JUDGMENT : RAVI NATH TILHARI, J. 1) Heard Sri K.G. Krishna Murthy, learned senior counsel, assisted by Sri A. Upendra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri G.V.S.Kishore Kumar, learned Government Pleader for Services-I for the respondents. 2) This Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner, challenging the Order, dated 08.12.2017, passed by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad, (APAT) in Original Application No.2676 of 2017 (“O.A.”). He has also challenged the endorsement in CCLA’s Lr.No.DD2/271/2013 dated 06.09.2014 of the 2nd respondent. 3) The petitioner was appointed as Junior Assistant on 06.1.1975 in Nalgonda District in the Revenue Department. He was transferred to the office of the 2nd respondent-the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh State, Krishna District in the year 1981 and was promoted as Senior Assistant in the year 1986. He was allotted to Chittoor District as Deputy Tahsildar in the year 1990-91 and was relieved from the office of the 2nd respondent on 01.09.1997. He was promoted as Tahsildar in February, 2004 and was given the notional seniority in the cadre of Tashildar from 01.09.1995 vide proceedings CCLA’s Ref.No.X1/954/2010, dated 11.11.2010. He retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.03.2008 and was sanctioned all the benefits of pension etc. 4) The petitioner after acquiring knowledge that some juniors including one Sri G.K. Venkoba, Tahsildar as per the seniority list of the Tahsildars issued vide proceedings CCLA’s Ref.No.X1/954/2010, dated 11.11.2010, in which G.K.Venkoba was placed at Sl.No.180, was drawing more pay than the petitioner, he represented the Government to fix his pay on par with Sri G.K. Venkoba which application was referred to the Chief Commissioner of the Land Administration vide Government Memo No.8233/Ser.I(1)/ 2013-3, dated 15.03.2013 but the same was rejected by the 2nd respondent vide the impugned endorsement dated 06.09.2014. 5) As per the endorsement dated 06.09.2014 Sri G.K. Venkoba was initially included in the panel year 2006-07, Deputy Collector Panel against Schedule Tribe (ST) roaster point. Subsequently, pursuant to the order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, dated 28.11.2003 in W.P.No.17430 of 2002, the panel of Deputy Collectors which was approved earlier before revision of seniority, was revised by conducting review D.P.C based on the revision of seniority in the Tahsildars cadre from the panel year 1998-99 to 2006-07 and also for the panel year 2010-2011. The revised Deputy Collectors Panels was sent to the Government for approval. The Government after examining the revised panels of the Deputy Collectors approved and communicated the same vide G.O.Ms.No.502 Rev (Ser-I) Dept dated 16.09.2013. As per the revised Deputy Collectors Panel Sri G.K. Venkoba (S.T) was pushed down from the earlier panel 2006-07 to the Deputy Collector panel for the year 2010-11 at S.No.99. The petitioner retired from service on 31.03.2008 on attaining the age of superannuation. Sri G.K. Venkoba belongs to Scheduled Tribe community and his name was included in the panel year 2010-11 of Deputy Collector since he was in service as on the date of DPC, whereas the petitioner belonged to the general category and had also retired. Consequently the petitioner’s case for notional promotion as Deputy Collector and fixation of pay in the cadre of Deputy Collector at par with G.K. Venkoba deserved no consideration on merits. 6) The petitioner submitted representation vide letter No.DD2/271/2013 dated 17.11.2014 to the Government which was again sent to the 2nd respondent vide Government Memo No.33180/Ser.J(2)/2014 dated 01.12.2014 upon which the 2nd respondent vide letter dated 17.07.2015 informed the Government that the report of the Collector, Chittoor was called which was awaited. The petitioner’s representation dated 17.11.2014 to the government remained pending without disposal. 7) The petitioner then filed O.A.No.2676/2017 before the A.P.A.T challenging the endorsement of the 2nd respondent dated 06.09.2014 and also seeking direction to the 1st respondent-State of A.P to consider his case for fixing the pay on par with his juniors including Sri G.K. Venkoba with all consequential benefits. 8) The APAT dismissed the O.A by order dated 08.12.2017 mainly on two grounds. 9) Firstly, the OA was not maintainable as the matter was pending with the Government and simultaneously the applicant could not seek setting aside of the endorsement dated 06.09.2014. 10) Secondly, the APAT observed that though originally Sri G.K. Venkoba was included in the panel of Deputy Collectors for the year 2006-07, but subsequently there was Review Departmental Committee meeting, in which his name was pushed down in the Deputy Collectors panel to the year 2010-11. Thus, Sri G.K. Venkoba did not get promotion as Deputy Collector prior to 31.03.2008 which is the date of the petitioner’s superannuation. In such consideration, the APAT also observed that the petitioner did not file any promotion order of G.K. Venkoba. Thus, Sri G.K. Venkoba did not get promotion as Deputy Collector prior to 31.03.2008 which is the date of the petitioner’s superannuation. In such consideration, the APAT also observed that the petitioner did not file any promotion order of G.K. Venkoba. 11) Sri K.G. Krishna Murthy, learned senior counsel submitted that the O.A challenging the endorsement dated 06.09.2014 was maintainable even during pendency of the petitioner’s representation before the Government. The APAT legally erred in holding that O.A was not maintainable only because of the pendency of representation which did not bar filing of O.A before the A.P.A.T. 12) Sri K.G.Krishna Murthy, learned senior counsel submitted that the petitioner’s juniors in the cadre of Tahsildars in the seniority list for the years 1995-96 were promoted vide G.O.Ms.No.970 Revenue (Services-I/1) Department dated 10.07.2007 to the Post of Deputy Collector. He submitted that Sri G.K. Venkoba (at Sl.No.180). Munnaswamy Naidu, (Sl.No.238) G. Naga Raja Rao, (Sl.No.240) and Janakiram Naidu (Sl.No.233) were considered for promotion by the Departmental Promotion Committee for inclusion of their names in the adhoc panel of Deputy Collectors list for the year 2006-07 but the petitioner at (Sl.No.179), senior to them was not granted promotion. He further submitted that the petitioner had filed the promotion order of Sri G.K. Venkoba as Deputy Collector as such the APAT is not correct in observing that the petitioner did not file promotion order of G.K. Venkoba. 