JUDGMENT : This is a claimant’s appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 seeking enhancement of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. 2. The two claimant-appellants, Arvind Agrawal and Smt. Renu Agrawal, are the parents of the late Anshul Agrawal, the victim of a fatal motor accident, that happened on 31.05.2008. According to the facts set out in the claim petition, the deceased, Anshul Agrawal, was proceeding on board a Maruti car bearing Registration No. UP 14 T 0150 on 31.05.2008 at about 10 o’clock in the evening hours, along with his workmen, one Dhananjay and another Sonu. He was proceeding from Rampur bound homewards. He lived at Premises No. 6/165, Rajnagar, Police Station Kavinagar, District Ghaziabad, and this was his destination on the fateful journey. When Anshul reached a place in front of the gate at Village Shahbazpur, a truck bearing Registration No. UP 25 T5201, driven at a high speed and negligently, approached from the opposite direction. The truck collided with Anshul’s car head-on. The impact led Anshul, Dhananjay and Sonu to sustain injuries. During medical aid at the Government Hospital, Gajraula, Anshul and Dhananjay lost their battle for life. 3. Arvind Agrawal lodged a first information report, [‘FIR’ for short] at Police Station Gajraula regarding the incident. Arvind Agrawal is arrayed as claimant no. 1 in the claim petition and appellant no. 1 in this appeal. Both the claimant-appellants shall hereinafter be collectively referred to as ‘the claimants’ except where the context requires an individual or a different reference. It is the claimants’ case that on account of the sudden demise of their lone and adult son, Arvind Agrawal was much troubled psychologically. Therefore, on account of an inadvertent error, he mentioned the number of the offending truck as UP 25T 2501 instead of UP 25 T 5201 in the FIR. However, during investigation, Arvind Agrawal took care to amend his mistake by informing the Investigating Officer, [‘IO’ for short]. The IO, after verifying facts and collecting material, charge-sheeted the driver of the offending truck in the crime arising from the accident. It is the claimants’ case that the deceased would provide for the claimants, earning his livelihood from business that he did. The deceased was the claimants’ lone son. He was the sole breadwinner and provided resources for their sustenance. It was the deceased’s income that would enable the family to make ends meet. It is the claimants’ case that the deceased would provide for the claimants, earning his livelihood from business that he did. The deceased was the claimants’ lone son. He was the sole breadwinner and provided resources for their sustenance. It was the deceased’s income that would enable the family to make ends meet. The deceased was aged 23 years and a healthy man. He had pursued higher technical education and earned a B.Tech (Communications) degree. He was an engineer by training. He was into the business of aluminium fabrication and glass fitting, wherein he was trading with profit. He would earn a sum of Rs.10,281/- per month and had a shop at 68, Punjab Expeller Compound, Meerut Road, Ghaziabad. The claimants, on account of their son’s demise, have been left without support. They have suffered irreparable loss and mental pain. The family, after Anshul’s demise, have plunged into financial crisis. The deceased committed no fault or negligence that contributed to the accident. If the driver of the offending vehicle had not driven it at a high speed and negligently, the claimants’ son would not have suffered an untimely demise. Therefore, opposite parties nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the claim petition, who are the owner, the driver and the insurers of the offending truck, respectively, are entirely liable for the untimely death of the claimants’ son. It is also pleaded on behalf of the claimants that the deceased’s ancestors have lived up to the age of 70-75 years. He would have at least lived to see his 75th birthday. He would have been gainfully employed for a minimum of 40 years and supported the family. The deceased was unmarried. 4. Opposite party no. 2 to the claim petition, Saleem Hussain, is respondent no. 2 to the appeal. He is the driver of the offending truck. He shall hereinafter be called ‘the driver’. Tanveer Ahmad is the owner of the offending truck. He is opposite party no. 1 to the claim petition and respondent no. 1 to this appeal. He shall hereinafter be called ‘the owner’. The Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Company Limited are the insurers of the offending truck. They are arrayed as opposite party no. 3 to the claim petition and respondent no. 3 to this appeal. The said insurance company shall, for the sake of convenience, be called as ‘the insurers’. 5. 1 to this appeal. He shall hereinafter be called ‘the owner’. The Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Company Limited are the insurers of the offending truck. They are arrayed as opposite party no. 3 to the claim petition and respondent no. 3 to this appeal. The said insurance company shall, for the sake of convenience, be called as ‘the insurers’. 