JUDGMENT : 1. This is a claimants' appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, seeking enhancement of compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jhansi in the case of a fatal motor accident. 2. The claim petition, being M.A.C.P. No.315 of 2000, was instituted by Smt. Urmila Chaturvedi, widow of the late S.K. Chaturvedi and Raj Kumar Chaturvedi, son of the late S.K. Chaturvedi, seeking compensation on account of the demise of Sanjay Chaturvedi, who died in a road accident in the night intervening 25/26.07.2000. Smt. Urmila Chaturvedi is the deceased's mother whereas Raj Kumar Chaturvedi is his brother. Smt. Urmila Chaturvedi was arrayed as claimant-petitioner No.1 before the Tribunal and is appellant No.1 before this Court. Raj Kumar Chaturvedi was claimant-petitioner No.2 before the Tribunal and is appellant No.2 before this Court. Smt. Urmila Chaturvedi and Raj Kumar Chaturvedi shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the claimants', unless the context requires a different or individual reference. 3. According to the claimants, in the intervening night 25/26.07.2000 at about half past one, Raj Kumar Chaturvedi was travelling with his brother and one Ankur Lal on board Maruti Car No. UP-93G-0711 from Kanpur to Jhansi. They were bound homewards. The Car was driven by the late Sanjay Kumar Chaturvedi. He was moving on his side according to the rule of the road. As the Car reached near Village Semari, within the local limits of Police Station Moth, District Jhansi, a Truck, bearing registration No. MP-08A-6294, approached from the Jhansi side of the road, driven by its driver at a high speed, negligently and wantonly. The Truck, swerving to the wrong side of the road, hit the Car head on, but on its right side. The impact caused Sanjay and Raj Kumar Chaturvedi, claimant No.2 to sustain grievous injuries. The other passenger on board, Ankur Lal suffered simple injuries. Ankur Lal informed the deceased's home on telephone about the accident. This led members of the deceased's and the injured-claimant's family to reach the spot and conveyed both of them to the Medical College at about half past six in the morning. The two were taken to the emergency facility, where the deceased, who was then alive and the second claimant, Raj Kumar Chaturvedi, were admitted. Both were examined and were in a precarious condition. The two were taken to the emergency facility, where the deceased, who was then alive and the second claimant, Raj Kumar Chaturvedi, were admitted. Both were examined and were in a precarious condition. The family members, finding that the two injured were not receiving suitable treatment and care, moved them to the Sudha Nursing Home. Sanjay was managed at the Sudha Nursing Home until 04.08.2000, when at 7.30 in the evening hours, he was conveyed to the Nirmal Hospital for surgery. During the surgical procedure to take care of certain haemorrhagic injuries in his abdomen, he breathed his last. The second claimant, Raj Kumar Chaturvedi was discharged from the Sudha Nursing Home on 10.08.2000 with plaster cast to his injured limb. It is said that Sanjay Chaturvedi was a healthy man and would earn a sum of Rs.6000/- per month, teaching at the Rajeev Coaching Centre. He would spend the money earned to meet the needs of his family. 4. It is the claimants' case that Smt. Urmila Chaturvedi's husband and Raj Kumar Chaturvedi's father had died an untimely death on 06.04.2000. He was employed as an Executive Engineer with the U.P. Power Corporation Limited. The late Sanjay Chaturvedi had applied for appointment on compassionate grounds and his claim had been accepted. The U.P. Power Corporation Limited had completed the necessary formalities. Sanjay Chaturvedi was on way to be appointed as an Assistant Engineer. He was awaiting his letter of appointment as such with the Parichha Thermal Power Project. Upon appointment to the said post, he would receive initially a salary of Rs.14,750/- per mensem. The claimants have been deprived of the benefits of the said appointment and ought to be compensated on that basis. The deceased's mother had already suffered because of the untimely demise of her husband and had now to face the spectre of her son's death. She had received a severe shock on this account and requires treatment. A sum of Rs.20,000/- was spent during hospitalization and treatment of the deceased. The claimants also prayed for compensation on account of the loss of consortium. A total sum of Rs.21,06,000/- was sought in compensation for Smt. Urmila Chaturvedi and a sum of Rs.9,16,000/- for Raj Kumar Chaturvedi, aggregating a sum of Rs.30,22,000/-, with interest of 15% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. 