JUDGMENT : SURESH KUMAR GUPTA, J. 1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 28.11.2000 passed by XIth Additional Sessions Judge, Faizabad in Sessions Trial No. 807 of 1997 arising out of crime no. 526 of 1997 Police Station-Purakalandar, District-Faizabad whereby the appellant has been convicted under Section 307 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 15,000/- and in default of payment of fine two years simple imprisonment. 2. Brief facts of the case emerges from the F.I.R. is that on 1.9.1997 at about 7:30 p.m. Krishna Kumar, son of complainant Ramdeen Yadav, resident of Bahad Village-Palia Goa, Police Station-Purakalandar, District-Faizabad went for defecation to his field at the east of his village. At that time, one hearing the hue and cry, Ramdeen Yadav and one another villagers-Ram Naresh, who were returning after defecation on the same way at the same direction, flushed the torch and ran away. In the light of the torch both of them saw that accused persons-Sanjai Singh and Jangbahadur caught hold Krishna Kumar, S/o Ramdeen and another accused-Anil Kumar @ Pappu Singh was inflicting injury by knife to Krishna Kumar. When with shouting Ramdeen along with Ram Naresh ran to his son then the accused persons fled away from the spot after leaving Krishna Kumar. The written report Exbt. Ka-1 has been scribed by Ram Pratap Yadav and then the F.I.R. has been lodged on 8:15 p.m. as Case crime no. 526 of 1997 under Section 324 I.P.C. 3. Investigation of this case was entrusted to the investigating officer. During course of investigation, he recorded the statement of the complainant, witnesses and the injured-Krishna Kumar. On the same day the spot inspection was done and injury of the injured Krishna Kumar was also examined. On the basis of injury, the case was converted under Section 307 I.P.C. 4. In order to prove his case, the prosecution examined following prosecution six witnesses: (i) PW-1/Krishna Kumar, who is injured witness, has supported the entire version of the prosecution. He stated that Sanjai Singh and Jangbahadur caught hold him and Anil Singh was inflicting injury on his neck and body by knife . The injuries of the injured were examined on the same day. He further submitted that the accused persons were identified by him in the light of the torch.
He stated that Sanjai Singh and Jangbahadur caught hold him and Anil Singh was inflicting injury on his neck and body by knife . The injuries of the injured were examined on the same day. He further submitted that the accused persons were identified by him in the light of the torch. He proved the F.I.R. Exbt. Ka-1. (ii) PW-2/Ramdeen, who is father of the injured-Krishna Kumar and also eye-witness, has supported the entire version of prosecution. (iii) PW-3/Ram Naresh, who is villagers of the village of the injured-Krishna Kumar and supported the version made by the injured-Krishna Kumar. (iv) PW-4/Constable Kanti Kanti Kumar Singh, who proved the chik F.I.R. Exbt.Ka-2 and entry of the General Diary as Exbt.Ka-3. (v) PW-5/Dr. K.N. Kaushal, who has examined the injury of the injured-Krishna Kumar on 1.9.1997 at 8:20 p.m. and following injuries were found: (a) Incised wound 5x4 c.m. on the right side of neck 5.5 c.m. just below the year and the blood was oozing. (b) Incised wound 2 c.m. x 1 c.m. skin deep was present at the right jaw. (c) Incised wound 2.5 c.m. x 1 c.m. muscle deep present on left of back scapula. (d) PW-5-Dr. K.N. Kaushal opined that tll the injuries were fresh and were kept under observation. As the condition of the injured/patient was not good, therefore, he was admitted in the hospital. PW-5/Dr. K.N. Kaushal in his cross examination stated that injury, which had been caused to the injured, may be caused by sharp side of the arm and that was not stab wound. After examining the injury he could not attend the patient. It has also been submitted that injury report was prepared in accident register because the injured was not sent by the police station. (vi) PW-6/Jagdish Singh, who is Investigating Officer, has proved site plan as Exbt. Ka-5 and charge sheet as Exbt. Kas-6. Thus, in order to prove its case, the prosecution relies upon oral testimony of PW-1 to PW-6 and documentary evidence as Exbt. Ka1 to Exbt. Ka-6. 5. Subsequent to conclusion of trial, statements of the accused persons and appellant were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. by the trial court in which the accused persons and appellant denied the prosecution story in toto and it was stated to be wrong and concocted. However, they did not choose to lead any evidence in their defence. 6.
