JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Rajiva Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the State. No one appeared for private respondents. 2. By the order impugned dated 27.07.1999, the respondent No.2-Extra Officer, Kheri, District-Lakhimpur Kheri allowed the application of defendant No.1-Vishram Lal (private respondent No.3 herein), which was filed by him under Order 18 Rule 3-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short "C.P.C.") praying therein to allow him to appear as a witness. 3. It would be apt to point out here that the application under Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C. was filed after recording the statement of one witness of the defendant namely, Banwari Lal, whose statement was recorded on 19.03.1999 and he was duly cross-examined on 20.03.1999. 4. The contents of the application preferred by defendant No.1 under Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C. are relevant to the view of this Court, as such, the same are being extracted herein under:- ^^mDr okn esa izkFkhZ izfroknh viuk xokg yk;k Fkk vkSj vius lkFk xokgha is'k djuk pkgrk FkkA dbZ ckj ykSV pqdk Fkk vr% izkFkhZ us igys viuk xokg is'k fd;k vkSj Lo;a gks xokgh esa is'k fd;k tSlh dh vk'kadk Fkh le;kHkko ds dkj.k izkFkhZ izfroknh dh xokgh fnukad 20-03-1999 dks ugha fy[kh tk ldrh FkhA ;fn ml fnu izkFkhZ Lo;a xokgh esa izLrqr dj fn;k gksrk rks xokg dh xokgha ugha fy[kh tkrhA vkt izkFkhZ izfroknh Lo;a dks lk{; esa izLrqr djkuk pkgrk gSA^^ vr% Jheku~ th ls izkFkZuk gS fd izkFkhZ izfroknh ds U;k;fgr esa Lo;a dks crkSj lk{kh izLrqr gksus dh vuqefr iznku dh tkosA^^ 5. From the above quoted contents of application, it appears that prior to 19.03.1999 and 20.03.1999 i.e. the date on which statement of witness of defendant namely Banwari Lal was recorded, dates were fixed in the case and on each date fixed the defendant No.1 and his witnesses were present but due to paucity of time, the statement of defendant No.1 and his witnesses could not be recorded, as such to avoid inconvenience to witness-Banwari Lal as also to avoid his non-presence on the dates to be fixed in the case he was produced before the Court and his statement was recorded and thereafter, on 22.06.1999, the application, in issue, was moved. 6. 6. The order passed on the above quoted application which is impugned herein dated 27.07.1999 is also extracted herein under:- ^^iqdkj djkbZ xbZA mHk; i{k gkftj vk,A izkFkZuk i= fnukad 27-06-1999 ij cgl lquh tk pdh gSA cgl ds nkSjku foJke yky ds fo}ku vf/koDrk }kjk AIR 1987 enzkl 178 esa of.kZr th- ds- jko- cuke ,- gsujh rFkk AIR 1981 dydRrk 295 esa of.kZr HkksykukFk e.My vkfn cuke dkyh ikM++k e.My esa izfrikfnr fl)karks dk mYys[k djrs gq, izkFkhZ izfroknh ds c;ku djk, tkus dh fu;fer crk;k gSA nwljh vksj deky nkl oknh ds fo}ku vf/koDrk }kjk cgl esa AIR 1995 enzkl 137 MkW- ih- ds eqDdwLokeh cuke m/s V.A. gchuk QeZ vkfn ds izfrikfnr fl)kUr dk mYys[k djrs gq, izkFkhZ izfroknh ds c;ku djus ls fu"ks/k djus dh ckr dgh gSA mHk; i{kksa ds fo}ku vf/koDrkvksa dh cgl lquus ,oa mfYyf[kr izfrikfnr fl)karksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, eSa bl fu"d"kZ ij igq¡prk gwa fd izkFkhZ dks U;k; fgr esa vius lk{; esa vius c;ku djkus dk volj nsuk mfpr gSA vr% 50 :i;s gtkZus ij izkFkZuk i= fnukad 27-06-1995 Lohdkj dj izkFkhZ foJke yky dks Lo;a ds c;ku ,oa ijh{k.k djkus dh vuqefr nh tkrh gSA i=koyh fnukad 04-08-1999 dks is'k gksA^^ 7. By the order impugned dated 13.12.2000, the respondent No.1-Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow dismissed the revision filed by the petitioners assailing the order dated 27.07.1999. By the order impugned dated 13.12.2000, the respondent No.1-Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow dismissed the revision filed by the petitioners assailing the order dated 27.07.1999. The relevant portion of the order on reproduction reads as under:- ^^3- fuxjkuhdrkZ dh vksj ls fo}ku vf/koDrk }kjk vius rdZ esa dgk x;k fd foi{kh dks igys Lo;a ds :i esa xokgh esa u mifLFkfr djds voj U;k;ky; esa cuokjh yky dks lk{; ds :i esa izLrqr djus dk vkns'k fn;k gS cuokjh yky blds i'pkr foi{kh laŒ 1 foJke yky tksfd izfr oknh laŒ 1 gSa] us Lo;a dks fcuk U;k;ky; dh iwoZ vuqefr ds xokg ds :i esa izLrqr fd;k gS ftl ij fuxjkuhdrkZ dh vksj ls vkifRr iLrqr dh x;h ftls voj U;k;ky; }kjk fujLr djds xEHkhj vfu;ferrk dh x;h gSA fo}ku vf/koDrk us vkMZj XVIII ^^:Yl 3, dk gokyk nsrs g;s dgk fd mDr dze ls lk{kh dks dze ls gh xokgh ds :i esa izLrqr djuk pkfg, muds vuqlkj voj U;k;ky; ls bl izdkj dksbZ vkns'k izkIr ugha fd;k x;k FkkA voj U;k;ky; ds iz'uxr vkns'k ds voyksdu ls Li"V gS fd voj U;k;ky; }kjk mHk;i{kksa dks lqudj O;oLFkkvksa dks m}fjr djrs gq, leqfpr vk/kkj nsrs gq;s viuk vkns'k U;k;k;fgr esa 50@& gtsZ ij ikfjr fd;k x;k gS ;g vkns'k fof/kd vk/kkj ij fuxZr fd;k x;k gS vkSj blesa lh-ih-lh ds vkMZj XVIII ^^:Yl 3, dh ck/;rk iw.kZ gks tkrh gS ;g vkns'k izR;{k :i ls lgh izrhr gksrk gSA blesa fdlh izdkj ds gLr{ksi dh vo';Drk izrhr ugha gksrh gSA fuxjkuh fujk/kkj gksus ds dkj.k fujLr gksus ;ksX; gSA 4- mDr foospuk ds ifjis{; esa fuxjkuh fujLr dh tkrh gSA voj U;k;ky; dh i=koyh okil dh tk;sA bl U;k;ky; dh i=koyh nkf[kr nrj dh tk;sA i{kx.k voj U;k;ky; esa fn- 03-01-2001 dks mifLFkr gksaA^^ 8. Needless to refer here that the orders impugned relate to Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C. It would be appropriate to refer that the order dated 27.07.1999 was passed by the respondent No.2-Extra Officer, Kheri, District-Lakhimpur Kheri on an application of defendant No.1 in a Suit No.175/85/98, which was filed under Section 229-B of U.P. Zamindari and Abolition of Land Reform Act, 1950 (in short “Act of 1950”). 