JUDGMENT : I.A. No.1892 of 2022 Mr. Gautam Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, assisted by Ms. Rukmini Kumari, learned counsel, based upon the office note that the review petition is not barred by limitation, intends not to press the instant interlocutory application. 2. Accordingly, the instant interlocutory application is dismissed as not pressed. Civil Review No.10 of 2022 3. Learned counsel for the appellants has sought for leave of this Court to make necessary correction in the cause title by inserting the provision of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. Let necessary correction be made in the provision of law in course of the day. 5. The instant review is against the order dated 20.09.2021 passed by Coordinate Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.753 of 2018 whereby and whereunder the order/judgment dated 10.04.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.2390 of 2003, whereby and whereunder, the writ petition has been allowed by setting aside the revisional order dated 12.11.2001 passed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Singhbhum East, in Revision Appeal No. 461 of 1995, has been declined to be interfered with. 6. The review has been filed as per the ground stipulated in the review petition which are being referred hereunder as :- (i) For that the present judgment is bad in law and on facts. (ii) For that the main points regarding the T.A.Misc.Case No.13 of 1943-44 is not a genuine proceeding between the genuine parties. (iii) For that the original order of the said case has never been brought on record and the petitioners are not aware about that case T.A.Misc Case No.13 of 1943-44. (iv) For that no original documents of deed of surrendered 1948 has been brought on record and the petitioners are not aware about the T.A.Misc.Case No.13 of 1943-44. (v) For that the person between whom T.A.Misc.Case No.13 of 1943-44 was contested does not belongs to genealogical table of these petitioners. (vi) For that Karan Singh is not recorded tenant of the land in questions and in the Revisional Survey 1937 name of Karan Singh is not appearing in respect of land in questions. (vii) For that the Bhunda Bhumij died on 13.4.1940 then how he executed the deed of surrender. (viii) For that there is a report of C.0.that the land in question under the possession of Telco since 18-19 years. (vii) For that the Bhunda Bhumij died on 13.4.1940 then how he executed the deed of surrender. (viii) For that there is a report of C.0.that the land in question under the possession of Telco since 18-19 years. (ix) For that rent receipt for the period 1982-83 was made available that shows that any proceeding before any authority was not in knowledge of this petitioner. (x) For that in absence of original documents about T.A.Misc.Case No.13 of 1943-44 and deed of surrender 1948 would have been considered as forged and fabricated documents. (xi) For that limitation period may be considered after 1983 nor from 1944 or 1948. In this regard there is a report of competent authority who is Circle Officer. (xii) For that there is no documents of delivery of possession in 1948. (xiii) For that there is no proof that before 1982 any kind of infrastructure either by the Tisco or Telco. (xiv) For that in absence of registered document the order of original authority and Appellate Authority are on assumption and presumption. 7. Before going into the fact that as to whether it is a case for review of the order/judgment dated 20.09.2021 passed in L.P.A. No.753 of 2018, necessary facts needs to be referred herein which reads hereunder as :- The issue pertains to claim over the property pertaining to R.S. Plot nos. 5563, 5588, 5589, 5590, 5591, 5592, 5598, 5599, 5560 and 5569 of Khata No. 6, Mauza Jojobera, Thana No. 1196 and R.S. Plot No. 5661, 5662, 5663, 5664 and 5665 of Khata No. 6, Mauza Jojobera, Thana No. 1196 belonging to the District Singhbhum, East. 8. The issue crept up by filing two separate applications by the private respondents for restoration of aforesaid lands under Section 71-A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1908’) registered as R.P. Case No. 06 of 1983-84 and R.P. Case No. 20 of 1986-87. The private respondents claimed to be the descendants of the recorded raiyat and claimed that they have been dispossessed from the property in question which is now under the possession of the writ petitioner. The private respondents claimed to be the descendants of the recorded raiyat and claimed that they have been dispossessed from the property in question which is now under the possession of the writ petitioner. The Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Dalbhum, Jamshedpur, has decided the applications by passing a common order on 28.01.1989 rejecting the applications filed by the predecessors in interest of the private respondents on the ground that they were out of possession since 1948 and accordingly held that the prayer of restoration in both the cases was time-barred. The private respondents filed two separate appeals being SAR Appeal No. 23 of 89-90 and SAR Appeal No. 304 of 89-90 which was also rejected by a common order dated 26.09.1995 holding that the land in question figured in the lease documents executed between the then Government of Bihar and M/s TISCO. Besides this the said lands were utilized by the writ petitioner under an arrangement with M/s TISCO in 1963-64. 9. Being aggrieved by the appellate order, the private respondents, filed a revision before the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi (now Kolhan), registered as Revision Appeal No. 461 of 1995 which was decided vide judgment pronounced on 12.11.2001 holding that since the initial transfer itself was illegal therefore, all the subsequent transactions are also illegal. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the order passed by the revisional authority has filed the writ petition invoking writ jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India inter alia on the ground that plot nos. 5563 and 5569 was purchased by the writ petitioner vide registered deed dated 10.03.1964 after due permission from the Deputy Commissioner which has been mentioned in the registered deed itself but this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the revisional authority. Further ground has been taken that the Circle Officer had recorded its specific finding that the sale deed dated 10.03.1964 is valid but while setting aside the order of the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, the authority has not recorded any contrary finding so far as the deed dated 10.03.1964 is concerned and accordingly the order of Commissioner to the extent it related to the deed dated 10.03.1964 is perverse and is fit to be set aside. Since the said property was purchased by the writ petitioner vide deed dated 10.03.1964 which was subject matter of R.P. Case No. 06 of 1983-84. 10. So far as the remaining property in R.P. Case No. 06 of 1983- 84 is concerned, the case of the writ petitioner was that the same was subject matter of T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943-44 which was a proceeding under Section 50 of the Act 1908 initiated by the land lord, viz., M/s TISCO for acquisition of land of various properties including Khata No. 6. The said T.A. Misc. Case No. 13 of 1943-44 was initiated against several tenants and was ultimately decided against the recorded tenants vide order dated 28.04.1944 with a direction to deliver vacant possession of the said land to M/s TISCO and accordingly, possession of the property was delivered to M/s TISCO as back as on 23.05.1944. Thereafter the aforesaid property was sub leased to the writ petitioner, viz., TELCO and by virtue of sub lease the writ petitioner came in possession of the property. Therefore, the case of the writ petitioner before the writ court that by virtue of quasi judicial order passed in T.A. Misc. Case No. 13 of 1943-44 M/s TISCO was put in possession of the property which was subsequently sub leased to the writ petitioner and accordingly, there cannot be dispute that the private respondents dispossessed from the property as back as in the year 1944. The aforesaid fact was taken into consideration by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms and came to the conclusion that the proceeding initiated for restoration of the land is time-barred. So far the property involved in R.P. Case No. 20 of 1986-87 is concerned the case of the writ petitioner is that M/s TISCO came in possession of that property by virtue of deed of surrender executed in the year 1948 which was the registered deed and accordingly private respondents were dispossessed from the property as back as in the year 1948. The aforesaid particular property was also sub leased to the writ petitioner by the TISCO Limited by virtue of registered deed of sub lease dated 21.08.1969 and by virtue of the same, the writ petitioner is in possession of the property from 1969 by virtue of registered sub lease but the fact remains that the private respondents or their predecessors were dispossessed from this property relates back to the year 1948 which was by virtue of registered deed of surrender. 11. In view of such factual backdrop a ground was taken before the writ court that the period of limitation would be counted from year 1948 and on the basis of that backdrop the writ petition was filed. 12. Per contra, the ground has been agitated by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents-State that so far as the registered sale deed dated 10.03.1964 relating to plot nos. 5563 and 5569 are concerned the factual position pertaining to that aspect of the matter has not been disputed to the effect that the sale deed was executed by virtue of the permission obtained from the Deputy Commissioner which is mentioned in the sale deed itself. Further ground of the State pertains to the property in R.P. Case No. 06 of 1983-84 which was transferred to M/s TISCO by virtue of the order passed in T.A. Misc. Case No. 13 of 1943-44 vide order passed in the year 1944 are concerned no argument has been advanced pertaining to the legality and the validity of the said order, however, so far as R.P. Case No. 20 of 1986-87 is concerned the State has agitated the ground that the transfer is by way of deed of surrender of the year 1948 which is subsequent to the amendment of Section 46 of the Act 1908, whereby prior permission of the Deputy Commissioner was required to be taken prior to transfer and there being no prior permission, the transfer by way of deed of surrender is absolutely illegal and therefore the possession by virtue of such transfer cannot be recognized. 13. 13. The learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and considering the pleadings filed before the writ court has allowed the writ petition by setting aside the order passed by the revisional authority dated 12.11.2001 passed in Revision Appeal No. 461 of 1995 against which the instant intra court appeal has been filed. 14. This Court, before dealing with the aforesaid ground to be a just ground for review of the order passed by this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer the position of law so far as the power of review is concerned. 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the width and scope of power of review in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. Vrs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Ors., reported in AIR 1954 SC 526 particularly at paragraph-32 which read as hereunder:- “32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XL VII, Rule I of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified, grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.” 