Ka-6. 5. Subsequent to conclusion of trial, statements of the accused persons and appellant were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. by the trial court in which the accused persons and appellant denied the prosecution story in toto and it was stated to be wrong and concocted. However, they did not choose to lead any evidence in their defence. 6. Learned trial court after hearing learned counsel for the parties and appreciating the entire oral evidence as well as documentary evidence found the accused-appellant guilty and convicted and sentenced him as stated above and remaining co-accused persons-Sanjai Singh and Jagdish Singh were acquitted. 7. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial court, the appellant has preferred the instant appeal. 8. I have heard Sri Arvind Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant, Shri Vijai Prakash Dwivedi, learned AGA for the State and perused the material available on record. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the prosecution miserably failed to the prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt and the findings of the trial court are based on surmise and conjecture. There is no independent witness in support of the prosecution. It is submitted that the F.I.R. was lodged under Section 324 I.P.C. and he further submitted that although the injured has got injury on neck and the injury was kept under observation but no supplementary report regarding gravity and nature of the injury was collected by the Investigating Office, therefore, it cannot be said that the injury inflicted to the injured was life-threatening. He further submitted that injuries, which were inflicted to the injured was not grievous in nature and prima facie no offence under Section 307 I.P.C. is made out against appellant. He further submitted that injured himself stated that the stab wound was inflicted by the appellant but no sign of stab wound was found in the medical examination. He further submitted that appeal is pending since 2000. The matter is pertaining to the year, 1997. 26 years has already passed and presently, the appellant is more than 50 years. Thus, sending the appellant at this juncture of age, when he is approaching his last phase of life, would not be feasible. Thus, the learned counsel claimed leniency. 10.
He further submitted that appeal is pending since 2000. The matter is pertaining to the year, 1997. 26 years has already passed and presently, the appellant is more than 50 years. Thus, sending the appellant at this juncture of age, when he is approaching his last phase of life, would not be feasible. Thus, the learned counsel claimed leniency. 10. Lastly, the counsel for the appellants submits that during investigation, trial and appeal, the appellants spent about 6 months in jail, therefore, he claims benefit of probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act and Section 360 Cr.P.C. but the learned counsel for the appellant fairly admitted that the injured may be adequately compensated. 11. Learned AGA vehemently opposed the prayer made by learned counsel for the appellants and submitted that the prosecution has been able to prove the allegation against the appellant beyond shadow of doubt. The appellant-Anil Kumar Singh @ Pappu inflicted injury by knife on the injured namely-Krishna Kumar by the appellant. Thus, learned AGA supported the judgment of the trial court and submitted that the appeal has no force and is liable to be dismissed. 12. On the careful reading of the entire statements and the evidence adduced by the fact witnesses, it transpires that the F.I.R. of the alleged incident is prompt. The injured-Krishna Kumar was medically examined on the same day by the doctor. Due to injury, the injured-Krishna Kumar reached the hospital and due to profusely bleeding the immediate attention of the doctor was required, therefore, injury letter was not obtained by the injured, as the examination of the injury was registered in the accident register. So far as sheet of the injury no. 1 and 2 are concerned, the injury was inflicted on the right side of the neck and back side of the scapula, which shows that injury was inflicted when the injured was running to save himself and thus, it also shows that the appellant has no intention to murder of the injured. 13.
1 and 2 are concerned, the injury was inflicted on the right side of the neck and back side of the scapula, which shows that injury was inflicted when the injured was running to save himself and thus, it also shows that the appellant has no intention to murder of the injured. 13. So far as, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned that the incident was occurred at night therefore, the identification of the appellant is doubtful and such type of argument is worthless because the appellant and other assailants are the same villagers, therefore, they may be identified by the injured and other witnesses, Ramdeen Yadav and one another villagers-Ram Naresh even in the night by their voice and demeanour. 14. However, so far as the argument, that accepting the prosecution evidence as such, case of the appellant does not travel beyond Section 324 I.P.C, is concerned, it may be seen that it is clear that there was profusely bleeding from the injury of the injured and injury was kept under observation but no such supplementary report has been proved to indicate that these injuries were grievous in nature and there is no such medical evidence also which shows that that these injuries were dangerous to life. The facts and circumstances of the case do not indicate that the appellants-accused had intention to kill the deceased. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the statement of the injured was recorded within 4-5 days of the incident but from the statement it is not clear that how many days the appellant was admitted in the hospital. Thus, prosecution was miserably failed to establish that the appellant has intention to kill the injured. The question arises for consideration is whether the act of the appellants falls within the ambit of Section 307 of IPC or 324 IPC. A person will be liable to have caused hurt voluntarily through dangerous weapons and means under Section 324 IPC which reads as under: “324.