9. 9. While assailing the orders impugned, the learned counsel for the petitioners stated before this Court that Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C. is mandatory in nature which says that where a party himself wishes to appear as a witness, he shall so appear before any other witness on his behalf has been examined unless the Court, for the reasons to be recorded, permits him to appear as his own witness at a later stage. The word "shall" used in the Rule makes it mandatory in nature. In this case, the leave was not sought as required under Rule 3-A before producing Banwari Lal, as witness, by the defendants in Suit and as such, subsequent permission granted by Court on an application under Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C., which was after thought effort, was unjustified. Accordingly, the order dated 27.07.1999, which was passed on an application preferred by defendant No.1 (private respondent No.3 herein) under Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C. after recording of the statement of Banwari Lal, affirmed by the order dated 13.12.2000, are unsustainable in view of the language couched under Rule 3-A, which appears to be mandatory in nature. 10. It is also stated that in view of the Rule 3-A, the defendant No.1 (private respondent No.3 herein) cannot be permitted to appear as a witness before the Trial Court at later stage. He also stated that the authority concerned i.e. respondent No.1 and 2 passed the impugned orders without taking note of spirit of Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C. Thus, the orders impugned have been passed without application of mind. Prayer is to set aside the impugned order(s) and allow the petition. 11. Considered the aforesaid and perused the record. 12. The issue before this Court is as to whether Rule 3-A of Order 18 of C.P.C. is mandatory in nature or not. 13. To appreciate the aforesaid, it would be appropriate to reproduce Rule 3-A of Order 18 of C.P.C.:- “Rule 3A Order XVIII of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Party to appear before other witnesses Where a party himself wishes to appear as a witness, he shall so appear before any other witness on his behalf has been examined, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, permits him to appear as his own witness at a later stage.” 14. Rule 3-A, quoted above, has been considered in the following cases. Rule 3-A, quoted above, has been considered in the following cases. 15. In the year 1978 in the case of Mohd. Aqil vs. Alimulla; 1978 SCC OnLine All 247; this Court held that "the provision of Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C. are directory" and thereafter, the Full Bench of High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of The Amritsar Improvement Trust vs. Ishri Devi; 1979 SCC OnLine P & H 54; has held that the provisions of Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C. are not mandatory but directory in nature. Relevant paras of Full Bench judgment are as under:- "“7. At the very outset it may be noticed that some conflict of precedent which existed earlier now stands resolved and there is now no discordant note. As is evident from above, the very cornerstone of the argument in favour of the petitioner was rested on Jagannath Nayak's case (supra): That view has, however, been recently overruled by an exhaustive judgment of a Division Bench of that very court reported in Maquni Devi v. Gauranga Sabu, 1978 Cut. W.R. 107 Therein it has been held categorically that Order 18, Rule 3-A, is directory in nature and in proper cases the court has got the power to accord permission to a party to appear at a later stage even though he may not have done so at the very commencement of his evidence. A similar view has been expressed by the Allahabad Court in the judgment reported as Mohd. Aqil v. Alimulla, 1978 (2) R.L.R. 554. Even in this court a learned Single Judge in Niranjan Lal v. Punjab State Electricity Board, Patiala, (supra) has opined to the same effect and, as already noticed, the Division Bench in M/s. Kwality Restaurant, Amritsar's case (supra) has expressed a similar view. Learned counsel for the petitioner had conceded his inability to cite any precedent to the contrary, and it is, therefore, plain that the weight of authority is uniformly against the stand taken by the petitioner. 