JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. This Letters Patent Appeal challenges the writ Court’s order dated 22nd October 2019 dismissing W.P.(C) No. 3533 of 2019. 2. Briefly stated, pursuant to a tender notice dated 13th August 2010 issued by the Corporation for supply of fabricated items an offer was made by M/s National Small Industries Corporation Limited (in short, NSICL) which was accepted by M/s. Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (in short, the Corporation) and a rate contract was signed on 23rd November 2010. Pursuant thereto, purchase order was issued by the Corporation for supply of fabricated items as per the drawings of the Corporation. According to the Corporation, the purchase order was issued on certain terms and conditions and one of the provisions thereunder was that the parties shall resolve the dispute in accordance with the arbitration agreement. It was further provided therein that the Court at Ranchi shall only have jurisdiction to entertain a petition arising out of the contract dated 23rd November 2010. Now, in order to supply the fabricated items to the Corporation, the NSICL placed work orders dated 1st December 2010 and 3rd January 2011 to M/s Pioneer Industries (in short, the Industry) for supply of those items. These work orders contained under clause 20 a stipulation that the notification of delivery or dispatch shall be made immediately and the contractor shall further supply to the consignee or the interim consignee as the case may be, a package account quoting number of the acceptance of tender and/or supply or repeat order and date of dispatch of the stores. According to the Corporation, there were delays in supply of the fabricated items and the Corporation was entitled to invoke the liquidated damages clause and to adjust such amount from the bills of NSICL. More specifically, deduction from the bills submitted by NSICL were made in terms of Clause 8(3) of the General Conditions of the Contract. 3. Aggrieved thereby, the Industry filed a petition before the Facilitation Council at Cuttack under section 18 of the MSME Act which was registered as MSEFC Case No. 13 of 2015 and a notice dated 28th January 2017 was issued to the Corporation requiring it to appear before the Facilitation Council at 11:00 AM on 7th February 2017 for settlement of the dispute. In response to this notice, the Corporation made a request through petition dated 3rd February 2017 seeking 8 weeks’ time for amicable settlement of dispute between the parties. However, the Facilitation Council passed an award dated 7th February 2017 which was forwarded to the Corporation through Memo No. 2117 dated 1st March 2017. 4. The award dated 7th February 2017 refers to a claim for Rs. 1,61,04,831.21 raised by the Industry which included the principal sum of Rs. 78,47,291.00, replies filed by opposite party nos. 1 and 2 on 8th September 2015 and 7th September 2015 respectively and the rejoinders dated 19th October 2015 and 21st December 2015 filed by the claimant – Industry. The Facilitation Council has then considered the rival claims and made the award dated 7th February 2017, which also gives a brief narration of the sittings of the Facilitation Council. The award dated 7th February 2017 made by the Facilitation Council runs as under: “The petitioner and the respondent No:-2 were present before the Council in 43rd sitting of MSEFC on 20.02.2016. But the respondent No:-1 was absent before the Council. The Council heard the deliberation from both the sides. It is observed that as per the terms and conditions of respondent No.1, 90% of payment will be made within 60 days and the remaining 10% shall be paid after the guarantee period. NSIC participated in the tender and got the job being of lowest price bidder. The O.P. No.1 ie. Heavy Engineering Corpn. Ltd, Ranchi placed purchase order to NSIC for supply of materials & NSIC in turn placed purchase order to the petitioner accordingly. In pursuance to it, the petitioner supplied fabricated Items to OP.No.1 & raised bills amounting to Rs.2,12,68,859.00 in favour of NSIC against which Rs.1,34,21,568.00 was paid by NSIC leaving a balance of Rs.78,47,291.00. Thus, NSIC acted as the middleman and is responsible to collect & pay the outstanding dues of the petitioner as per the provision of MSMED Act, 2006. The Council directed NSIC to take appropriate action in the matter. In the meantime, NSIC has communicated to the O.P.No.1 on 20.06.2016 to release the due amount of Rs.1,00,92,568.00 along with interest to the petitioner The petitioner and O.P. No.2 were present before the Council in its 46th sitting of MSEFC held on 30.07.2016. The O.P. No.1 was absent before the council. In the meantime, NSIC has communicated to the O.P.No.1 on 20.06.2016 to release the due amount of Rs.1,00,92,568.00 along with interest to