5. The claimants also prayed for compensation on account of the loss of consortium. A total sum of Rs.21,06,000/- was sought in compensation for Smt. Urmila Chaturvedi and a sum of Rs.9,16,000/- for Raj Kumar Chaturvedi, aggregating a sum of Rs.30,22,000/-, with interest of 15% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. 5. Ismail Khan, opposite party No.1, is the owner of the offending Truck whereas Iqbal Khan is the driver. They are arrayed as opposite parties Nos.1 and 2 to the claim petition and respondent Nos.1 and 2 to the appeal. Ismail Khan, shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the owner' and Iqbal Khan, 'the driver'. The offending Truck was insured with The New India Assurance Company Limited through its General Manager, Civil Lines, Jhansi. They are the insurers of the offending Truck and shall hereinafter be called 'the Insurers'. 6. A joint written statement was filed on behalf of the owner and the driver, where the case in the claim petition was generally denied. In the additional pleas, it was asserted that the accident did not involve the offending Truck at all. The claimants have falsely set up the accident, involving the offending Truck. The ill-fated car had collided with some other vehicle, leading to Sanjay's death. Also, it was pleaded that the compensation claimed is exaggerated. The driver did not cause any accident. On the date of the accident, the offending Truck was insured with the Insurers. 7. The Insurers filed their own written statement, generally denying the claim. They have said in the additional pleas that it is incorrect to say that Sanjay Chaturvedi was a healthy man prior to the accident or that he was earning a sum of Rs.6000/- per month, working as a coaching master. The compensation claimed is inflated. The offending Truck was being driven by an unauthorized man. There was contributory negligence on the part of both the drivers. The Maruti Car's owner and its insurers have not been impleaded. The deceased was not aged 31 years, nor was he gainfully employed. He did not have an income of Rs.6000/- per month. The Maruti Car was driven by an unauthorized man. The claim, according to the Insurers, deserved to be rejected. 8. The Maruti Car's owner and its insurers have not been impleaded. The deceased was not aged 31 years, nor was he gainfully employed. He did not have an income of Rs.6000/- per month. The Maruti Car was driven by an unauthorized man. The claim, according to the Insurers, deserved to be rejected. 8. On the pleadings of parties, the following issues were framed (translated into English from Hindi) : “(1) Whether on 25/26.07.2000 in the night at about 1.30, the son/ brother of the claimants, Sanjay Kumar Chaturvedi was proceeding on his Car, bearing registration No. UP-93G-0711 at a controlled speed and on his side, when, near Village Semari, within the local limits of Police Station Moth, Truck No. MP-08A-6294, proceeding from the Jhansi end of the road, driven by opposite party No.2 at a high speed, negligently and wantonly, moved to the wrong side of the road and hit the Maruti Car on the right side head on, leading the deceased, Sanjay and claimant No.2 to sustain grievous injuries and the other passenger, Ankur Lal simple injuries and that during treatment, he (Sanjay), [added by Court for clarification’s sake] died? (2) Whether on the date of the said accident, the driver of the said Truck had a valid driving licence? If yes, its effect? (3) Whether on the date of the said accident, the said Truck was insured with the Insurance Company/ opposite party No.3 under a valid insurance policy? If yes, its effect? (4) Whether the claimants are entitled to receive any compensation? If yes, how much and from whom?” 9. The claimants have filed through a list of documents, bearing paper No.8C1, a photostat copy of the FIR, medical report, discharge ticket, High School certificate, B.E. Degree, certificate from Rajeev Coaching Centre, application form, and a notarized copy of the death certificate. Through another list of documents, paper No.35C1, certified copies of the FIR, charge sheet, technical report, a notarized copy of the death certificate, panchayatnama, papers summary, investigation report, cash memos and a notarized copy of the driving licence relating to the late Sanjay Chaturvedi, were brought on record. Through a list, bearing paper No.31C2, a photostat copy of the injury report, showing the injuries sustained by Sanjay was filed on record. Still another list of documents, bearing paper No. 44C1, carries along with it the original certificate of pay dated 20.09.2000. Through a list, bearing paper No.31C2, a photostat copy of the injury report, showing the injuries sustained by Sanjay was filed on record. Still another list of documents, bearing paper No. 44C1, carries along with it the original certificate of pay dated 20.09.2000. Along with a list of documents, paper No. 57C1, a certified copy of the charge-sheet has been brought on record. Through another list, 68C1, certified copies of the statement of Raj Kumar has been filed, besides policy cover note No. 60112, bearing paper No.75-Ga and photostat copy of the driving licence No. 1-8/99/SUP-Va-1-262/96 (paper No.76-Ga). 