ORDER : Heard. 1. The applicant has preferred this application under Section 438 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for grant of anticipatory bail as she apprehends her arrest in connection with Crime No.651/2022 for the offence punishable under Section 10 (1) of the Chhattisgarh Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes And Other Backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status Certification) Act, 2013 (for short, “the Act, 2013”) registered at Police Station- Mungeli, District – Mungeli, Chhattisgarh. 2. As per the prosecution story, a social status certificate of Scheduled Tribe was issued in favour of the applicant by the competent authority on 17.07.2020. A complaint was made by one Sant Kumar Netam and Ramesh Khusro making allegation that the applicant does not belong to Scheduled Tribe category and the social status certificate issued in her favour is illegal. On 16.01.2022, social status certificate of applicant was placed under suspension by the district level caste scrutiny committee and later on, matter was referred to the High Power Certification Scrutiny Committee, (for short, 'The Committee') where after full fledged enquiry vide order 18/23-06-2021, the social status certificate of the applicant was cancelled and direction was issued to the Collector. District Mungeli, to initiate proceeding in accordance with Rule 23 (3) of the Rules, 2013. An FIR was lodged by L. R. Kurre, Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Development Department, Mungeli on 16.11.2022 in pursuance of the direction issued by the Collector, Mungeli dated 15.11.2022. On such complaint, the police registered FIR against the applicant for the aforesaid offence. 3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the applicant would submit that the order was passed by the High Level Certification Scrutiny Committee to initiate proceedings in accordance with Rule 23 (3) of the Rules of 2013 and in this regard Collector of District Mungeli was authorized. He would further submit that from the FIR (Annexure A/4) it is apparent that power was delegated by the Collector to Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Development Department, Mungeli and according to the order passed by the Committee as well as under the Rules, such Sub-delegation of power is not permissible. He would further submit that the Section 10 of the Act, 2013 is punishable with imprisonment for 2 years and offence is cognizable and non-bailable. He has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shree Digvijya Cement Co. He would further submit that the Section 10 of the Act, 2013 is punishable with imprisonment for 2 years and offence is cognizable and non-bailable. He has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shree Digvijya Cement Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2000 SC 680 and State of M.P. v. Bhupendra Singh, AIR SC 679 and would submit that if the statute has conferred power upon the authority, it can not sub delegate its power his sub ordinates. He would refer to paragraph No. 4 and 6 of Bhupendra Singh (supra) and same is reproduced hereinbelow- “4. The consent for the prosecution of the respondent was granted by the Additional District Magistrate of the district concerned and, in this behalf, reliance was placed, on behalf of the appellant, upon a notification dated 24th April, 1995 issued by the appellant whereunder it appointed the joint Collector and Executive Magistrate as Additional District Magistrate for the District Gwalior and directed that he should “exercise powers of District Magistrate conferred under the said Code ( Criminal Procedure Code) or under any other law for the time being in force. “The submission on behalf of the appellant is that, by reason of the latter notification, the power under Section 7 of the said act delegated by the Central Government to the District Magistrate had now been delegated to the Additional District Magistrate and that, accordingly, the consent that he granted for the prosecution of the respondent was valid. 6. The decision of this Court in Hari Chand Aggarwal v. Batal Engineering Co. Ltd., AIR 1969 SC 483 is also of some relevance. This Court said that where, by virtue of a notification under Section 20 of the Defence of India Act, the Central Government had delegated its powers under Section 29 to a District Magistrate, an Additional District Magistrate was not competent to requisition property under Section 29 simply because he had been invested with all powers of a District Magistrate under Section 10 (2).” 4. Next judgment cited by learned senior Counsel is A.K. Roy and another v. State of Punjab and others, (1986) 4 SCC 326 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 and 13 as under: “12. Next judgment cited by learned senior Counsel is A.K. Roy and another v. State of Punjab and others, (1986) 4 SCC 326 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 and 13 as under: “12. In the case of statutory powers, the important question is whether on a true construction of the Act, it is intended that a power conferred upon A may be exercised on A's authority by B. The maxim delegatus non potest delegare merely indicates that this is not normally allowable but the legislature can always provide for sub-delegation of powers. The provision contained in Section 24 (2) (e) enables the State Government to frame a rule for delegation of powers and functions under the Act but it clearly does not envisage any sub-delegation. That apart, a rule framed under Section 24 (2) (e) can only provide for delegation of minor administrative functions e.g. appointment of Food Inspectors, Food (health) Authority etc. In the case of important executive functions like the one contained in Section 20 (1) of the Act to authorise launching of prosecutions for an offence under the Act which is in the nature of a safeguard, the courts may be disposed to construe general powers of delegation restrictively..... 13. In the premises, the impugned notification dated September 7, ultra vires the Food (Health) Authority insofar as he purported to delegate his powers to institute prosecutions for an offence under the Act under Section 20(1) to the Food Inspector, Faridkot. It must accordingly follow that the Food Inspector, Faridkot was not competent to lodge the complaint against the appellants for having committed an offence punishalbe under Section 16 (1) (a)Iii) read with Section 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.” 5. On the other hand, learned State counsel would submit that the applicant has committed fraud, though, she belongs to the general category, but she has obtained social status certificate of Scheduled Tribe, and had submitted her nomination to contest election from Akaltara Constituency in the year 2018, as a candidate of reserved category. On the other hand, learned State counsel would submit that the applicant has committed fraud, though, she belongs to the general category, but she has obtained social status certificate of Scheduled Tribe, and had submitted her nomination to contest election from Akaltara Constituency in the year 2018, as a candidate of reserved category. The complaint was made and an enquiry was conducted in which it was found that she does not belong to the Scheduled Tribe category, and consequently, her social status certificate has been cancelled by the High Level Committee with an observation to take action in accordance with Section 10 of the Act, 2013 and Rules 23 of 2013. He would further submit that during the course of the investigation, the police has registered the offence punishable under Sections 193, 419, 420 against the present applicant. With regard to sub-delegation of power, he would submit that the Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Development Department, Mungeli has lodged an FIR in compliance of the order of the Collector, therefore, there is compliance of Section 10 of the Act, 2013 and Rule 23 (3) of the Rules 2013, hence, the application preferred by the applicant is liable to be rejected. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the case diary with utmost circumspection. 7. Section 10 & 11 of the Act, 2013 are reproduced hereinbelow:- “10. Offences and Penalties.-(1) Where a Social Certificate has been cancelled under Section 8, the person obtaining such Certificate shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to two years and with fine, which shall not be less than two thousand rupees and which may extend to twenty thousand rupees. (2) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under this section except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the High Power Certification Scrutiny Committee or on its behalf by any person so authorized by the High Power Certification Scrutiny Committee for this purpose. Section 11. Offences under the Act to be cognizable and non-bailable.- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, offences punishable under Section 10 of this Act shall be cognizable, non-bailable and may be tried summarily. 8. Section 11. Offences under the Act to be cognizable and non-bailable.- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, offences punishable under Section 10 of this Act shall be cognizable, non-bailable and may be tried summarily. 8. Rule 23 of Chhattisgarh Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes And Other Backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status Certification) Rules, 2013 (for short, 'the Rules, 2013') deals with decision of the Scrutiny Committee and proceedings Sub-Rule 1, 2 and 3 read as under:- (1) After hearing both the sides in support and against the claim, the Scrutiny Committee on being satisfied with regarding the genuineness of the claim of the Applicant shall direct the concerned Verification Committee to issue Verification Certificate, if applied so. (2) If after hearing the Applicant regarding his claim of Social Status Certificate the Scrutiny Committee, comes to the conclusion that the claim of the Applicant is not genuine, it may pass a reasoned order and cancel the Certificate. (3)The Scrutiny Committee while passing order under sub-rule (2) shall authorize an officer of the employer, educational institution, local authority, the Central Government or the State Government to file complaint under sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act and forward attested copies of all documents related to the case to such officer for further proceedings. 9. From bare reading of the above provisions, it is apparent that a complaint can be made by a person authorized by the Committee. In the present case, the Committee authorized the Collector, Mungeli to lodge complaint against the applicant, but he sub-delegated his power in favour of the Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Welfare Development, Mungeli which appears to be in contravention of the Rules, 2013. 10. From the case diary, it also appears that the social status certificate was issued in favour of the applicant on 17.07.2020 and a complaint was made by the two persons namely Sant Kumar Netam and Ramesh Khusro on 28.09.2020. The district level caste scrutiny committee suspended the social status certificate vide order 16.10.2022 and thereafter, matter was referred to the High Level Certification Scrutiny Committee where enquiry was conducted by this Committee and vide order dated 18/23-06.2021, the certificate has been cancelled and the Collector was authorized to take action against the applicant in accordance with the Act of 2013 against the present applicant. It appears from the FIR that after 17 months, one Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Development Department lodged an FIR against the present applicant. In the FIR itself, it is stated that according to the provisions of Rule 23(2) of Rules, 2013, the Collector is authorized to initiate proceeding or take action, but the collector has sub delegated the power to the Assistant Commissioner of Tribal Development Department, Mungeli to take action and subsequently, FIR was registered in pursuance of order passed by caste scrutiny committee. In the matter of Bhupendra Singh (supra) where the Central Government had delegated its power to grant consent to District Magistrate with regard to the Section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act, but the District Magistrate subdelegated the power to its sub-ordinate; the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that such delegation of power is not permissible where the statute provides for exercise of power by an authority, it cannot be sub delegated in contravention. 11. Considering the contention of learned counsel for the State that the applicant had submitted her nomination for legislative assembly election from Akaltara Constituency as a candidate of Scheduled Tribe and thus she tried to take benefit; the argument advanced by the State counsel is misconceived as in the year 2018 there was no social status certificate issued in favour of the applicant, it was issued only on 17.07.2020. Further, there is no allegation that the present applicant had taken any benefit from the certificate so issued by the concerned authority. 12. In the matter of A.K. Roy (supra), the Hon'ble SC has dealt with the maxim delegatus non potest delegare meaning thereby that this is not normally allowable but the legislature can always provide for sub-delegation of powers, the authority which has been empowered to discharge functions under any statute, cannot authorize or sub-delegate its power to any subordinate. Further considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of Bhupendra Singh (supra) and A. K. Roy (supra), the provisions of Section 10 of the Act, 2013 and Rule 23 (3) of the Rules 2013, I am inclined to enlarge the applicant on anticipatory bail by extending the benefit of Section 438 of the CrPC. Accordingly, the instant MCRCA is allowed. 13. It is directed that in the event of the applicant executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs. Accordingly, the instant MCRCA is allowed. 13. It is directed that in the event of the applicant executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the satisfaction of the concerned arresting officer, she shall be released on anticipatory bail, on following conditions :- (a) she shall make herself available for interrogation by the police officer as and when required; (b) she shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such fact to the Court; and (c) she shall not act in any manner which will be prejudicial to fair and expeditious trial. The observations made hereinabove are for the purpose of deciding the bail application only, the learned trial Court shall decide the case on its own merits.