JUDGMENT : (J.J. Munir, J.) 1. This is a judgment-debtor's petition under Article 227 of the Constitution arising out of a part rejection of his application under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'the Code') by the Executing Court vide order dated 05.05.2018, holding the execution application not barred by time, and the order of the learned District Judge, Etah dated 28.05.2018, affirming the said order in Revision. 2. Briefly stated, the facts relevant for decision of this petition are that one Chhote Lal instituted Original Suit No. 466 of 1969 for specific performance of contract against Maha Ram, saying that the latter had entered into an agreement to sell with the plaintiff on 14.08.1966, covenanting to sell Plot no. 442 admeasuring 4.86 acres, situate at village Birauchi, Paragana Pachalana, District Etah. The suit was instituted before the exCourt of Munsif, Kasganj, saying that Maha Ram had agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiff in terms of the suit agreement dated 14.08.1966 for a total sale consideration of Rs. 2500/-. It was covenanted between parties that Maha Ram, who was arrayed as defendant no. 1 to the suit, will execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within three months after securing bhumidhari rights. The plaintiff had paid an earnest of Rs. 1000/-, and, defendant No. 1 delivered possession to the plaintiff over the suit property. Maha Ram avoided execution of the covenanted sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on various pretexts, though the plaintiff remained ready and willing throughout to perform his part of the contract. Maha Ram stealthily executed a sale deed, conveying the suit property to one Har Prasad, arrayed as defendant no. 2 to the suit on 13.06.1969. Defendant no. 2 to the suit knew about the prior agreement in favour of the plaintiff, as also the fact of possession being with the plaintiff. The suit aforesaid was duly contested by both the defendants and decreed for the relief of specific performance by the Munsif, Kasganj vide judgment and decree dated 02.06.1975. The said decree was appealed by the second defendant to the suit, Har Prasad before the learned District Judge, Etah, arraying Maha Ram as a proforma respondent. The suit aforesaid was duly contested by both the defendants and decreed for the relief of specific performance by the Munsif, Kasganj vide judgment and decree dated 02.06.1975. The said decree was appealed by the second defendant to the suit, Har Prasad before the learned District Judge, Etah, arraying Maha Ram as a proforma respondent. The appeal, upon assignment, came on for hearing before the Additional District Judge, Court No. 5, Etah on 31.03.2011, when it was dismissed and the decree of the Trial Court affirmed. A second appeal from the appellate decree was carried to this Court, being second appeal No. 468 of 2011. The Second Appeal, however, was dismissed by this Court under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code vide an order dated 24.05.2011. It is common ground that the decree for specific performance has attained finality between parties. 3. An application for execution of the decree was moved on 21.07.2011, that is to say, after the Lower Appellate Court had affirmed the Trial Court and this Court also had summarily rejected the second appeal preferred by Har Prasad, the purchaser and another. In the execution application that was filed, in Column No. 3, the date of the decree to be executed was mentioned as 02.06.1975, that is to say, the date of the original decree. In Column No. 4, it was mentioned that a first appeal from the original decree was filed, being First Appeal No. 114 of 1975, which was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Etah on 31.03.2011. It is mentioned that Second Appeal No. 468 of 2011 too was carried before the High Court, which was dismissed vide order dated 24.05.2011. Now, in the execution case registered on the basis of the execution application dated 21.07.2011, bearing Execution Case No. 2 of 2011, an application has been filed on behalf of judgment-debtors nos. 2/1 and 2/2, bearing paper no. 54-EC-2, saying that the execution application is ex facie barred by time, because it seeks execution of the decree dated 02.06.1975 passed in Original Suit No. 466 of 1969 and presented far beyond the prescribed period of limitation of 12 years, under Article 136 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 ('the Act of 1963' for short). The limitation was sought to be reckoned from the date of the original decree by the judgment-debtors nos. The limitation was sought to be reckoned from the date of the original decree by the judgment-debtors nos. 2/1/ and 2/2, calculating time between the original decree dated 02.06.1975 passed in the suit and the date of institution of the execution application i.e. 21.07.2011. Another objection raised through the same application, bearing paper no. 54-EC-2, is to the effect that the heirs of judgmentdebtor no. 1, Maha Ram, were not properly impleaded, inasmuch as on the date of institution of the execution application, the heirs and LRs of Maha Ram were judgmentdebtors nos. 1/2/1 Satya Prakash and 1/2/2 Basdev, shown to be minors in the application, but their guardian ad litem, through whom they were to be represented, was not impleaded, in compliance with the provisions of Order XXXII Rule 3 of the Code. Another facet of this objection and more fundamental in nature that was raised was that after the death of judgment debtor no. 1 Maha Ram, who was defendant no. 1 to the suit, his heirs and LRs were not substituted in the plaint. 4. The learned 1st Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kasganj, the successor of the ex-Court of Munsif, Kasganj before whom the application, paper No. 54-C-2, came up for hearing, sustained it in a very minor part of the objection about the impleadment of judgment-debtors nos. 1/2/1 Satya Prakash and 1/2/2 Basdev. It was allowed to the extent that the decreeholder ought to carry out amendment to the execution application, indicating the age of these minor judgementdebtors on the date of presentation of the execution application and implead them through their guardian ad litem within a week. The other facet of this objection about impleadment that the said defect went much farther, as the heirs and LRs of defendant no. 1 to the suit had not been substituted in the plaint, was not accepted because his heirs and LRs were duly substituted in the second appeal, after defendant no. 1/2 Chando Devi died, who was substituted in place of original defendant no. 1 Maha Ram. The Executing Court held this to be a minor irregularity. 5. The principal objection that was canvassed through the application, paper no. 54-EC-2, was the one about limitation, briefly spoken of in the opening part of this judgment. 1/2 Chando Devi died, who was substituted in place of original defendant no. 1 Maha Ram. The Executing Court held this to be a minor irregularity. 5. The principal objection that was canvassed through the application, paper no. 54-EC-2, was the one about limitation, briefly spoken of in the opening part of this judgment. The objection precisely was that since the decree to be executed was the original decree dated 02.06.1975 and the execution application was instituted on 21.07.2011, it was way beyond the prescribed period of limitation under Article 136 of the Schedule, appended to the Act of 1963. This, no doubt, is a substantial objection, as it goes to the root of the Executing Court's jurisdiction. The Executing Court rejected this objection, holding, by the order impugned dated 05.05.2018, that it is settled law that the decree of the original Court merges into that of the Appellate Court and the execution is of the Appellate Court's decree. It was remarked that since this Court had passed a decree on 24.05.2011 in a second appeal, what was to be executed was the decree of this Court dated 24.05.2011. It was held that limitation would run from 24.05.2011, and not from 02.06.1975. The judgment-debtors nos. 2/1 and 2/2, who are the two petitioners here, carried a revision to the District Judge, Kasganj (Kasganj being carved out as a new District out of the former territory of the original District Etah, pending proceedings), who summarily dismissed the revision by the impugned order dated 28.05.2018, holding that the order impugned passed by the Executing Court was an interlocutory order, which did not fall within the definition of a 'case decided' within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code. It was also held that no injury was caused to the petitioners on account of the impugned order, rendering the revision fit to be summarily dismissed. 