The question arises for consideration is whether the act of the appellants falls within the ambit of Section 307 of IPC or 324 IPC. A person will be liable to have caused hurt voluntarily through dangerous weapons and means under Section 324 IPC which reads as under: “324. Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means - Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” 15. To establish an offence under Sec 324 IPC, the presence of following ingredients is a must which are as follows: 1. Voluntary hurt caused to another person by the accused. 2. Such hurt was caused: (a) By any instrument used for shooting, cutting or stabbing, or any other instrument likely to cause death. (b) By fire or other heated instruments. (c) By poison or other corrosive substance. (d) By any explosive substance. (e) By a substance that is dangerous for the human body to swallow, inhale, or receive through blood. (f) By an animal. When a person commits an offence of voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons and means under Section 324 of Indian Penal Code, then such person shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of three years, or with fine. 16. The provision of Section 307 of IPC reads as under: “307.
(f) By an animal. When a person commits an offence of voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons and means under Section 324 of Indian Penal Code, then such person shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of three years, or with fine. 16. The provision of Section 307 of IPC reads as under: “307. Attempt to murder - Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life convicts - When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.” 17. The first part of Section 307 refers to “an act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder”. The second part of Section 307, which carries a heavier punishment, refers to ‘hurt’ caused in pursuance of such an ‘act’. It may be stated that proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence under Section 307 of IPC. The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent. 18. For the conviction under this section more importance has been given to mens rea or the intention than the actus reus or the actual act itself. The attempt should arise out of a specific intention or desire to murder the victim. The nature of the weapon used, the manner in which it is used, motive for the crime, severity of the blow, the part of the body where the injury is inflicted is all taken into consideration to determine the intention. 19.
The attempt should arise out of a specific intention or desire to murder the victim. The nature of the weapon used, the manner in which it is used, motive for the crime, severity of the blow, the part of the body where the injury is inflicted is all taken into consideration to determine the intention. 19. In Kundan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 2013 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “We are of the view that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case and particularly in view of the fact that PW-6 and PW-7 were in the courtyard of their house when the appellant fired gun shots and he could not, therefore, have intended to injure them, the conviction of the appellant under Section 307, I.P.C. was not justified. We think that the conviction of the appellant could be maintained only under Section 324 of the I.P.C. since PW-6 and PW-7 received simple injuries. We accordingly allow the appeal and alter the conviction of the appellant to one under Section 324 of the I.P.C. for causing simple injuries to PW-6 and PW-7 and since the appellant has already suffered imprisonment for about 16 months, we direct that the sentence imposed on the appellant be reduced to that already undergone by him and that he may be set at liberty forthwith.” 20. The Apex Court in Merambhai Punjabhai Khachar and Others vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1996 SC 3236 wherein in an attempt to commit murder by fire-arm, victim has suffered a pallet injury, the Apex Court held that Section 307 I.P.C. cannot be held to have been satisfied and the conviction was altered to Section 324 of IPC. 21. In Ramesh vs. State of U.P. AIR 1992 SC 664 , wherein the injury was found on the back of the injured. Accused was tried along with two other was convicted under Section 307/34 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years, while the two others were acquitted. The Apex Court altered from section 307 of IPC into Section 324 of I.P.C. and sentence was reduced to the period already undergone with fine of Rs. 3000/- which was to be paid to the complainant as compensation. 22.
The Apex Court altered from section 307 of IPC into Section 324 of I.P.C. and sentence was reduced to the period already undergone with fine of Rs. 3000/- which was to be paid to the complainant as compensation. 22. After considering above mentioned pronouncements, in the facts and evidence of the present case, it appears that the ingredients of sections 307 of IPC are not satisfied. Although, the injury was found on the neck but that fact is not sufficient to establish the gravity and nature of the gravity that the injury is dangerous to life. Thus, conviction of the accused-appellant under Sections 307 of IPC cannot sustained and the injured have got injury by sharp edged weapon so in these circumstances, the appellant is liable to be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC. 23. So far as question of sentence to be imposed u/s 324 IPC is concerned, perusal of the record shows that the occurrence took place on 1.9.1997 and it was submitted that appellant is remained in jail about seven months and presently, his age is more than 50 years. No minimum sentence prescribed u/s 324 Cr.P.C. So after considering the entire fact and circumstances of the case I am of the view that after 26 years in the interest of justice no useful purpose shall be served to again lodging the appellant into jail. Concludingly, while the conviction of the appellant is upheld under Section 324 I.P.C. but his sentence is reduced to the period of imprisonment already undergone by him and he is also entitled for benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of First Offenders Act. But in this case, the injured due to injury suffered mental trauma and for the treatment he was admitted in hospital so it would be appropriate to award compensation to the injured. 24. Since learned counsel for the appellant restricted his arguments to grant benefit of probation, therefore, in these circumstances, It would be appropriate to quote Section 360 Cr.P.C. 361 Cr.P.C. reads as follows: Section 360 Cr.P.C. reads as follows: “360.