5. The claimants say that the driver was driving the offending truck on the owner’s instructions. The owner is, therefore, liable. The offending truck was insured with the insurers vide Cover Note No. BZ0800234677. Therefore, the owner, the driver and the insurers are jointly and severally liable to make good the compensation demanded by the claimants. A total sum of Rs.30,20,000/- was asked to be paid in compensation by the claimants, who petitioned the Tribunal. 6. The owner and the driver filed a joint written statement and generally denied the claimants’ case. It was averred that it was not the driver’s fault that led to the accident. The driver of the offending vehicle was operating it with due care and caution, and in accordance with the rules. He held a valid and effective driving license. On the date and time of the accident, the offending truck was insured with the insurers. It was also pleaded that the claimants have demanded compensation arbitrarily. If at all the offending truck be held responsible for the accident, the liability has to be borne by the insurers. 7. The insurers filed a separate written statement, generally denying, like the driver and the owner, the claimants’ case. It was pleaded that the deceased was driving his car negligently and wantonly, on account of which, the accident happened. There was no fault on the driver’s part. The claimants are not entitled to compensation. They have demanded an exaggerated figure in compensation, to which they are not entitled. It was also averred that at the time of the accident, the driver did not hold a valid driving license. The insurers have pleaded that the claim petition ought to be rejected. 8. The claimants are not entitled to compensation. They have demanded an exaggerated figure in compensation, to which they are not entitled. It was also averred that at the time of the accident, the driver did not hold a valid driving license. The insurers have pleaded that the claim petition ought to be rejected. 8. On the pleadings of parties, the Tribunal, on 15.02.2010, struck the following issues (translated into English from Hindi) : (i) Whether on 31.05.2008 at 10 o’clock in the night, when the deceased Anshul Agrawal was proceeding to Ghaziabad from Rampur, along with Dhananjay and Sonu in Maruti Car No. UP 14 T 0150, in front of Shahbazpur Door, on the Gajraula Brajghat Road, within the local limits of Police Station Gajraula, District J.P. Nagar, Truck No. UP 25 T 5201, driven at a high speed and negligently by its driver, collied with Car No. UP 14 T 0150, on account of which, the claimants’ son, Anshul Agrawal sustained grievous injuries and died during treatment at the Government Hospital, Gajraula ? (ii) Whether the accident in question happened on account of the negligence of the deceased/driver of Vehicle No. UP 14 T 0150 ? (iii) Whether at the time of the accident, the deceased did not hold a valid and effective driving license ? (iv) Whether the claim petition is bad for non-joinder of the owner and the insurers of Maruti Car No. UP 14 T 0150 ? (v) Whether at the time of the accident, the driver of Truck No. UP 25 T 5201 did not hold an effective and valid driving license ? (vi) Whether the claimants are entitled to compensation on account of Anshul Agrawal’s death? If yes, how much and from whom ? 9. On behalf of the claimants, Arvind Agrawal, examined himself as P.W.1 and Sonu Sharma, as P.W.2. The claimants, in their documentary evidence through a list bearing Paper No. 6 x produced photostat copies of five documents, and through a list bearing Paper No. 30 x , certified copies of 12 documents. On the other side, the truck driver, Saleem Hussain, was examined as D.W.1 and the owner and the driver filed, along with their joint written statement, photostat copies of three documents. The documents as well as the parol evidence shall be discussed, so far relevant, during the course of this judgment. 10. Issues Nos. On the other side, the truck driver, Saleem Hussain, was examined as D.W.1 and the owner and the driver filed, along with their joint written statement, photostat copies of three documents. The documents as well as the parol evidence shall be discussed, so far relevant, during the course of this judgment. 10. Issues Nos. 1 and 2 were dealt with by the Tribunal together. The Tribunal held in favour of claimants on Issue No. 1, but opined that the drivers of both vehicles had a contributory negligence to the extent of 50%. Issue No. 3 was decided, holding that on the date of the accident, the deceased held a valid driving license. Issue No. 4 was decided again in favour of the claimants, holding that compensation, as determined, is payable by the owner and the insurers of the offending truck. The car driver is dead. One of the claimants is the car driver’s father and his legal representative as well. It was held that there was no defect in the petition on account of the car driver and the insurers of the car not being made parties. Issue No. 5 was decided, again, in favour of the claimants, so to speak, holding that the driver of the truck held a valid and effective driving license on the date of the accident. In determining Issue No. 6, the Tribunal looked into the deceased’s income tax returns and balance-sheet for the Financial Year 2005-06 and Assessment Year 2006-07, and likewise, for the Financial Year 2006-07 and Assessment Year 2007-08. The Tribunal was not much convinced about the monthly income of the deceased and all that was left with him, after taking into account the outgoings and expenditure. The Tribunal also took into consideration the deceased’s high technical qualifications. The circumstances of his business and life were also considered to reach a conclusion that the deceased had a monthly income of Rs.8,000/-, corresponding to an annual income of Rs.96,000/-. The deceased, being a bachelor, 50% was deducted towards personal and living expenses by the Tribunal. In order to choose the multiplier applicable, the Tribunal has considered the age of claimant no. 1, Arvind Agrawal and adopted a multiplier of ‘11’. Therefore, a total dependency of Rs.5,28,000/- was determined by the Tribunal. A sum of Rs.2,000/- was awarded towards funeral expenses. 