JUDGMENT : (N.K. Chandravanshi, J.) 1. This appeal is preferred against an order dated 08.05.2018 passed by Judge, Family Court, Camp Court, Katghora, District Korba in Misc. Civil Case No. 01/2017 whereby application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (henceforth “CPC”) alongwith application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was dismissed. 2. Factual matrix of the case, in brief, are that marriage between the parties was solemnized on 22.04.2014 as per Hindu rites and rituals, but their marriage did not go well, hence, respondent/wife (henceforth “wife') filed an application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (henceforth “Act, 1955”) for granting decree of divorce against the appellant/husband (henceforth “Husband”) on 8.4.2016, which was registered as Civil Suit No. 92-A/2016 in the Family Court, Camp Court – Katghora, District Korba, in which, despite service of notice, husband did not make his presence before the family Court, hence, the Family Court proceeded ex parte against him in the case on 09.09.2016 and after taking evidence of wife, vide judgment & decree dated 09.12.2016, granted ex parte decree of divorce against the husband. 3. On 4.7.2017, husband filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the CPC along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which was registered as Misc. Civil Case No. 01/2017, stating therein that in Civil Suit No. 92-A/2016, the notice or summons was never served upon him and despite knowing the fact very well that husband did not reside at Bilaspur, rather he resided at Bangluru/Mumbai, wife without providing his the then present address to the Court got ex parte decree against him, hence, ex parte judgment & decree dated 9.12.2016 was sought to be set aside by allowing his aforesaid application and restoring the Civil Suit in its original number, so that opportunity of hearing may be afforded to him. 4. After filing reply by wife and perusing the material available on record, learned Family Court vide impugned order dated 08.05.2018 dismissed his both the applications holding therein that despite issuance of notice through usual mode and through paper publication, husband did not appear before the Family Court, hence, ex parte judgment & decree was passed against him. It was further observed that sufficient reasons have not been assigned by the husband for delay in filing the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the CPC. It was further observed that sufficient reasons have not been assigned by the husband for delay in filing the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the CPC. Hence, this appeal. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the husband would submit that at the time of marriage, husband was working and residing in Bangluru (Karnataka) where wife also resided for some time with him, thereafter, he shifted to Mumbai in relation to his job, which is also known to the wife and her family, despite that wife filed a suit being Civil Suit No. 92-A/2016 mentioning his permanent address of Bilaspur, where his old aged parents used to reside and they too often reside out of Bilaspur because they come to reside with the appellant/husband for 3-4 months in a year and for few months, they reside in husband's paternal grand-father's ancestral house in Kolkata, therefore, almost half of the time in the year, their home at Bilaspur remains locked. It is further submitted that despite knowing all these facts very well, wife has filed aforesaid civil suit concealing the aforesaid facts, so that husband should not get any information about the same and she may obtain ex parte decree of divorce against him. It is further submitted that any notice through ordinary process server/or through the Court having jurisdiction where husband was shown to be residing, were never issued in the mater and notice was sent directly by registered post, which was returned unserved/un-claimed, thereafter, notice was published in the daily newspaper “Dainik Bhaskar”, but as the husband and his family members are not the readers of “Dainik Bhaskar”, therefore, they could not get any information about the notice/summon issued by the Family Court. It is next submitted that in the aforesaid civil suit, summons was never served to the husband, therefore, he had no opportunity to defend allegations levelled against him and the wife succeeded in obtaining ex parte decree of divorce vide judgment dated 09.12.2016 on the basis of various false, malafide and vague allegations. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that husband may not claim reversal of the decree of divorce and simple and non-stigmatic decree of divorce may be granted by expunging false, malafide and vague allegations levelled against the husband and his parents, so that, it may not affect the interest of husband and his parents in other legal proceeding pending between the parties. Hence, it is prayed that impugned order dated 08.05.2018 passed in Misc. Civil Case No. 01/17 and judgment & decree dated 9.12.2016 passed in Civil Suit No. 92-A of 2016 may be set aside and opportunity of hearing be afforded to the appellant and the matter may be decided on its own merit in accordance with law. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/wife would submit that registered notice was sent to the husband in her given address of Bilaspur, which was returned with endorsement of “not claimed”, thereafter, with the permission of the trial Court, notice was published in daily News Paper Dainik Bhaskar, Bilaspur on 22nd August, 2016, despite that husband did not appear before the Family Court, hence, the Court proceeded ex parte against him and after recording evidence of plaintiff's side, vide ex parte judgment dated 9.12.2016, decree of divorce was passed in favour of wife. It is further submitted that application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC filed by husband is barred by limitation and he did not assign any valid or sufficient reason for the delay in filing the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the CPC. Hence, impugned order dated 08.05.2018 passed by learned Family Court does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality warranting interference of this Court, therefore, the appeal, being devoid of substance, is liable to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the copy of order sheets of Misc. Civil Case No. 01/2017 alongwith record of court below relating to Civil Suit No. 92-A/2016 with utmost circumspection. 