8. An examination of the matter on principle is however now inevitable, and since the controversy must revolve around the language of the statute, it is necessary to read Rule 3A:— “3A. 8. An examination of the matter on principle is however now inevitable, and since the controversy must revolve around the language of the statute, it is necessary to read Rule 3A:— “3A. Where a party himself wishes to appear as a witness, he shall so appear before any other witness on his behalf has been examined, unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, permits him to appear as his own witness at a later stage.” In construing the provision aforesaid it must necessarily be kept in the forefront that in essence it lays down a rule of procedure. Equally, imperative it is to recall the repeated dictum that procedure is in the ultimate the handmaid of justice and not its mistress and is meant to advance its cause and not to obstruct the same. A procedural rule, therefore, has to be liberally construed and care must be taken that so strict an interpretation be not placed thereon whereby technicality may tend to triumph over justice. It has to be kept in mind that an overly strict construction of rule of 3-A may result in the stifling of the material evidence of a party even if for adequate reasons, which may be beyond his control, the party concerned had failed to secure the permission, to step into the witness-box later, at the time of commencement of his evidence. That to my mind cannot be easily ascribed as the intent of the legislature in enacting the provision. It is worthwhile to recall the picturesque observations of Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the court in State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719 : AIR 1976 SC 1177 , that “we must always remember that procedural law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. It has been wisely observed that procedural prescriptions are the hand maid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. Where the non-compliance, the ‘procedural, will thwart fair’ hearing of prejudice doing of parties, the rule is mandatory. But, grammar apart, if the breach can be corrected without injury to a just disposal of the case, we should not enthrone a regulatory requirement into a dominent desideretum. After all, courts are to do justice, not to wreck this end product on technicalities.” 9. But, grammar apart, if the breach can be corrected without injury to a just disposal of the case, we should not enthrone a regulatory requirement into a dominent desideretum. After all, courts are to do justice, not to wreck this end product on technicalities.” 9. Keeping the aforesaid canon of construction with regard to procedural laws in mind we may now go back to the language of Rule 3-A. A bare reference thereto would make it manifest that the Legislature has undoubtedly laid down the rule that a party appearing as his own witness must so appear before any other witness on his behalf has been examined. However, in equally express terms one exception to the said rule has also been provided by the Legislature itself. This is that with the permission of the court a party for sufficient cause may be allowed to appear even at a stage subsequent to the examination of one or all of his witnesses. It, therefore, deserves highlighting that the rule requiring a party to step into the witness-box first is not an inflexible one and can be relaxed with the permission of the court. What however is significant to note herein is that the language of the statute does not in any way prescribe the precise time at which the permission to appear later is to be secured. It does not say that this must necessarily be in the very first instance before any witness has been examined on his behalf. One may, therefore, say that the statute is silent as to the stage at which the permission is to be secured. Nor can it be said that by necessary intendment the legislature has laid down that the said permission must be sought at the very inception of the evidence and not later. Indeed, when broadly construed, the intention of the Legislature appears to be that the normal and the ordinary rule prescribed now is that party appearing as his own witness should do so before any one of his witness. However, the rule is not an inflexible or a sacrosanct one and may be expressly deviated from with the permission of the court based on adequate reasons. However, the rule is not an inflexible or a sacrosanct one and may be expressly deviated from with the permission of the court based on adequate reasons. No specific stage being prescribed or fixed by the statute for securing such permission, a party may perhaps as a matter of abundant caution apply at the stage of commencing his evidence and get the necessary permission and equally, if a sufficient ground is made out, he may secure the same at a later stage. 10. Coming now to precedents, in view of the fact that Jagannath Nayak's case (supra) has itself been overruled by a Division Bench of its own court, it would obviously be wasteful to examine or refute its rationale. It suffices to mention that some reliance was placed on the legislative history of the provision and in particular the report of the Law Commission for taking that view, which was considered and repelled in M/s. Kwality Rastaurant, Amritsar's case (supra) to which a detailed reference can be made on this specific point. Again it would be wasteful to tread the same ground over again and agreeing with the reasoning of the Division Bench in Maquni Devi's case (supra) and the Allahabad view in Mohd. Aqil's case (supra), I would hold that the provisions of rule 3-A are directory in nature and the court is not denuded of jurisdiction to grant permission when an application therefor is made for good reasons even at a later stage. 