6. Aggrieved by the orders of the Revisional Court and the Executing Court, judgment-debtor nos. 2/1 and 2/2 have preferred this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. Heard Mr. Anil Tiwari, Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Taniya Pandey, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Shobhit Dube, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Anant Ram Dube and Mr. Anil Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1. No one has appeared on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 6. 8. Mr. 7. Heard Mr. Anil Tiwari, Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Taniya Pandey, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Shobhit Dube, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Anant Ram Dube and Mr. Anil Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1. No one has appeared on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 6. 8. Mr. Anil Tiwari, learned Senior Advocate has strenuously argued before this Court that what is being executed is the original decree dated 02.06.1975 passed by the Trial Court and it was never stayed pending the first appeal or in second appeal. It was, thus, an enforceable decree with effect from 02.06.1975. He submits that since the decree was never stayed, the prescribed period of limitation under Article 136 of the Schedule appended to the Act of 1963 i.e. 12 years has to be reckoned with effect from 02.06.1975, the limitation running continuously and never arrested. He has invited this Court's attention to Article 136 of the Schedule, appended to the Act of 1963, which reads: THE SCHEDULE (PERIODS OF LIMITATION) [See sections 2(j) and 3] Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 136. For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court. Twelve years When the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place: Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation. (emphasis by Court) 9. He has emphasized the words ‘when the decree or order becomes enforceable’ and says that the decree here is not one regarding which commencement of the period of limitation is postponed to a particular event, like a decree directing any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain or future date. The decree here passed in the suit, according to Mr. Tiwari, became executable forthwith, that is to say, on the date of the decree. The decree here passed in the suit, according to Mr. Tiwari, became executable forthwith, that is to say, on the date of the decree. Time, according to the learned Senior Advocate, would therefore, commence on 02.06.1975, running continuously from the said date until exhaustion of the period of limitation on the expiry of 12 years. He emphasizes that an order of stay, if there were one pending appeal, would surely have arrested time from running. But, it was never there. He has urged that the decree of the lower Appellate Court is a decree of dismissal and affirmation, and not an executable decree. It is for the said reason that the execution application seeks in Column No. 3, execution of the decree dated 02.06.1975 passed by the Trial Court. The learned Senior Advocate submits that time would not run from the date of the decree of the lower Appellate Court, because that is not an operative decree at all. He further submits that so far as the order of this Court is concerned, that too affirms the decrees passed by the Courts below, and for that reason, is not an executable decree from the date of which limitation would run. In the submission of the learned Senior Advocate, the Executing Court committed a manifest error of law in holding that limitation to execute the decree under Article 136 of the Schedule appended to the Act of 1963, would commence from this Court's order dated 24.05.2011 passed in the second appeal. 10. In support of his submission that limitation in this case would not be arrested and run continuously from the date of the original decree, because there was no stay in appeal granted by the Lower Appellate Court or this Court in second appeal, Mr. Tiwari has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ratansingh v. Vijaysingh and others, (2001) 1 SCC 469 . He has next placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Shyam Sundar Sarma v. Pannalal Jaiswal and others, (2005) 1 SCC 436 and further upon the authority of Ram Bachan Rai and others v. Ram Udar Rai and others, (2006) 9 SCC 446 . Also placed reliance upon by the Senior Advocate for the petitioners is the decision of the Supreme Court in Bimal Kumar and another vs. Shakuntala Debi and others, (2012) 3 SCC 548 . Also placed reliance upon by the Senior Advocate for the petitioners is the decision of the Supreme Court in Bimal Kumar and another vs. Shakuntala Debi and others, (2012) 3 SCC 548 . The thrust of the submission, as already noted on the foot of all these authorities, is that in the absence of a stay of execution of the decree passed by the Trial Court in appeal, limitation would continuously run. Before the close of his submissions, Mr. Anil Tiwari has emphasized that the learned District Judge has committed a manifest illegality in rejecting the revision summarily, holding the order impugned to be an interlocutory order, and not one that is a 'case decided', within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code. It is urged that the learned Judge has, on completely wrong and flawed premise, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him, because the settled position of the law is that where an order challenged in revision is one, if reversed, would result in a final decision of the suit or other proceedings, it can never be regarded as interlocutory. Here, according to Mr. Tiwari, if the order of the Executing Court were reversed and the execution application held barred by time, it would certainly result in termination of proceedings. 11. Mr. Shobhit Dube, learned Counsel for respondent no. 1, in reply, has supported the impugned orders. He submits that there cannot be any doubt that what was to be executed was the decree of the lower Appellate Court, wherein the decree of the Trial Court stood merged. The lower Appellate Court having passed its decree on 31.03.2011, the execution application instituted on 21.07.2011 is within limitation. Mr. Dube has placed strenuous reliance in this regard upon the holding of the Supreme Court in Surinder Pal Soni vs. Sohan Lal (Dead) through Legal Representatives, (2020) 15 SCC 771 . He has also placed reliance upon a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sajja Chimpiraiah vs. Gaddam Venkata Subbaiah (died) and others, AIR 2004 AP 528 . 12. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, this Court must say that the facts here are not in dispute. As already remarked, the suit for specific performance was decreed on 02.06.1975 and an appeal carried by the predecessor-in-title of the judgment-debtor-petitioners was dismissed by the Additional District Judge on 31.03.2011. 12. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, this Court must say that the facts here are not in dispute. As already remarked, the suit for specific performance was decreed on 02.06.1975 and an appeal carried by the predecessor-in-title of the judgment-debtor-petitioners was dismissed by the Additional District Judge on 31.03.2011. A second appeal preferred by the petitioners' predecessor was summarily dismissed by this Court under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code vide order dated 24.05.2011. Columns Nos. 3 and 4 of the execution application moved on 21.07.2011 would be relevant to refer to. These are extracted below: 3- fMdzh dk fnukad 02-06-1975 4- D;k fMdzh ds fo:) dksbZ vihy ;ksftr gqbZ\ th gk¡ ¼1½ izFke vihy la[;k 114@75 gj izlkn cuke~ NksVs yky U;k;ky; ftyk tt ,Vk esa ;ksftr gqbZ tks fnukad 31-03-2011 dks [kkfjt gqbZA ¼2½- n~forh; vihy la[;k 468@11 gj izlkn cuke~ NksVs yky vkfn ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; esa ;ksftr gqbZ tks fnukad 24-05-2011 dks okn lquokbZ fujLr gqbZA 13. Though in Column no. 3, the date of decree to be executed is mentioned as that of the original decree, but in Column No. 4, the decree with its full particulars passed in the first appeal and event in the second appeal, with all its particulars are mentioned. In the opinion of this Court, the mere mention of the original decree in Column No. 3 as the decree to be executed would not alter the substance of the execution application, which makes ample reference to the decree of the Lower Appellate Court also. 14. It is a salutary principle of law that the decree is only one. If a decree passed in a suit by the Court of the first instance is challenged in appeal and affirmed, it is the appellate decree that alone would be the ‘ruling decree’, as it is called. The appellate decree, even if a decree of affirmation, saying nothing more than that the (operative) decree of the Court of the first instance is affirmed, and the appeal dismissed, would yet be the decree that alone would be executed. The decree of the Trial Court, howsoever much it may be operative in nature, will always merge in the superior Court's decree, which then would express all its directions by just a word of affirmation. 15. So far as a second appeal is concerned, it is technically an appeal from the appellate decree. The decree of the Trial Court, howsoever much it may be operative in nature, will always merge in the superior Court's decree, which then would express all its directions by just a word of affirmation. 15. So far as a second appeal is concerned, it is technically an appeal from the appellate decree. It was mooted on behalf of respondent No. 1 by Mr. Dube that limitation would be reckoned from the date of this Court's order dismissing the appeal under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code. This need not be gone into, because on the facts here, that question is not necessary to decide. The reason is that if the decree of the Lower Appellate Court were assumed to be the ruling decree that is executable, the execution application would still be within limitation. It is not a case, where the starting point of limitation, reckoned from the date of the order under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code, dismissing the defendant's Second Appeal, is decisive about the limitation available to the decree-holder. Therefore, the ruling decree is that of the Lower Appellate Court, which is a decree dated 31.03.2011. Limitation, to bring an application for execution, therefore, would run from the date of the decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court, or the only decree, that now governs the rights of parties. The Lower Appellate Court passed its decree on 31.03.2011 and the execution application was instituted on 21.07.2011, which is clearly well within the prescribed time period of 12 years provided under Article 136 of the Schedule appended to the Act of 1963. 16. The decision in Ratansingh (supra) relied upon by Mr. Anil Tiwari, learned Senior Advocate to say that unless operation of the decree passed by the Court of first instance stayed in appeal, limitation does not cease to run, holds: “9. Filing of an appeal would not affect the enforceability of the decree, unless the appellate court stays its operation. But if the appeal results in a decree that would supersede the decree passed by the lower court then it is the appellate court decree which becomes enforceable. When the appellate order does not amount to a decree there would be no supersession and hence the lower court decree continues to be enforceable. 10. A decree is defined in Section 2(2) CPC as under: “2. When the appellate order does not amount to a decree there would be no supersession and hence the lower court decree continues to be enforceable. 10. A decree is defined in Section 2(2) CPC as under: “2. (2) ‘decree’ means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 144, but shall not include— (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation.—A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final;” 11. In order that a decision of a court should become a decree there must be an adjudication in a suit and such adjudication must have determined the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and such determination must be of a conclusive nature. If those parameters are to be applied then rejection of application for condonation of delay will not amount to a decree. Consequently, dismissal of an appeal as time-barred is also not a decree. We are aware that some decisions of the High Courts have taken the view that even rejecting an appeal on the ground that it was presented out of time is a decree within the meaning of the said definition. We are also aware of the contrary decisions rendered by High Courts on the same point. Dealing with some of those decisions a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court [S.P. Mitra, C.J., Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. (as he then was) and S.K. Datta, J.] has held in Mamuda Khateen v. Beniyan Bibi [ AIR 1976 Cal 415 : (1976) 2 Cal LJ 357 (FB)] that “if the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was rejected the resultant order cannot be a decree and the order rejecting the memorandum of appeal is merely an incidental order”. The reasoning of the Full Bench was that when an appeal is barred by limitation the appeal cannot be admitted at all until the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed and until then the appeal petition, even if filed, will remain in limbo. If the application is dismissed the appeal petition becomes otiose. The order rejecting the memorandum of appeal in such circumstances is merely an incidental order. We have no doubt that the decisions rendered by the High Courts holding the contrary view do not lay down the correct principle of law. 12. In such a situation the mere fact that the second appeal was dismissed as a corollary to the dismissal of application for condonation of delay has no effect on the decree passed by the first appellate court. 13. Learned counsel cited the decision of a two-Judge Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Shyama Pada Choudhury v. Saha Choudhury & Co. [ AIR 1976 Cal 122 : (1976) 80 CWN 29] as the Bench repelled the contention that the time would start running from the date of the decree of the lower court when the appellate court did not interfere with the lower court decree. That position was adopted in the background where the appellate court affirmed the decree of the lower court though with a slight modification regarding the costs portion. In such a situation it was rightly held that the appellate court decree became enforceable and hence the time would start running from the date of that decree.” 