JUDGMENT : The present Second Appeal is preferred by the appellants aggrieved by the Decree and Judgment dated 07.10.2014 passed in A.S.No.49 of 2009 on the file of XIII Additional District Judge (FTC), Vijayawada, reversing the decree and judgment dated 29.12.2008 passed in O.S No.514 of 2008 on the file of V Additional Senior Civil Judge (FTC), Vijayawada. 2. The appellants herein are the plaintiffs and the respondents herein are the defendants in the suit in O.S No.514 of 2008 on the file of the V Additional Senior Civil Judge (FTC), Vijayawada (for short “the trial Court”). 3. For convenience the parties are hereinafter referred to as arrayed in the suit before the trail Court. 4. Originally, the suit was filed by the plaintiffs for grant of declaration that the registered sale deed No.252/05 dated 20.01.2005 obtained by the 1st defendant from one Shaik Mastan i.e., 4th defendant and the General Power of Attorney (GPA) is null and void and in operative against the plaintiffs and defendants No.2 and 3 and for consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the 1st defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of ‘A’ schedule property and recovery of possession of ‘B’ schedule property from the 1st defendant. 5. The 1st plaintiff is the mother of the 2nd plaintiff and the defendants No.2 and 3. They are the owners of the plaint schedule property. The 1st defendant is the own sister of the 1st plaintiff. The plaint ‘B’ schedule property is a part of plaint ‘A’ schedule property. Item No.1 of plaint ‘A’ schedule property was purchased by the husband of the 1st plaintiff from one Nalluri Venkateswara Rao on 27.02.1987 under an oral agreement of sale for a valid consideration of Rs.6,000/- and paid an amount of Rs.5,000/- on the same day towards advance and subsequently he paid the balance amount of Rs.1,000/- in the month of March, 1987. Similarly, Item No.2 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property was also purchased by the husband of the 1st plaintiff during his lifetime on the same day i.e., on 27.02.1987 from one Pasam Prameela, D/o. Nalluri Venkateswara Rao for a valid consideration of Rs.7,000/- under an oral agreement and paid an amount of Rs.6,000/- on the same day and subsequently paid the balance amount of Rs.1,000/- in the month of March, 1987 and the properties were delivered to the husband of the 1st plaintiff on the same day. Both the plaintiffs were present during the whole transaction along with elders Munaga Rama Rao and Vema Sivaiah of Patamata, Vijayawada. The said Nalluri Venkateswara Rao and Pasam Prameela agreed to register proper sale deeds after obtaining the necessary permissions to register the sale deeds by them in favour of Pothamesetty Atchaiah or a person nominated by him whenever he demands on his expenses. Since the date of delivery of possession of the subject property, they are in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same till the death of said Pothamsetty Atchaiah on 04.04.1989. Since then, his wife i.e., the 1st plaintiff and his children i.e., 2nd plaintiff and defendants No.2 and 3 have been in continuous and joint possession and enjoyment of the same being legal heirs of the said Achaiah. Sri Nalluri Venkateswara Rao also died on 11.5.1994 leaving behind his only daughter Prameela. The subject property was used by the Achaiah and subsequently by the plaintiffs and defendants No.2 and 3 for keeping their cattle for some time. Thereafter, the 1st plaintiff gave some amount to the 2nd defendant and performed the marriage of 3rd defendant, constructed a three portioned house in the plaint ‘A’ schedule property with the help of 2nd plaintiff. The land revenue is being paid and there is electricity connection to the subject property since 10 years. 6. While the matter stood thus, some disputes arose between the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant with regard to money transactions. Then, the 1st defendant, her son and daughter obtained a registered sale deed for the plaint schedule property on 20.01.2005 with false recitals from one Shaik Mastan i.e., 4th defendant styled himself as GPA holder of Pasam Prameela under a false and created GPA. The 4th defendant has no such authority to register the sale deed of plaint schedule property to the 1st defendant. The 4th defendant has no such authority to register the sale deed of plaint schedule property to the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant and her children are openly proclaiming that they would occupy the other extent of the plaint schedule property also immediately even by resorting to do away with the lives of the plaintiffs. The 1st and 4th defendants are colluded together for wrongful gain for themselves and created the sale deed dated 20.01.2005. On 28.4.2005 at about 8.00 a.m., the 1st defendant’ son along with some rowdy elements came to the plaint schedule property and tried to dispossess the 2nd plaintiff and left the premises at the intervention of some elders threatening him with dire consequences. The plaintiffs are apprehending that the 1st defendant may succeed in her attempts to dispossess them from the subject property. Hence they filed suit for the reliefs as stated above. 7. The defendants No.2 and 3 remained set ex parte. 