Ankit Singh S/o Late Anup Singh v. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station
2023-03-03
SACHIN SINGH RAJPUT
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. The applicant is apprehending his arrest in connection with Crime No.368/2022 registered at Police Station – Akaltara, District – Janjgir – Champa (C.G.) for alleged commission of offences under Section 341, 354- D and 506, 509(B) of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 12 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short POCSO Act). 2. The allegation against the present applicant is that the prosecutrix is a minor and during the period from 30/12/2021 to 19/08/2022, the applicant used to follow her while going to school or market and used obscene talks and gave obscene signals and when the victim said that she would inform her father, the applicant threatened her of dire consequences and also threatened to abduct her from her school on 17/08/2022. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant vehemently argued that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated in this case. It is submitted that the present applicant and father of the victim / complainant belongs to rival political party and there is dispute between them in relation to the political dominance in the village. He further submits that because of the said rivalry, the father of the complainant / victim did not like that the applicant should talk to the complainant / victim and despite of the warning to the victim, he saw that the applicant and the complainant / victim used to maintain talking terms and it is submitted that he created pressure on the complainant to lodge this false complaint against the applicant. It is further submitted that the applicant is a respected member of the society and his arrest would lead to irreparable loss to his image in the public. He submits that investigation is complete, charge sheet has been filed, therefore, custodial interrogation may not be necessary. He relies upon judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., AIR 1994 SC 1349 in which, it has been observed that - “24. The above guidelines are merely the incidents of personal liberty guaranteed under the Constitution of India. No arrest can be made because it is lawful for the police officer to do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing. The justification for the exercise of it is quite another.
The above guidelines are merely the incidents of personal liberty guaranteed under the Constitution of India. No arrest can be made because it is lawful for the police officer to do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing. The justification for the exercise of it is quite another. The police officer must be able to justify the arrest apart from his power to do so. Arrest and detention in police lockup of a person can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of a person. No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person. It would be prudent for a police officer in the interest of protection of the constitutional rights of a citizen and perhaps in his own interest that no arrest should be made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness and bona fides of a complaint and a reasonable belief both as to the person's complicity and even so as to the need to effect arrest. Denying a person of his liberty is a serious matter. The recommendations of the Police Commission merely reflect the constitutional concomitants of the fundamental right to personal liberty and freedom. A person is not liable to arrest merely on the suspicion of complicity in an offence. There must be some reasonable justification in the opinion of the officer effecting the arrest that such arrest is necessary and justified. Except in heinous offences, an arrest must be avoided if a police officer issues notice to person to attend the Station House and not to leave the Station without permission would do.” He submits that there is no physical assault committed by the applicant on the victim / complainant. They were in only talking terms and used to exchange messages which was not liked by her father and despite of warning given, the victim continued to maintain relationship with the applicant. Therefore, it is not a case that any offence, as alleged, is made out against the present applicant. He further submits that Section 341, 354D and 506 of IPC are bailable in nature and learned trial Court committed error in rejecting anticipatory bail of the applicant.
Therefore, it is not a case that any offence, as alleged, is made out against the present applicant. He further submits that Section 341, 354D and 506 of IPC are bailable in nature and learned trial Court committed error in rejecting anticipatory bail of the applicant. He made specific submission that since punishment prescribed under Section 12 of the POCSO Act may extend to 3 years, the same would be bailable in nature in view of Part II of Schedule I of CrPC. It is next submitted that initially, report was lodged under Section 354D, 341 and 506 of IPC and charge sheet has been filed under Section 354D, 341, 506, 509 (B), 354 (A) of IPC and Section 12 of the POCSO Act. He further submits that other allegations are not made out, therefore, the applicant may also be granted anticipatory bail. Learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67 and other connected matter. He further submits that the applicant is ready and willing to abide by any of the conditions which may be imposed upon him by this Court while granting bail. 4. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes prayer and vehemently submitted that the victim / complainant is aged about 15 years whereas the applicant is a married man aged about 30 years. Therefore, any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that the prosecutrix and the applicant would be in talking terms. She further submits that the applicant is having some criminal antecedent and he is an influential person. Therefore, possibility of tampering the evidence and influencing the witnesses cannot be ruled out. She further submits that from the perusal of FIR and her statement of the victim / complainant under Section 161 and 164 of CrPC and also from the statement of the parents of the victim / complainant and also from the material collected by the prosecution during the course of investigation, prima facie, case against the present applicant is made out. She further submits that submission of counsel for the applicant with regard to Section 12 of POCSO Act being bailable, does not hold water in view of the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in the case of Santosh Kumar Mandal v. State, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5378.