11. The matter is capable of being viewed from another angle as well. Apart from the issue of the rule being mandatory or directory, it is clear that the command laid therein regarding the party appearing before his other witnesses has been itself provided with an exception where permission to do otherwise can be accorded by the court for adequate reasons. When the provision itself provides both the mandate and an exception thereto, the one cannot be divested from the other. The significant thing to highlight here is that the true question at issue is not with regard to the ordinary rule that party shall appear before any witness on his behalf appears, but pertains to the stage at which such permission to appear at a later stage is to be secured. The significant thing to highlight here is that the true question at issue is not with regard to the ordinary rule that party shall appear before any witness on his behalf appears, but pertains to the stage at which such permission to appear at a later stage is to be secured. Whilst the ordinary rule with the exception thereto may normally be adhered to there appears to be nothing inflexible in rule 3-A with regard to the stage of securing the permission as such. I would, therefore, hold that such permission may also be sought at a later stage and if the court finds merit in the same it would not be debarred from acceding to such a prayer. Equally it deserves to be recalled that the Legislature has itself prescribed a certain safeguard by laying down the requirement or the recording of reasons for doing so. 12. Before parting with this judgment, however, a note of caution must be sounded. Holding that the aforesaid rule is directory and the permission may be granted at a later stage, is not to say that the mandate of the legislature in this context is to be easily disregarded or lightly deviated from. It is plain that as a normal rule the legislature requires the testimony of the party to be recorded first and the rationale there is not far to seek. Apparently in order to prevent an easy deviation from the rule, it has been laid down that the court shall record its reasons for doing so. It is to be hoped that the trial Courts in whom primarily the discretion has been vested, would keep both the letter and the spirit of the rule in mind before according permission thereunder in exceptional circumstances, and not whittle the same down by allowing too easy and indiscriminate deviation therefrom.”" 16. In the case of Sanj Dainik Lokopchar & Others vs. Gokulchand Govindlal Sananda; 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 3336; High Court of Bombay observed as under:- "8. The legislative mandate is that ordinarily where a litigant himself wishes to appear as a witness, he shall so appear before any other witness on his behalf has been examined. 9. The provision confers a discretion to the Court to permit, for reasons to be recorded, the plaintiff to appear as his own witness at a later stage. The legislative mandate is that ordinarily where a litigant himself wishes to appear as a witness, he shall so appear before any other witness on his behalf has been examined. 9. The provision confers a discretion to the Court to permit, for reasons to be recorded, the plaintiff to appear as his own witness at a later stage. Implicit in the statutory scheme is the rider that the normal rule may be deviated from only in exceptional circumstances and for reasons recorded which must sustain judicial review. 10. Rule 3-A has been inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. The Law Commission noted with concern the unhealthy practice which has developed which enabled the party to step into the witness box last to fill in the lacuna, or loopholes which remained in the deposition. Addressing the said issue, the Law Commission in 14th Report observed thus; In dealing with the question of oral evidence we wish to refer to an undesirable practice which seems to prevail in certain Courts. The plaintiff or the defendant upon whom lies the burden of proving certain issues and who has to give evidence in support of his case is not called as witness before the evidence of the other witnesses is recorded. He is called after all his witnesses have been examined. The underlying purpose of this practice appears to be that the plaintiff or the defendant giving evidence at the end may be able to fill in gaps in the evidence given by his witnesses. We strongly deprecate this practice and recommend that it should be stopped. The parties to a proceeding should be in a position at the commencement of the proceedings to make up their minds whether they wish to give evidence. If they do wish they should be required to enter the witness box before any of their witnesses are examined. We recommend that Rule 2 or Rule 3 of Order XVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure be suitably amended so as to embody such a provision. 11. The 27th Report of the Law Commission notes thus: The Fourteenth Report has recommended that, ordinarily, a party who wishes to be examined as a witness should offer himself first, before the other witnesses are examined. It is however, considered unnecessary to make any such statutory provision. 