16. In the case of Shivdev Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1909 , in a review petition filed under Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C., the Supreme Court held that the power of review of its own order by the High Court inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction, to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. In doing so, the Court was only upholding the principles of natural justice. In doing so, the Court was only upholding the principles of natural justice. This decision indicates that the Court’s power of review while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution extends to correct all errors to prevent miscarriage of justice. On the similar issue, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sow Chandra Kante and Anr. v. Sheikh Habib, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1500 has held which reads hereunder as :- “A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition through different counsel of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient.” 17. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in a recent judgment rendered in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v. State Tax Officer (1) and Another [Review Petition (Civil) No. 1620 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 1661 of 2020], upon relying various judgments on the issue, has noted the gist of all the judgments at paragraph 16 of the said judgment, for ready reference, paragraph 16 is quoted hereunder as :- “16. The gist of the afore-stated decisions is that: - (i) A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. (ii) A judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. (iii) An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review. (iv) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected.” (v) A Review Petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.” (vi) Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided. (vii) An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions. (viii) Even the change in law or subsequent decision/ judgment of a co-ordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.” 18. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove the power of review can only be exercised if one of the conditions, as propounded by Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments referred hereinabove, is available. 19. This Court, based upon the aforesaid legal position, is now proceeding to examine by taking into consideration the ground taken on behalf of the review petitioners as to whether the said grounds can be said to be a ground fit to review the impugned order/judgment. 20. It is evident from the grounds that the first ground is the declaration given by the Coordinate Division Bench in the judgment dated 20.09.2021 that T.A. Misc. Case No.13 of 1943-44 is not a genuine proceeding between the genuine parties. 21. The further ground has been taken that no original documents of deed of surrendered 1948 has been brought on record and the petitioners are not aware about the T.A.Misc.Case No.13 of 1943-44. 22. The ground has also been taken that the person between whom T.A. Misc. Case No.13 of 1943-44 is not a genuine proceeding between the genuine parties. 21. The further ground has been taken that no original documents of deed of surrendered 1948 has been brought on record and the petitioners are not aware about the T.A.Misc.Case No.13 of 1943-44. 22. The ground has also been taken that the person between whom T.A. Misc. Case No.13 of 1943-44 was contested does not belong to genealogical table of these petitioners; Karan Singh is not recorded tenant of the land in questions and in the Revisional Survey 1937 name of Karan Singh is not appearing in respect of land in questions; the Bhunda Bhumij died on 13.4.1940 then how he executed the deed of surrender; there is a report of Circle Officer that the land in question is under the possession of Telco since 18-19 years; the rent receipt for the period 1982-83 was made available that shows that any proceeding before any authority was not in knowledge of this petitioner; in absence of original documents about T.A.Misc.Case No.13 of 1943-44 and deed of surrender 1948 would have been considered as forged and fabricated documents; the limitation period may be considered after 1983 and not from 1944 or 1948; there is no documents of delivery of possession in 1948; there is no proof that before 1982 any kind of infrastructure either by the Tisco or Telco; and in absence of registered document the order of original authority and Appellate Authority are on assumption and presumption. 23. It is evident from the judgment passed by the Coordinate Division Bench, wherein, all the grounds which have been taken as grounds to review the impugned judgment, have well been discussed, as would be evident from paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 of the judgment, for ready reference the aforesaid paragraphs are being referred hereunder as :- “21. We now have proceeded to examine the factual aspect in the given case after appreciating the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the parties in order to test whether the period of limitation will be counted from the year 1944 or 1964? We now have proceeded to examine the factual aspect in the given case after appreciating the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the parties in order to test whether the period of limitation will be counted from the year 1944 or 1964? Admittedly the Act herein which is detrimental