She further submits that submission of counsel for the applicant with regard to Section 12 of POCSO Act being bailable, does not hold water in view of the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in the case of Santosh Kumar Mandal v. State, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5378. She further submits that in the above judgment, Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has held that offence under Section 12 of POCSO Act is cognizable and non-bailable. 5. Learned counsel for the objector vehemently opposes the bail application and submits that the applicant was continuously harassing the victim / complainant when she was going to tuition / coaching class and also created mental torture on the victim / complainant and her family members. He tried to brain wash the minor victim which is evident on record that despite warning being given by the parents, he continued to indulge in such activities though there is long age gap between the victim and the applicant. He places reliance on the judgment of the Delhi High Court passed in the case of Ajay Kumar v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi and anr., Bail Appl. No.2729/2022 on 20/10/2022. In response to the submission of learned counsel for the State and objector, counsel for the applicant submits that though there are some criminal antecedents of the applicant, but in two of the cases, he has been acquitted and Section 54 of the Evidence Act clearly envisages that previous bad character is not relevant in criminal proceedings. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions and perused the documents. 7. Learned counsel for the applicant vehemently submitted that offence under Section 12 of the POCSO Act is bailable in nature. Before dwelling into the merits of the case, this Court feels necessary to decide the issue with regard to Section 12 of the POCSO Act. In this context, Section 12 of the POCSO Act is relevant and is quoted as below - “Section 12. Punishment for sexual harassment – Whoever, commits sexual harassment upon a child shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine” 8.
In this context, Section 12 of the POCSO Act is relevant and is quoted as below - “Section 12. Punishment for sexual harassment – Whoever, commits sexual harassment upon a child shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine” 8. Likewise, Part II of Schedule I of CrPC is quoted as below - “II – Classification of offences against other Laws Offence Cognizable or non-cognizable Bailable or non-bailable By what Court triable If punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for more than 7 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session If punishable with imprisonment for 3 years and upwards but not more than 7 years Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first class If punishable with imprisonment for less than 3 years or with fine only Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate 9. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Santosh Kumar Mandal (supra) has held as under - “11. Thus, the decisions of Supreme Court in case of Rajeev Chaudhary and Avinash Bhosale (supra) have no application to the facts of the case as discussed in detail by three Judge Bench in Om Prakash (supra) holding that the offences under Section 9 of Central Excise Act, 1944 and Section 135 (1) (ii) of the Customs Act, 1962 were noncognizable and thus bailable offences. Considering the gravity of the offences and the special mechanism provided under POCSO Act to hold that the offences are bailable though cognizable and would fall in category 3 would be rendering an interpretation to the classification provided in second part of First Schedule of Cr.P.C. contrary to the object of the special enactment. Thus, offences punishable under POCSO Act including Section 12 are cognizable and non-bailable offences.” 10. Similarly, the Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in a Public Interest Litigation considering the application of Item III of Part II of Schedule I of CrPC to offences under section 12 of POCSO Act vide order dated 24/11/2022 in WP(C) No.5434/2017 in the case of R.K. Tarun v. Union of India and ors, relying upon judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Knit Pro International v. State of NCT of Delhi and another, 2022 SCC Online 668 held as under - “8.