11. The 27th Report of the Law Commission notes thus: The Fourteenth Report has recommended that, ordinarily, a party who wishes to be examined as a witness should offer himself first, before the other witnesses are examined. It is however, considered unnecessary to make any such statutory provision. This should be the ordinary rule; but a rigid provision on the subject does not seem to be desirable. 12. Finally, the 54th Report of the Law Commission recommended thus: We think that the amendment recommended in the 14th Report should be carried out. Since the proposed rule will be confined to ordinary cases, the hardships arising from special features of the case, should not present a problem. Having regard to the persistent and notorious malpractice indulged in by litigants in this respect-malpractice which borders on dishonesty - we think that the time has come to insert a statutory provision. 13. The legislative object of bringing on statute Rule 3-A is to ensure that a litigant should not be permitted to bide his time and to fill in the lacuna or cover the loopholes after the other witnesses are examined." 17. In the case of Anju Toshniwal and Others vs. Expat Properties India Ltd.; 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1665; High Court of Bombay observed as under:- "12. Rule 3A of Order 18 reads as under: “Where a party himself wishes to appear as a witness, he shall so appear before any other witness on his behalf has been examined, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, permits him to appears as his own witness at a later stage.” 13. Thus, a party examining himself before other witnesses are examined is a rule and a party examining himself after the other witnesses are examined, is an exception. An exception can be made only for valid reasons. 14. In the case of Hari Shrawan Sutar v. Ramdas Tukaram Patil, reported in 1985 Mh.L.J. page 197, this Court has held thus: “4. The provisions of Rule 3-A of Order 18 of the Code were inserted by Amending Act No. 104 of 1976 to the Code. That lays down a Rule of law with regard to the order of witnesses to be examined in the Court. It applied to both the plaintiff as well as the defendant. The provisions of Rule 3-A of Order 18 of the Code were inserted by Amending Act No. 104 of 1976 to the Code. That lays down a Rule of law with regard to the order of witnesses to be examined in the Court. It applied to both the plaintiff as well as the defendant. In cases where a party, either plaintiff or defendant, wishes to appear as a witness, the provisions of this rule require that such a party would appear for giving evidence before any other witness is examined. The Rule has been couched in mandatory terms and would, ordinarily, govern the matter of tendering evidence. When the rule is required to be departed from, the Court has to record the reasons and permit such a party to be kept back for the examination as a witness. The reasons in such matter may be various, including the non-availability of the plaintiff. Though the provisions of Rule 3-A of Order 18 of the Code are salutary and intended to be applied as such so as to achieve the object thereof, the Rule itself confers jurisdiction upon to Court to permit such a party to appear and examine himself at a later stage. The purpose of the Rule appears to be to have the evidence of the party first. It is the party who can unfold the case. Such unfolding by other evidence should follow after the party is examined. If party be the witness, the amended provision confers primacy upon it and enacts a priority in that regard. Ordinarily, the same will have to be followed.” 15. Thus, the provision of Order 18 Rule 3A of the CPC lays down nominal rule that the party as a witness must offer himself as a witness before any other witness is examined. This salutary rule can be departed by leave of the Court for which reasons are required to be recorded. Once such reasoned order is made, the examination of such a party at a later stage would be quite regular and in keeping with the rule. It follows from this that but for such leave, the party will not be free to examine, itself as a witness at a later stage." 18. In the case of Shri Bhagwan Narvadeshwar Ji Maharaj Mandir vs. Sunita Singh and Others; 2018 SCC OnLine All 5871; this Court observed as under:- "18. It follows from this that but for such leave, the party will not be free to examine, itself as a witness at a later stage." 18. In the case of Shri Bhagwan Narvadeshwar Ji Maharaj Mandir vs. Sunita Singh and Others; 2018 SCC OnLine All 5871; this Court observed as under:- "18. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced by the learned counsel of the plaintiff-appellant, it is necessary to go through the relevant provisions in this regard. Order XVIII of Rule 1 and 2 as originally stand in C.P.C. are reproduced hereunder:- "1. Right to begin.- The plaintiff has the right to begin unless the defendant admits the facts alleged by the plaintiff and contends that either in point of law or on some additional facts alleged by the defendant the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the relief which he seeks, in which case the defendant has the right to begin. 