JUDGMENT/ORDER Krishna S Dixit, J. - There are two sets of challenge in these Petitions: in W.P.Nos. 40343/2004 & 40382/2004, the land owners have laid a challenge to the acquisition proceedings taken up under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, which commenced with the issuance of Preliminary Notification dated 10.12.2001 issued u/s 28(1) followed by the enquiry under Section 28(3) dated 18.11.2003 and culminating in the issuance of the Final Notification dated 7.5.2004 u/s 28(4) and eventually resulting into the issuance of Possession Delivery Notice dated 3.9.2004 u/s 28(6) of the 1966 Act. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner-land owners argued that these lands are not required for the purpose for which they are notified for acquisition; this fact becomes pronounced by virtue of denotification of these lands from the acquisition process; initially, the acquisition was for the benefit of INFOSYS, which has given up its claim; subsequently there being no named beneficiary, Final Notification could not have been issued; the acquisition process is continued only to benefit real estate agents and thus, the same is vitiated by colourable exercise of power; there is no valid scheme preceding the acquisition; even the very Notification declaring the petition lands and other lands as an 'industrial area' itself is without due application of mind; the entire process of acquisition is vitiated because of the involvement of middlemen; part of the lands are reserved as park and open spaces under the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 and therefore, these lands cannot be acquired. So contending, they seek invalidation of the acquisition proceedings. 3. In the companion three cases i.e., W.P.No.11727/2006,W.P.No.15452/2007& W.P.No.21456/2009, the beneficiary of acquisition seeks to lay a challenge to the three Notifications dated 21.03.2006, 12.09.2007 & 3.5.2008 issued by the government whereby, the subject lands have been dropped from acquisition process. Learned counsel for the Petitioner vehemently argued that these Notifications are issued with malafide; they are issued without jurisdiction & jurisdictional facts; they are bad in being unilaterally issued with no notice to Petitioner-Company which has already paid a huge money; once the objections of the land owners were overruled and Final Notification was issued, the government is absolutely not justified in issuing the impugned Notifications; the then Deputy Chief Minister/Minister is instrumental in all this for obvious reasons. So contending, he seeks invalidation of the said Notifications, so that the acquisition process would be accomplished and land would fall into the hands of his client. 4. Learned AGA appearing for the government maintained equidistance from the land owners and the beneficiary of acquisition. He made legal submissions substantially based upon the Statement of Objections filed in the Writ Petitions of the land owners. Learned counsel appearing for the beneficiary made submissions in justification of the acquisition process and for the invalidation of denotification of the lands. The contentions which he took up to oppose the land owners petitions are broadly the contentions which the beneficiaries have taken up in its Writ Petitions. Since common questions of law & facts are involved, all these petitions with the concurrence of the Bar were taken up for hearing. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the Petition Papers, this Court is inclined to grant indulgence in the challenge to de-notification of the land and to decline interference in the challenge to the acquisition, for the following reasons: (A) AS TO CHALLENGE BY THE BENEFICIARY COMPANY TO THE DENOTIFICAITON OF LANDS: (i) The vehement contention of advocates appearing for the land owners that the 'so called' beneficiary company has no locus standii for laying a challenge to the de notification is bit difficult to countenance. In fact, the beneficiary company had sought for allocation of lands although after the preliminary notification was issued earmarking the lands for acquisition. It had made the payment of a huge sum of money, to the KIADB admittedly, in terms of the extant allotment norms. However, a bit later its request for the petition lands was agreed to by the authorities with the concurrence of the government. If de notification is sustained, what would be at crises is the interest of this prospective allotee. Thus, it has sufficient locus standii to maintain the challenge. This view accords with the observations of the Division Bench in its judgment dated 09.01.2015 rendered in beneficiaries Writ Appeal No. 2399-2400/2010 between M/s MOOLA INVESTMENTS (INDIA) PVT. LTD vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA It is submitted at the bar that there was no further challenge to the said judgment; therefore, the same has attained finality at least as between the parties, if not others. LTD vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA It is submitted at the bar that there was no further challenge to the said judgment; therefore, the same has attained finality at least as between the parties, if not others. (ii) The scheme of acquisition of land envisaged under the provisions of 1966 Act is a bit in variance with that of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894, so far as vesting of the acquired land in the State is concerned. Ordinarily, under the 1894 Act, the land will vest in the State once the award is passed and possession is taken, subject to certain exceptions which may not be of much relevance for our discussion. In the case of acquisition under the 1966 Act, the land will vest in the State once the Final Notification is issued u/s 28(4) and the question of taking possession and passing award would arise later. (iii) The above view gains support from the Division Bench decision in W.P.No.17600/2004 