8. Perusal of the record would go to show that in Civil Suit No. 92-A/2016, on 09.09.2016, the Family Court proceeded ex parte against husband holding therein that despite paper publication of notice, he did not mark his presence in the case, subsequent to that court proceeded ex parte against him and ex parte judgment was passed on 09.12.2016 granting decree of divorce against husband, thereafter, husband filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the CPC along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on 4.7.2017, as his application was barred by limitation. 9. 9. Learned Family Court has dismissed both the applications filed by the husband vide impugned order dated 8.5.2018 holding therein that despite issuance of notice to the husband through paper publication in the daily newspaper “Dainik Bhaskar”, he did not appear before the court below. It was also held that husband has failed to assign sufficient reasons for delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC. 10. At this juncture, it would be apt to refer the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and observations of Apex Court in respect of “sufficient cause” envisaged in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which reads thus :- “Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads thus:- "5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases-- Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation---The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." 11. In S. Ganesharaju (dead) through LRs. and another versus Narasamma (dead) through LRs. and others, (2013) 11 SCC 341 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court in unequivocal terms held that expression "sufficient cause" as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction unless shown malafide in not approaching the Court within the prescribed period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the Courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matters on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given a go-by. It is apt to reproduce the following observations:- "12. The expression "sufficient cause" as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. It is apt to reproduce the following observations:- "12. The expression "sufficient cause" as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the respondents are able to show mala fides in not approaching the Court within the prescribed period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the Courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matters on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given a go-by. 14. We are aware of the fact that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing the suit or from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. In fact, it is always just, fair and appropriate that matters should be heard on merits rather than shutting the doors of justice at the threshold. Since sufficient cause has not been defined, thus, the courts are left to exercise a discretion to come to the conclusion whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. The only guiding principle to be seen is whether a party has acted with reasonable diligence and had not been negligent and callous in the prosecution of the matter. In the instant case, we find that the appellants have shown sufficient cause seeking condonation of delay and the same has been explained satisfactorily." 12. In Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines for condonation of delay:- (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude." 13. A two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhiraj Singh (dead) through legal representatives and others versus State of Haryana and others, (2014) 14 SCC 127 , observed as under: "15.......The substantive rights of the appellants should not be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds by taking hyper technical view of self-imposed limitations....." 14. In B.S. Sheshagiri Setty and others versus State of Karnataka and others, (2016) 2 SCC 123 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court has held that when what is at stake, is justice, then a technical or pedantic approach should not be adopted by the Courts to do justice when there is miscarriage of justice caused to a public litigant. It is apt to reproduce the following observations:- "28. If a statute does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it must be exercised within a reasonable time frame. In the instant case, it is evident that constant litigation has been carried on by the appellants, and therefore they cannot be accused of suddenly waking up after 13 years to claim their land. Further, in the context of limitation, it has been held by this Court in a catena of cases that when what is at stake is justice, then a technical or pedantic approach should not be adopted by the Courts to do justice when there is miscarriage of justice caused to a public litigant." 15. Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Brahampal v. National Insurance Co., (2021) 6 SCC 512 , has held that undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts with discretionary powers to condone the delay, however at the same time it also places an obligation upon the party to justify that he was prevented from abiding by the same due to the existence of "sufficient cause". Although there exists no straitjacket formula for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must not only take into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of case but also the conduct of the parties. Although there exists no straitjacket formula for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must not only take into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of case but also the conduct of the parties. The concept of reasonableness dictates that the Courts even while taking a liberal approach must weigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties. When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other, the Court shall refrain from exercising its discretionary power. It was further held that what colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. 