A comprehensive reading of the above demonstrates that a similar rationale will be applicable to the instant case and that Section 12 of the POCSO Act will also fall within the scope of the second category of Part II of Schedule I of the CrPC. In light of this, this Court finds no reason to pass Orders in the instant PIL when the Supreme Court has already settled the matter and nothing survives in this Writ Petition.” 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Knit Pro International (Supra) held as below - “10. Thus, for the offence under Section 63 of the Copyright Act, the punishment provided is imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years and with fine. Therefore, the maximum punishment which can be imposed would be three years. Therefore, the learned Magistrate may sentence the accused for a period of three years also. In that view of the matter considering Part II of the First Schedule of the CrPC, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for three years and onwards but not more than seven years the offence is a cognizable offence. Only in a case where the offence is punishable for imprisonment for less than three years or with fine only the offence can be said to be non-cognizable. In view of the above clear position of law, the decision in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) relied upon by learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent no.2 shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The language of the provision in Part II of First Schedule is very clear and there is no ambiguity whatsoever. 11. Under the circumstances the High Court has committed a grave error in holding that the offence under Section 63 of the Copyright Act is a non-cognizable offence. Thereby the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing and setting aside the criminal proceedings and the FIR. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the criminal proceedings/FIR under Section 63 of the Copyright Act deserves to be quashed and set aside. 12.
Thereby the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing and setting aside the criminal proceedings and the FIR. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the criminal proceedings/FIR under Section 63 of the Copyright Act deserves to be quashed and set aside. 12. In view of the above discussion and for the reason stated above, it is observed and held that offence under Section 63 of the Copyright Act is a cognizable and nonbailable offence. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court taking a contrary view is hereby quashed and set aside and the criminal proceedings against respondent no.2 for the offence under Sections 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act now shall be proceeded further in accordance with law and on its own merits treating the same as a cognizable and non-bailable offence.” 12. In the light of above pronouncement and reading of provisions of Section 12 of the POCSO Act as well as Part II of Schedule I of CrPC, it is manifest on record that the person charged with Section 12 of the POCSO Act can be punished for a period of 3 years. 13. Learned counsel for the applicant tried to impress upon that language used in Section 12 of the POCSO Act is prescribed for punishment which may extend to 3 years, therefore, it should have been treated as bailable and non-cognizable. Reliance placed by learned counsel for the applicant in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) is also misplaced because the issue involved in that case is totally different from the issue involved in this case. Hon’ble Supreme Court in that case was dealing with a question whether, pending investigation, the petitioner could be kept in custody for a maximum period of 60 days in terms of clause (ii) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. or for 90 days in terms of clause (i) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. without a charge sheet being filed. Hence, the applicant cannot take any benefit out of the above judgment.
Hence, the applicant cannot take any benefit out of the above judgment. Relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Knit Pro International (supra) and Delhi High Court judgments in the case of Santosh Kumar Mandal (supra) and R.K.Tarun (supra), this Court has no hesitation to hold that Section 12 of the POCSO Act is cognizable and non-bailable. 14. Reverting back to the merits of the case, this Court finds that the age of the victim is about 16 to 17 years and she is studying in school whereas the applicant appears to be aged about 30 years and as submitted by state counsel that he is a married man. The investigation is complete, charge sheet has been filed and the applicant is shown to be absconding. It is also reflecting from the evidence collected that the parents of the victim / complainant tried to advice the applicant not to indulge in such activities but instead of restraining himself, he continued with those activities. Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Ajay Kumar (supra) observed as below - “This Court in Dharmender Singh v. State (Govt. of NCT) BAIL APPL.1559/2020, granted bail to the accused while taking into consideration the possibility of a reciprocal physical relationship between the accused and the minor victim. It has also laid down the parameters that are to be followed when considering bail of a person accused under the POCSO Act, it has held as follows - “77.