etc., between Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprise Limited vs. State & Others, disposed off on 15.06.2011. In these cases significantly, the KIADB happened to be the 2nd Respondent. Having analyzed the provisions of Section 28 of the 1966 Act, the Bench at paragraph 19 reiterated the legal position with the following observation: 'Under the Land Acquisition Act, Section 16 of the Act contemplates vesting of the land with the Government. Under the said Act, the lands under acquisition get vested with the Government when the Collector makes an award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act and the Government takes possession. The situation is entirely different under KIAD Act. After the final notification under Section 28(4) of KIAD Act, the lands get vested in the Government by virtue of Section 28(5) of the Act by operation of law and it does not depend upon passing of any award by the Land Acquisition Officer. The situation is entirely different under KIAD Act. After the final notification under Section 28(4) of KIAD Act, the lands get vested in the Government by virtue of Section 28(5) of the Act by operation of law and it does not depend upon passing of any award by the Land Acquisition Officer. Therefore, though Sections 28(1) and 28(4) of the KIAD Act contemplates preliminary and final notifications for acquisition of land, when once final notification under Section 28(4) of the Act get published, the land vests with the State Government as contemplated under Section 28(5) of the Act...' (iv) Section 48 of the 1894 Act is structured on a legal premise arising from the statutory scheme that the government will have power to drop acquisition proceedings at any stage before possession is taken; obviously, that is the stage at which land is yet to vest in the State. As already observed above, the vesting of land in the State would happen on the passing of the award and taking its possession. The Division Bench in NANDI INFRASTRUCTURE, supra, framed the question at paragraph 19: '...Therefore, now the question is whether the State Government could have de-notified these lands after they vested with the State by virtue of notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act.' This question is answered in the subsequent paragraphs of the decision in a negative way. Of course, one of the factors for such a view was that the beneficiary of acquisition was not heard in the matter. However, it is only an added reason for the ratio and that the absence of such a reason would not rob away the precedential force of the said decision, as rightly argued by learned counsel for the Petitioner-beneficiary of acquisition who too was admittedly not heard before the denotification of lands. There is no much dispute at the Bar that the lands in question have been vested in the State by virtue of the Final Notification issued u/s 28(4) of the 1966 Act on 7.5.2004, followed by the Possession Delivery Notice issued u/s 28(6) on 3.9.2004. (B) AS TO CULPABLE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT: (i) Firstly, it is not that the 1966 Act is of nascent making and therefore, it was undergoing a virgin interpretation when the impugned denotification of lands was made. (B) AS TO CULPABLE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT: (i) Firstly, it is not that the 1966 Act is of nascent making and therefore, it was undergoing a virgin interpretation when the impugned denotification of lands was made. There is a plethora of decisions of the Apex Court and of this Court which have fairly settled the position of law as to the stage at which the lands can be denotified from acquisition under the said Act, which is a bit in variance with the law arising u/s 48 of the 1894 Act. The lands in question were acquired pursuant to the Preliminary Notification dated 10.12.2001, followed by rejection of land owners' objections on 18.11.2003; the Final Notification came to be issued u/s 28(4) on 7.5.2004 and the Possession Delivery Notice u/s 28(6) was issued on 3.9.2004 asking the land owners to peaceably surrender the land within the cut-off date i.e., 8.10.2004. (ii) One set of land owners filed W.P.No.40382/2004 on 1.10.2004 and obtained interim order of status quo on 5.10.2004. They had given a letter dated 17.2.2006 requesting the then Deputy Chief Minister to denotify the lands from acquisition. The records reveal that the Law Department of Government, Law Section of KIADB & then the Advocate General had opined in writing that the proposed denotification is legally impermissible, the lands already having vested in the State under the provisions of the 1966 Act. The KIADB vide letter dated 6.4.2004 and Udyoga Mitra of the government vide letter dated 12.4.2004 had recommended for the allotment of subject lands to the beneficiary company. Even a first year law student would have understand the correct legal position that once the lands have vested in the State on the issuance of Final Notification u/s 28(4) followed by Possession Delivery Notice u/s 28(6) of the 1966 Act, the power to denotify or to exclude them from the notified industrial area, would not avail. However, nothing deterred the powers that be, from going ahead with the denotification exercise. This Court is bewildered, to say the least. The course of action that resulted into impugned denotification gives abundant scope for the argument that the same was actuated by an ulterior motive and therefore, is vitiated by legal malafide. The issue of factual malafide against the political executive is not examined since they are not made arraigned as parties. This Court is bewildered, to say the least. The course of action that resulted into impugned denotification gives abundant scope for the argument that the same was actuated by an ulterior motive and therefore, is vitiated by legal malafide. The issue of factual malafide against the political executive is not examined since they are not made arraigned as parties. (iii) What makes the things worse is that no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the beneficiary of acquisition though it had paid a sum of Rs.14,72,800/- by State Bank of India cheque long before and had sought for the allotment of these lands specifically. The Apex Court in M/S. LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AIR 1990 SC 208 mandated that in matters like this, hearing of the beneficiary is a must. When one is driven by an ulterior motive, once seldom heeds to the warning of one's conscience if at all one has and one cares not the dicta of the highest Arbitral Tribunal of the country. 