24. Since learned counsel for the appellant restricted his arguments to grant benefit of probation, therefore, in these circumstances, It would be appropriate to quote Section 360 Cr.P.C. 361 Cr.P.C. reads as follows: Section 360 Cr.P.C. reads as follows: “360. Order to release on probation of good conduct or after admonition: (1) When any person not under twenty one years of age is convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, or when any person under twenty-one years of age or any woman is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and no previous conviction is proved against the offender, if it appears to the Court before which he is convicted, regard being had to the age, Character or antecedents of the offender, and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be released on probation of good conduct, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period (not exceeding three years) as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour: Provided that, where any first offender is convicted by a Magistrate of the second class not specially empowered by the High Court, and the Magistrate is of opinion that the powers conferred by this section should be exercised, he shall record his opinion to that effect, and submit the proceedings to a Magistrate of the first class, forwarding the accused to, or taking bail for his appearance before such Magistrate, who shall dispose of the case in the manner provided by sub-section (2). (2) Where proceedings are submitted to a Magistrate of the first class as provided by sub-section (1), such Magistrate may thereupon pass such sentence or make such order as he might have passed or made if the case had originally been heard by him, and, if he thinks further inquiry or additional evidence on any point to be necessary, he may make such inquiry or take such evidence himself or direct such inquiry or evidence to be made or taken.
(3) In any case in which a person is convicted of theft, theft in a building, dishonest misappropriation, cheating or any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), punishable with not more than two years, imprisonment or any offence punishable with fine only and no previous conviction is proved against him, the Court before which he is so convicted may, if it thinks fit, having regard to the age, character, antecedents or physical or mental condition of the offender and to the trivial nature of the offence or any extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed, instead of sentencing him to any punishment, release him after due admonition. (4) An order under this section may be made by any Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session when exercising its powers of revision. (5) When an order has been made under this section in respect of any offender, the High Court or Court of Session may, on appeal when there is a right of appeal to such Court, or when exercising its powers of revision, set aside such order, and in lieu, thereof pass sentence on such offender according to law: Provided that the High Court or Court of Session shall not under this subsection inflict a greater punishment than might have been inflicted by the Court by which the offender was convicted. (6) The provisions of Sections 121, 124 and 373 shall, so far as may be, apply in the case of sureties offered in pursuance of the provisions of this section. (7) The Court before directing the release of an offender under sub-section (1), shall be satisfied that an offender or his surety (if any) has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place for which the Court acts or in which the offender is likely to live during the period named for the observance of the conditions. (8) If the Court which convicted the offender, or a Court which could have dealt with the offender in respect of his original offence, is satisfied that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of his recognisance, it may issue a warrant for his apprehension.
(8) If the Court which convicted the offender, or a Court which could have dealt with the offender in respect of his original offence, is satisfied that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of his recognisance, it may issue a warrant for his apprehension. (9) An offender, when apprehended on any such warrant shall be brought forthwith before the Court issuing warrant, and such Court may either remand him in custody until the case is heard or admit him to bail with a sufficient surety conditioned on his appearing for sentence and Court may, after hearing the case, pass sentence. (10) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1951), the Children Act, 1960 (60 of 1960) or any other law for the time being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders.” Section 361 Cr.P.C. reads as under: 361. Special reasons to be recorded in certain cases. Where in any case the Court could have dealt with: (a) an accused person under section 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958). (b) a youthful offender under the Children Act, 1960 (60 of 1960 ), or any other law for the time being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders, but has not done so, it shall record in its judgment the special reasons for not having done so. Section 3, 4 and 5 of the Probation of First Offenders Act reads as under: Section 3 - Power of court to release certain offenders after admonition.