2. Statement and production of evidence.- (1) On the day fixed for the hearing of the suit or on any other day to which the hearing is adjourned, the party having the right to begin shall state his case and produce his evidence in support of the issues which he is bound to prove. (2) The other party shall then state his case and produce his evidence (if any) and may then address the Court generally on the whole case. (3) The party beginning may then reply generally on the whole case. (3A) Any party may address 'oral arguments in a case, and shall, before he concludes the oral arguments, if any, submit if the Court so permits concisely and under distinct headings written arguments in support of his case to the Court and such written arguments shall form part of the record. (3B) A copy of such written arguments shall be simultaneously furnished to the opposite party. (3C) No adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of filing the written arguments unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, considers it necessary to grant such adjournment. (3D) The Court shall fix such time-limits for the oral arguments by either of the parties in a case, as it thinks fit." 19. (3C) No adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of filing the written arguments unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, considers it necessary to grant such adjournment. (3D) The Court shall fix such time-limits for the oral arguments by either of the parties in a case, as it thinks fit." 19. Allahabad High Court made an amendment by substituting Rule 2 in the following manner and which became effective w.e.f. 24th July, 1926:- "Allahabad.- In Order XVIII, for rule 2, substitute the following rule, namely:- "2.(1) On the day fixed for the hearing of the suit or on any other day to which the hearing is adjourned the party having the right to begin shall state his case, indicating the relevancy of each of the documents produced by him, and the nature of the oral evidence which he proposes to adduce and shall then call his witnesses in support of the issues which he is bound to prove. (2) The other party shall then state his case in the manner aforesaid and produce his evidence (if any)." 20. To appreciate the argument further Rule 3A of the Order XVIII is reproduced hereunder:- "3A. Party to appear before other witnesses.- Where a party himself wishes to appear as a witness, he shall so appear before any other witness on his behalf has been examined, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, permits him to appear as his own witness at a later stage." 21. According to the above provision, the plaintiff has a liberty to get himself examined after the other witnesses though of course subject to discretion of the court concerned. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant argues that in view of the Section 97 of the Act 104 of 1976 if the provisions under Rule 2 is taken to be one which casts an obligation upon the plaintiff-appellant to come into the witness box in the first instance and thereafter the other witnesses, the same is rendered inconsistent with Rule 3A which gives discretion to the court to consider an application of the plaintiff-appellant to give his evidence in the last. Section 97 of Act No. 104 of 1976 amendment is reproduced hereunder:- "97. Section 97 of Act No. 104 of 1976 amendment is reproduced hereunder:- "97. Repeal and savings.- (1) Any amendment made, or any provision inserted in the principal Act by a State Legislature or a High Court before the commencement of this Act shall, except in so far as such amendment or provision is consistent with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act, stand repealed." 22. Rule 2 vide Allahabad Amendment does no stood deleted in any manner vide section 97 of 1976 Amendment Act as the said Rule 2 as originally stood was not subjected to amendment. 23. Further from the bare reading of the provisions quoted above and the arguments advanced by learned counsels of the rival parties, it clearly emerges as a conclusive legal position that Allahabad amendment of Rule 2 Order XVIII of C.P.C. if read with Rule 3A of Order XVIII as inserted by amending Act of 1976 are not in any way inconsistent with each other. The language in which the Allahabad Amendment is couched clearly spells out that the party who has a right to begin and obviously the plaintiff here, in this case, it is he, who is to elaborate not only the points involved but the nature of the evidence he wants to produce in support of the documents already lead and the pleadings raised and then he shall call his witness and get his evidence recorded. Naturally, if a party is leading an allegation in the plaint, it is required to prove and if it leads a document in support of the plaint allegations the same is required to be proved. Plaintiff is the best person to prove his plaint allegation and document led by him. However, earlier there was nothing to compel the court to record the testimony of the plaintiff first. It required the discretion of the plaintiff to either give his witness by coming himself into the witness box or call his other witnesses and until Rule 3A