the petitioner The petitioner and O.P. No.2 were present before the Council in its 46th sitting of MSEFC held on 30.07.2016. The O.P. No.1 was absent before the council. The petitioner submitted before the council that the case is pending since 26.06.2015 and their unit is in financial crisis due to the outstanding dues lying upon the O.P. He requested the Council to decide the case at an early date. The petitioner submitted that work order was placed by NSIC and for which they had supplied the materials. The Council observed that order was placed by NSIC, part payment was effected. So, the NSC is the principal buyer and he is responsible to clear the outstanding dues of the petitioner. Both the parties were present before the Council in its 48th sitting of MSEFC held on 29.09.2016. The Council observed that NSIC shows interest for amicable settlement of the case but the petitioner did not turn up. It was taken adversely and decided that the petitioner is to attend NSIC within 15 days on their call & create atmosphere for amicable settlement. It was accepted by all. Both the parties, are directed to make an amicable settlement within 15 days of issue of this order, otherwise award as deemed proper shall be passed under MSMED Act, 2006. In the meantime, the NSIC has requested on 10.11.2016 to kindly permit them some more time to reconcile the matter with the petitioner. The petitioner on dtd. 10.12.2016 intimated to NSIC that since two months have been passed neither any account statement nor any communication has been made to HEC, Ranchi. The O.P.No.1 was present before the Council in its 50th sitting held on 30.12.2016. Keeping the submission of O.P-1 i.e. Heavy Engineering Corporation, Jharkhand in view, the Council decided to deferred the case to its next sitting for final hearing. On 13.01.2017, the petitioner submitted that till date no action has been taken by the OP. regarding amicable settlement of the case. The petitioner and O.P.No.2 were present before the Council its 51st sitting MSEFC Held on 07.02.2017, The O.P.No.1 was absent before the Council. On 13.01.2017, the petitioner submitted that till date no action has been taken by the OP. regarding amicable settlement of the case. The petitioner and O.P.No.2 were present before the Council its 51st sitting MSEFC Held on 07.02.2017, The O.P.No.1 was absent before the Council. The petitioner putforth before the Council that the O.P.No.2 i.e. NSIC does not take necessary follow up action for payment of his outstanding dues from the OP No. 1 i.e. Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. Ranchi inspite of his personal pursuation. As per the instruction of the Hon'ble council in their 50th sitting on 30.12.2016, no action has been taken by the O.Ps for amicable settlement of the case. NSIC submitted before the Council that he is in the process of pursuation but due to non co-operation of O.P. No.1, the process of amicable settlement could not be materialized. ORDER Thus, it was decided that "the Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd., Ranchi impleaded as OP. No. 1 is to pay the principal amount of Rs.22,36,386.00 (Rupees Twenty-two lakhs thirty six thousand three hundred eighty six) only along with the interest amount of Rs.90,46,635.00 (Rupees Ninety lakhs forty six thousand six hundred thirty five) upto 31.10.2015 (statement enclosed as Annexure—XIX) and further, compound interest with monthly rests shall be payable to the petitioner at the rate of 3 times of the Bank rate as notified by Reserve Bank of India from time to time till realization of dues. NSIC impleaded as O.P. No.2 is to make follow up action for payment of above outstanding dues of the petitioner within 30 days from to-day. NISC is at liberty to file case against the ultimate buyer for release of outstanding dues if he fails to comply.” 5. On receiving the communication regarding the award dated 7th February 2017, the Corporation filed an application under section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short, AC Act) which was entertained by the Facilitation Council and the date for hearing the said application was fixed on 23rd August 2018 and dismissed the said application by an order passed on 5th December 2018. In the meantime, the Corporation received a notice dated 1st August 2018 issued by the Court of Additional Judicial Commissioner-XIII at Ranchi along with the execution petition in Execution Case No. 3 of 2018. 6. In the meantime, the Corporation received a notice dated 1st August 2018 issued by the Court of Additional Judicial Commissioner-XIII at Ranchi along with the execution petition in Execution Case No. 3 of 2018. 6. The recall application dated 28th March 2017 filed in MSEFC Case No. 13 of 2015 by the Corporation was dismissed by an order dated 5th December 2018. 