JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. This Cr.M.P. has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with a prayer to quash the entire criminal proceedings including the F.I.R. arising out of Chas Muffassil P.S. Case No.133 of 2021 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 323, 384, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code as well as the orders dated 13.07.2021 and 16.07.2021 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Bokaro for institution of the F.I.R. and investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. 3. The brief facts of the case is that the complainant/informant purchased five tipper trailers in the name of his company namely Project Equipment and Construction Company which were financed by TATA Capital Financial Services Limited in the month of October, 2020 and he had been paying the installment regularly and even deposited the money during the lockdown imposed consequent upon the COVID-19 pandemic. It is the specific case of the complainant/informant that on 02.03.2021 between 1:00-2:00 p.m. while four of the five tipper trailers were returning from Bokaro to Giridih, the petitioners boarded in different vehicles, forcibly stopped the four trailers, abused and beat the drivers of the trailers and took away all the four vehicles by threatening to harm the informant if the police was informed. The complainant after approaching the accused persons got assurance that they would return the vehicles if the complainant paid one installment of the vehicles but even after the payment of Rs.4,88,500/- because of inducement and cheating by the persons, the accused persons have not returned the vehicles and thus defrauded the complainant. The further allegation is that the accused persons demanded Rs.3,00,000/- as extortion amount for release of the vehicles. Initially, the complaint which was filed on 08.07.2021 was not supported by the affidavit but subsequently an affidavit in support of the complaint was filed on 14.07.2021. The further allegation is that the accused persons demanded Rs.3,00,000/- as extortion amount for release of the vehicles. Initially, the complaint which was filed on 08.07.2021 was not supported by the affidavit but subsequently an affidavit in support of the complaint was filed on 14.07.2021. The learned Magistrate on 13.07.2021 after hearing the matter through video conferencing passed order for sending the copy of the complaint to the Officer In-charge of Chas (M) Police Station, Bokaro for institution, investigation and to report under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Subsequently, on 16.07.2021, a petition along with the copy of the complaint was filed on behalf of the complainant and again the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Bokaro ordered that the complaint- petition be sent to the Officer In-charge of Chas (M) Police Station, Bokaro for institution, investigation and to report under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. 4. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the informant defaulted in payment of the E.M.I. on proper time and a substantial amount of Rs.19,51,951/- became due against the five loan accounts. The complainant refused to pay it despite repeated reminders. The employer of the petitioners issued a notice for inspection of the vehicle as well as demand to make payment of dues on 20.10.2020. The company got the vehicles repossessed through its authorized repossession agents following the entire guidelines laid down by the Reserve Bank of India on 02.03.2021 and also sent notice for recalling the loan. As a goodwill gesture, the employer of the petitioners gave one last opportunity to the complainant to pay Rs.1,62,16,049/- within seven days from the notice to the company but the informant after receipt of the notice did not make the payment and has filed the complaint making several false allegations. 5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Isaac Isanga Musumba & Others vs. State of Maharashtra & Others reported in (2014) 15 SCC 357 paragraph-3 of which reads as under:- “3. 5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Isaac Isanga Musumba & Others vs. State of Maharashtra & Others reported in (2014) 15 SCC 357 paragraph-3 of which reads as under:- “3. We have read the FIR which has been annexed to the writ petition as Annexure P-7 and we find therefrom that the complainants have alleged that the accused persons have shown copies of international warrants issued against the complainants by the Ugandan Court and letters written by Uganda Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and the accused have threatened to extort 20 million dollars (equivalent to Rs 110 crores). In the complaint, there is no mention whatsoever that pursuant to the demands made by the accused, any amount was delivered to the accused by the complainants. If that be so, we fail to see as to how an offence of extortion as defined in Section 383 IPC is made out. Section 383 IPC states that: “383. Extortion.—Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits ‘extortion’.” Hence, unless property is delivered to the accused person pursuant to the threat, no offence of extortion is made out and an FIR for the offence under Section 384 could not have been registered by the police.” (Emphasis supplied) and submits that as there is no mention in the complaint that pursuant to the demand made by the accused, any amount was delivered to the accused by the complainant, hence, no offence punishable under Section 384 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioners. 6. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners next relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sardar Trilok Singh & Others vs. Satya Deo Tripathi reported in (1979) 4 SCC 396 paragraphs-5 and 6 of which read as under:- “5. We are clearly of the view that it was not a case where any processes ought to have been directed to be issued against any of the accused. We are clearly of the view that it was not a case where any processes ought to have been directed to be issued against any of the accused. On the well-settled principles of law it was a very suitable case where the criminal proceeding ought to have been quashed by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power. The dispute raised by the respondent was purely of a civil nature even assuming the facts stated by him to be substantially correct. Money must have been advanced to him and his partner by the financier on the basis of some terms settled between the parties. Even assuming that the agreement entered on March 29, 1973 was duly filled up and the signature of the complainant was obtained on a blank form, it