was inserted it remained the legal position. But now the question is that if the plaintiff/ party enlists itself as the key witness No.1 whether he can alter his position to give witness in the last as a corroborating evidence to be recorded by the court. But now the question is that if the plaintiff/ party enlists itself as the key witness No.1 whether he can alter his position to give witness in the last as a corroborating evidence to be recorded by the court. The Legislature, it seems, was quite conscious of the dilatory tactics of the plaintiff in disposal of the suit proceedings and, therefore, it inserted Rule 3A purposefully to point the plaintiff to give his witness first if he wanted to enter into the witness box, however, the discretion is vested with the court that it can grant an application to defer the party's own witness to a later stage of the suit. In the opinion of the Court whether the first part of the order is directory or mandatory or whether the whole of the provisions is directory, this issue does not in any way help the plaintiff-appellant. If the party is there to get recorded his evidence first as a witness, according to the Rule 3A he must give first but the court can on an application exercise its discretion. It is this discretionary part which, according to me has to be exercised keeping in mind the stages of the suit and the conduct of the parties. In the instant case, the conduct as discussed above of the plaintiff, sufficiently demonstrates that he never wanted to give his witness otherwise his application would not have been so vague that he was out of station and not sure when he would return. From the facts discussed above in this judgment and referred to in the order of the trial court it does not transpire that any such request or prayer in the miscellaneous application to defer the witness of the plaintiff to some other date, was ever made. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant could not demonstrate anything from the record that any such prayer was made nor, could assert in the affidavit filed in support of this appeal that any such prayer was made at any point of time. 27. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant then relied upon the judgment of Madras High Court in the case of S. Ramachandra Reddy v. Natarajan 2011 (2) MLJ 329 ; where the Court observed that application under Rule 3A application could have been moved at any point of time. In the opinion of the Court, there is no quarrel of this proposition. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant then relied upon the judgment of Madras High Court in the case of S. Ramachandra Reddy v. Natarajan 2011 (2) MLJ 329 ; where the Court observed that application under Rule 3A application could have been moved at any point of time. In the opinion of the Court, there is no quarrel of this proposition. The question in the instant case is not as to why the plaintiff had moved the application so belatedly, the question, instead, is as to when the plaintiff himself wanted to give his testimony first, then looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and that the issues were framed in 2000 and after 14 years such application was moved and then the witness was not being produced though the plaintiff was to appear as first witness. In the opinion of the Court, it was an absolute discretion of the court either to accept the application or reject the same. So far as the first part of the order of Rule 3A is concerned, it is quite clear from the plain reading of the said provisions that if a party wants to give his witness first, in a sense he wants to be examined first, the court shall record his evidence first. So on the facts also this judgment is distinguishable, however, on the point as to when the application could be moved, this court does not dispute the proposition. So far as the discretion part is concerned the judgment has not held anything and discretion, of course, of the court under Rule 3A will depend upon the facts and circumstance of each case. 28. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has also relied upon another judgment of this Court in the case of Mohd. Aqil vs. Alimulla 1978 AWC 485 ; wherein the court had allowed the plaintiff to give his witness in the last. The Court has observed in the said judgment that the provision being directory, it is for the court to exercise discretion, whether to allow such application or not. In that case the court was considering whether the discretion can be exercised by the court or not; and court observed that the court can exercise its discretion in deferring the party's own witness at later stage after other witnesses were recorded but for that the court has to record reasons. In that case the court was considering whether the discretion can be exercised by the court or not; and court observed that the court can exercise its discretion in deferring the party's own witness at later stage after other witnesses were recorded but for that the court has to record reasons. In the opinion of the court, in the instance case, the court has recorded sufficient reasons. The court has gone into the question of time factor involved and the manner in which the plaintiff was avoiding to give