8. The 1st defendant filed written statement and denied all the allegations made in the plaint and stated that the suit is not maintainable under law and liable to be dismissed in limini. It is further stated that the said Pasam Prameela executed a sale agreement in favour of one Sali Koteswara Rao in 1990 and put him in possession of the property in which schedule property is a part of it. The 1st defendant came to an agreement with Sali Koteswara Rao to purchase schedule property in 1995 and taken possession and she was in possession and enjoyment of it and she constructed a three portioned ACC roofed house therein and leased out two portions. The 1st plaintiff is the second elder sister of the 1st defendant and her family has a house near the schedule property. The 1st defendant got plaint schedule property registered through the GPA holder of Pasam Prameela i.e., 4th defendant as per directions of Sali Koteswara Rao vide Doc.No.2521/05 dated 20.01.2005. In fact there is no demand for tax prior to April 2004. When the son of the 1st defendant approached electricity department for new connection, he came to know that the existing connection was in the name of the 1st plaintiff. In fact the 1st defendant is under the impression that the connection was in her name. In fact there is no demand for tax prior to April 2004. When the son of the 1st defendant approached electricity department for new connection, he came to know that the existing connection was in the name of the 1st plaintiff. In fact the 1st defendant is under the impression that the connection was in her name. In fact there is no practice of payment of revenue tax, but this defendant does not know why the plaintiffs paid revenue tax, it should be a motivated plan to grab the property. It is further stated that the plaintiffs have no title, no prima facie case and the balance of convenience was also not in their favour. 9. The 4th defendant also filed written statement denying all the allegations made in the plaint and while reiterating the averments in the written statement of 1st defendant, stated that, the said Pasam Prameel executed a registered GPA in favour of this defendant on 13.06.1994 basing on it, he was directed to register the sale deed or deeds either in favour of Sali Koteswara Rao or by his order to any others. On that the 4th defendant executed sale deeds as a GPA as per the order of Sali Koteswara Rao including the 1st defendant. The 4th defendant executed registered sale deed over the property in which the plaint schedule property is a part of it even in 1994 and even after the execution of this sale deed another sale deed was executed, so the question of creating of false GPA does not arise. It is further stated that the 4th defendant came to know that the plaintiffs were permitted to keep their cattle in the premises of the 1st defendant. The plaintiffs have no right over the property in any manner and that the plaintiffs have no right to claim the relief of permanent injunction or for recovery of possession, hence prayed to dismiss the suit. 10. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues : 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of the registered sale deed dated 20.01.2005 is null and void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiffs, defendants 2 and 3 as prayed for ? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for consequential permanent injunction as prayed for? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of the registered sale deed dated 20.01.2005 is null and void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiffs, defendants 2 and 3 as prayed for ? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for consequential permanent injunction as prayed for? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for recovery of possession of ‘B’ schedule from D1 as prayed for? 11. During course of trial, on behalf of the plaintiffs, PWs.1 to 4 were examined and Exs. A1 to A10 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B1 to B8 were marked. 12. After considering the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court decreed the suit with costs declaring the registered sale deed vide Doc.No.252/05 dated 20.01.2005 at the office of Sub Registrar, Patamata, Vijayawada obtained by 1st defendant from the 4th defendant under a fake GPA is null and void and inoperative and not binding on the plaintiffs and defendants No.2 and 3 and the plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction restraining the 1st defendant and permanent injunction is granted restraining the 1st defendant from interfering with the ‘A’ schedule property. The trial Court further directed the 1st defendant to handover the possession of the ‘B’ schedule property to the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the same, the 1st defendant preferred an appeal in A.S No.49 of 2009 before the XIII Additional District Judge (FTC), Vijayawada (for short “the first appellate Court”). After hearing the both sides, the first appellate Court has framed the following points for consideration : (i) Whether the respondents/plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of the registered sale deed dated 20.01.2005 is null and void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiffs, defendants No.2 and 3? (ii) Whether the respondents/plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? (iii) Whether the respondents/plaintiffs are entitled for recovery of possession of ‘B’ schedule property from D.1? (iv) Whether this appeal is liable to be allowed? If so, on what ground? (v) To what relief? 13. The first appellate Court, on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence on record and legal aspects, has allowed the first appeal setting aside the trial Court decree and judgment. Challenging the same, the present second appeal came to be filed. 14. If so, on what ground? (v) To what relief? 