs.40,000/- has paid, she will execute a sale deed. This does not mean and cannot be read that she had agreed to her suit being dismissed. The Court cannot abdicate its statutory duty to the parties before it. 18. The right conferred on the tenant to obtain a compulsory sale from his land lord is subject to an application filed under Section 9 of the CTP Act being held maintainable and then allowed on merits. As would seen in the later paragraph, there are several steps which have to be gone through before an order of sale is made. 19. As would seen in the later paragraph, there are several steps which have to be gone through before an order of sale is made. 19. Proceeding on the basis of an admission is as if the Court skirts the requirements of Section 9 of the CTP Act and short-circuits the entire substantive law. The right under CTP Act is an exception to the rights and obligations between the land-lord and the tenant under the Transfer of Property Act. If not for the order under the CTP Act, the tenant, who puts up the structure on the land-lord''s property, might have to dis-mantle it and take it away, if the landlord sues for the possession of his land. 20. The Legislature in its wisdom amended the Law and enabled the tenant to purchase the land. Prior to such purchase, it imposed sufficient conditions for enforcement of that right. In order to confer that right on the tenant, it imposed certain duties on the Court which is found under Section 9. The Court cannot as stated above abdicate its duties and proceed purely on the basis of an alleged "admission" of a party. 21. In this case as already premised, the Court did not deal with Section 9 at all. If the Court to deal with the ejectment, the suit simplicitor, it cannot order sale of the super-sturcture. It can either dismiss or decree the suit. This power of the Court interferred with by an order under Section 9. That been absent in the present case, the Court could not have proceeded further on the basis of the alleged admission and ordered sale of the land. 22. The Court under Section 9 of the CTP Act has several steps to be completed:- i. The Court has come to the conclusion that the person making a claim is a tenant under the Act. ii. The Court would have to decide the minimum extent of land necessary for convenient enjoyment by the tenant. iii. The Court has to fix the price for the minimum extent of land decided as aforesaid. iv. The price has to be arrived at on the basis of average market value of 3 years immediately preceding the date of the order. The Court would have to decide the minimum extent of land necessary for convenient enjoyment by the tenant. iii. The Court has to fix the price for the minimum extent of land decided as aforesaid. iv. The price has to be arrived at on the basis of average market value of 3 years immediately preceding the date of the order. v. The Court then has to determine the period within which the amount has to be paid and this period should be not less than 3 months and not more than 3 years from the date of the order and the amount also could be in one or more installments with or without interest. 23. None of these steps have been adhered to. Section 9 of the CTP Act is not for asking because it is the duty of the Court to come to the conclusion that the person making the claim is a “tenant” and also fix the minimum extent of land necessary for the purpose of convenient enjoyment by the tenant. None of these procedures, which confer a right on the tenant, while depriving the right of the landlord to have a decree for ejectment have been followed. 24. Mr.G.Mohanraj, learned counsel for the respondent would argue that both the Courts below have read it to be a compromise and therefore it will operate against the appellant. I have to point out that the appellant is a landlord and the words used by her in evidence cannot be read as an admission. She was frustrated with the pendency of the legal proceedings and wanted to see an end to the same. Such a statement on affairs would not have arisen if the Court had taken up the application under Section 9 of the CTP Act and Section 5 of the Limitation Act and had disposed of the same one way or the other. Instead, as seen from the above, the Interlocutory Applications had suffered adjournments for a period of nearly 6 years. Apart from this, as pointed out above, when the statute has fixed a particular manner of disposal of the suit & application, neither party can confer jurisdiction on the Court to bypass that procedure. 25. Instead, as seen from the above, the Interlocutory Applications had suffered adjournments for a period of nearly 6 years. Apart from this, as pointed out above, when the statute has fixed a particular manner of disposal of the suit & application, neither party can confer jurisdiction on the Court to bypass that procedure. 25. The learned counsel for the respondent would vehemently contend that the evidence extracted above would go to show that the plaintiff had admitted that she will execute the sale deed in favour of the 2nd defendant. The portion extracted above would go to show that it cannot be treated as an admission but only as a challenge to the 2nd defendant for the purpose of having dragged on the litigation for more than 6 years before the evidence was recorded. 