'More is not necessary to specify and less is insufficient to leave it unsaid'. The KIADB in its Objections to the land owners challenge to the acquisition has in so many words stated about the requirement of these lands for the purpose for which they have been notified for acquisition. CONCLUSION: The impugned denotification apart from being incompetent, is actuated by the legal malafide. Sustaining them would hit at the root of law, at the head of reason and at the heart of justice. (C) AS TO LAND OWNERS CHALLENGE TO THE ACQUISITION: (i) The submission of learned Advocates appearing for the Petitioner-land owners that the KIADB does not require these lands, is bit difficult to countenance. The acquisition process involves several stages wherein, high functionaries act on the basis of the inputs given by various State agencies. The Board constituted u/s 5 of the 1966 Act comprises of high functionaries of several Departments of the Government having expertise in the matter and therefore, their views having been found worthy, the government went ahead with the acquisition under the provisions of the 1966 Act. Essentially, it is for the Executive to form an opinion as to the requirement of land for the public purpose and the Writ Courts cannot run a race of opinions, subject to all just exceptions into which argued case of the land owners does not fit. Essentially, it is for the Executive to form an opinion as to the requirement of land for the public purpose and the Writ Courts cannot run a race of opinions, subject to all just exceptions into which argued case of the land owners does not fit. Ordinarily, the Courts cannot substitute their opinion for that of the Executive, more particularly in matters like this. Petitioners' similar objections along with the other having been examined by the competent authority, after the issuance of Preliminary Notification have been turned down in the enquiry that preceded the issuance of Final Notification. (ii) The submission of the Petitioners land owners that 'en mass acquisition is being resorted without any rationale or justification' and that many lands have been dropped from the acquisition process depending upon the influence and money power wielded by the real estate developers, is too farfetched an argument. No material particulars warranting the examination of said contention have been pleaded, let alone proved. In fact, the contention of the kind ordinarily does not avail when the challenge to the acquisition is also structured on the ground of non-application of mind. True it may be that certain lands have been denotified after duly considering the objections of the land owners. That is consistent with the very object of institutionalizing the enquiry after the issuance of Preliminary Notification. Such objections having already been looked into by the competent authority, have been overruled. It is not pointed out at the Bar as to which of the objections filed by the land owners remained unconsidered before issuing the Final Notification. Bald averments in the petition would not much come to the aid of Petitioners. (iii) The submission of Petitioner-land owners that these are the lands on which they bank upon for eking out their livelihood and therefore, they could not have been acquired, is bit difficult to countenance. Had these lands been acquired without payment of compensation, there was scope for putting forth such a contention. However, that is not the case. The Fundamental Right to property that was guaranteed u/a 19(1)(f) no longer avails as such after the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution and now that has been relegated to as a constitutional guarantee u/a 300A, is true. The word 'law' appearing under this Article is interpreted by the Apex Court as the legislation made by the State or the Parliament. The Fundamental Right to property that was guaranteed u/a 19(1)(f) no longer avails as such after the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution and now that has been relegated to as a constitutional guarantee u/a 300A, is true. The word 'law' appearing under this Article is interpreted by the Apex Court as the legislation made by the State or the Parliament. The 1966 Act being a piece of legislation, the acquisition has been initiated & accomplished under its provisions. The compensation is also fixed. It is not the case of Petitioners that what has been fixed as compensation is illusory. That being the position, this contention cannot be countenanced. 5. In the above circumstances, this Court makes the following: ORDER (i) The land owners' challenge to the acquisition of subject lands in Writ Petition Nos.40343/2004 & 40382/2004 being devoid of merits, is unsustainable and therefore, the said Writ Petitions are dismissed. (ii) The companion cases of the beneficiaries of acquisition in W.P.Nos.15452/2007, 11727/2006 & 21456/2009 are hereby allowed; a Writ of Certiorari issues quashing the impugned Notifications whereby Petition lands have been dropped from acquisition process. (iii) A Writ of Mandamus issues to the official Respondents to accomplish the acquisition process on a war footing inasmuch as more than two decades have lapsed since the acquisition was commenced. 6. This Court very reluctantly refrains itself from levying costs in the land owners' Writ Petitions.