13. The first appellate Court, on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence on record and legal aspects, has allowed the first appeal setting aside the trial Court decree and judgment. Challenging the same, the present second appeal came to be filed. 14. While both counsels prepared to argue the matter finally, this Court also decided to dispose of the matter at the admission stage with the consent of both the counsels. Further, the appellant counsel has raised the following substantial questions of law in the grounds appeal : (a) Whether the G.P.A. alleged to have been executed by Prameela in favour of the defendant No.4 who is alleged to be the vendor of the 1st defendant is binding on the plaintiffs? (b) Whether the 4th defendant has any authority to register the Sale deed of plaint schedule property to the 1st defendant under a false and created GPA? (c) Whether any right will confer over the plaint schedule property on mere paying the municipal tax on the name of the 1st defendant? (d) Whether the judgment of the lower appellate court is valid when admittedly the plaintiffs proved their case independently and they did not depend on the weakness of the case of defendants who admitted the possession of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property? (e) Whether the judgment of the lower appellate court is justified when the plaintiffs makes a semblance of case that they proved that there is an oral agreement and possession is with them, so the burden shifts on the defendants and the defendants failed to prove their case? (f) Whether the judgment of the lower appellate is justified when admittedly Ex.A2 the land cist paid by the plaintiff’s ancestor shows that the possession of the plaintiffs? 15. Heard Sri Eswaraiah Chowdary, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri S. Rajendra Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 16. On hearing, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the first appellate court erred in allowing the appeal suit reversing the well-considered judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, without properly appreciating the facts and circumstances and the material available on record. 16. On hearing, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the first appellate court erred in allowing the appeal suit reversing the well-considered judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, without properly appreciating the facts and circumstances and the material available on record. The first appellate Court failed to note that the husband of the 1st appellant and father of the 2nd appellant Atchaiah purchased the subject property from Nalluri Venakteswara Rao and his daughter Prameela on 27.02.1987 and there is no dispute with regard to the title held by Nalluri Venakteswara Rao and his daughter Prameela and the Atchaiah was inducted into possession by way of oral agreement till his death on 04.04.1989. He further submits that the lower appellate court ought to have seen that the 1st respondent herein who is none other than the sister of the 1st appellant herein who is having the knowledge of the purchase of the suit property by the husband of the 1st appellant with an intention to grab the suit property obtained registered sale deed on 20.1.2005 with false recitals from the 4th respondent, who is styled as GPA holder of Pasam Prameela under a false and created GPA. In fact the 4th respondent Shaik Mastan has no such authority to register the sale deed of suit property. He mainly submitted that the first appellate court ought to have seen in order to prove that the appellants are in possession, the electricity service connection which is in the name of the 1st appellant and without the possession and the valid documents, the electricity service connection will be sanctioned on the name of the 1st appellant. The first appellate Court also failed to note that the respondents No.1 and 4 herein did not deny specifically or admitted in their written statements that the plaint ‘B’ schedule property is part of plaint ‘A’ schedule property which itself is quite sufficient to hold that the appellants are in peaceful and lawful possession and also failed to appreciate the evidence of PW.3, who witnessed the transaction between the husband of the 1st appellant and Nalluri Venkateswara Rao and his daughter Prameela. 17. 17. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents while reiterating the averments made in the written statements filed by the respondents and while denying the contents made by the appellants, contended that, admittedly the 1st defendant has got another house in RTC colony and her family is residing there. The 1st appellant requested the 1st respondent to use the open site to her cattle as they have no open site at their house. On that the appellants were inducted in the open site in the eastern side and the room in eastern side of the shed. As there is no electric connection to the house, the 2nd appellant asked to take electric connection and obtained the thumb impression of the 1st respondent on the required papers. In fact they have got electricity connection with the influence of the 2nd appellant. Later, the 1st respondent’s house at RTC colony was in very low level due to formation of roads and she want to demolish it and construct a new house and hence 1st respondent family evicted the tenants in the western side two portions and joined her house in March 2005 and residing there. When the son of 1st respondent approached electrical department for new connection, he came to know that the existing connection was in the name of 1st appellant. In that