11. In order to choose the multiplier applicable, the Tribunal has considered the age of claimant no. 1, Arvind Agrawal and adopted a multiplier of ‘11’. Therefore, a total dependency of Rs.5,28,000/- was determined by the Tribunal. A sum of Rs.2,000/- was awarded towards funeral expenses. 11. Looking to the special circumstances that the claimants had lost their only son, relying on a decision of Uttarakhand High Court in Jamuna Prasad and another v. Baljeet Singh and others, 2010 (3) AWC 2988, the Tribunal awarded separately a sum of Rs.25,000/-, but under what head, is not clear. In addition, on account of pain and suffering for the loss of their only son, the claimants were awarded a sum of Rs.10,000/- and further, a sum of Rs.10,000/- for the loss of consortium and services. In the aforesaid manner, a total compensation of Rs.5,75,000/- was worked out by the Tribunal. Since 50% contributory negligence was adjudged, the total compensation was halved to determine the compensation payable, leading to a sum of Rs.2,87,500/-. This compensation was ordered to be paid by the owner, the driver and the insurers jointly and severally to the claimants along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the claim petition until realisation. The insurers were ordered to deposit the sum awarded within a month of the award with the Tribunal. The Tribunal further directed that out of the sum of compensation payable to the claimants, both would be entitled to receive a one half each. 12. Heard Mr. Vivek Kumar Singh, learned Counsel for the claimants and Mr. S.K. Mehrotra, learned Counsel appearing for the Insurers. 13. It is argued by Mr. Vivek Kumar Singh that there is no case of contributory negligence, as the evidence shows that the offending truck was entirely responsible for the accident. It is also argued that the truck being the heavier vehicle, the inference of the Tribunal to apportion contributory negligence equally on ground that it is a head-on collision, is erroneous. It is next submitted that the Tribunal erred in not awarding anything towards future prospects and incorrectly applying the multiplier. It is also argued that the Tribunal has committed error in not awarding adequately under the conventional heads on account of the loss of consortium, funeral expenses and the loss of estate. 14. On the other hand, it is argued by Mr. It is also argued that the Tribunal has committed error in not awarding adequately under the conventional heads on account of the loss of consortium, funeral expenses and the loss of estate. 14. On the other hand, it is argued by Mr. S.K. Mehrotra, learned Counsel for the insurers that the Tribunal has passed a just award. He submits that the Tribunal’s award should neither be a pittance nor a bonanza. Mr. Mehrotra has further argued that the finding regarding contributory negligence is unassailable and has referred to the site-plan, besides the other evidence, to say that the Tribunal has rightly determined the issue. 15. Upon hearing learned Counsel for parties, this Court finds that so far as this appeal is concerned, there are only two points that arise for consideration, to wit, whether the Tribunal was right in finding contributory negligence and apportioning it at 50% between the deceased and the offending driver; and the other is, if the compensation awarded is adequate. So far as the evidence of P.W.2, who is the surviving passenger on board the ill-fated car is concerned, all that he has said in his affidavit filed in lieu of his examination-in-chief in Paragraphs Nos. 4 and 5 is this : ^^4- eSa 'kiFkiqoZd dFku djrk gw¡ fd tc gekjh xkM+h xtjkSyk ls c`t?kkV dh rjQ 'kkgcktiqj xsV ds lkeus igqaph rks lkeus ls Vªd la[;k & ;w-ih- & 25 Vh & 5201 ds pkyd us cM+h rsth ls o ykijokgh ls Vªd dks pykrs gq,] xyr lkÃM esa vkdj ek:fr dkj esa lkeus ls VDdj ekj nhA 5- eSa 'kiFkiqoZd dFku djrk gw¡ fd gekjh xkM+h dks esjk ekfyd va'kqy vxzoky cM+h lko/kkuh o ;krk;kr ds fu;eksa dk ikyu djrs gq, pyk jgk Fkk fdUrq Vªd pkyd us rsth o ykijokgh ls Vªd pyk dj gekjh xkM+h esa VDdj ekjh ftlls bl nq?kZVuk esa vk;h pksVks ds dkj.k va'kqy vxzoky o /kuat; dh e`R;q gks x;h rFkk eSa Hkh ?kk;y gks x;k FkkA** 16. This witness, in his cross-examination about the accident, has said : ^^ge yksx ml fnu jkeiqj ls 'kke lkढs+ lkr vkB cts pys FksA eSa ?kVuk LFky ls jkeiqj dh nwjh ugha crk ldrkA ?kVuk LFky ij Mkoj dh lM+d yxHkx 20 QhV pkSM+h gS mlds fcp fMokbMj ugha gSA lM+d ij VªSfQd ykÃV ugha gSA lM+d ds fdukus xkao gS ftldh jks'kuh lM+d ij yxh gqà FkhA ?kVuk Vªd ls gqà gS ftldk uEcj eSa crk