16. Reverting to the facts of the instant case, if we consider facts of the instant case in view of aforesaid principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court, then it is apparent that in the instant case, pursuant to the order dated 08.04.2016 & 13.05.2016, notice was issued to the husband on his address of Bilaspur vide registered post, which was returned with acknowledgement that ^^nkok ugha fd;k^^ (not claimed), this endorsement cannot be treated as “Refused”, because it was not mentioned in the envelope that when concerned person (Postman) went to the address given in the registered post, then he or his family members were found there, despite that they did not receive the envelope. 17. Husband has stated the reasons that why notice did not serve upon him, because at that time, he was working/residing at Bangluru (Karnataka) and, thereafter, he was working and residing in Mumbai, therefore, he seldom resided at Bilaspur, which is his parental place. The wife is well aware of the aforesaid facts, despite that she did not give his address of Bangluru/Mumbai. The wife is well aware of the aforesaid facts, despite that she did not give his address of Bangluru/Mumbai. It is further stated that in the address of Bilaspur given by wife in her divorce application, parents of husband reside, but being elderly persons, they are also often reside out of Bilaspur, as they generally come to reside with husband (petitioner) for 3 – 4 months in the year and for a couple of months they reside in their parental place/house in Kolkata, therefore, most of the time in the year, their home at Bilaspur remains locked. 18. In the divorce application filed by the wife, she had pleaded that husband works on the post of Consultant in M/s. Chef's @ Work in Bengaluru and was residing in Bangaluru, despite that she had given address of husband of Bilaspur. Since husband was not residing at Bilaspur, hence, she ought to have disclosed the address of Bangluru of husband. It is stated that later on, husband was working and residing in Mumbai, but without disclosing the aforesaid fact, she mentioned the address of husband of Bilaspur, where husband was not residing and his elderly parents also often reside at the place of their son (husband) or their parental place (Kolkata) and, therefore, most of the time in the year, their home at Bilaspur is said to be remained closed. In such a situation, if registered notice sent to the husband was returned with endorsement of “not claimed”, then it cannot be considered that husband was deliberately avoiding service of summons/notice. Hence, the cause shown by husband for his non appearance in a proceeding of Civil Suit No. 92-A/2016 is found to be bonafide and unintentional. 19. Considering the aforesaid facts and the principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in afore-cited cases and further bonafide intention of the husband that he wants to pursue his case on merits, learned Family Court ought to have taken liberal approach while deciding the application for restoration of Civil Suit No. 92-A/2016 filed by the husband, but without properly appreciating the facts putforth by the husband in his applications and law laid down by the Supreme Court, appellant's both the application have been dismissed arbitrarily and capriciously, hence, we find that order dated 08.05.2016 passed by the learned Family Court is not found to be just & proper. 20. 20. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the appeal is allowed. application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the husband are allowed and, accordingly, the order dated 08.05.2016 passed by the Family Court in Misc. Civil Case No. 01/2017 is set aside, consequent upon, ex parte judgment & decree dated 09.12.2016 passed by Family Court, Camp Court, Katghora, District Korba in Civil Suit No. 92-A/2016 is also set aside. It is directed to the concerned Family Court to restore the Civil Suit No. 92-A/2016 to its original number and to afford opportunity of hearing to the appellant/husband by filing written statement, evidence, etc and decide the case on merits in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within a period of 8 month from the date of receipt/production of certified copy of this order. 21. Record of Civil Suit No. 92-A/2016 be sent back forthwith. 22. The parties are directed to appear before the Family Court on 04.04.2023. It is further directed to the parties that they shall cooperate with the family Court for early disposal of the case. 23. Now, coming to the grant of maintenance to the wife, during course of hearing learned counsel appearing for the wife would submit that the husband earlier was working on the post of consultant in M/s. Saif @ Work Company, Bangluru and he was earning Rs.5,00,000/- per annum. Now he is working in Mumbai and earning more than the aforesaid amount, which is also found to be appropriate in view of the facts mentioned by husband in his application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC. It is further submitted that presently, the wife is working as Ad hoc Teacher in Govt. Higher Secondary School, Dharamjaigarh and earning very less salary. 24. Since ex parte decree of divorce was granted in favour of wife on 09.12.2016, but the case is now being restored to its original number on the application filed by the husband, hence, to make capable the wife to lead respectable life, we deem it appropriate to grant Rs.10,000/- per month towards maintenance of wife, which shall be given by appellant/husband and she will entitle to get the same after restoration of Civil Suit No. 92-A/2016, till disposal of the case.