connection, some disputes arose between both families and the 1st respondent asked the 1st appellant to vacate the premises. In fact the 1st respondent is under the impression that the connection was in her name. It should be an ill-motivated plan to grab the property. Learned counsel mainly contended that originally the schedule property belongs to one Nalluri Venkateswara Rao and he executed registered settlement deed regarding this property to his only daughter Pasam Prameela on 10.12.1982 vide Doc No.12093/82, S.R.O., Vijayawada and the said Venkatewara Rao died later. Thereafter, the said Pasam Prameela became the absolute owner of the entire property and she sold the property and executed possessory sale agreement in favour of one Sali Koteswara Rao in 1990 and put him in possession of the property in which the schedule property is a part of it. As per agreement between the said Sali Koteswara Rao and Prameela, she received the entire sale consideration from him and put him in possession of the property and only registration remained. As per agreement between the said Sali Koteswara Rao and Prameela, she received the entire sale consideration from him and put him in possession of the property and only registration remained. As per the agreement, Prameela has to execute the sale deed either in favour of the Sali Koteswara Rao or to anybody on his order. The said Pasam Prameela executed a registered GPA in favour of the 4th respondent on 13.06.1994. On that the 4th respondent executed sale deed as a GPA as per the order of Sali Koteswara Rao including the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent was in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property and constructed RCC roofed house long time back it was recited in the sale deed. He further submitted that the 1st appellant and the 1st respondent are sisters and due to their disputes the appellants are trying to occupy the property. He mainly contended that the appellants have no right to claim any relief and hence prayed to dismiss the appeal. 18. Admittedly, the suit was filed by the appellants/ plaintiffs against the respondents/defendants for cancellation of sale deed dated 20.01.2005, as null and void, which is in between the respondents No.1 and 4. The 4th respondent executed a sale deed as GPA in favour of the 1st respondent in respect of plaint schedule property. 19. The appellants contention is that they purchased the property i.e., the husband of the 1st appellant has purchased the plaint schedule property from one Nalluri Venkateswara Rao during their lifetime i.e., on 27.2.1987 under an oral agreement of sale for a valid consideration of Rs.6,000/- i.e., plaint item No.1; and item No.2 of plaint schedule property was also purchased by the husband of the 1st appellant form Pasam Prameela, the daughter of Nalluri Venkatewra Rao, under a valid consideration of Rs.7,000/- under an oral agreement. 20. It is also observed that the 1st appellant is the second elder sister of 1st respondent. The 1st respondent did not deny or admitted specifically in her statement that the plaint ‘B’ schedule property is part of plaint ‘A’ schedule property. So, it is an admitted fact that the plaint ‘B’ schedule property is part of plaint ‘A’ schedule property. 21. It is observed from the impugned judgment that, cancellation can only be at the instance of a party who has executed the instrument which is void or voidable. So, it is an admitted fact that the plaint ‘B’ schedule property is part of plaint ‘A’ schedule property. 21. It is observed from the impugned judgment that, cancellation can only be at the instance of a party who has executed the instrument which is void or voidable. If the document is one executed by a third party, the plaintiff has to show that it casts a cloud upon his title. The plaintiff has to show that they have a reasonable apprehension that such instrument is left outstanding may cause him serious injury and against whom a written instrument is void or voidable. An instrument to which the plaintiff was a party should be cancelled to enable him to establish his title when that instrument stands in the way of his doing so. When, however, the instrument was one between third parties. Here, in this case, the essentials of long possession have to be proved. It is their definite case that the husband of the 1st appellant has purchased the property by virtue of an oral agreement and the said possession was continued with the appellants/plaintiffs even after death of the husband of the 1st appellant. Hence, it clearly establishes that the appellants have been in possession since 1987 and since then they continued in the said possession and therefore, the plaintiffs have perfected their title by long possession. 22. It is settled law that if a person is put in possession in pursuance to an oral transfer and deed of transfer is not executed, the transferee keeps possession with the distinct understanding that he is holding the property on his own behalf. 