17. To the understanding of this Court, it is one thing to say that mere filing of an appeal would not arrest limitation from running, and quite different to say that a decree having been passed in appeal, the period of limitation would be reckoned from the date of the decree of the Appellate Court; not the original decree. It is the latter proposition which governs the fate of this case. The authority of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ratansingh relied upon by Mr. Tiwari does not hold differently. 18. The next decision relied upon by Mr. Anil Tiwari, learned Senior Advocate is Syam Sundar Sarma (supra). It is the latter proposition which governs the fate of this case. The authority of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ratansingh relied upon by Mr. Tiwari does not hold differently. 18. The next decision relied upon by Mr. Anil Tiwari, learned Senior Advocate is Syam Sundar Sarma (supra). It is a three Judge Bench decision, which appears to lay down the principle that the rejection of a delay condonation application, accompanying the memorandum of appeal, is nevertheless a decision in the appeal itself and has the same effect on divesting the Trial Court of its jurisdiction to entertain an application for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code though filed earlier, as the case, where an appeal from the ex parte decree is dismissed on merits. This decision does overrule the principle in Ratansingh that the rejection of a delay condonation application accompanying an appeal, and the consequent dismissal of the appeal as time barred, does not amount to a decree. That is not the point that arises here. Nothing is held in Shyam Sundar Sarma, which may be of any assistance to the judgment-debtors-petitioners. 19. The next authority relied upon by Mr. Anil Tiwari, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the judgment-debtor-petitioners is Ram Bachan Rai (supra), which too, this Court is afraid, does not at all apply in principle to the issue involved. Ram Bachan Rai was a case where an ex parte decree was passed and sought to be set aside under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code. The application to set aside was dismissed in default. The application to restore the earlier application to set aside was rejected by the Trial Court, and an appeal from the said order was dismissed. A revision from the Appellate Court's order was also dismissed by the High Court. When in execution, symbolic possession of the suit property was delivered to the decreeholder, the judgment-debtors moved the Executing Court under Section 47 of the Code, saying that the execution of the decree was barred by time. The decree ex parte was passed on 03.05.1976 and the execution application was instituted on 05.04.1991, that is to say, after a period of 15 years. It was beyond the limitation of 12 years. The decree ex parte was passed on 03.05.1976 and the execution application was instituted on 05.04.1991, that is to say, after a period of 15 years. It was beyond the limitation of 12 years. There was no issue on facts that there was never a stay granted on execution of the decree ex parte, at any stage, so as to arrest time from running and save limitation. The Executing Court dismissed the objection under Section 47, holding that the period of limitation would have to be reckoned from the date of rejection of the civil revision, arising out of the restoration matter by the High Court and not the date of the decree. This order was affirmed in revision by the High Court. Upon an appeal by special leave to their Lordships of the Supreme Court, reversing the Executing Court and the High Court, it was held that the execution application was barred by limitation under Article 136 of the Schedule appended to the Act of 1963, because the limitation had to be reckoned not from the date of dismissal of the civil revision arising out of the restoration matter against the exparte decree, but the date of the decree. Apparently, there was no stay of execution pending the proceedings, seeking to restore, that ultimately failed. Therefore, the period of limitation was held to run from the date of the decree continuously and end upon expiry of a period of 12 years, whereafter execution was levied. 20. This Court must observe that Ram Bachan Rai was not a case about the merger of an original decree with an appellate decree at all. It was a case where the original decree was the one to be executed, albeit after failure of motions to get it set aside before the Trial Court, and also the higher fora, since the decree was ex parte. Obviously, to this nature of proceedings, no one can doubt that the period of limitation applicable would have to be reckoned from the date of the original decree, when during motions brought to set aside the ex parte decree or by invoking appellate procedures, there was no stay of execution. It has not the slightest application to a case, where the original decree stands effaced and merged in the superior decree of an Appellate Court, as the case here. 21. It has not the slightest application to a case, where the original decree stands effaced and merged in the superior decree of an Appellate Court, as the case here. 21. The limitation here, therefore, has to be counted from the date of the Lower Appellate Court's decree, if not the order in second appeal affirming it, a question not thought necessary to be gone into, as earlier said. 22. In view of what has been said above, the decision in Ram Bachan Rai also does not bail out the judgment-debtor-petitioners. In a last ditch effort, Mr. Tiwari has fallen back for support upon the decision in Bimal Kumar (supra). He has drawn this Court's attention to the following paragraphs of the report in Bimal Kumar: “41.In this context, we may usefully refer to the dictum in Ratansingh v.Vijaysingh[ (2001) 1 SCC 469 ] wherein, while dwelling upon the concept of enforceability of a decree and the effect of an order of stay passed by the appellate court, the Bench stated thus: (SCC p. 473, paras 8-9) “8. When is a decree becoming enforceable? Normally a decree or order becomes enforceable from its date. But cases are not unknown when the decree becomes enforceable on some future date or on the happening of certain specified events. The expression ‘enforceable’ has been used to cover such decrees or orders also which become enforceable subsequently. 9. Filing of an appeal would not affect the enforceability of the decree, unless the appellate court stays its operation. But if the appeal results in a decree that would supersede the decree passed by the lower court then it is the appellate court decree which becomes enforceable. When the appellate order does not amount to a decree there would be no supersession and hence the lower court decree continues to be enforceable.” 42.In Ram Bachan Rai [ (2006) 9 SCC 446 ] the two-Judge Bench took note of the fact that an application under Order 9 Rule 13 for setting aside the ex parte decree was dismissed which was assailed in a miscellaneous appeal and ultimately in a civil revision. At no stage, stay was granted by any court. The decree-holders therein filed an application for execution after 12 years. Regard being had to the same, it was held that the execution proceeding was barred by limitation. 44. At no stage, stay was granted by any court. The decree-holders therein filed an application for execution after 12 years. Regard being had to the same, it was held that the execution proceeding was barred by limitation. 44. In the case at hand, the compromise decree had the status of a final decree. The latter suit filed by the appellants was for partition and declaring the ex parte compromise decree as null and void. As has already been stated, there was no stay of the earlier judgment or any proceedings emanating therefrom. In the absence of any interdiction from any court, the decree-holder was entitled to execute the decree. It needs no special emphasis to state that there was no impediment or disability in the way of the respondents to execute the decree but the same was not done. Therefore, the irresistible conclusion is that the initiation of execution proceedings was indubitably barred by limitation. 