7. The relevant portions of the order dated 05th December 2018 passed in MSEFC Case No. 13 of 2015 are extracted below: “The petitioner and the respondent No:-2 were present before the Council in 43rd sitting of MSEFC on 20.02.2016. But the respondent No:-1 was absent before the Council. The Council heard the deliberation from both the sides. It is observed that as per the terms and conditions of respondent No.1, 90% of payment will be made within 60 days and the remaining 10% shall be paid after the guarantee period. NSIC participated in the tender and got the job being of lowest price bidder. The O.P. No. 1 i.e. Heavy Engineering Corpn. Ltd, Ranchi placed purchase order to NSIC for supply of materials & NSIC in turn placed purchase order to the petitioner accordingly. In pursuance to it, the petitioner supplied fabricated items to O.P.No.1 & raised bills amounting to Rs.2,12,68,859.00 in favour of NSIC against which Rs.1,34,21,568.00 was paid by NSIC leaving a balance of Rs.78,47,291.00. Thus, NSIC acted as the middleman and is responsible to collect & pay the outstanding dues of the petitioner as per the provision of MSMED Act, 2006. The Council directed NSIC to take appropriate action in the matter. In the meantime, NSIC has communicated to the O.P.No.1 on 20.08.2016 to release the due amount of Rs.1,00,92,568.00 along with interest to the petitioner. The petitioner and O.P. No.2 were present before the Council in its 46th sitting of MSEFC held on 30.07.2018. The OP. No… was absent before the council. The petitioner submitted before the council that the case is pending, since 28.06.2015 and the unit is in financial crisis ….. the outstanding dues lying upon the OP. He requested the Council to decide the case at an early date. The petitioner submitted that work order was placed by NSIC and for which they had supplied the materials. The Council observed that order was placed by NSIC, part payment was effected. the outstanding dues lying upon the OP. He requested the Council to decide the case at an early date. The petitioner submitted that work order was placed by NSIC and for which they had supplied the materials. The Council observed that order was placed by NSIC, part payment was effected. So, the NSIC is the principal buyer and he is responsible to clear the outstanding dues of the petitioner. Both the parties were present before the Council in its 48th sitting of MSEFC held on 29.09.2016. The Council observed that NSIC shows interest for amicable settlement of the case but the petitioner did not turn up. It was taken adversely and decided that the petitioner is to attend NSIC within 15 days on their call & create atmosphere for amicable settlement. It was accepted by all. Both the parties are directed to make an amicable settlement within 15 days of issue of order, otherwise award as deemed proper shall be passed under MSMED Act, 2006, In the meantime, NSIC has requested on 10.11.2016 to kindly permit them some more time to reconcile the matter with the petitioner. The petitioner on dtd 10.12.2016 intimated to NSIC that since two months have been passed neither any account statement nor any communication has been made to HEC, Ranchi. The O.P.No.1 was present before the Council in its 50th sitting held on 30.12.2016 keeping the submission of OP-1 i.e. Heavy Engineering Corporation, Jharkhand in view, the Council decided to deferred the case to its next siting for final hearing. On 13.01.2017, the petitioner submitted that till date no action has been taken by the OP regarding amicable settlement of the case. The petitioner and OP No 2 were present before the Council in its 51st sitting of MSEFC held on 07.02.2017. The OP.No was absent for the Council. The petitioner putforth before the Council that the OP.No.2 ie. NSIC does not take necessary follow up action for payment of his outstanding dues from the O.P No 1 ie. Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd., Ranchi inspite of his personal pursuation. As per the instruction of the Hon'ble council in their 50th sitting on 30.12.2016, no action has been taken by OPs for amicable settlement of the case. NSIC does not take necessary follow up action for payment of his outstanding dues from the O.P No 1 ie. Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd., Ranchi inspite of his personal pursuation. As per the instruction of the Hon'ble council in their 50th sitting on 30.12.2016, no action has been taken by OPs for amicable settlement of the case. NSIC submitted before the Council that he is in the process of pursuation but due to non co-operation of OP No.1, the process of amicable settlement could not be materialized. Thus, it was decided that "the Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd., Ranchi impleaded as O.P.No.1 is to pay the principal amount of Rs.22,36,386.00 (Rupees Twenty two lakhs thirty six thousand three hundred eighty six) only along with the interest amount of Rs. 90,48,635.00 (Rupees Ninety lakhs forty six thousand six hundred thirty five) upto 31.10.2015 (statement enclosed as Annexure-XIX) and further, pound interest with monthly rests shall be payable to the petitioner at the rate of 3 times of the Bank rate as notified by Reserve Bank of India from time to time till realization of dues". NSIC impleaded as OP No 2 is to make follow up action for payment of above outstanding dues of the petition within 30 days from to-day. NSIC is at liberty to file case against the ultimate buyer for release of outstanding dues if to talk to comply. In the meantime the petitioner has submitted that he has filed an Execution proceeding before the Additional District Judge, Ranchi, bearing the Commercial execution case No- 3/2018 Due to exigency the case was deferred to 24.09.2018, 26.10.2016, 28.11.2018 & 05.12.2018. The petitioner and the OP. No.1 were present and the O.P.No.2 was absent before the Council in its 63rd sitting held on 05.12.2018. The petitioner stated before the Council that an execution proceeding on 21.08.2018 before the 1st Additional District Judge, Ranchi has been initiated in Execution Case No.3/2018, wherein the O.P. one has already made his appearance and took time to file show cause which is fixed on 27.08.2018. The council observed that order was passed on 5th sitting of MSEFC held on 07.02.2017 in exparte. In the meantime, the O.P.No.1 filed a petition on 29.03.2017 to recall the exparte order dtd.07.02.2017. Accordingly, both the parties were served with notices attend the 63rd sitting of MSEFC on today.” 8. The council observed that order was passed on 5th sitting of MSEFC held on 07.02.2017 in exparte. In the meantime, the O.P.No.1 filed a petition on 29.03.2017 to recall the exparte order dtd.07.02.2017. Accordingly, both the parties were served with notices attend the 63rd sitting of MSEFC on today.” 8. At this stage, we may indicate that the Corporation did not challenge the award dated 7th February 2017 passed in MSEFC Case No.13 of 2015 by filing a section 34 petition under the AC Act and, instead, moved an application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure to question maintainability of the execution proceedings in Execution Case No. 3 of 2018. Later on, the Corporation filed the writ petition to lay a challenge to different orders passed in Execution Case No. 3 of 2018 and also questioned legality of award dated 7th February 2017 and order dated 5th December 2018 passed in MSEFC Case No. 13 of 2015. 9. The Corporation filed WP(C) No. 3533 of 2019 seeking the following reliefs: (i) To Set aside the impugned order dated 02.06.2018 (Annexure-16), admitting the Commercial Execution Case No. 03 of 2018 (M/s Pioneer Industries -Vs- M/s Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited) of the Court of Shri Rajeev Anand, the learned Presiding Officer, Commercial Court, Ranchi; (ii) To quash the summon dated 11.06.2018 and the execution petition enclosed with the summon issued in Commercial Execution Case No. 03 of 2018 (Annexure-15 series). (ii) To quash the entire proceeding of Commercial Execution Case No. 03 of 2018, as contained in execution petition filed under Order- XXI, Rule- 11 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to execute the aforesaid Award dated 07.02.2017, pending in the Court of Shri Rajeev Anand, the learned Presiding Officer, Commercial Court, Ranchi. (iv) To Set aside the impugned order dated 13.2.2019 (Annexure-20), passed in Commercial Execution Case No. 03 of 2018 by Shri Rajeev Anand, Presiding Officer, Commercial Court, Ranchi whereby it has rejected the prayer made in the dated 10.10.2018, a Preliminary Show cause and subsequent objection of the petitioner dated 23.1.2019 under Order- XXI, Rules 5 & 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (v) The impugned order/Award dated 7.2.2017 (Annexure-11) passed by the respondent No. 4 in M.S.E.F.C. Case No. 13 of 2015, whereby and where under the petitioner was ordered to pay the principal amount of Rs.22,36,386.00(Rupees Twenty Two Lakhs thirty six thousand three hundred and eighty-six only) along with interest amount of Rs.90,46,635.00 (Rupees Ninety Lakhs forty six thousand six hundred and thirty five only), calculated up to 31.10.2015 (as per the statement enclosed with the impugned Award and further compound interest with monthly rest @ three times of the Bank rate, as notified by the Reserve Bank of India from time to time till realization of the dues. (vi) To set aside/quash the impugned order dated 05.12.2018 (Annexure-14) passed in M.S.E.F.C. Case No. 13 of 2015 by the Council on the application of the writ petitioner dated 28.03.2017 (Annexure-12 hereto) whereby and where under the Council has rejected the prayer of the writ petitioner to correct and recall the order dated 07.02.2017 (Annexure- 11). 