10. The claimants examined in support of their case, PW-1 Ankur Lal, PW-2 Phool Chand, PW-3 Rajeev Gupta, PW-4 Madhukar Chaturvedi and PW-5, Raj Kumar Chaturvedi. 11. Issue No.1 was decided in favour of the claimants, whereas Issues Nos.2 and 3 were decided in favour of the owner and against the Insurers. In this appeal, the only issue pressed by parties is about the quantum of compensation, that is to say, Issue No.4. 12. Heard Mr. Ramanuj Pandey, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Pervez Husain Khan, learned Counsel for the claimants and Mr. S.D. Ojha, Advocate appearing for the Insurers. No one has appeared on behalf of the owner and the driver. 13. The Tribunal has apparently disbelieved the salary certificate issued by the Rajeev Coaching Centre dated 20.09.2000, bearing paper No.45C2, which shows the deceased's monthly salary as Rs.6000/-. The said income for the deceased has been disbelieved without any cogent finding and merely by referring to submissions advanced on behalf of the Insurers. All that is said for a finding by the Tribunal about the deceased's income is that there is no authentic proof on record that the deceased was about to be appointed as an Assistant Engineer with the U.P. State Electricity Board. It has been remarked by the Tribunal that all that is brought on record to prove the prospects of the deceased’s appointment is his application made for the purpose. However, there are no orders of the senior departmental officers to show that the deceased was indeed about to be appointed. 14. It has then been remarked that according to the medical papers, the deceased's age was about 28-30 years. There is then a cryptic finding by the Tribunal, based on a very illogical assumption, that the deceased's income would be Rs.24,000/- a year. 14. It has then been remarked that according to the medical papers, the deceased's age was about 28-30 years. There is then a cryptic finding by the Tribunal, based on a very illogical assumption, that the deceased's income would be Rs.24,000/- a year. So far as Smt. Urmila Chaturvedi, the deceased's mother is concerned, it has been opined that she is aged about 50 years. Raj Kumar Chaturvedi is the deceased's brother. There is nothing to show, in the opinion of the Tribunal, that Raj Kumar was dependent upon the deceased. 15. The Tribunal has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Gyan Chand Jain and others v. Permanand and others, 2003 (1) TAC 490, where, in the case of death of a 26 year old unmarried man, the mother and the father being 48 and 55 years, respectively, a multiplier of 12' was considered to be appropriate. The Tribunal has adopted the said multiplier. Assuming the deceased's income to be Rs.24,000/- per annum, one-third has been deducted towards personal and living expenses a and two-thirds considered the annual dependency available to the deceased's mother. Adopting a multiplier of 12', dependency has been worked out at a sum of Rs.1,92,000/-. To this has been added a sum of Rs.2000/- towards funeral expenses and Rs.2500/- towards loss of estate. In this manner, the Tribunal has arrived at the figure of Rs.1,96,500/- payable in compensation to the deceased's mother along with 8% interest from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. In the award made, a sum of Rs.50,000/- has been ordered to be paid to the claimant, Smt. Urmila Chaturvedi through an account payee cheque, drawn on a nationalized bank and the balance directed to be invested in a fixed deposit with a nationalized bank for a period of three years, the quarterly interest whereon would be payable to the deceased's mother. The claim of the deceased's brother has been rejected. 16. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties, as already remarked hereinabove, this Court finds the reasons to disbelieve the deceased's claimed income to be hardly there and whatever reasons have been given, they are absolutely cryptic and laconic. The claimants have placed a certificate from the Coaching Centre, where the deceased taught, showing his income to be Rs.6000/- a month. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties, as already remarked hereinabove, this Court finds the reasons to disbelieve the deceased's claimed income to be hardly there and whatever reasons have been given, they are absolutely cryptic and laconic. The claimants have placed a certificate from the Coaching Centre, where the deceased taught, showing his income to be Rs.6000/- a month. The fact that the salary register also showed the owner of the Coaching Centre receiving the same salary, does not discredit the authenticity of the payment made towards salary to the deceased by the Coaching Centre. In his examination-in-chief, PW-3 Rajeev Gupta has proved the salary certificate and payment of salary in the sum of Rs.6000/- per month to the deceased. He has proved his signatures on the certificate dated 20.09.2000. In his cross-examination, no doubt, PW-3 has admitted that the Coaching Centre is not registered and that he has not brought the account register or the balance sheets for the past three years. He has, nevertheless, stated that he pays income tax, but said that he has not brought along the income tax assessment for the last two years. The witness has generally supported the fact that Sanjay Kumar Chaturvedi taught in the named coaching institute, and that the register and salary certificate were genuine. 17. It is common to find in small-time or young coaching centres irregular maintenance of records. At the time, to which the incident relates, non-payment of income tax by many a small private enterprise was not an uncommon phenomenon. What is to be seen is that looking to the qualifications of the deceased, the salary claimed to have been received by him from the Coaching Centre is not at all an exaggerated figure. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that for some decades past, there are coaching centres galore that have almost overtaken the formal system of education, wherein people do not repose much trust, particularly, when preparing to write certain competitive admission tests, like those for admission to engineering courses etc. For the self-employed in the unorganized sector, some kind of assessment about the income has to be done, based on their education and circumstances. 18. The deceased, as already noted, was an engineering graduate and it is believable that he was teaching at the Rajeev Coaching Centre, a fact proved by PW-3. For the self-employed in the unorganized sector, some kind of assessment about the income has to be done, based on their education and circumstances. 18. The deceased, as already noted, was an engineering graduate and it is believable that he was teaching at the Rajeev Coaching Centre, a fact proved by PW-3. Since there are no records, like balance-sheets or account register for the Coaching Centre produced, besides the income tax returns or assessments, this Court considers it safe to hold the deceased's income to be a sum of Rs.5000/- per month. It is, accordingly, held. Given the monthly income of the deceased, the annual income would be Rs.60,000/-. 19. The Tribunal has erred in deducting a one-third towards and personal and living expenses of the deceased. The deceased was a bachelor, and going by the principles with regard to deduction towards personal and living expenses of the bachelors, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (Smt) v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , 50% of the income has to be deducted towards personal and living expenses; not 'one-third'. This Court must say here that the deceased’s brother, who is a matured and independent man, is in no manner one of his dependents. The finding of the Tribunal on this score is affirmed. 20. The Tribunal has applied a multiplier of 12' going by the claimant’s age, who is the deceased's mother. The deceased was clearly aged, according to his High School Certificate, 30 years, 9 months 25 days, as on the date of his demise. The principle governing the reckoning of age beyond completed years, with added months, has received the attention of the Supreme Court in Shashikala and others v. Ganga-lakshmamma and another, (2015) 9 SCC 150 . In Shashikala (supra), it has been observed : “16. Insofar as appropriate multiplier, the date of birth of the deceased as per driving licence was 16-6-1961. On the date of accident i.e. 14-12-2006, the deceased was aged 45 years 5 months and 28 days and the Tribunal has taken the age as 46 years. Since the deceased has completed only 45 years, the High Court has rightly taken the age of the deceased as 45 years and adopted multiplier of 14 which is the appropriate multiplier and the same is maintained. Total loss of dependency is calculated at Rs.16,82,310 (Rs1,20,165 × 14).” 21. Since the deceased has completed only 45 years, the High Court has rightly taken the age of the deceased as 45 years and adopted multiplier of 14 which is the appropriate multiplier and the same is maintained. Total loss of dependency is calculated at Rs.16,82,310 (Rs1,20,165 × 14).” 21. A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Branch Manager, Future General India Insurance Company Limited, Bengaluru v. Varsha S.L., 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3498, has held : “44. The next controversy is with regard to the appropriate multiplier to be applied in the instant case. As noted above, the contention of Sri A.N. Krishnaswamy, Learned Counsel for the Insurance Company is that the deceased was 40 years 7 months 5 days and therefore, he was 41 years and not 40 years and hence, the multiplier which is applicable for the age group 41 to 45 years being ‘14’ had to be applied in the instant case, but the Tribunal has applied the multiplier of ‘15’, which is for the age group of 35-40 years. 