13) Learned senior counsel submitted that the juniors to the petitioner having been promoted, to the post of Deputy Collector vide G.O.Ms.No.970 dated 10.07.2007, at the time when the petitioner was in service, he could not be denied, the promotion or the pay fixation at par his juniors. 14) Sri G.V.S. Kishore Kumar, learned Government Pleader submitted that the A.P.A.T rightly dismissed the O.A as not maintainable as it was filed after three years and ten months of the impugned endorsement dated 06.09.2014 and hence O.A was barred by limitation. 15) Sri G.V.S. Kishore Kumar further submitted that according to revised seniority list of Tahsildar for the year 1995-96 and 1997-98, the names of the juniors to the petitioner were included in the panel of the Deputy Collectors for the year 2006-07 which was approved vide G.O.Ms.No.970 dated 10.07.2007. 15) Sri G.V.S. Kishore Kumar further submitted that according to revised seniority list of Tahsildar for the year 1995-96 and 1997-98, the names of the juniors to the petitioner were included in the panel of the Deputy Collectors for the year 2006-07 which was approved vide G.O.Ms.No.970 dated 10.07.2007. The immediate junior of the petitioner Sri G.K.Venkoba at Sl.No.180, was placed at Sl.No.1 against the vacancy reserved for Scheduled Tribe in the panel year 2005-06 vide G.O.Ms.No.939 dated 10.05.2007. He further submitted that in pursuance of the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P.No.17430 of 2002, the panel of Deputy Collector, which was approved earlier, before revision of seniority, was revised by conducting review DPC, based on the revised seniority in the Tahsildar Cadre from the panel years 1998-99 to 2006-07 and for the panel year 2010-11. After such revision, the Deputy Collectors” panel was sent to the government for approval which was approved by G.O.Ms.No.502 dated 16.09.2013. The petitioner had retired from service on 31.03.2008 on attaining the age of superannuation. The petitioner belonged to the general category. So, his name could not be included in the Deputy Collectors’ panel for the year 2006-07. So far as the other juniors are concerned, he submitted that no other juniors were included in the Deputy Collectors” panel for the year 2006-07 till the retirement of the petitioner. Sri G.K.Venkoba was pushed down in the Deputy Collectors panel to the panel year 2010-11. Consequently, on merit also, there is no illegality in the endorsement dated 06.09.2014 as also in the order of the A.P.A.T. 16) We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record. 17) The following points arise for our consideration and determinations: (1) Whether the O.A No.2676 of 2017 was not maintainable and barred by limitation? (2) Whether the order of the A.P.A.T in O.A.No.2676 of 2017 deserves interference? CONSIDERATION OF POINT NO.1: 18). Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (for short, “the Act, 1985”) provides for applications not to be admitted by the Tribunal ordinarily unless the applicant has exhausted the other remedies. It reads as under:- “20. (2) Whether the order of the A.P.A.T in O.A.No.2676 of 2017 deserves interference? CONSIDERATION OF POINT NO.1: 18). Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (for short, “the Act, 1985”) provides for applications not to be admitted by the Tribunal ordinarily unless the applicant has exhausted the other remedies. It reads as under:- “20. Applications not to be admitted unless other remedies exhausted.— (1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances,— (a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or (b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired. (3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial.” 19). Section 21 of the Act, 1985 provides for limitation for admitting the application by the Tribunal. It reads as under:- “21. Section 21 of the Act, 1985 provides for limitation for admitting the application by the Tribunal. It reads as under:- “21. Limitation.— (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,— (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where— (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and (b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.” 20). As per Section 20 of the Act, 1985, the Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievance. As per Section 20 of the Act, 1985, the Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievance. As per sub section of (2) of Section 20 of the Act, a person shall be deemed to have availed all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievance if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or the other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or where no final order has been made by the Government or the other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on such appeal was preferred or representation was made, has expired. 21). Section 21 (1)(a) provides that the Tribunal shall not admit an application, in case where a final order under Section 20(2)(a) has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made within one year from the date on which such final order has been made. Section 21(1)(b) further provides that the Tribunal shall also not admit an application in a case where appeal or representation as under Section 20(2)(b) has been made and a period of six months expired thereafter, without final order having been made, if the same is not filed within one year from the date of expiry of the period of said six months. 