10. The writ Court considered the scheme under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (in short, MSMED Act) and came to a conclusion that the statutory regime under the MSMED Act which requires a pre-deposit of 75% of the decreetal/awarded amount is a mandatory requirement for entertaining the writ petition and, that, section 19 of the MSMED Act shall prevail upon the general provisions under section 35 of the AC Act. The writ Court held that the requirement of pre-deposit under section 19 of the MSMED Act having not been complied, W.P.(C) No. 3533 of 2019 cannot be entertained and, accordingly, dismissed the same. By an order dated 22nd October 2019, the writ petition has been dismissed holding as under: “13. It is the further settled position of Law if there is any self-contained code in the nature of special statute, the general provision will not be applicable as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kandla Export Corporation and Anr. Vrs. OCI Corporation and Anr., reported in (2018) 14 SCC 715 wherein at para17 which is being quoted hereinbelow:- “17. To answer this question, it is necessary to advert to the judgment in Fuerst Day Lawson. Vrs. OCI Corporation and Anr., reported in (2018) 14 SCC 715 wherein at para17 which is being quoted hereinbelow:- “17. To answer this question, it is necessary to advert to the judgment in Fuerst Day Lawson. The common question that arose for consideration in the batch of cases before the Court was whether an order, though not appealable under Section 50 of the Arbitration Act would, nevertheless be subject to appeal under the Letters Patent of the High Court. In answering this question, this Court exhaustively reviewed the authorities and then stated, in para 36, that the decisions noticed so far lay down certain broad principles. We are directly concerned with the principle laid down in the sub-section (vii), which reads as under. (SCC p. 350, para 36) “36. …’’(vii) The exception to the aforementioned rule is where the special Act sets out a self-contained code and in that event the applicability of the general law procedure would be impliedly excluded. The express provision need not refer to or use the words “letters patent” but if on a reading of the provision it is clear that all further appeals are barred then even a letters patent appeal would be barred.” 14. The express provision need not refer to or use the words “letters patent” but if on a reading of the provision it is clear that all further appeals are barred then even a letters patent appeal would be barred.” 14. The contention as has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that within the period to file an appeal as provided under Section 35 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the execution case has been filed herein is that when specific provision has been provided under Section 19 of the Act, 2006, there is no question to prefer an appeal under Section 35, in view of the fact that section 35 of the Act, 1996 being a Law general in nature and when the specific provision has been provided under Section 19 of the Act, 2006, then the appeal is to be filed by the parties if aggrieved with the award passed under Section 18 of the Act, 2006 by invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Section 19 of the Act, 2006, since the appellant herein who is the petitioner in the present writ petition, is the Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. who is not the supplier, therefore, as per the provision of Section 19 of the Act, seventy five per cent of the amount of compensation as awarded by the Council was required to be deposited, in case of filing an appeal as per the provision of Section 19 of the Act, 2006. Admittedly, as yet no such appeal has been preferred under Section 19 of the Act, 2006 as has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner at Bar. 15. In view of such factual aspects and the discussion made hereinabove, the second ground as has been agitated by the petitioner is being answered against the petitioner. 16. In view thereof, the writ petition fails, hence it is dismissed.” 11. This is the case set up by the Corporation that there is no buyer-supplier relationship between the parties inasmuch as the Industry is not a party to the supply contract dated 23rd November 2010 therefore the petition filed by the Industry under section 18 of the MSME Act was not entertainable by the Facilitation Council. Mr. This is the case set up by the Corporation that there is no buyer-supplier relationship between the parties inasmuch as the Industry is not a party to the supply contract dated 23rd November 2010 therefore the petition filed by the Industry under section 18 of the MSME Act was not entertainable by the Facilitation Council. Mr. Gulam Mustafa, the learned counsel for the Corporation puts forth a plea that the award which is a nullity can be challenged in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the alternative remedy route under section 34 of the AC Act read with section 19 of the MSMED Act cannot be a hurdle in availing the writ remedy by the aggrieved party. 