rights from the record of the writ petitioners wherein the records pertaining to T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943-44 has been appended at Annexure-5 to the affidavit filed in the shape of reply to the counter affidavit dated 27.06.2005 wherein it is evident that the aforesaid proceeding was in between M/s Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited, Jamshedpur and Karam Singh and others. It appears that by virtue of order passed on 19.04.1944 steps have been directed to be taken for the purpose of giving delivery of possession of the lands acquired in the case. It further appears therefrom that the land in question was acquired in view of the provision of Section 50 of the Act, 1908 and in pursuance thereto the land pertaining to opposite party, viz., Karam Singh and others, has been ordered to be acquired in favour of the applicant and accordingly a direction was issued to the concerned competent authority to put the said applicant, viz., M/s TISCO in possession of the same as also to remove any person who may refute to vacant the same. 22. The plots in question as appended to the schedule and the deed of surrender the possession has been handed over in favour of M/s Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited. It appears that the descendants of the appellants are also the parties in T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943-44 apart from Karam Singh. Subsequent thereto the possession of the lands in question has been handed over in favour of M/s TISCO and who in the year 1964 has transferred the said land in pursuance to the provisions as conferred under Section 49(3) of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act after getting permission from 46 (3) of the Act, 1908 in favour of TELCO, the writ petitioner. Admitted fact herein is that the order passed in T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943-44 has never been questioned by the descendants of the appellants, herein. Admitted fact herein is that the order passed in T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943-44 has never been questioned by the descendants of the appellants, herein. Thus, the order passed in T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943-44 establishes the fact that the descendants of the appellants have already been dispossessed from the landed property in question in the year 1944 itself by virtue of order passed in T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943-44 in the year 1948 and the said order remain unquestioned. M/s TISCO has came into possession over the land in question and thereafter the same has been transferred in favour of TELCO by virtue of registered deed of transfer. Since the descendants of the appellants have not assailed their dispossession from the year 1948 based upon the order passed in T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943- 44 and as such they will be said to have dispossessed from the land in the year 1948 itself and as such the limitation would be counted from the date of dispossession, i.e., from the year 1948. However, submission has been made that the date of dispossession is required to be counted from the year 1964, the day when the landed property has been transferred by M/s TISCO in favour of TELCO the writ petitioner but we are not in agreement for such submission for the reason that if the appellants at all were aggrieved with their dispossession which took place by virtue of effect of order passed in T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943-44, basis upon which, they have been dispossessed from the property in question sometimes in the year 1948 it would have been questioned but the same remain unquestioned and as such the appellants cannot be treated to have dispossessed from the land in the year 1964 by virtue of deed of transfer executed in between M/s TISCO and TELCO. However, at this juncture submission has been made that the deed of transfer executed in the year 1964 after obtaining permission from the Deputy Commissioner as required to be obtained under the provisions of sub section 3 of Section 49 cannot be said to be in consonance with the Act 1908 since there is no permission of the Deputy Commissioner as required. This argument even accepted to be true, will not help the appellants because they have already been dispossessed in the year 1948 by virtue of the order passed in T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943- 44 and as such the appellants have got no cause of action to question the transfer of the landed property in question in between M/s TISCO and TELCO, it is for the reason that the writ petitioner will only be said to have aggrieved with the dispossession which took place in the year 1948 by virtue of the order passed in T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943-44 by which M/s TISCO has come into possession and having came to the possession on account of acquisition of land in view of the provisions of Section 50 of the Act, 1908, TISCO has got valid title over the land in question to transfer it to the subsequent transferee but the same has never been questioned by the appellants. 23. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants, however, took plea that the order passed in T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943-44 has never been brought on record but we find no substance in such argument because before the writ court the aforesaid document has been brought on record by the writ petitioner by filing reply to the counter affidavit dated 27.06.2005 after serving the copy of the same upon the learned counsel representing the appellants and as such the said argument has also been negated. Further the said argument is having no force as because even the learned Single Judge has called for the entire records and after perusing the same the order has been passed. 24. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has taken the plea that they had not been heard while deciding the appeal but that argument is also having no substance as appearance was made by the learned counsel for the appellants before the writ court as also they had filed detailed counter affidavit and even thereafter if they have chosen not to appear on the date of hearing before the writ court, no advantage can be derived by them by allowing them to take the plea that opportunity of hearing had not been provided. Since the appellants have already put their appearance and filed counter affidavit and the learned Single Judge has even called for the original record and thereafter the order has been passed after considering the fact in entirety as also the counter affidavit filed on their behalf, the plea of not providing an opportunity cannot be said to be correct and accordingly rejected. 25. It is evident that the application filed under Section 71-A before the original authority, i.e., before the Deputy Collector Land Reforms that M/s TISCO has never been impleaded as party rather the application has been filed against the TELCO writ petitioner which also goes to the root of the issue while passing order of restoration by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms in absence of M/s TISCO, the party in whose favour the land originally was acquired in view of the provisions of Section 50 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. 26. We having discussed the entire facts in its entirety and, having scrutinized the order passed by the learned Single Judge, found therefrom that the learned Single Judge has considered the fact about the order passed in T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943-44, basis upon which the possession of the land in question has been handed over in favour of M/s TISCO on the land being acquired under Section 50 of the Act, 1908. The learned Single Judge has further considered the fact about the period of limitation to be counted from which date either from the date of dispossession or the registered sub-lease dated 21.08.1969 in favour of TELCO by M/s TISCO. We have further found from the impugned order that after discussing the fact in entirety about dispossession of the appellants from the land in question way back in the year 1948 due to the effect of the order passed in T.A. Misc Case No. 13 of 1943-44, on the land being acquired under Section 50 of the Act, 1908, has come to the conclusive finding about counting period of limitation from the date of dispossession and after taking into consideration the issue laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Situ Sahu Vs. State of Jharkhand (supra) which has laid down the law of filing application under Section 71-A within reasonable period as also considering the period of limitation to file application under Section 71-A of the Act which is the period of 30 years has set aside the order passed by the revisional authority. We have also considered the order passed by the appellate authority wherein the consideration has been given about the issue of limitation basis upon which the order passed by the original authority has been affirmed by holding therein that the application filed under Section 71-A is beyond the period of limitation but the revisional authority without recording any finding about entertaining the application filed under Section 71-A on the ground of period of limitation no such consideration has been made and therefore, according to our conscious view the interference shown by the learned Single Judge with the order passed by the revisional authority dated 12.11.2001 in Revision Appeal No. 461 of 1995 cannot be said to suffer an error of law.” 24. It is evident that the grounds which have been taken for review have already been dealt with on merit after hearing the learned counsel for the parties. 25. It further appears that the grounds for review have also been answered by taking into consideration the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, thereafter the order passed by the Revisional Authority dated 12.11.2001 in Revisional Appeal No.461 of 1995 has been set aside by the learned Single Judge which was declined to be interfered with by the Coordinate Division Bench. 26. The law is well settled regarding the power of review which is to be exercised by the Court depending upon the following grounds, i.e., (i) A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. (ii) A judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. (iii) An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review. (iii) An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review. (iv) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected.” (v) A Review Petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.” (vi) Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided. (vii) An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions. (viii) Even the change in law or subsequent decision/ judgment of a co-ordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review. 27. We, on consideration of the judgment sought to be reviewed and taking into consideration the grounds which have been taken to review the said order, have found that all the grounds have been taken into consideration and, therefore, the requirement to exercise the power of review as per the parameter fixed in the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, are of the considered view that the same is not available. 28. Therefore, it is not a case where the power of review is to be exercised. 29. Accordingly, the instant review petition is dismissed.