26. It is well settled position of law that admissions are conclusive proof with respect to the matter admitted. The evidence of P.W.1 does not admit to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant. On the contrary, she has denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. Under Section 9 of the CTP Act, if and only if, a person proves himself to be a tenant, the question of purchasing the property would arise and that too, to the extent which the Court determines. To reiterate, none of these procedures had been followed in the case. 27. I would buttress my conclusion on the matter of admission by referring to Paragraph No.10 of the Judgement reported in – - M.Manohara Chetti and Others Vs. M/s.C.Coomaraswamy Naidu and Sons, Madras - AIR 1980 Madras 212. "10. The law by no means regards admission as conclusive proof of the matters admitted. This is because to a Court of law admissions are but statements which do no more then suggest an inference as to some fact or facts in issue. (See Section 31 and 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872). It is, therefore, important that the Court should examine any given admission inside out to see if it suggests any clear inference on the fact in issue against the party making it. For a Court to draw an adverse inference against a party on the basis of what he is stated to have admitted, the admission must be unequivocal. It must also be comprehensive. For a Court to draw an adverse inference against a party on the basis of what he is stated to have admitted, the admission must be unequivocal. It must also be comprehensive. It must go the whole-hog, as it were, on the point at issue. If a party''s admission falls short of the totality of the requisite evidence needed for legal proof of a fact in issue, such an admission would be only a truncated admission. It follows that in such a case it cannot support a valid judicial determination, unless it be that the Court is in a position to find other evidence before it to make up for the deficiencies in the admission." 28. Following this Judgement, I would conclude that the so called admission does not go the whole-hog and therefore, the Courts below erred in treating it as one. In any event, there cannot be an estoppel against a statute. The statute enjoins the Court as to what should be done, under Section 9(ii)(b) of the CTP Act. As pointed out earlier, none of the procedures had been followed. Hence, I am not inclined to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent. 29. Mr.J.R.K.Bhavanantham, learned counsel for the appellant wanted me to give a finding that the 2nd defendant is not entitled to the benefit of CTP Act as the tenancy was never attorned or accepted, and further on the ground that a purchaser of the superstructure from a tenant is not entitled to the benefits of the CTP Act. 30. He relied upon the following judgments for the said propositions:- 1. P.Ananthakrishan Nair & Anr. Vs. Dr.G.Ramakrishan and Anr. – 100 LW page 095 (SC). 2. J. Lease & Co. and 2 Others Vs. M.S.A. Mohamed Farooq – 2000(3) CTC 423 (Mad) 3. P.N.Chockalingam Pillai Vs. A. Natarajan and others – 2002 -1- .L.W.373. 4. S.R.Radhakrishan and Others VS. Neelamegam – (2003) 10 SCC 705 . 31. I am not persuaded to go into those submissions because it will cause prejudice to the case of the respondent/2nd defendant. It is the duty of the Trial Court to first satisfy itself that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be allowed and thereafter it has to take up the application under Section 9 of the CTP Act and then, determine the rights of parties. It is the duty of the Trial Court to first satisfy itself that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be allowed and thereafter it has to take up the application under Section 9 of the CTP Act and then, determine the rights of parties. If it finds that the 2nd defendant entitled to the benefits of CTP Act, it shall proceed in accordance with Section 9 of the CTP Act and fix the minimum extent of land. If it finds that the application filed by the 2nd defendant is not maintainable, it should dismiss the application and proceed with the suit. Till the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 9 of the CTP Act are decided, the suit should be kept pending. It is left open to either parties to agitate the correctness of the orders under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, if so advised. Both the Courts below not having followed the special procedure under Section 9 of the CTP Act and also the binding judgement of this Court and Supreme Court, constraint to interpret with the same. I am aware that remanding the matter will only prolong the litigation. However, as there is no other way that is available to dispose of Section 9 of the CTP Act and I am constrained to remit the matter to the Trial Court. I feel that interest of Justice would be served, if a time bound direction is given and monitored by this Court. I find the judgement perverse. They have thrown the CTP Act to the winds and have abdicated their duties. It has resulted in jeopardising the rights of the appellant as well as that of the respondent. Having taken this view I pass the following orders:- i) The Second Appeal is allowed. The judgement and decree of the Sub-Court, Ponneri in A.S.No.7 of 1998 dated 17.09.2003 in confirming the judgement and decree of the Court of the District Munsif, Ponneri in OS.No.548 of 1988 dated 24.02.1992 are set aside. ii) The suit and the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 9 of the CTP Act are remanded to the file of the Trial Court for fresh disposal. iii) The Trial Court shall take up I.A.No.1105 of 1986 first and dispose of the same. ii) The suit and the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 9 of the CTP Act are remanded to the file of the Trial Court for fresh disposal. iii) The Trial Court shall take up I.A.No.1105 of 1986 first and dispose of the same. On the basis of the said order; If the application is allowed, it shall take up IA.No.2286 of 1986 and dispose of the same strictly in accordance with Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act. iv) The above-said exercise shall be completed within a period of 5 months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. v) The Registry is directed to send entire records to the Trial Court on or before 31.03.2023. vi) The parties shall be directed to appear before the Trial Court on 06.04.2023. 32. The learned District Munsif is directed to give priority to this case, as it is a matter pending from the year 1985 and dispose of the same on or before 30.09.2023. It shall submit a report of disposal of the applications immediately thereafter. The parties are requested to cooperate with the disposal of the case and not seek any adjournment. Full discretion is given to the Trial Court to refuse adjournment if it feels that the same is unnecessary or an attempt to prolong the litigation. At no cost should the Court keep the applications and suit pending beyond 30.09.2023. As the parties have been litigating for the past 30 years, I am not ordering any cost in this appeal.