23. As seen from the evidence of PW.3, it is categorically established that, PW.3 who was present at the time of oral agreement in between Pothamsetty Atchaiah and Nalluri Venkateswara Rao and Pasam Prameela. PW.3 deposed in his chief examination that item No.1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property i.e., an extent of 64.44 sq. yds., was purchased by late Pothamsetty Atchaiah from late Nalluri Venakteswara Rao during their lifetime on 27.2.1987 under an oral agreement of sale for a valid consideration of Rs.6,000/-. He further deposed that Item No.2 of the plaint schedule property i.e., 79.27 sq. yds., of house site was purchased by late Atchaiah from Pasam Prameela on the same day for a valid consideration of Rs.7,000/- under an oral agreement of sale. He further deposed that Item No.2 of the plaint schedule property i.e., 79.27 sq. yds., of house site was purchased by late Atchaiah from Pasam Prameela on the same day for a valid consideration of Rs.7,000/- under an oral agreement of sale. He further deposed that after receiving sale consideration the said Nalluri Venkateswara Rao and Pasam Prameela delivered their respective properties on the same day when late Atchaiah paid the balance consideration by deciding the boundaries. PW.3 further deposed that the plaint schedule property was used by the appellants for keeping their cattle for some time. About 12 years back they constructed a three portioned house in the plaint schedule property and they let out two portions and one portion was occupied by the 3rd respondent. Due to disputes, the 1st respondent/1st defendant got registered sale deed in her favour through 4th respondent/4th defendant on 20.01.2005. He further deposed that at present the appellant/plaintiffs have been residing in two portions of the property whereas the 1st respondent/1st defendant tress passed into the ‘B’ schedule property. 24. It is also to be noted that, in the evidence of DW.1, it is admitted by DW.1 that in one portion the plaintiffs were residing and according to her, for the last 13 years electricity connection is in existence. 25. This Court mainly observed that the plaintiffs were in possession and they established that fact by filing cist, tax receipts and electricity bills which were in the name of 1st plaintiff. The suit was filed not for declaration of title but for declaring the GPA registered sale deed as null and void, because the plaintiffs are having possession since 1987. The declaration of title is in between two parties but the third party cannot claim and the disputed documents only permissible under law. 26. As seen from the entire record, it appears that the 4th defendant inducting into possession from 2005 onwards by way of registered sale deed as GPA. To that extent it cannot be decided that he is having title over the property. Further, by virtue of an oral agreement, the plaintiffs are having possession since 1987 by claiming long possession. 27. In English Law possession is a good title of right against anyone who cannot show a better. To that extent it cannot be decided that he is having title over the property. Further, by virtue of an oral agreement, the plaintiffs are having possession since 1987 by claiming long possession. 27. In English Law possession is a good title of right against anyone who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself. Many other legal systems, however, go much further than this, and treat possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true owner himself. Even a wrongdoer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner, who takes his own, may be forced in this way to restore it to the wrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it. He must first give up possession, and then proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing on the ground of his ownership. The intention of the law is that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law. 28. Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection of possession even against ownership are called possessory, while those available for the protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary. In the modern and medieval civil law the distinction is expressed by the contrasted terms petitorium (a proprietary suit) and possessorium (a possessory suit). (Salmond, ibid, pp. 294-295) The law in India, as it has developed, accords with the jurisprudential thought as propounded by Salmond. 29. In a case of Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. Vs. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy and Ors., 1924 PC 144, Sir John Edge summed up the Indian law by stating that in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. 30. In the oft-quoted case of Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs. K.C. Alexander and Ors., (1968) 3 SCR 163 , the Apex Court held that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. 30. In the oft-quoted case of Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs. K.C. Alexander and Ors., (1968) 3 SCR 163 , the Apex Court held that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. The court quoted Loft's maxim 'Possessio contra omnes valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis (He that hath possession hath right against all but him that hath the very right)' and said, "A defendant in such a case must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title, or probably a possession prior to the plaintiff's and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time". 31. In M.C. Chockalingam and Ors. Vs. V. Manickavasagam and Ors., (1974) 1 SCC 48 , the Apex Court held that the law forbids forcible dispossession, even with the best of title. 32. In Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his Lrs. Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131 , it was held that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. 33. In Nagar Palika, Jind Vs. Jagat Singh, Advocate, (1995) 3 SCC 426, the Apex Court held that disputed questions of title are to be decided by due process of law, but the peaceful possession is to be protected from the trespasser without regard to the question of the origin of the possession. When the defendant fails in proving his title to the suit land the plaintiff can succeed in securing a decree for possession on the basis of his prior possession against the defendant who has dispossessed him. Such a suit will be founded on the averment of previous possession of the plaintiff and dispossession by the defendant. 