45. Thus analysed, the reasons ascribed by the learned Single Judge are absolutely unsustainable. The period of limitation stipulated under Article 136 of the Act could not have been condoned as has been so presumed by the learned Single Judge. The reliance placed on Bharti Devi [ AIR 2010 Jhar 10 : (2009) 3 JLJR 90 ] is totally misconceived inasmuch as in the said case, the execution proceeding was initiated for permanent injunction. No exception can be taken to the same and, therefore, reliance placed on the said decision is misconceived.” 23. Now, Bimal Kumar was a case that never involved the the merger of a decree passed by a Court of first instance with an appellate decree. It was a case where a partition suit was filed between parties earlier, where, leaving aside one defendant, the plaintiff and the other defendants filed a joint petition of compromise. The defendant, who appeared in the suit and filed a written statement to contest, later on chose not to contest. The Trial Judge accepted the compromise and passed a compromise decree, proceeding against the non compromising defendant ex parte. Later on, it appears that the heirs and legal representatives of ex-parte defendant brought a fresh suit for partition on ground that the compromise decree, passed in earlier suit, was obtained by fraud, challenging the compromise decree passed in the former suit. The later suit was dismissed. An appeal carried from this decree was dismissed for non-prosecution. Later on, it appears that the heirs and legal representatives of ex-parte defendant brought a fresh suit for partition on ground that the compromise decree, passed in earlier suit, was obtained by fraud, challenging the compromise decree passed in the former suit. The later suit was dismissed. An appeal carried from this decree was dismissed for non-prosecution. At this stage, the decree-holder in the earlier suit, where the compromise decree had been passed, applied for execution. In the meantime, the ex-parte defendant in the earlier suit, who had unsuccessfully sued and appealed by a separate suit, passed away. The decree-holders in the former suit for partition levied execution against the heirs and legal representatives of the ex parte defendant-judgment-debtors of the earlier suit. The legal representatives raised an objection that the execution was barred by limitation and deserved to be dismissed on that ground. 24. The Trial Judge dismissed the execution application as time barred. A revision carried to the High Court was allowed, holding it to be within time. In appeal by special leave, their Lordships held that in the absence of a stay of the compromise decree passed in the earlier suit being granted in the subsequent suit brought by the ex parte defendant, the limitation has to be reckoned from the date of the compromise decree. In the absence of any stay, the limitation would run continuously and run itself out at the end of the prescribed period of time. It can thus be seen that in Bimal Kumar too, there was no case about a decree of a Court of first instance merging with the decree of an Appellate Court from the date of which limitation would then have to be reckoned. Therefore, the holding in Bimal Kumar is also away from the point that the judgment-debtor-petitioners canvass here. 25. In Surinder Pal Soni (supra) relied upon by Mr. Shobhit Dube, the relevant facts and the point involved can best be understood in their Lordships' words, carried in paragraph no. 8 of the report: “8. On the other hand, Mr Gopal Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that: 8.1. The doctrine of merger applies to a situation when the limitation for the filing of an execution application is to be computed. 8.2. 8 of the report: “8. On the other hand, Mr Gopal Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that: 8.1. The doctrine of merger applies to a situation when the limitation for the filing of an execution application is to be computed. 8.2. The decree of the trial court was conditional since it contained a direction for the execution of the sale deed of the suit land except 2 kanals within a period of 2 months on receipt of the balance sale consideration. The decree contained three conditions, each of which had to be fulfilled. 8.3. In the present case, the decree of the trial court was not modified by the appellate court. 8.4. No application was filed by the appellant for the extension of time to effect deposit nor was any amount deposited while filing the execution application. The High Court while dismissing the appeal of the judgment-debtor did not grant an extension of time to the decree-holder for the deposit of the balance. 8.5. The decree-holder has not shown reasonable grounds for extension of time and the filing of an appeal does not constitute a valid ground particularly in the absence of a stay under Order 41 Rule 5. 8.6. The respondent deposited the balance of the sale consideration on 19-2-2015 without an application under Section 148 CPC for the extension of time. 8.7. For the above, it was submitted that the appellant having failed to comply with the conditions specified in the decree dated 20-3-2012, the High Court was justified in allowing the respondent's civil revision and holding that the decree had been rendered inexecutable.” 26. On these facts, repelling the contention that non grant of a stay order pending appeal by the Appellate Court would not, at all, affect the reckoning of limitation from the date of decree of the Appellate Court, subsequently passed, it was observed: “9. The rival submissions fall for our consideration. 10. By its judgment dated 20-3-2012, the trial court decreed the suit for specific performance filed by the appellant save and except for the land admeasuring 2 kanals. The decree of the trial court envisaged performance of the agreement to sell dated 8-12-2003 in respect of the land which formed the subject-matter of the suit, except for 2 kanals. 10. By its judgment dated 20-3-2012, the trial court decreed the suit for specific performance filed by the appellant save and except for the land admeasuring 2 kanals. The decree of the trial court envisaged performance of the agreement to sell dated 8-12-2003 in respect of the land which formed the subject-matter of the suit, except for 2 kanals. The judgment-debtor was directed to execute the sale deed in respect of the remaining portion of the suit land: (i) within a period of 2 months; (ii) on receipt of the balance sale consideration; and (iii) upon deducting the consideration for 2 kanals of land. The decision of the trial court was carried in appeal both by the decree-holder and by the judgment-debtor. The appellate court issued notice on the appeal and the application for stay filed by the judgment-debtor, while the decree-holder moved for execution of the decree. The judgment-debtor had filed objections to the execution of the decree. The appellate court dismissed both sets of appeals by confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. 