ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The substituted legal heirs of the purchaser, namely, late Abdul Hamid are in appeal against the order dated 29th July 2019 passed in W.P(C ) No.1582 of 2019. 2. The writ petition was filed by the legal heirs of Abdul Hamid to challenge the order dated 19th November 2018 passed in L.C Revision No.44 of 2017. In the meantime, Parmeshwar Rai also passed away and was substituted by Rukmani Devi, Dilip Rai, Robin Rai and Ranjit Rai by an order dated 13th May 2015 passed in the execution case. These substituted legal heirs were arrayed as respondent nos.7, 8, 9 and 10 before the writ Court. 3. For the sake of fullness, it would be necessary to indicate here that Abdul Hamid was a purchaser from Indradeo Rai and Nageshwar Rai who are respondent nos. 11 and 12 herein. Abdul Hamid claimed that he purchased a piece of land measuring about 84 decimals out of a big chunk of plot with area about 4.11 acres through a registered sale-deed dated 4th April 1989. This sale was challenged by Parmeshwar Rai, Nakul Rai, Sarju Rai and Raj Kumar Rai by filing an application under section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (in short, “the Ceiling Act”) which was registered as L.C Case No.25 of 1991-92 and allowed in their favor vide judgment dated 23rd June 1993. The aforesaid order dated 23rd June 1993 passed by the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms was challenged in appeal which was dismissed on 18th January 1996. However, the revisional authority allowed the revision petition filed by Abdul Hamid under section 32 of the Ceiling Act by an order dated 22nd March 1999. Thus, the pre-emption application filed by Parmeshwar Rai, Nakul Rai, Sarju Rai and Raj Kumar Rai stood dismissed by virtue of the revisional order dated 22nd March 1999 passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue. Aggrieved thereof, Parmeshwar Rai along with the other pre-emptors approached Patna High Court in CWJC No.1269 of 1999(R) but the writ Court declined to interfere with the order dated 22nd March 1999 and dismissed the writ petition. 4. Aggrieved thereof, Parmeshwar Rai along with the other pre-emptors approached Patna High Court in CWJC No.1269 of 1999(R) but the writ Court declined to interfere with the order dated 22nd March 1999 and dismissed the writ petition. 4. Now against the order of the writ Court dated 1st May 2001, L.P.A No.319 of 2001 was filed by the pre-emptors which was allowed by the order dated 29th November 2002 and thus the order dated 23rd June 1993 was revived and the pre-emption application stood allowed. 5. Several years thereafter, an execution case was filed on 31st October 2014 by Parmeshwar Rai, Nakul Rai, Sarju Rai and Raj Kumar Rai which was opposed by the legal heirs of Abdul Hamid on the ground that the same was barred by limitation but this objection was overruled and the present appellants who are the legal heirs of Abdul Hamid were directed by an order dated 13th May 2015 to execute sale deed in favour of the legal heirs/successors of the pre-emptors. The appellate and revisional authorities have affirmed this order of the Deputy-Collector, Land Reforms. 6. The writ Court having regard to the aforesaid facts referred to the judgments in “Hamid Joharan (D) & Ors. v. Abdul Salam (D) & Ors.” AIR 2001 SC 3404 , “Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey” AIR 1932 PC 165 , “Sidheshwar Prasad Singh & Ors. v. Ram Saroop Singh & Ors.” AIR 1963 Patna 412 (FB), “Shyama Pada Choudhary v. Saha Choudhury & Co. & Ors.” AIR 1976 Calcutta 122, “Most. Munni Devi v. Viswakarma Mandir Trust” 1998 3 BLJR 2185 , “Ghanshyambhai K. Sathwara v. Sonubhai Baliram Patil & Ors.” AIR 2006 Gujarat 109, “Dharam Gope @ Dharam Mahto v. State of Bihar” (2004) 1 JCR 365 , “Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan” AIR 1964 SC 477 , “Swarn Singh v. State of Punjab” (1976) 2 SCC 868 , “Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd v. Krishna Kant Pandey” (2015) 4 SCC 270 , and “Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram” (1986) 4 SCC 447 and arrived at a conclusion that no interference is required with the order passed by the statutory authorities and, accordingly, dismissed W.P(C) No.1582 of 2019. 7. The writ Court has held as under: “10. 7. The writ Court has held as under: “10. This Court is of the view that on the basis of detailed discussion as has been made hereinabove, there is no infirmity in the order dated 19.11.2018 passed in L.C. Revision No.44 of 2017, warranting any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by issuing the writ of certiorari for the reason that the condition precedent is to be looked into by the High Court that if the order is without jurisdiction or the same has been passed without following the fundamental right but no such reason has been made out in the instant writ petition. It needs to refer herein that the scope of interference of the High Court to issue writ of certiorari sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited, as has been discussed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 477 Supreme Court wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have held as follows:- “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 .” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh Vrs. State of Punjab reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. State of Punjab reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been please to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 11. In view thereof, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.” 8. Mr. Manjul Prasad, the learned senior counsel for the appellants contends that having regard to the right of pre-emption being a weak right in law the application under section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act could not have been allowed after a decade and, moreover, a direction for executing the sale deed cannot be issued twelve years after the date of a decree of the pre-emption. 9. 9. No doubt with efflux of time, this also the Courts may keep in mind whether or not displacing a person in possession of a piece of land would be in the interest of justice, but then, a right which is conferred by a Statute; in the present case through section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act – cannot be taken away merely on the ground that it took quarter a century for the Courts to finally decide the pre-emption application. 10. In “Sheoji Mahto v. Addl. Member, Board of Revenue” (1997) 1 SCC 733 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “3. A reading of Section 16(3)(i) clearly indicates that when any transfer of land is made after the commencement of the Act, to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled within three months of the date of registration of the document of transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed. It is not in dispute that the Tribunal below held the appellants to be raiyats holding land adjoining to the land sold to the respondents by registered sale deed. An application was also filed within three months from the date of the registration of the document. Under these circumstances, the two conditions having been satisfied by operation of Section 16(3)(i), the appellants are entitled to pre-emption of the said land. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in refusing to entertain the writ petition dismissed in limine. The Collector was also wrong in allowing the appeal.” 11. The position in law has been further elucidated in “Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 24 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “17. In modern times, the right of pre-emption based on statutes is very much a maligned law. During hearing of these appeals, such rights have been characterised as feudal, archaic and outmoded and so on. But its origin which was based on custom and subsequently codified was out of necessity of the then village community and society for its preservation, integrity and maintenance of peace and security. During hearing of these appeals, such rights have been characterised as feudal, archaic and outmoded and so on. But its origin which was based on custom and subsequently codified was out of necessity of the then village community and society for its preservation, integrity and maintenance of peace and security. In changed circumstances, the right of pre-emption may be called outmoded, but so long it is statutorily recognised, it has to be given the same treatment as any other law deserves. The right of pre-emption of a co-sharer is an incident of property attached to the land itself. It is some sort of encumbrance carrying with the land which can be enforced by or against the co-owner of the land. The main object behind the right of pre-emption, either based on custom or statutory law, is to prevent intrusion of a stranger into the family-holding or property. A co-sharer under the law of pre-emption has right to substitute himself in place of a stranger in respect of a portion of the property purchased by him, meaning thereby that where a co-sharer transfers his share in holding, the other cosharer has right to veto such transfer and thereby prevent the stranger from acquiring the holding in an area where the law of pre-emption prevails. Such a right at present may be characterised as archaic, feudal and outmoded but this was law for nearly two centuries, either based on custom or statutory law. It is in this background the right of pre-emption under statutory law has been held to be mandatory and not mere discretionary. The court has no option but to grant decree of pre-emption where there is a sale of a property by another co-sharer. And for that reason the courts consistently have taken the view that where there is a sale of holding or property by a co-sharer, the right of a pre-emption is required to be settled at the earliest either on the pre-emptor's proving his qualification to pre-empt on the date of the sale, on the date of filing of suit, and on the date of the decree of the court of first instance or the vendee improving his status till the adjudication of the suit for pre-emption and after adjudication of the suit any loss of qualification by the pre-emptor or vendee improving his status equal or above to right of preemptor is of no consequence. In Zahur Din v. Jalal Din a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court while expressing necessity for settlement of rights of the parties at the earliest, held thus: (ILR pp. 450-51) “It seems to be essential that a line should be drawn at some stage when the race between a pre-emptor and a vendee ought to come to an end and after leaving the well-known landmark of the date of the sale behind — as one now must — the farthest limit that can be granted to a vendee is that of ‘the time of the adjudication of the suit’ by the trial court.” 12. As regards question of legality of the application for execution dated 31st October 2014, this much only shall be necessary to indicate that the same was filed within 12 years which is the period of limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The application for pre-emption was finally decided by virtue of the order dated 29th November 2002 passed in L.P.A No. 319 of 2001. As noticed above, LC Case No. 25 of 1991-92 which was allowed on 23rd June 1993 and affirmed by the appellate authority by an order dated 18th January 1996 stood dismissed on 22nd March 1999 because the revisional authority interfered with the appellate order and set aside the same on 22nd March 1999. Thereafter, CWJC No. 1269 of 1999 (R) filed by Parmeshwar Rai and the other pre-emptors was also dismissed by an order dated 1st May 2001. 13. This is a well accepted proposition in law that where an order is set aside or modified by the appellate/revisional authority the operative order shall be that order which has been passed by the appellate/revisional authority. Now whether or not the order passed by the statutory authorities under the Ceiling Act shall fall under the definition of the expression decree under section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, LC Case No. 25 of 1991-92 must be held conclusively decided only when L.P.A No. 319 of 2001 was finally decided by this Court on 29th November 2002. Now counting from such date, the application for execution was well within 12 years and while so maintainable. 14. “CIT v. Amritlal Bhogilal & Co.” AIR 1958 SC 868 is a judgment on point wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “10. Now counting from such date, the application for execution was well within 12 years and while so maintainable. 14. “CIT v. Amritlal Bhogilal & Co.” AIR 1958 SC 868 is a judgment on point wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “10. There can be no doubt that, if an appeal is provided against an order passed by a tribunal, the decision of the Appellate Authority is the operative decision in law. If the Appellate Authority modifies or reverses the decision of the Tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. In law the position would be just the same even if the appellate decision merely confirms the decision of the Tribunal. As a result of the confirmation or affirmance of the decision of the Tribunal by the Appellate Authority, the original decision merges in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement …..” 15. There is no dispute that the pre-emptor, namely, Parmeshwar Rai who was represented through his legal heirs and survivors, namely, Rukmani Devi, Dilip Rai, Robin Rai and Ranjit Rai as respondent nos.7 to 10 and the other pre-emptors who was represented through respondent nos.4 to 6 claimed themselves as adjoining raiyats and their claims have been found substantiated through the materials on record. There is a concurrent finding of fact on this issue by the appellate as well as the revisional authorities and, therefore, the writ Court rightly did not interfere in the matter and dismissed W.P(C) No.1582 of 2019. 16. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances in the case, we also do not find any ground to interfere in this matter and, accordingly, L.P.A No.563 of 2019 is dismissed.