34. It is thus clear that, so far as the Indian law is concerned, the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. 34. It is thus clear that, so far as the Indian law is concerned, the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner. 35. As per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court the essentials which are required to be pleaded and proved by a party claiming long possession, all the ingredients have filed by the plaintiffs before the trial Court to prove their case viz., Ex.A2-cist receipt, Ex.A7 and Ex.A8 electricity receipts. It is also relevant to observe that the Ex.A10-certified copy of registered sale deed 1996, which was filed by the plaintiffs before the trial Court, wherein it was mentioned at schedule part – in the southern side boundary, the name of the husband of the 1st appellant was shown. It is also relevant to observe that the Ex.A10-certified copy of registered sale deed 1996, which was filed by the plaintiffs before the trial Court, wherein it was mentioned at schedule part – in the southern side boundary, the name of the husband of the 1st appellant was shown. So, it clearly establishes that the appellants are having possessing over the subject property and claiming long possession. 36. Upon appreciation of evidence, the trial court has recorded findings on various issues which were reversed by the first appellate Court. Since the first appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial Court, this Court observed that the appellants have proved their case and they did not depend upon weaknesses on the case of the respondents and they proved their case by claiming long possession. Even though the appellants produced sufficient evidence and burden shifted to the respondents to prove their case but the respondents did not produce any evidence prior to 2005 and the contention of the respondents counsel that the appellants solely depend upon weaknesses of the case of the respondents but there is no such evidence on record and the appellants adduced their independent evidence and they discharged their burden of proving their case by examining the witnesses by produced evidence then the burden shifts to the respondents. Admittedly the declaratory suit can be passed in favour of the plaintiffs against the defendants as the defendants failed to prove the instrument which is in between 4th defendant and 1st defendant. Moreover, it is the contention of the respondents that ‘A schedule property is also part of ‘B’ schedule property, so, the B schedule property also in possession of the appellants since long time i.e., since 1987. 37. It is trite law that, in a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff. 38. On perusing the citations of Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to above, this Court observed that, it cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. 38. On perusing the citations of Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to above, this Court observed that, it cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the Statute of Limitations applicable to the case, his right is forever extinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title. 39. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court observed that, in the suit for cancellation of sale deed dated 20.01.2005, as null and void, the plaintiffs could succeed only on the strength of their own title and not on the weakness of the case of the defendants. So the appellants have proved their case before the trial Court that they are having possession and enjoyment of the subject property, but the first appellate Court has failed to appreciate that, in order to prove that the appellants are in possession, the electricity service connection which is in the name of 1st appellant and without possession and the valid documents, the electricity service connection will be sanctioned on the name of the 1st appellant and also failed to appreciate the evidence of PW.3 who witnessed the transaction between the husband of the 1st appellant and Nalluri Venkateswara Rao and his daughter Prameela. Therefore, in the light of the above principles and also going by the evidence available in the case, it cannot be said that the defendants have succeeded in proving that they have perfected title. The trial Court was justified in coming to such a conclusion but the first appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that, whatever the substantial questions of law raised by the appellants in the grounds of appeal are satisfied and hence, the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is not proper and liable to be set aside. 40. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is allowed. The Decree and Judgment passed by the first appellate Court is hereby set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court shall stand restored. 40. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is allowed. The Decree and Judgment passed by the first appellate Court is hereby set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court shall stand restored. Further, the 1st respondent is directed to handover the possession of the ‘B’ schedule property to the appellants, on or before 10.10.2023. 41. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications shall stand closed.