Section 3, 4 and 5 of the Probation of First Offenders Act reads as under: Section 3 - Power of court to release certain offenders after admonition. When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable under section 379 or section 380 or section 381 or section 404 or section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860) or any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both, under the Indian Penal Code or any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against him and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence, and the character of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct under section 4, release him after due admonition. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, previous conviction against a person shall include any previous order made against him under this section or section 4. Section 4 Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.
Explanation - For the purposes of this section, previous conviction against a person shall include any previous order made against him under this section or section 4. Section 4 Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct. (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour: Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond. (2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case. (3) When an order under sub-section (1) is made, the court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender.
(4) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender. (5) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned. Section 5 - Power of court to require released offenders to pay compensation and costs. (1) The court directing the release of an offender under section 3 or section 4, may, if it thinks fit, make at the same time a further order directing him to pay: (a) such compensation as the court thinks reasonable for loss or injury caused to any person by the commission of the offence. (b) such costs of the proceedings as the court thinks reasonable. (2) The amount ordered to be paid under sub-section (1) may be recovered as a fine in accordance with the provisions of sections 386 and 387 of the Code. (3) A civil court trying any suit, arising out of the same matter for which the offender is prosecuted, shall take into account any amount paid or recovered as compensation under subsection (1) in awarding damages. 25. There are other legislative requirements that need to be kept in mind. The Probation of Offenders Act provides, in Section 5 thereof for payment of compensation to the victim of a crime (as does Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Yet, additional changes were brought about in the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2006 providing for a victim compensation scheme and for additional rights to the victim of a crime, including the right to file an appeal against the grant of inadequate compensation. How often have the Courts used these provisions? 26.
Yet, additional changes were brought about in the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2006 providing for a victim compensation scheme and for additional rights to the victim of a crime, including the right to file an appeal against the grant of inadequate compensation. How often have the Courts used these provisions? 26. In Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad vs. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0461/2013 : (2013) 6 SCC 770 and Jitendra Singh vs. State of U.P. MANU/SC/0679/2013 : (2013) 11 SCC 193 the Court held that consideration of grant of compensation to the victim of a crime is mandatory, in the following words taken from Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad: “While the award or refusal of compensation in a particular case may be within the court’s discretion, there exists a mandatory duty on the court to apply its mind to the question in every criminal case. Application of mind to the question is best disclosed by recording reasons for awarding/refusing compensation.” 27. Section 357 Cr.P.C. and Section 5 of the Offenders Act empowers the Court to award compensation to the victims of the offence in respect of the loss/injury suffered. The object of the section is to meet the ends of justice in a better way. This section was enacted to reassure the victim that he is not forgotten in the criminal justice system. The amount of compensation to be awarded under Section 357 Cr.P.C. depends upon the nature of crime, extent of loss/damage suffered and the capacity of the accused to pay, which the Court has to conduct a summary inquiry as well as considering the submission of learned counsel for appellant as earlier, this Court is of the view that benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of First Offender Act, 1958 should be provided to the appellant. 28. Thus the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction as directed by trial court is confirmed and on the point of sentence it is directed to be released the appellant on probation and under section 4 of the U.P. of the Probation of Offenders Act with stipulated condition that he will keep peace and good conduct for one year subject to furnishing personal bond of Rs.50,000/- and two sureties of the like amount before the Court. 29.
29. Considering the law propounded by Hon’ble Apex Court and as per provisions of Section 357 Cr.P.C. and Section 5 of the Probation of the Offenders Act, 1958, I am of the view that compensation of Rs. 50,000/- should be awarded to the injured-Krishna Kumar. So the compensation of Rs. 50,000/- is imposed upon the appellant and the said amount of Rs. 50,000/- shall be paid to the injured-Krishna Kumar and in case of death of the injured-Krishna Kumar, the compensation of Rs. 50,000/- should be released in favour of legal heirs/ representatives of injured-Krishna Kumar. If the appellant fails to pay alleged amount within fifteen days from the date of production of certified copy of this order, then he shall undergo simple imprisonment of one year. 30. Thus, the appeal is dismissed on the point of conviction and partly allowed on the point of sentence. The appellant need not surrender before the trial court but his personal bond and sureties shall be discharged only when the appellant deposits the entire amount of fine or has been arrested and servers out the default sentence as imposed upon the appellant hereinabove. 31. Office is directed to communicate this order to the trial court concerned. The trial court record be sent back.