22). From bare reading of the aforesaid provisions it is evident that where the final order has been passed by the competent authority, an application shall be filed before the Tribunal within a period of one year from the date of the final order. But, where no final order has been passed with regard to the appeal preferred or the representation made within a period of six months, from the date of such representation/appeal the application is to be filed within a period of one year from the expiry of the period of six months from the date of filing of the appeal or representation. 23) It is also settled in law that the remedies available to the applicant must be exhausted before filing the application before Tribunal and that those remedies must be the remedies as provided under the service rules for redressal of the grievance. If the remedy is not provided under the rules, filing of representation or appeal against a final order would not extend the period of limitation of one year from the date of the final order from which the applicant feels aggrieved. 24). In S.S. Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the cause of action shall be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal or representation is made. Where no such order is made, though the remedy has been availed of, a six months' period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first arisen. The Hon’ble Apex Court, however, made it clear that this principle may not be applicable when the remedy availed of has not been provided by law. Repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law are not governed by this principle. 25). It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 15 to 20 of S.S. Rathore (supra) as under:- 15. In several States the Conduct Rules for government servants require the administrative remedies to be exhausted before the disciplinary orders can be challenged in court. Section 20(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 provides: “20. (1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances.” 16. The Rules relating to disciplinary proceedings do provide for an appeal against the orders of punishment imposed on public servants. Some Rules provide even a second appeal or a revision. The purport of Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act is to give effect to the Disciplinary Rules and the exhaustion of the remedies available there under is a condition precedent to maintaining of claims under the Administrative Tribunals Act. Some Rules provide even a second appeal or a revision. The purport of Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act is to give effect to the Disciplinary Rules and the exhaustion of the remedies available there under is a condition precedent to maintaining of claims under the Administrative Tribunals Act. Administrative Tribunals have been set up for government servants of the Centre and several States have already set up such Tribunals under the Act for the employees of the respective States. The law is soon going to get crystallised on the line laid down under Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. 17. In this background if the original order of punishment is taken as the date when cause of action first accrues for purposes of Article 58 of the Limitation Act, great hardship is bound to result. On one side, the claim would not be maintainable if laid before exhaustion of the remedies; on the other, if the departmental remedy though availed is not finalised within the period of limitation, the cause of action would no more be justiciable having become barred by limitation. Redressal of grievances in the hands of the departmental authorities take an unduly long time. That is so on account of the fact that no attention is ordinarily bestowed over these matters and they are not considered to be governmental business of substance. This approach has to be deprecated and authorities on whom power is vested to dispose of appeals and revisions under the Service Rules must dispose of such matters as expeditiously as possible. Ordinarily, a period of three to six months should be the outer limit. That would discipline the system and keep the public servant away from a protracted period of litigation. 18. We are satisfied that to meet the situation as has arisen here, it would be appropriate to hold that the cause of action first arises when the remedies available to the public servant under the relevant Service Rules as to redressal are disposed of. 19. The question for consideration is whether it should be disposal of one appeal or the entire hierarchy of reliefs as may have been provided. Statutory guidance is available from the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. 19. The question for consideration is whether it should be disposal of one appeal or the entire hierarchy of reliefs as may have been provided. Statutory guidance is available from the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. There, it has been laid down: “20.(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances,— (a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or (b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired. (3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial.” 20. We are of the view that the cause of action shall be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal or representation is made and where no such order is made, though the remedy has been availed of, a six months' period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first arisen. We, however, make it clear that this principle may not be applicable when the remedy availed of has not been provided by law. Repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law are not governed by this principle. 26). We, however, make it clear that this principle may not be applicable when the remedy availed of has not been provided by law. Repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law are not governed by this principle. 