is to be noticed that the amount of the two monthly instalments admittedly paid by him was to the tune of Rs 3566 exactly at Rs 1783 per month. The complaint does not say as to when these two monthly instalments were paid. In the first information report which he had lodged he had not stated that the third monthly instalment was payable on July 31, 1973. Rather, from the statement in the first information report it appears that the instalment had already become due on July 28, 1973 when the complainant went out of Kanpur according to his case. The question as to what were the terms of the settlement and whether they were duly incorporated in the printed agreement or not were all questions which could be properly and adequately decided in a civil court. Obtaining signature of a person on blank sheet of papers by itself is not an offence of forgery or the like. It becomes an offence when the paper is fabricated into a document of the kind which attracts the relevant provisions of the Penal Code making it an offence or when such a document is used as a genuine document. Even assuming that the appellants either by themselves or in the company of some others went and seized the truck on July 30, 1973 from the house of the respondent they could and did claim to have done so in exercise of their bona fide right of seizing the truck on the respondent's failure to pay the third monthly instalment in time. It was, therefore, a bona fide civil dispute which led to the seizure of the truck. On the face of the complaint petition itself the highly exaggerated version given by the respondent, the appellants went to his house with a mob armed with deadly weapons and committed the offence of dacoity in taking away the truck was so very unnatural and untrustworthy that it could take the matter out of the realm of civil dispute. Nobody on the side of the respondent was hurt. Even a scratch was not given to anybody. 6. In our opinion on the facts and in the circumstances of this case criminal prosecution deserves to be quashed. On behalf of the respondent it was argued that the appellants' filing a petition in the High Court for quashing the proceeding before issuance of the summons was premature and the High Court could not have quashed it. In our opinion the point is so wholly without substance that it has been stated merely to be rejected. Since the parties during the course of the hearing in this appeal showed their inclination to settle up and end all their disputes and quarrels in relation to the matter in question after we indicated our view that we are going to allow the appeal and quash the proceedings, we have not thought it necessary to elaborately give other reasons in support of our order.” and submits that on the fact of the complaint itself, the allegations made are highly exaggerated version and the occurrence is very unnatural and untrustworthy. 7. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners further relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Priyanka Srivastava & Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others reported in (2015) 6 SCC 287 paragraphs-29 to 33 of which read as under:- “29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellow citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same. 30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores. 31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false; he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari [ (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR. 32. The present lis can be perceived from another angle. We are slightly surprised that the financial institution has been compelled to settle the dispute and we are also disposed to think that it has so happened because the complaint cases were filed. Such a situation should not happen. 33. At this juncture, we may fruitfully refer to Section 32 of the SARFAESI Act, which reads as follows: “32.Protection of action taken in good faith.—No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any secured creditor or any of his officers or manager exercising any of the rights of the secured creditor or borrower for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith under this Act.” In the present case, we are obligated to say that the learned Magistrate should have kept himself alive to the aforesaid provision before venturing into directing registration of the FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC. It is because Parliament in its wisdom has made such a provision to protect the secured creditors or any of its officers, and needless to emphasise, the legislative mandate has to be kept in mind. and submits that since the petitioners have exercised the right of secured creditor, hence, they are protected from any suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding. Hence, it is submitted that the entire criminal proceedings including the F.I.R. arising out of Chas Muffassil P.S. Case No.133 of 2021 as well as the orders dated 13.07.2021 and 16.07.2021 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Bokaro for institution of the F.I.R. and investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C., be quashed and set aside. 8. Hence, it is submitted that the entire criminal proceedings including the F.I.R. arising out of Chas Muffassil P.S. Case No.133 of 2021 as well as the orders dated 13.07.2021 and 16.07.2021 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Bokaro for institution of the F.I.R. and investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C., be quashed and set aside. 8. Learned Addl.P.P. appearing for the State and the learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 vehemently oppose the prayer for quashing the entire criminal proceedings including the F.I.R. arising out of Chas Muffassil P.S. Case No.133 of 2021 as well as the orders dated 13.07.2021 and 16.07.2021 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Bokaro for institution of the F.I.R. and investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 submits that; true it is that to constitute the offence of extortion, delivery of the property extorted is a sine qua non but the allegations made in the complaint are sufficient to constitute the offence punishable under Section 385 of the Indian Penal Code. It is next submitted that the allegations also constitute the offence punishable under Sections 323, 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code as the petitioners have criminally intimidated the drivers of the four trailers which were forcibly taken away by the petitioners. Besides, the petitioners have also committed the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating. 9. Learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 next submits that there was a specific moratorium declaring any term loan to be an N.P.A. in view of the COVID-19 pandemic. So, otherwise also, the petitioners were not authorized in law to take the repossession of the vehicle as there was no default in payment of the installment amount. It is next submitted that in this case the petitioners have also extorted the amount of Rs.4,88,500/-, so, the offence punishable under Section 384 of the Indian Penal Code is also made out besides the offence punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. It is next submitted that this is not a simple case of repossession of the vehicle. It is further submitted that Section 32 of the SARFAESI Act do not protect the petitioners indulging in extortion or criminal intimidation or putting the drivers of the vehicles in fear of injury in order to commit extortion. It is next submitted that this is not a simple case of repossession of the vehicle. It is further submitted that Section 32 of the SARFAESI Act do not protect the petitioners indulging in extortion or criminal intimidation or putting the drivers of the vehicles in fear of injury in order to commit extortion. It is next submitted that the investigation of the case is going on at present. Hence, it is submitted that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot enter into a mini trial to arrive at a finding of fact as to whether the allegations made in the complaint is a false one and the allegation of assault, extortion and criminal intimidation; by no stretch of imagination can be treated to be an exaggerated version. Hence, it is submitted that this Cr.M.P., being without any merit, be dismissed. 10. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials available in the record, so far as the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Priyanka Srivastava & Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (supra) is concerned, the learned Magistrate has passed a fresh order upon the application of the complainant after affidavit was filed in support of the complaint. So, in the considered opinion of this Court, the reference of the complaint to the police for registration of the F.I.R., investigation of the case cannot be stated to be hit by paragraphs-30 or 31 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Priyanka Srivastava & Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (supra). True it is that Section 32 of the SARFAESI Act protects action taken in good faith against the Officers or Managers exercising any of the right for any secured creditor but extortion, criminal intimidation, cheating and thereby dishonestly inducing the victim to part with money and causing hurt cannot be termed as part of the rights of secured creditor or being germane to the action taken in good faith. 11. 11. So far as the allegation of extortion, criminal intimidation and causing hurt to the drivers of the vehicles as well as the complainant is concerned, the facts of this case being different from the facts of the case of Priyanka Srivastava & Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (supra); in the considered opinion of this Court, this is not a fit case where the entire criminal proceedings including the F.I.R. arising out of Chas Muffassil P.S. Case No.133 of 2021 as well as the orders dated 13.07.2021 and 16.07.2021 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Bokaro for institution of the F.I.R. and investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C., be quashed and set aside. 12. So far as the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Isaac Isanga Musumba & Others vs. State of Maharashtra & Others (supra) is concerned, true it is that pursuant to the demand of extortion, delivery of property is a sine qua non to constitute the offence punishable under Section 384 of the Indian Penal Code but in this case there is allegation against the petitioners that consequent upon the demand of extortion, the petitioners have received Rs.4,88,500/-. Further, there is allegation against the petitioners of putting the complainant in fear of injury in order to commit extortion also through the drivers of the said four trailers from whom forcibly the trailers were taken away; which amounts to constitute the offence punishable under Section 385 of the Indian Penal Code. 13. So far as the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sardar Trilok Singh & Others vs. Satya Deo Tripathi (supra) is concerned, this Court after going through the materials available in the record finds that the allegations made in the complaint on the face of it cannot be termed to be highly exaggerated version of the occurrence. Hence, the facts of this case being different from the facts of Sardar Trilok Singh & Others vs. Satya Deo Tripathi (supra), the ratio of the said case is not applicable to the facts of this case. 14. Hence, the facts of this case being different from the facts of Sardar Trilok Singh & Others vs. Satya Deo Tripathi (supra), the ratio of the said case is not applicable to the facts of this case. 14. It is a settled principle of law that High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. will not stifle a legitimate prosecution as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Monica Kumar (Dr.) & Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others reported in (2008) 8 SCC 781 . 15. Because of the discussions made above, this Court is of the considered view that the offences punishable under Sections 384 and 385 of the Indian Penal Code besides the other offences are made out inter alia against the petitioner from the face of the complaint which upon being referred to police under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. for institution and investigation of case by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Bokaro; the F.I.R. has been lodged. 16. Hence, in the considered opinion of this Court, this is not a fit case where the entire criminal proceedings including the F.I.R. arising out of Chas Muffassil P.S. Case No.133 of 2021 as well as the orders dated 13.07.2021 and 16.07.2021 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Bokaro for institution of the F.I.R. and investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C., be quashed and set aside. 17. Accordingly, the prayer to quash and set aside the entire criminal proceedings including the F.I.R. arising out of Chas Muffassil P.S. Case No.133 of 2021 as well as the orders dated 13.07.2021 and 16.07.2021 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Bokaro for institution of the F.I.R. and investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. is rejected and consequently this Cr.M.P., being without any merit, is dismissed.