ldrk gw¡A ?kVuk okyk Vªd lkeus ls vk jgk FkkA ?kVuk ds le; lM+d ij dkQh okgu vk jgs FksA dkj o Vªd dh vkeus lkeus eaqg ls VDdj gqà gSA dkj esa ?kVuk ds le; pkyd ds vykok ,d vkneh vkxs cSBk FkkA eSa ihNs cSBk FkkA dkj ?kVuk ds le; [kkyh Fkh FkksM+s ls vkStkj Fks tks fMXxh esa j[ks FksA Vªd yxHkx 10&20 xt dh nwjh ls fn[kkbZ ns jgk Fkk ftldh jks'kuh fn[kkbZ ns jgh FkhZ eq>s ekewyh pksVs vkbZ FkhA va'kqy vxzoky dks pksVs vkbZ FkhA ftudh bl ?kVuk esa e`R;q gks x;h gSA----- ----;g dguk xyr gS fd va'kqy vxzoky rsth ls xkM+h pyk jgs Fks bl dkj.k ?kVuk ?kVh gksA---^^ 17. This witness, who has testified as P.W.2, is a very reliable witness of the accident. His presence cannot be doubted because he was on board the ill-fated car and received minor injuries too in the accident. The said version of his has remained unchallenged by the insurers in the cross-examination. The witness is, in no way, partisan or related to the claimants. He was an employee of the deceased, and after him, took up employment with his uncle. He is, thus, no longer in contact with the deceased’s family. There is no reason for him to say the slightest of falsehood about the negligence of the two drivers involved in the accident. A perusal of the testimony of witness and his cross-examination clearly shows that the witness has said that the truck driver was driving it at a high speed and negligently. He has, particularly, said that the truck driver moved to the wrong side of the road and hit the ill-fated car head-on. It is further said in the examination-in-chief that the deceased was carefully driving the car following the traffic rules, but the truck driver driving negligently and at a high speed, caused the accident. He has, particularly, said that the truck driver moved to the wrong side of the road and hit the ill-fated car head-on. It is further said in the examination-in-chief that the deceased was carefully driving the car following the traffic rules, but the truck driver driving negligently and at a high speed, caused the accident. In the cross-examination of this witness at the instance of the insurers, there is nothing elicited, which may cast doubt about the witnesses’ judgment of the negligence involved in the accident. It is said by the witness in his cross-examination that he was sitting on the backseat of the car when the accident happened. He could see the truck at a distance of 10-20 yards. He has specifically refuted the suggestion by the learned Counsel for the insurers that the accident happened on account of the deceased driving the ill-fated car at a high speed. 18. In substance, therefore, whatever the witness has said in his examination-in-chief remained the unshaken version of the eye-witness, who saw it all happen at close quarters. The version there is clear that the truck was driven negligently and moved to the wrong side of the road to collide head-on with with the ill-fated car. 19. On behalf of the insurers, the driver of the offending truck, Saleem Hussain, has been examined as D.W.1. In his examination-in-chief in the dock, he has stated : ^^eSa ml le; ;wŒihŒ 25 VhŒ 2501 dk Mªkboj Fkk fnukad 31-05-2008 dks eSa Vªd UP 25 T 5201 dks ysdj xkft;kckn ls cktiqj tk jgk FkkA tSls gh eSa 'kkgckniqj xsV ds ikl igqapk rks lkeus dh vksj ls ls ,d dkj dks mldk Mªkboj cgqr rsth o ykijokgh ls pykrk gqvk yk;k vkSj esjs Vªd esa VDdj ekj nh bl nq?kZVuk esa esjh dksbZ xyrh ugha FkhA leLr xyrh dkj pkyd dh FkhA--- ---bl ?kVuk ds laca/k esa fy[kok;s x;s vijk/k la[;k 923@08 Fkkuk xtjkSyk esa esjh tekur gqbZ FkhA bl eqdnesa esa xkMh dh Hkh tekur gqbZ FkhA ;g dguk lgh gS fd bl eqdnesa esa iqfyl }kjk eq>s nks"kh ekurs gq, vkjksi i= U;k;ky; esa nkf[ky dj fn;k gksA--- ----;g dguk xyr gS fd jkr esa uhan ds dkj.k xyr fn'kk esa vkdj rsth o ykijokgh ls pykrs gq, dkj esa VDdj ekj nh gksA ;g dguk xyr gS fd mDr ,DlhMsUV esa esjh xyrh gksA---^^ 20. This witness was examined on behalf of the owner as D.W.1. A perusal of the testimony of this witness shows that he has refuted his negligence or even his contribution to the causing of the accident. The witness has acknowledged the fact that the Police have charge-sheeted him in the crime. The charge-sheeting by the Police is not decisive on the issue of negligence, but is certainly a piece of evidence to be considered. It does show that the Police doing their investigation also thought that it was the driver’s negligence that led to the accident. 21. There is another important feature about the testimony of P.W.2. It is not just that, that as the driver of the offending truck, any stand of his which revealed or was a pointer to his negligence, would bring his conduct or ability as a driver into question, but also place him disadvantageously in the criminal trial he is facing on the charge of causing death by negligence. Assuming that the testimony in the motor accident claim would not be read in evidence in the criminal trial, the driver, who is a layman, can reasonably be expected to think that it would. He could think that it would lead to his conviction in the criminal case. This witness is, therefore, by no means, an independent witness of the kind that P.W.2 Sonu is, as the surviving victim of the accident. The fear of blameworthy conduct or conviction in the criminal case, would keep the witness D.W.1, inhibited from speaking the truth. 