of NCT) BAIL APPL.1559/2020, granted bail to the accused while taking into consideration the possibility of a reciprocal physical relationship between the accused and the minor victim. It has also laid down the parameters that are to be followed when considering bail of a person accused under the POCSO Act, it has held as follows - “77. Though the heinousness of the offence alleged will beget the length of sentence after trial, in order to give due weightage to the intent and purpose of the Legislature in engrafting section 29 in this special statute to protect children from sexual offences, while deciding a bail plea at the postcharge stage, in addition to the nature and quality of the evidence before it, the court would also factor in certain real life considerations, illustrated below, which would tilt the balance against or in favour of the accused : a. the age of the minor victim : the younger the victim, the more heinous the offence alleged; b. the age of the accused : the older the accused, the more heinous the offence alleged; c. the comparative age of the victim and the accused : the more their age difference, the more the element of perversion in the offence alleged; d. the familial relationship, if any, between the victim and the accused : the closer such relationship, the more odious the offence alleged; e. whether the offence alleged involved threat, intimidation, violence and/or brutality; f. the conduct of the accused after the offence, as alleged; g. whether the offence was repeated against the victim; or whether the accused is a repeat offender under the POCSO Act or otherwise; h. whether the victim and the accused are so placed that the accused would have easy access to the victim, if enlarged on bail : the more the access, greater the reservation in granting bail; i. the comparative social standing of the victim and the accused : this would give insight into whether the accused is in a dominating position to subvert the trial; j. whether the offence alleged was perpetrated when the victim and the accused were at an age of innocence : an innocent, though unholy, physical alliance may be looked at with less severity; k. whether it appears there was tacit approval-infact, though not consent-in-law, for the offence alleged; l. whether the offence alleged was committed alone or along with other persons, acting in a group or otherwise; m. other similar real-life considerations.
The above factors are some cardinal considerations, though far from exhaustive, that would guide the court in assessing the egregiousness of the offence alleged; and in deciding which way the balance would tilt. At the end of the day however, considering the myriad facets and nuances of real-life situations, it is impossible to cast in stone all considerations for grant or refusal of bail in light of section 29. The grant or denial of bail will remain, as always, in the subjective satisfaction of a court; except that in view of section 29, when a bail plea is being considered after charges have been framed, the above additional factors should be considered." 15. Learned counsel for the applicant had made a submission that since the charge sheet has been filed hence his custodial interrogation may not be necessary. In a recent judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of X v. Arun Kumar C.K. & Anr., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 870 held as under :- “In a case containing such serious allegations, the High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction in granting protection against arrest, as the Investigating Officer deserves free-hand to take the investigation to its logical conclusion. It goes without saying that appearance before the Investigating Officer who, has been prevented from subjecting Respondent No.1 to custodial interrogation, can hardly be fruitful to find out the prima facie substance in the allegations, which are of extreme serious in nature. The fact that the victim – girl is traumatized to such a high degree that her academic pursuits have been adversely impacted alone, coupled with the legislative intent especially reflected through Section 29 of the POCSO Act, are sufficient to dissuade a Court from exercising its discretionary jurisdiction in granting pre-arrest bail. It may be true, as pointed out by learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.1, that charge-sheet has already been filed. It will be unfair to presume on our part that the Investigating Officer does not require Respondent No.1 for custodial interrogation for the purpose of further investigation. Be that as it may, even assuming it a case where Respondent No.1 is not required for custodial interrogation, we are satisfied that the High Court ought not to have granted discretionary relief of anticipatory bail.” 16.
Be that as it may, even assuming it a case where Respondent No.1 is not required for custodial interrogation, we are satisfied that the High Court ought not to have granted discretionary relief of anticipatory bail.” 16. In view of the provisions enumerated and also considering the conduct of the accused, age difference between the applicant and the victim / complainant, evidence collected and other relevant material available on record, I do not find any good ground to allow this application for grant of anticipatory bail. The same is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.