12. In “King v. Postmaster General Ex parte Carmichael” (1928) 1 KB 291 it was observed that the superior Court shall readily issue a certiorari in a case where there has been a denial of natural justice. In “Rex v. Wandsworth Justices Ex parte Read” (1942) 1 KB 281 it was held that the remedy of a man who was convicted in a Court of summary jurisdiction without giving him an opportunity of being heard was not by way of an appeal but by an application to the High Court for an order of certiorari to quash the conviction. In “Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks” (1998) 8 SCC 1 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. And, that, the alternative remedy has been consistently held not to operate as a bar where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. Therefore, the mere fact that there is a statutory remedy of appeal shall not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ but before the High Court takes a decision to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India it should be remembered that it can be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere with the order of the inferior Tribunal/Court because there is an adequate legal remedy available to the aggrieved person. 13. Section 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 is extracted below: 19. Application for setting aside decree, award or order.— No application for setting aside any decree, award or other order made either by the Council itself or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the Council, shall be entertained by any court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five per cent of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, the other order in the manner directed by such court : Provided that pending disposal of the application to set aside the decree, award or order, the court shall order that such percentage of the amount deposited shall be paid to the supplier, as it considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case, subject to such conditions as it deems necessary to impose.” 14. Section 19 which starts with a sort of non-obstante clause provides that no application for setting-aside any decree, award or other order made either by the Council itself or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the Council shall be entertained by any Court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it 75% of amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, the other order in the manner directed by such Court. This is one of the rules of procedure that a writ petition shall normally be not entertained if the aggrieved party has an alternative statutory remedy. This is more so true in the matters relating to commercial transactions where the parties should normally approach the statutory forum unless it is demonstrated that the order has been passed by the Tribunal or Court which had no jurisdiction in the matter. This is more so true in the matters relating to commercial transactions where the parties should normally approach the statutory forum unless it is demonstrated that the order has been passed by the Tribunal or Court which had no jurisdiction in the matter. The provisions under section 19 which require deposit of 75% of the amount of the Award is a mandatory requirement for laying a challenge to the award made by the Facilitation Council. This provision further reinforces the intention of the Parliament that the award made by the Facilitation Council should not be taken lightly and the party aggrieved by the award must follow the route under section 19. In “Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC” (2020) 15 SCC 706 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the writ Court should not entertain a challenge to the award made in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Furthermore, in a series of judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the writ Court should not encourage petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution ignoring the statutory regime which normally the parties should follow and only upon the aggrieved party establishing that the alternative statutory remedy available to it is not effective, efficacious and adequate the writ Court should entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge legality of an award. In “G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd.” AIR 1952 SC 192 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the prerogative