22. To the understanding of this Court, the testimony of this witness about the question of negligence or the deceased’s contribution to it is not dependable, particularly, when compared to that of P.W.2, who is absolutely independent and unconcerned. The Tribunal, while noticing the testimony of both these witnesses in order to evaluate it, has not at all assessed it either by the credit of the witnesses or the worth of their testimonies, judged on a comparative basis. The Tribunal has simplistically set forth the salient features of the testimony of both the witnesses and contented itself with doing that. This Court thinks that the testimony of P.W.2 and D.W.1, when taken into consideration decisively, shows that P.W.2 is more reliable about an accurate and first-hand account. The Tribunal has simplistically set forth the salient features of the testimony of both the witnesses and contented itself with doing that. This Court thinks that the testimony of P.W.2 and D.W.1, when taken into consideration decisively, shows that P.W.2 is more reliable about an accurate and first-hand account. This Court is also of opinion that the account of the accident given out by P.W.2 clearly establishes the driver’s negligence. It excludes any contribution by the deceased. To add to it, by way of support is the fact that the Police have also thought that the truck driver was guilty of offences punishable under Sections 279, 338, 427 and 304A of the Penal Code, all of which would point to the driver’s negligence. This Court makes it clear that we do not rely on the conclusions drawn by the Police, but merely look to it for the slight support of whatever worth it is in aid of our conclusions based on the evidence before us. The Court has also looked into the site-plan, which the Tribunal has relied on to found its conclusions about contributory negligence. Contrary to the Tribunal’s understanding of the site-plan, what this Court finds is that the truck did move to the right and hit the car, that was not moving in the centre of the road. The car was moving according to the rule of the road, may not be on the last inch of the left-hand side. In fact, a perusal of the Tribunal’s finding on the issue makes it pellucid that the learned Judge also thought about the site-plan the same way as this Court. The only error that seems to have arisen is on account of the Tribunal straining the standards of care for the driver of the ill-fated vehicle to find a case of contributory negligence. The only error that seems to have arisen is on account of the Tribunal straining the standards of care for the driver of the ill-fated vehicle to find a case of contributory negligence. This would be evident from the Tribunal’s finding on the issue, the relevant part of which reads : ^^uD'kk utjh dh izekf.kr izfrfyfi dkxt laŒ 32 x@2 ds voyksdu ls ik;k tkrk gS fd dfFkr nq?kZVuk lM+d ij vkeus lkeus ls gqbZ gSA Vªd lM+d ij yxHkx chp esa py jgk Fkk rFkk dkj lkeus ls lM+d ds chp ls FkksMk cka;s FkhA ;fn dkj pkyd lko/kkuh cjrrk vkSj ;fn Vªd pkyd ykijokgh ls Vªd yk jgk Fkk] rks dkj ck;s ykdj nq?kZVuk ls cpk tk ldrk FkkA vr% dfFkr nq?kZVuk esa dkj pkyd dh Hkh xyrh Li"V gksrh gSA^^ (emphasis by Court) 23. It will be noticed that in the finding recorded by the Tribunal, it has been said that the site-plan showed that the truck was moving almost in the centre of the road, whereas the car was moving slightly to the left-hand side. About this finding, the Tribunal is absolutely right in our opinion, but then it has remarked that if the driver of the ill-fated vehicle had observed caution, seeing the truck driver driving negligently, he could have moved the car farther to the left and averted the accident. That advice may have been good for the deceased to enable him see another day, and, of course, a long life, but it cannot set the standards for negligence and its apportionment between the two drivers. 24. In the opinion of this Court, therefore, the finding of the Tribunal, that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, is absolutely misplaced. It is, accordingly, held that it is the driver alone, who was responsible for the accident, with no contribution on the deceased’s part. 25. This takes this Court to the next issue and that is the assessment of compensation, which the claimants are entitled to. This Court has already noticed the way the Tribunal has taken into consideration the deceased’s income tax returns, his revenue expenditure, the kind of business that he was into, his establishment and above all, his qualifications to find that the deceased’s monthly income was Rs.8,000/- per month. There is no reason for this Court to disagree with that assessment of the Tribunal about the deceased’s monthly income. 26. There is no reason for this Court to disagree with that assessment of the Tribunal about the deceased’s monthly income. 