11. Upon the decision of the appellate court, there was a merger of the judgment of the trial court with the decision which was rendered in appeal. Consequent upon the passing of the decree of an appellate court, the decree of the trial court merges with that of the appellate court. The doctrine of merger is founded on the rationale that there cannot be more than one operative decree at a given point of time. The doctrine of merger applies irrespective of whether the appellate court has affirmed, modified or reversed the decree of the trial court. In Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 ], while explaining the doctrine of merger, this Court held thus : (SCC p. 370, para 12) “12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by an inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. When a decree or order passed by an inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way — whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view.” 12. Further, while explaining the position that emerges on the grant of special leave to appeal by this Court, it was observed : (Kunhayammed case [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 ] , SCC p. 383, para 41) “41. Once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or non-speaking one.” 13. This position of law has been recently affirmed and reiterated by a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. [Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376 ] 14. The decision in Kunhayammed [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 ] was followed by a three- Judge Bench decision of this Court in Chandi Prasad [Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724 ], which held thus : (Chandi Prasad case [Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724 ] , SCC p. 731, paras 23-24) “23. The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of propriety in the hierarchy of the justice delivery system. The doctrine of merger does not make a distinction between an order of reversal, modification or an order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subjectmatter at a given point of time. 24. It is trite that when an appellate court passes a decree, the decree of the trial court merges with the decree of the appellate court and even if and subject to any modification that may be made in the appellate decree, the decree of the appellate court supersedes the decree of the trial court. In other words, merger of a decree takes place irrespective of the fact as to whether the appellate court affirms, modifies or reverses the decree passed by the trial court.” 15. More recently, the decision in Chandi Prasad [Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724 ] was followed by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Shanthi v. T.D. Vishwanathan [Shanthi v. T.D. Vishwanathan, (2019) 11 SCC 419 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 787] rendered on 24-10-2018 in the following terms : (Shanthi case [Shanthi v. T.D. Vishwanathan, (2019) 11 SCC 419 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 787], SCC OnLine SC para 7) “7. … When an appeal is prescribed under a statute and the appellate forum is invoked and entertained, for all intents and purposes, the suit continues. When a higher forum entertains an appeal and passes an order on merit, the doctrine of merger would apply. The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of the propriety in the hierarchy of the justice delivery system. The doctrine of merger does not make a distinction between an order of reversal, modification or an order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time.” 16. The doctrine of merger does not make a distinction between an order of reversal, modification or an order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time.” 16. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that under Order 41 Rule 5 CPC, an appeal does not operate as a stay of the proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except so far as the appellate court may order, nor shall execution of the decree be stayed only by reason of an appeal having been preferred from the decree. The appellate court is however vested with the authority to stay the execution of the decree for sufficient cause. The submission is that since the decree was not stayed pending the disposal of the appeal, there was no impediment in its execution and, upon the failure of the appellant to deposit the balance in the execution proceedings, the decree becomes inexecutable. The learned counsel submitted that in such a situation, application of the doctrine of merger stands obviated. 17. We are unable to accept the submission. The doctrine of merger operates as a principle upon a judgment being rendered by the appellate court. In the present case, once the appellate court confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court, there was evidently a merger of the judgment of the trial court with the decision of the appellate court. Once the appellate court renders its judgment, it is the decree of the appellate court which becomes executable. Hence, the entitlement of the decree-holder to execute the decree of the appellate court cannot be defeated.” (emphasis by Court) 27. The other decision relied upon by Mr. Dube, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 is Sajja Chimpiraiah (supra). The issue that arises here, including the facts, in the background of which the issue arose, have been considered under point No. 1. Sajja Chimpiraiah was a case that arose out of an execution proceedings brought to execute a decree for specific performance of contract and a point of limitation, barring the execution, was raised. The issue that arises here, including the facts, in the background of which the issue arose, have been considered under point No. 1. Sajja Chimpiraiah was a case that arose out of an execution proceedings brought to execute a decree for specific performance of contract and a point of limitation, barring the execution, was raised. It was observed in Sajja Chimpiraiah thus: “11.Point No. 1 : The decree-holder obtained the decree in O.S. No. 319 of 1972 on 12-1-1977 for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 26-3-1972. As per the terms of the decree, the revision petitioner was directed to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the decree-holder. The revision petitioner preferred A.S. No. 11 of 1997 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Chirala and it was dismissed on 31-8-1977. He also preferred S.A. No. 78 of 1989 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and it was dismissed by the High Court on 16-6-1997. Subsequently, the decree-holder filed E.P. No. 46 of 1999 on 20-10-1998 by depositing the balance sale consideration with interest, after obtaining an order of extension from the High Court on 9-1-1998, to direct the revision petitioner under Order 21, Rule 34, C.P.C. to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the decree-holder after receiving the balance of sale consideration and in the event of the failure of the revision petitioner, the Court to execute the sale deed on their behalf through process of the Court. If the date of the decree of the Junior Civil Judge, Parchur is taken into consideration, the execution petition is beyond the period of 12 years, since the original decree was passed on 12-1-1977. If the decree of the High Court in the Second Appeal is taken as 16-6-1997, the Execution Petition is within time. 12. The learned counsel for the decree-holder Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar submitted that since the revision petitioner preferred appeals before the Sub-Court and the High Court, the decree of the trial Court and the AP530 first Appellate Court merged with the decree of the High Court in the second appeal. Therefore, the limitation starts to run from the date of the disposal of the second appeal i.e., 16-6-1997. Therefore, the limitation starts to run from the date of the disposal of the second appeal i.e., 16-6-1997. Hence, the decree-holder has ample time to file the execution petition within 12 years from the date of the decree of the High Court and as the execution petition was filed on 20-10-1998, it is within time. Therefore, the decree is enforceable against the revision petitioner and the question of rescinding the contract of sale under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act does not arise. 13. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner Sri T. Jagadish submitted that since the execution petition was filed beyond the period of 12 years from the date of the decree of the Junior Civil Judge, Parchur, the execution petition could not be maintained. Therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. 14. The learned counsel for both parties placed strong reliance on various judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts and they requested to pass appropriate orders in the light of the principles laid down in those judgments. 15. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied on the following rulings and requested to hold that the execution petition is barred by limitation. 16. In Ratansingh v. Vijaysingh, AIR 2001 SC 279 , the Supreme Court while considering the scope of Article 136 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 held as follows (Paras 8 and 9) :"Article 136 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 provides 12 years for execution of any decree or order of any Civil Court (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction). The third column in the Article which indicates the time from which period begins to run, states that "when the decree or order becomes enforceable........" Normally a decree or order becomes enforceable from its date. But cases are not unknown when the decree becomes enforceable on some future date or on the happening of certain specified events. The expression "enforceable" has been used to cover such decrees or orders also which become enforceable subsequently. Filing of an appeal would not affect the enforceability of the decree, unless the appellate Court stays its operation. But if the appeal results in a decree that would supersede the decree passed by the lower Court and it is the appellate Court decree which becomes enforceable. Filing of an appeal would not affect the enforceability of the decree, unless the appellate Court stays its operation. But if the appeal results in a decree that would supersede the decree passed by the lower Court and it is the appellate Court decree which becomes enforceable. When the appellate order does not amount to a decree there would be no supersession and hence the lower Court decree continues to be enforceable." 17. Under Article 182 of the old Limitation Act, the time from which the period would begin to run was shown as :- 1) Date of the decree or order or 2) Whether there has been appeal, the date of final decree or order by the appellate Court or withdrawal of the appeal. 18. Section 48 of the old C.P.C. prescribed a period of 12 years, before expiry of which, an application could be made for execution. "Sec. 48 (1) Where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting an injunction has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of twelve years from-(a) the date of the decree sought to be executed, or,(b) where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree.(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed-(a) to preclude the Court from ordering the execution of a decree upon an application presented after the expiration of the said term of twelve years, where the judgment-debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of the decree at sometime within twelve years immediately before the date of the application; or(b) to limit or otherwise affect the operation of Article 180 of the second schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1877. 19. The provision under Article 182 of AP531 the old Limitation Act, was quite different from its corresponding Article 136 of the present Limitation Act. Now period of execution of a decree starts running from the date when it becomes enforceable. 20. 19. The provision under Article 182 of AP531 the old Limitation Act, was quite different from its corresponding Article 136 of the present Limitation Act. Now period of execution of a decree starts running from the date when it becomes enforceable. 20. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that as per the above decision of the Supreme Court the decree becomes enforceable from the date on which the Appellate Court passed the decree which supersedes the decree of the trial Court and as there was no decree passed by the first Appellate Court or second Appellate Court altering the decree passed by the trial Court it became enforceable from the date of decree of the trial Court. Therefore, the execution petition filed beyond the period of 12 years from the date of the decree of the trial Court cannot be maintained. 21. In Antonysami v. Arulanandam Pillai, 2002 (1) Andh LD 1 : AIR 2001 SC 2967 , the Supreme Court while considering the scope of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 held that when a decree of specific performance was passed with a direction that the decree-holder should deposit the balance of sale consideration before a particular date and the judgment-debtor to measure and demarcate the land before the same date and when the decree-holder deposited the amount the limitation for execution starts despite the Judgment-debtor failing to demarcate the land, the decree becomes executable when once the decree-holder deposits the amount. 22. In West Bengal Essential Commodities Supply Corporation v. Swadesh Agro Farming and Storage Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 3421 , the Supreme Court held as follows (Para 21) : "The period of limitation for execution of decree under Article 136 of the Limitation Act runs from the date of the decree and not from the date when the decree is actually drawn up and signed by the Judge." 23. In Bhuralal v. Jiwansingh, AIR 1956 Rajasthan 21, Modi J., held as follows : "Article 182 is not exhaustive in the sense that it is not the only Article which applies to execution applications and that Art. 181 may also be applicable to such applications. Article 181 is a residuary Article and will only apply where the application of Article 182 is excluded. Article 181 is a residuary Article and will only apply where the application of Article 182 is excluded. The correct Article applicable to applications for execution in conditional decrees is Article 181, Limitation Act and not Article 182, and that as there is nothing in law to preclude the decree-holder from performing the condition laid down in the decree on the very day the decree is passed, where no date for the performance of the condition is specified in the decree itself, the decree-holder has the liberty to perform the condition within three years of the date of the decree at the most but not beyond it, and he cannot be permitted to extend this period by a belated performance of the condition which it was for him to fulfil." 24. In L. Lahori Ram Sahgal v. L. Prabhu Dayal, AIR 1953 Allahabad 120, a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court considered the scope of Section 148, C.P.C., 1908, regarding the extension of time in a decree for specific performance held as follows : "The decree was to become executable only on compliance of its terms. Failure to comply with the terms would make the decree inexecutable. The decree-holder not having fulfilled the terms of the contract had no right to get the decree executed." 25. The law laid down in the above decisions, makes it clear that the period for execution of a decree starts running from the date when it becomes enforceable. The above decisions are not helpful to the revision petitioner on the question as to when the limitation for execution of a decree starts to run. 26. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand cited the following decisions regarding the starting point of limitation for execution of the decree. 