writs shall be issued by the High Court in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in grave cases where the subordinate Tribunals or bodies or officers have acted wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. No doubt a certiorari shall lie where an order/judgment has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice or there is an error apparent on the face of the record and such error has resulted in manifest injustice to a party. But, as held in “G. Veerappa Pillai”, howsoever wide or extensive the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution may be, the High Court cannot convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision under challenge, or to decide what is the proper view to be taken, or the order to be made. 15. 15. The submission made at the Bar that the award dated 7th February 2017 is a nullity inasmuch as the Facilitation Council had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 18 of the MSMED Act filed by the Industry shall necessarily pertain to an interpretation of the expressions ‘buyer’ and ‘supplier’ as defined under section 2 of the MSMED Act. For the sake of fullness, we may further indicate that the expression ‘buyer’ as defined under clause (d) to section 2 of the MSMED Act means whoever buys any goods or receives any services from a supplier for consideration. Similarly, the expression ‘supplier’ has been defined under clause (n) which reads as under: “(n) “supplier” means a micro or small enterprise, which has filed a memorandum with the authority referred to in sub-section (l) of section 8, and includes.- (i) the National Small Industries Corporation, being a company, registered under the Companies Act, 1956; (ii) the Small Industries Development Corporation of a State or a Union territory, by whatever name called, being a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956; (iii) any company, co-operative society, trust or a body, by whatever name called, registered or constituted under any law for the time being in force and engaged in selling goods produced by micro or small enterprises and rendering services which are provided by such enterprises.” 16. The well-recognized exception to a statutory alternative remedy of appeal does not take into its fold all kinds of cases and merely by raising a contentious issue the Corporation cannot support maintainability of the writ petition to challenge the award dated 7th February 2017. In a situation like the present one which would involve a strenuous exercise by the writ Court to examine the facts of the case and interpret the definition of ‘buyer’ and ‘supplier’, the writ Court shall not exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ Court shall definitely exercise its powers to entertain a challenge to the award/decree which on the face of it and, without any enquiry into the facts of the case, appears to be a nullity. Therefore, the aggrieved party must demonstrate on the face of the award a prima facie case for entertaining the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India – the present one is not such a case. Therefore, the aggrieved party must demonstrate on the face of the award a prima facie case for entertaining the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India – the present one is not such a case. The question raised by the Corporation before the writ Court could have very well been raised and established by it in a proceeding under section 34 of the AC Act. The award dated 7th February 2017 takes note of history of the case, objections taken by opposite party nos. 1 and 2 and the rejoinder affidavits dated 19th October 2015 and 21st December 2015. The award made by the Facilitation Council specifically records that the parties were present in the 48th sitting of the Facilitation Council held on 29th September 2016 but NSICL did not evince any interest for amicable settlement of the case. There are references of further sittings of the Facilitation Council held on 30th December 2016 and 7th February 2017. Therefore, the rival claims on adherence/non-adherence of the provisions under section 18(2) by the Facilitation Council also could have been decided in a section 34 petition where the parties would have supported their rival stands with reference to the materials on record. Now in a case which involves a host of disputed questions of fact and an interpretation of various clauses of the MSMED Act including the expressions ‘buyer’ and ‘supplier’, in our opinion, the writ Court has rightly stayed away from entering into the realm of factual dispute and dismissed the writ petition on the ground that no appeal has been preferred under section 19 of the MSMED Act. 17. In view of the foregoing discussions, we do not find any reason to interfere in this matter and, accordingly, LPA No. 135 of 2020 is dismissed.