26. Based on the deceased’s monthly income, his annual income would be a sum of Rs.96,000/-. Since the deceased was bachelor, going by the law laid down in Paragraph No. 30 of the report in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , a deduction of 50% towards the deceased’s personal and living expenditure has been made, which this Court thinks is correct. The Tribunal has applied the multiplier of ‘11’, reckoning it by the father’s age. That is a patently fallacious standard to assess the applicable multiplier. According to the table in Paragraph No. 40 of the report in Sarla Verma (supra) the deceased being in the age group of 21-25, the applicable multiplier would be 18; not 11. It is accordingly held. 27. This Court further notices that the Tribunal has not awarded anything towards future prospects. It is no longer in the realm of doubt that future prospects are as much available in the case of the self-employed or those working on a fixed salary as those employed in government establishment or other establishments on salaries hitherto regarded as the sole index of a dependable income. Now that perspective of the law has completely changed, in view of the holding of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC 680 . In Pranay Sethi (supra) it has been held : 56. The seminal issue is the fixation of future prospects in cases of deceased who are self-employed or on a fixed salary. Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] has carved out an exception permitting the claimants to bring materials on record to get the benefit of addition of future prospects. It has not, per se, allowed any future prospects in respect of the said category. 57. Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are disposed to think when we accept the principle of standardisation, there is really no rationale not to apply the said principle to the self-employed or a person who is on a fixed salary. It has not, per se, allowed any future prospects in respect of the said category. 57. Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are disposed to think when we accept the principle of standardisation, there is really no rationale not to apply the said principle to the self-employed or a person who is on a fixed salary. To follow the doctrine of actual income at the time of death and not to add any amount with regard to future prospects to the income for the purpose of determination of multiplicand would be unjust. The determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated under Section 168 of the Act. In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is an acceptable certainty. But to state that the legal representatives of a deceased who was on a fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of future prospects for the purpose of computation of compensation would be inapposite. It is because the criterion of distinction between the two in that event would be certainty on the one hand and staticness on the other. One may perceive that the comparative measure is certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the other but such a perception is fallacious. It is because the price rise does affect a self-employed person; and that apart there is always an incessant effort to enhance one's income for sustenance. The purchasing capacity of a salaried person on permanent job when increases because of grant of increments and pay revision or for some other change in service conditions, there is always a competing attitude in the private sector to enhance the salary to get better efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a person who is self-employed is bound to garner his resources and raise his charges/fees so that he can live with same facilities. To have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. To have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. Though it may seem appropriate that there cannot be certainty in addition of future prospects to the existing income unlike in the case of a person having a permanent job, yet the said perception does not really deserve acceptance. We are inclined to think that there can be some degree of difference as regards the percentage that is meant for or applied to in respect of the legal representatives who claim on behalf of the deceased who had a permanent job than a person who is self-employed or on a fixed salary. But not to apply the principle of standardisation on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the marrows of ground reality. And, therefore, degree-test is imperative. Unless the degree-test is applied and left to the parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and inequitable. The degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept of percentage. Taking into consideration the cumulative factors, namely, passage of time, the changing society, escalation of price, the change in price index, the human attitude to follow a particular pattern of life, etc., an addition of 40% of the established income of the deceased towards future prospects and where the deceased was below 40 years an addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years would be reasonable. 58. The controversy does not end here. The question still remains whether there should be no addition where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] thinks it appropriate not to add any amount and the same has been approved inReshma Kumari [Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826]. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that salary does not remain the same. When a person is in a permanent job, there is always an enhancement due to one reason or the other. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that salary does not remain the same. When a person is in a permanent job, there is always an enhancement due to one reason or the other. To lay down as a thumb rule that there will be no addition after 50 years will be an unacceptable concept. We are disposed to think, there should be an addition of 15% if the deceased is between the age of 50 to 60 years and there should be no addition thereafter. Similarly, in case of self-employed or person on fixed salary, the addition should be 10% between the age of 50 to 60 years. The aforesaid yardstick has been fixed so that there can be consistency in the approach by the tribunals and the courts. 28. The other issue that still requires consideration is whether future prospects, to which the claimants are entitled, would be governed by the principle in Pranay Sethi or Rule 220-A(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998, [‘the Rules of 1988’ for short]. The issue was settled by the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822, where it has been held : 9. It is to be noted that the validity of the Rules was not, in any way, questioned in the instant matter and thus the only question that we are called upon to consider is whether in its application, sub-Rule 3(iii) of Rule 220A of the Rules must be given restricted scope or it must be allowed to operate fully. 10. The discussion on the point in Pranay Sethi was from the standpoint of arriving at “just compensation” in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50-60 years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50-60 years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. If a statutory instrument has devised a formula which affords better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument must be allowed to operate unless the statutory instrument is otherwise found to be invalid. 12. We, therefore, reject the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and affirm the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court and dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs. 29. There is, therefore, no doubt that in the State of Uttar Pradesh, future prospects have to be calculated in accordance with Rule 220-A (3) of the Rules, 1998 and not the principles in Pranay Sethi. 30. It was, at some time, a matter of doubt whether Rule 220-A (3) of the Rules, 1998 introduced by Notification No 777/XXX-4-2011-4(3)-2010 dated 26 September, 2011 i.e. The Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2011 would apply retrospectively to an accident that took place much before the amendment. The issue is no longer res integra in view of the Bench decision of this Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. M/s. Sampark Lojastic Private Limited and others, 2017 (35) LCD 1311. In Sushil Kumar(supra), it has been held : 31. Rule 220-A was inserted in the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 in view of the various decisions of the law courts for providing benefit on account of future prospects of the injured/deceased. It provides for addition of certain percentage of the income of the injured/deceased in his actual income depending upon the age of the injured/deceased for the purposes of determination of the compensation. The aforesaid Rule came into effect on 26.09.2011 after the decision of the claim petition but before filing of the appeal though the accident took place on 08.05.2010 much before the enforcement of the above Rule. 32. It is in view of the above that an argument is being raised that Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident which had taken place on 08.05.2010. 33. In Ram Sarup Vs. 32. It is in view of the above that an argument is being raised that Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident which had taken place on 08.05.2010. 33. In Ram Sarup Vs. Munshi AIR 1963 SC 553 it was laid down that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the rights of the parties. 34. The view expressed above was followed by the Supreme Court in Mula Vs. Godhu AIR 1971 SC 89 . 35. In Dayawati Vs. Inderjit AIR 1966 SC 1423 the court had observed as under:-If the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the court of first instance. 36. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. Pritam Singh AIR 1974 SC 2068 effect was given to the change in law during the pendency of an appeal as the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of this country is in the nature of rehearing of the suit by superior court. 37. It was in the light of the above decisions that in Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others Vs. Niranjan Modak AIR 1985 SC 111 it was held that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the right of the parties. 38. The aforesaid decision was followed by a Division Bench of this court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Smt. Madhu Sharma and others, 2003 (4) AWC 2620 which was a case in relation to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and it was observed that it is apparent that the change in law during the pendency of the original proceedings has to be taken into account so as to cover the rights of the parties. 39. Smt. Madhu Sharma and others, 2003 (4) AWC 2620 which was a case in relation to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and it was observed that it is apparent that the change in law during the pendency of the original proceedings has to be taken into account so as to cover the rights of the parties. 