his witness. It is a fact that the issues were framed in 2000 and then it was after 14 years last opportunity was given to the plaintiff-appellant to lead evidence but even then he avoided to give evidence and ultimately, when the time was running out and the suit was to be dismissed that suddenly an application was moved that instead of plaintiff's own witness some other witness should be examined. If the court has refused to exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff in the given facts and circumstances of the case, where the bonafides of the plaintiff is rendered doubtful, I do not see any illegality or manifest error in the order passed by the trial court in rejecting the application under Order XVIII Rule 3A C.P.C." 19. From the judgments, referred above as also taking note of Rule 3-A, the position which emerges out is to the effect that the provisions of Rule 3A are not mandatory in nature and rather the same are directory in nature. A party can be permitted to appear as a witness at later stage even if a witness on his behalf has been examined. However, the Court while allowing the party to appear as a witness at later stage should consider all the aspect of the case and should also record reasons thereof for permitting such party to appear as a witness at later stage. However, the Court while allowing the party to appear as a witness at later stage should consider all the aspect of the case and should also record reasons thereof for permitting such party to appear as a witness at later stage. While considering the request/prayer under Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C. the Court is under obligation to consider as to whether the party seeking permission to appear as witness has deliberately withheld himself to be examined as a witness at a later stage after examination of other witnesses, with a view to fill up lacuna in evidence, as the legislative object of bringing on statute Rule 3-A of C.P.C. is to ensure that a litigant should not be permitted to bid his time and to fill lacuna or cover the loopholes after the other witnesses are examined. 20. In the light of the aforesaid, this Court considered the reasons mentioned in the application under Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C. preferred by the defendant No.1-private respondent No.3 and where from it appears that on dates fixed in the case, the statement(s) of witnesses of the defendant(s) could not be recorded though they were present on the dates fixed and therefore, on 19.03.1999 to avoid inconvenience to one Banwari Lal as also to avoid his non-presence on the dates to be fixed in the case he was produced as witness and his statement was recorded on that date and he was also cross-examined on subsequent date i.e. 20.03.1999 and due to paucity of time, the statement of defendant No.1 could not be recorded on 20.03.1999. Thereafter, the application dated 22.06.1999, in issue, was preferred on which the impugned order dated 27.07.2019 was passed. The reasons indicated in the application on which the impugned order dated 27.07.1999 was passed have not been refuted by the plaintiffs/petitioners before this Court. Further, from the reasons indicated in the application as also from the fact that after examination of only one witness the application under Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C. was preferred, it appears that defendant No.1, who preferred the application, did not deliberately withheld himself to be examined as a witness at a later stage after examination of other witnesses with a view to fill up lacuna in evidence. 21. The reasons indicated in the application under Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C. appears to be justified. 21. The reasons indicated in the application under Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C. appears to be justified. In the light of the reasons indicated above, when this Court considers the order dated 27.07.1999, this Court finds that the order dated 27.07.1999, though not happily worded, but is justified as it is in the interest of substantial justice between the parties. It is in view of the fact that procedural law is handmaid of justice and should not come in the way, which prevents substantial justice between the parties. In the same tune, the revisional authority passed the impugned order dated 13.12.2000. Thus, both the orders, in issue, which relate to application under Order 18 Rule 3-A of C.P.C., to the view of this Court, are justified. 22. Normally, this Court remands the case on the ground of non-recording of reasons. In the instant case, considering the age of litigation, this Court itself has considered the merits of issue involved. 23. Before parting, this Court feels it appropriate to direct the Court concerned to decide the suit, which is pending since 1998, at the earliest, say within a period of one year from the date of production of certified copy of this order. For concluding the proceedings in the time specified, the Court concerned shall avoid unnecessary adjournment to the parties to the litigation. 24. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the impugned order(s). Accordingly, present writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.