45. The contra submission of Learned Counsel for the claimants is that the completed age has to be taken into consideration for the purpose of applying the multiplier and not the running age. In the instant case, the deceased Ethendranath had completed 40 years and not 41 years. That he maybe 40 years and few months thereafter, but that does not mean that he had completed 41 years. Hence, the contention of Learned Counsel for the claimants is that multiplier ‘15’ has been rightly applied by the Tribunal.” (emphasis by Court) 22. More recently, a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in P.O. Meera and another v. Ananda P. Naik and others, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 546 had occasion to consider the issue, where it has been held : “33. Sri. Rajan P. Kaliyath argued that since Madhavan had completed the age of 50 years and was running 51, the multiplier of ‘11’ adopted by the Tribunal is correct. He also contended that, if the above interpretation is not followed, there would be a vacuum in the age group between 50 - 51 years. The argument may sound attractive at the first blush, but is hard to be accepted for the following reasons. 37. He also contended that, if the above interpretation is not followed, there would be a vacuum in the age group between 50 - 51 years. The argument may sound attractive at the first blush, but is hard to be accepted for the following reasons. 37. A reading of the table in Sarla Verma leaves no room for any speculation that it is only when the deceased/injured completes the age of 51 years, the multiplier would shift from ‘13’ to ‘11’ and not when the deceased/injured attains the age of 50 years and runs the said age till the previous night of his 51st birthday. (Read the interpretation given by the Honourable Supreme Court in Prabhu Dayal Sesma v. State of Rajasthan [ (1986) 4 SCC 59 on the Indian Majority Act, 1875 and this Court in Jaison V. George v. State of Kerala [ 2019 (5) KHC 115 ] on the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2005, while computing the age of a person). In other words, the sine qua non to select the multiplier is the attainment of the specified age mentioned in the table and not the running of the age into the next group. It is also apposite to note, in Pranay Sethi, the age for awarding future prospects is segregated into three groups i.e., 16 - 39, 40 - 49 and 50 - 59. Therefore, if the argument of the learned Counsel for the Insurer is to be accepted, the same vacuum would also arise at the ages of 25, 30, 35, 40, 50, 55, 60 and 65 in selecting the multiplier and the ages of 39, 49 and 59 for awarding future prospects. This Court is bound to follow the law declared by the Honourable Supreme Court as enshrined under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and not to give a different interpretation or tinker with the well settled enunciation.” 23. It would, thus, be evident that the deceased, who had, going by his High School Certificate, not completed the age of 31 years and was about two months shy of that age, cannot be regarded as 31 years. He has to be accepted as 30 years old. 24. The applicable multiplier for the age bracket of 26-30 years, as laid down in the table in Paragraph No.40 of the report in Sarla Verma (supra) is 17'. He has to be accepted as 30 years old. 24. The applicable multiplier for the age bracket of 26-30 years, as laid down in the table in Paragraph No.40 of the report in Sarla Verma (supra) is 17'. There is, of course, no basis in law to apply a multiplier based on the parents' age. That principle has been given up long ago and Sarla Verma is an authority on the point, which has universally been followed for the choice of multiplier. The Tribunal, therefore, clearly erred in adopting a multiplier of 12', which ought to be 17'. 25. The next question to be considered is about the future prospects of the deceased, which has been urged by the claimants. According to the decision of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi and others (2017) 16 SCC 680 , future prospects are admissible in cases of persons, who are self-employed or those working on fixed salary. It is no longer the law that future prospects are reserved for the salaried class in government services alone or those employed in the lucrative private sector. In this connection, reference may be made to the holding in Pranay Sethi (supra), where it has been observed : “56. The seminal issue is the fixation of future prospects in cases of deceased who are self-employed or on a fixed salary. Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] has carved out an exception permitting the claimants to bring materials on record to get the benefit of addition of future prospects. It has not, per se, allowed any future prospects in respect of the said category. 57. Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are disposed to think when we accept the principle of standardisation, there is really no rationale not to apply the said principle to the self-employed or a person who is on a fixed salary. To follow the doctrine of actual income at the time of death and not to add any amount with regard to future prospects to the income for the purpose of determination of multiplicand would be unjust. The determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated under Section 168 of the Act. The determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated under Section 168 of the Act. In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is an acceptable certainty. But to state that the legal representatives of a deceased who was on a fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of future prospects for the purpose of computation of compensation would be inapposite. It is because the criterion of distinction between the two in that event would be certainty on the one hand and staticness on the other. One may perceive that the comparative measure is certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the other but such a perception is fallacious. It is because the price rise does affect a self-employed person; and that apart there is always an incessant effort to enhance one's income for sustenance. The purchasing capacity of a salaried person on permanent job when increases because of grant of increments and pay revision or for some other change in service conditions, there is always a competing attitude in the private sector to enhance the salary to get better efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a person who is self-employed is bound to garner his resources and raise his charges/fees so that he can live with same facilities. To have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. Though it may seem appropriate that there cannot be certainty in addition of future prospects to the existing income unlike in the case of a person having a permanent job, yet the said perception does not really deserve acceptance. We are inclined to think that there can be some degree of difference as regards the percentage that is meant for or applied to in respect of the legal representatives who claim on behalf of the deceased who had a permanent job than a person who is self-employed or on a fixed salary. But not to apply the principle of standardisation on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the marrows of ground reality. But not to apply the principle of standardisation on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the marrows of ground reality. And, therefore, degree-test is imperative. Unless the degree-test is applied and left to the parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and inequitable. The degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept of percentage. Taking into consideration the cumulative factors, namely, passage of time, the changing society, escalation of price, the change in price index, the human attitude to follow a particular pattern of life, etc., an addition of 40% of the established income of the deceased towards future prospects and where the deceased was below 40 years an addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years would be reasonable. 58. The controversy does not end here. The question still remains whether there should be no addition where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] thinks it appropriate not to add any amount and the same has been approved in Reshma Kumari [Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826]. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that salary does not remain the same. When a person is in a permanent job, there is always an enhancement due to one reason or the other. To lay down as a thumb rule that there will be no addition after 50 years will be an unacceptable concept. We are disposed to think, there should be an addition of 15% if the deceased is between the age of 50 to 60 years and there should be no addition thereafter. Similarly, in case of self-employed or person on fixed salary, the addition should be 10% between the age of 50 to 60 years. The aforesaid yardstick has been fixed so that there can be consistency in the approach by the tribunals and the courts.” 26. In the State of Uttar Pradesh, future prospects are governed by Rule 220-A (3) of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short, the Rules of 1998) as held by the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. The aforesaid yardstick has been fixed so that there can be consistency in the approach by the tribunals and the courts.” 