39. In view of above decision the view expressed by the Division Bench of this court in ICICI Lombard (Supra) is not of good law as it does not takes into account the decisions referred to above in holding that the Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident that took place prior to the said date only for the reason that the Rule was not specifically stated to be retrospective in nature. 31. According to the law laid down by the Division Bench in Sushil Kumar which apparently binds this Court the award of future prospects is to be made in accordance with Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998, notwithstanding the fact that accident happened prior to the amendment. Now, going by Rule 220-A(3), considering the age of the deceased, which was much less than 40 years, 50% is to be added to his income towards future prospects. 32. The claimants’ entitlement under the conventional heads is again governed by the principles in Pranay Sethi where it has been held : 48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ]. Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574 it has been reiterated by stating : (SCC p. 80, para 54) “54. … we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy.” 49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. … we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy.” 49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows: “3. General damages (in case of death): The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above : (i) Funeral expenses Rs.2000 (ii) Loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse Rs.5000 (iii) Loss of estate Rs.2500 (iv) Medical expenses — actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding Rs.15,000” 50. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting from the decision in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] and there has been no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs.1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. The justification for grant of consortium, as we find from Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149], is founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore. 51. On the aforesaid basis, the Court has revisited the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads. 52. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. It has granted Rs.25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. It has granted Rs.25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167], it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000, Rs.40,000 and Rs.15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads. (emphasis by Court) 33. So far as the award of compensation for the loss of consortium is concerned, the issue was considered by the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 . (emphasis by Court) 33. So far as the award of compensation for the loss of consortium is concerned, the issue was considered by the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 . In Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. (supra), it has been held : "21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, "consortium" is a compendious term which encompasses "spousal consortium", "parental consortium", and "filial consortium". The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse : [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] 21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of "company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation". [Black's Law Dictionary(5th Edn., 1979).] 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of "parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training. 21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit.” (emphasis by Court) 34. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit.” (emphasis by Court) 34. In view of what this Court held the compensation payable to the claimants in this appeal would have to be revised in the following manner : - S. No. Particulars Amount (in Rs.) (i) Monthly Income of the deceased Rs.8,000/- (ii) Monthly Income+Future Prospects (Monthly Income x 50%) = 8000+4000 Rs.12,000/- (iii) Annual Income (of the deceased) = 12,000 x 12 Rs.1,44,000/- (iv) Annual Dependency = Annual Income – 1/2 deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased = 1,44,000 – 72,000 Rs.72,000/- (v) Total Dependency = Annual Dependency x Applied Multiplier = 72,000 x 18 Rs.12,96,000/- (vi) Claimants’ entitlement towards conventional heads = Loss of Estate + Funeral Expenses + dependents’ Consortium = 15000 + 15000 + 40,000 x 2 Rs.1,10,000/- TOTAL COMPENSATION (Rs.12,96,000 + Rs.1,10,000) Rs.14,06,000/- Total Compensation Payable (in words) = Rupees Fourteen Lacs Six Thousand only 35. In the result, this appeal stands allowed in part. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the compensation awarded is enhanced to Rs.14,06,000/-. The aforesaid sum of money shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. Any sum of money already deposited with the Tribunal by the Insurer, pursuant to the impugned award, shall be adjusted against the award. The other directions of the Tribunal in the award shall remain intact. 36. Costs easy.