26). In C. Jacob vs. Director of Geology and Mining and another, 2008(10) SCC 115 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the representation with respect to the matters which have become stale or barred by limitation even if considered and rejected would not give a fresh cause of action or revive a stale claim. 27). It is apt to refer paras 10 and 11 of C. Jacob (supra) as under: “10. Every representation to the government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the department or to inform the appropriate department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim. 11. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of `acknowledgment of a jural relationship' to give rise to a fresh cause of action.” 28). In Union of India v. Har Dayal, 2010(1) SCC 394, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that merely giving representation will neither extend the limitation nor wipe out the delay and laches. 29). In this case, the grievance raised by the petitioner is with respect to his non promotion to the post of Deputy Collector. The petitioner is claiming that his juniors were promoted. His further grievance was to fix his pay at par with his juniors who had been granted promotion. 30). The petitioner retired from service on 31.03.2008. 29). In this case, the grievance raised by the petitioner is with respect to his non promotion to the post of Deputy Collector. The petitioner is claiming that his juniors were promoted. His further grievance was to fix his pay at par with his juniors who had been granted promotion. 30). The petitioner retired from service on 31.03.2008. During his service period he did not raise any grievance nor approached for redressal of his grievance to the Tribunal. It is for the first time after his retirement, he filed the representation some times in the year 2013, which was rejected by the 2nd respondent by endorsement dated 06.09.2014. Against the said endorsement, the petitioner submitted representation to the Government on 17.11.2014 and during its pendency filed O.A. on 13.06.2017. Nothing has been placed before us to show whether against the endorsement dated 06.09.2014 the petitioner had the remedy of representation to the Government or not, but even if we take that the petitioner’s such representation was the remedy provided by the service rules, then also the representation was filed on 17.11.2014 to the Government and the O.A was filed on 13.06.2017. Thus, from the date of the endorsement dated 06.09.2014, the O.A was filed after more than two years nine months. Even from the date of the petitioner’s representation to the Government, the O.A was filed after two years and six months. As per Section 21, if no final order is passed on representation or appeal preferred and the period of six months has expired then the application is to be filed before the Tribunal within a period of one year from the date of expiry of six months of such representation or appeal. The period of one year from expiry of six months from 17.11.2014 also expired much before filing of the O.A. Consequently, we are of the considered view that the O.A was filed by the petitioner barred by limitation. The period of one year from expiry of six months from 17.11.2014 also expired much before filing of the O.A. Consequently, we are of the considered view that the O.A was filed by the petitioner barred by limitation. 31) Sub section (3) of Section 21 of the Act, 1985, as reproduced above, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (1) or sub section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub section (1) or as the case may be the period of six months specified in sub section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. Thus, the Tribunal has the power to admit an application even after the period of limitation of one year, as specified, if the Tribunal there was sufficient cause. However such provision was not attracted as the petitioner’s case was of the O.A being within limitation and not barred by limitation. The petitioner had also not filed any application for admitting the O.A, after condonoation of delay. 32). Para 5 of the O.A reads as under: “5. Limitation:- The O.A is filed well within the time of limitation as envisaged under Section 21 of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985.” 33). The Tribunal observed that the O.A was not maintainable, during pendency of the petitioner’s application dated 17.11.2014 before the Government the O.A. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that during the pendency of the representation/appeal before the Government, O.A was maintainable. Learned senior counsel would be right in his submission to the extent that O.A would be maintainable even during pendendency of appeal or representation, it decision is not taken within six months, but upto the limitation period of one year on expiry of said six months. We are not convinced with the submission that O.A would be maintainable even after one year period as aforesaid, unless of course Section 21(3) gets attracted, which is not the case here. The aforesaid observation of the Tribunal is to be considered in the correct perspective. We are not convinced with the submission that O.A would be maintainable even after one year period as aforesaid, unless of course Section 21(3) gets attracted, which is not the case here. The aforesaid observation of the Tribunal is to be considered in the correct perspective. When the Tribunal held that the O.A during pendency of the representation before the Government was not maintainable, it meant that it was not so maintainable because O.A could not be maintained at any time i.e., beyond the period of limitation provided by Section 21(1) of the Act, 1985. 34). In Prahlad Raut vs. All India Institute of Medical Sciences (Civil Appeal No.6640 of 2019-SLP(C ) No.30046 of 2017), the Hon’ble Apex court considered Union of India and others vs. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 and held that the proposition of law laid down in Tarsem Singh is unexceptionable. It is well settled that where there is a continuing wrong in relation to a service related claim, relief may be granted notwithstanding delay, provided the granting of the relief does not unsettle matters settled and affect third parties. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that the judgment in Tarsen Singh (supra) was, however, rendered in the context of discretionary relief in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for which there is no limitation prescribed. Where the cause of action is not a continuing one the High Courts refuse monetary claim on the ground of delay, specially arrears. 35). It is apt to reproduce para 30 of Prahlad Raut (supra) as under: “30. The proposition of law laid down by this Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) is unexceptionable. It is well settled that where there is a continuing wrong in relation to a service related claim, relief may be granted notwithstanding delay, provided the granting of the relief does not unsettle matters settled and affect third parties. The judgment was, however, rendered in the context of discretionary relief in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for which there is no limitation prescribed. Where the cause of action is not a continuing one the High Courts refuse monetary claim on the ground of delay, specially arrears. In this context it would be pertinent to refer to the concluding part of Paragraph (7) and Paragraph (8) of the judgment of this Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) extracted herein below: “7. Where the cause of action is not a continuing one the High Courts refuse monetary claim on the ground of delay, specially arrears. In this context it would be pertinent to refer to the concluding part of Paragraph (7) and Paragraph (8) of the judgment of this Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) extracted herein below: “7. ……….Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. 8. In this case, the delay of sixteen years would affect the consequential claim for arrears. The High Court was not justified in directing payment of arrears relating to sixteen years, and that too with interest. It ought to have restricted the relief relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever was lesser. It ought not to have granted interest on arrears in such circumstances.” 36). In the present case, the claim made by the petitioner involved issues relating to promotion. The delay would render the claim stale. It is not a continuing wrong. Though the petitioner has also claimed for pay fixation but such a claim is not independent of the claim for promotion. In the present case, the claim made by the petitioner involved issues relating to promotion. The delay would render the claim stale. It is not a continuing wrong. Though the petitioner has also claimed for pay fixation but such a claim is not independent of the claim for promotion. It is depending upon the petitioner’s claim for promotion being successful. Then only the pay fixation would be relevant. It cannot be said in the present case that the claim of pay fixation is a continuing wrong giving raise to continuous cause of action to maintain the O.A. Once the claim with respect to promotion was barred by limitation, the claim for pay fixation, depending upon the claim for promotion, would also be barred by limitation. 37). In Prahlad Raut (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the law of limitation is founded on public policy. The object of limitation is to put a quietus on stale and dead disputes. A person ought not to be allowed to agitate his claim after a long delay. There can be no doubt that when retiral benefits are withheld without cause, there would be a continuing cause of action. However, when retirement benefits are withheld by way of disciplinary action, the order would necessarily have to be challenged within the period of limitation or alternatively there would have to be sufficient cause for the delay. Once there is cessation of employer employee relationship by an order of termination, the cause of action would necessarily arise when the order of termination is passed. The forfeiture of pensionary benefits by reason of a punitive order of termination is not a continuing cause of action. 38). In our view, there is no continuing cause of action to maintain the O.A after the limitation period as prescribed under the statute. Consequently, the Tribunal has rightly rejected the O.A on the ground of its maintainability. 39). Consequently, we do not find any illegality in the order of the Tribunal, holding the O.A to be not maintainable. The petitioner’s O.A was barred by limitation and was rightly held as not maintainable. 40). On point No.(i), we hold that the Tribunal did not commit any illegality in holding the O.A as not maintainable. The O.A was barred by limitation. CONSIDERATION ON POINT No.2: 41). The petitioner’s O.A was barred by limitation and was rightly held as not maintainable. 40). On point No.(i), we hold that the Tribunal did not commit any illegality in holding the O.A as not maintainable. The O.A was barred by limitation. CONSIDERATION ON POINT No.2: 41). Even on merits, we find that the promotion of Sri G.K. Venkoba was granted under the reservation category of Schedule Tribe. As per the case of the respondents, no other junior to the petitioner was promoted to the post of Deputy Collector, during the petitioner’s continuance in service. The promotion was granted only after the petitioner’s retirement. Consequently, the petitioner’s claim based on the promotion of the juniors after the petitioner’s retirement has also been rightly rejected by the Tribunal. 42). In view of the aforesaid consideration, on Point No.2, we hold that there is no illegality in rejection of the petitioner’s claim by the Tribunal. 43). In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand closed.