26. In the State of Uttar Pradesh, future prospects are governed by Rule 220-A (3) of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short, the Rules of 1998) as held by the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822. Therefore, the computation has to be made in accordance with the Rules of 1998, and not the principles in Pranay Sethi. 27. After the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. M/s. Sampark Lojastic Private Limited and others, 2017 (35) LCD 1311, Rule 220-A (3) of the Rules of 1998, that was introduced by Notification No. 777/XXX-4-2011-4(3)-2010 dated 26 September, 2011 i.e. The Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2011, is applicable retrospectively to an accident that happened much before the amendment. Rule 220-A (3) provides for addition of 50% of the deceased's income towards future prospects, where the deceased was aged less than 40 years. In the present case, the claimant, Smt. Urmila Chaturvedi is, therefore, held entitled to add 50% to the deceased's income. 28. The issue of award of compensation under the conventional heads was again the subject matter of consideration in Pranay Sethi, where it has been held : “48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ]. Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574 it has been reiterated by stating : (SCC p. 80, para 54) “54. … we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy.” 49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows: “3. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows: “3. General damages (in case of death): The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above : (i) Funeral expenses Rs.2000 (ii) Loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse Rs.5000 (iii) Loss of estate Rs.2500 (iv) Medical expenses — actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding Rs.15,000” 50. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting from the decision in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] and there has been no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs.1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. The justification for grant of consortium, as we find fromR ajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149], is founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore. 51. On the aforesaid basis, the Court has revisited the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads. 52. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. It has granted Rs.25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167], it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000, Rs.40,000 and Rs.15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads.” (emphasis by Court) 29. There is then the question of compensation to be awarded on account of loss of consortium. Here, the deceased was claimant No.1's son and, therefore, she would be entitled to the award of filial consortium in accordance with the holding of the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 . 30. Here, the deceased was claimant No.1's son and, therefore, she would be entitled to the award of filial consortium in accordance with the holding of the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 . 30. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, the compensation payable to the claimant-mother in this appeal is revised and shall be determined in the following manner : (i) Monthly Income (of the deceased) Rs.5000 (ii) Annual Income (of the deceased) = 5000x12 Rs.60000 (iii) Annual Income+Future Prospects (annual income x 50%) = 60000+30000 Rs.90000 (iv) Annual Dependency = Annual Income – 50% deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased = 90000-45000 Rs.45000 (v) Total Dependency = Annual Dependency x Applied Multiplier = 45000 x 17 Rs.765000 (vi) Claimant’s entitlement towards conventional heads = Loss of Estate + Funeral Expenses + dependents’ Consortium =15000+15000+40000 Rs.70000 The total compensation would therefore, work out to a figure of Rs.765000+ Rs.70000 Rs.835000 31. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the compensation awarded enhanced to Rs.8,35,000/-. The aforesaid sum of money shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. Any sum of money already deposited with the Tribunal by the Insurers, pursuant to the impugned award or the interim orders passed by this Court, shall be adjusted against it. The direction of the Tribunal for investment of the awarded compensation in fixed deposit shall stand set aside and the entire compensation, as enhanced by this award, shall be paid in account through a bank instrument or electronic transfer, as permissible under the rules or as per directions of the Tribunal on the execution side. 32. Costs easy.