27. In Nalluri Veerraju v. Sri Kanchi Kamakshammavari Temple at Madhavaram, West Godavari Dist., (1997) 1 Andh LD 716 : 1997 AIHC 2151, S. Dasaradharama Reddy, J., of A. P. High Court while considering the scope of Article 136 of the Limitation Act held that the Limitation has to be computed from the date of the appellate decree, in the appeal preferred by one of the defendants, though the petitioner himself did not file the said appeal. The Court further held that when one of the judgment-debtors filed appeal AP532 against the decree and judgment of the trial Court though dismissed, the Execution Petition filed against the second Judgment-debtor is not barred by time, as the limitation has to be computed from the date of the appellate decree. 28. In Posani Ramachandraiah v. Daggupati Seshamma, AIR 1978 Andh Pra 342, a Division Bench of this Court held as follows : "Where appellate decree is sought to be executed, limitation starts from the date of that decree as decree of the first Court merges with the decree of the Appellate Court." The Court further held : "Art. 136 says that the period of limitation begins to run when the decree or order becomes enforceable. It does not say when it becomes enforceable. The repealed S. 48, C.P.C. says, that no order for execution of a decree shall be made after the expiration of twelve years from the date of the decree sought to be executed. The meaning of the words "from the date of the decree sought to be executed", in S. 48 C.P.C. and the words "where the decree or order becomes enforceable" in Art. 136, is practically the same." "When the Legislature enacted Art. 136 by omitting S. 48, C.P.C. and re-producing it in Art. 136, they must have been aware of the interpretation of S. 48 by the Courts and approved of it. Consequently, under Art. 136 of the present Limitation Act, the period of limitation can be reckoned from the date of the appellate decree, even though there was no stay in the appeal. If there is an appeal, the decree that can be enforced is that of the appellate Court, and the period of limitation has to be reckoned from the date of that decree." 29. In Thodkamalla Venkata Laxmi Narayanarao v. Kishanlal, AIR 1961 Andh Pra 326, a Division Bench of this High Court while considering the scope of Section 48, CPC and Article 182 of the old Limitation Act held as follows : "When execution application filed beyond 12 years of original decree but within time from the date of dismissal of appeal by appellate Court, the execution application is not barred by Section 48, C.P.C. in view of the unrestricted words "where there has been an appeal" in Article 182 of the old Limitation Act." 30. In Nacharammal v. Veerappa Chettiar, AIR 1946 Madras 231, a Division Bench of Madras High Court while dealing with Section 48, C.P.C. held as follows : "Where an appellate Court passes a decree it takes the place of the decree of a trial Court, and it is the decree of the appellate Court only which becomes capable of execution, consequently the period of 12 years under S. 48 commences from the date of such appellate decree and not from the date of the decree of the trial Court." 31. In S.T.M. Vyravan Chettiar v. R.M. Rayalu Ayyar Nagaswami Ayyar and Co., AIR 1951 Madras 844, a Division Bench of Madras High Court held as follows : "The period of 12 years under S. 48 would be computed from the date of the decree and not from the date when that decree is amended." 32. The trend of the above decisions leads to a conclusion that irrespective of allowing or dismissing the appeal, the period of limitation has to be computed from the date of the appellate decree for filing the execution petition. 33. In the present case the appeals preferred by the revision petitioner were dismissed. Therefore, the contention of the revision petitioner that the limitation runs from the date of the original decree cannot be accepted. It is applicable to cases where appeals were entertained at the instance of one of the judgment-debtors also. 34. In the light of the above legal position it can be safely concluded that from the date of the decree of the High Court dated 16-6-1997, the execution petition was within time. Therefore, it is not barred by limitation. 35. Point No. 2 : The revision petitioner filed I.A. No. 269 of 1999 under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act requesting to rescind the contract dated 26-3-1972 and to restore the schedule property to the revision petitioner directing the respondent to pay the costs. The revision petitioner in the said application contended AP533 that he purchased the schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 15-4-1972 from the third respondent. The Principal District Munsif Court, Chirala passed a decree on 12-1-1977 for specific performance of the contract of sale dated 26-3-1972, wherein he was directed to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the first respondent. The Principal District Munsif Court, Chirala passed a decree on 12-1-1977 for specific performance of the contract of sale dated 26-3-1972, wherein he was directed to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the first respondent. The first respondent did not file the execution petition to execute the decree within the period of 12 years, therefore, it is barred by limitation. He also contended that since the first respondent failed to pay the balance of purchase money within the period of limitation, the decree for specific performance is barred by limitation, therefore, the contract has to be rescinded by holding that he is entitled for restoration of possession of the property. The first respondent resisted the application contending that the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court settled the issue between the parties regarding the execution of the sale deeds and he further contended that since the High Court allowed him to pay the balance of sale consideration by extending time, he is entitled to get the decree enforced through the execution petition.” (emphasis by Court) 28. The issue was examined by this Court in Chandi Prasad and others vs. Addl. Dist. and Sessions Judge, Hapur and others, AIR 2001 All 229 , wherein Sudhir Narain, J. held: “9. The question is whether the decree drawn in pursuance of the judgment of the High Court passed on 18-4-1985 shall be taken as the date when the decree becomes enforceable or the date of the judgment of the lower appellate Court delivered on 4-1-1974. Similar controversy was raised in Banshidhar Durga Dutta v. Loonkaran Sethia, 1983 ALJ 557, where the execution application was filed after the judgment of the appellate Court, the Division Bench of this Court held that the decree becomes enforceable after the judgment of the lower appellate Court. In this case the appeal was dismissed as not pressed and the judgment-debtor raised the contention that as the appeal was not pressed and the judgment was affirmed and as there was no stay of the operation of the decree of the trial Court, the execution application become time barred. This contention was not accepted on the reasoning that once the appeal has been filed against the decision of the lower appellate Court it is open to the decree-holder to wait for the decision of the appeal and thereafter to file application for execution of the decree. This contention was not accepted on the reasoning that once the appeal has been filed against the decision of the lower appellate Court it is open to the decree-holder to wait for the decision of the appeal and thereafter to file application for execution of the decree. It was observed (at Page 559; of All LJ): “It follows from the law laid down by the Privy Council that if the Court's order furnishes a cause of action then similarly the lower Court's decree also furnishes a cause of action. The time from which the limitation begins to run is the point when the decree or order becomes enforceable. The expression “enforceable” means “to put into execution, to cause to take effect”. In case of a decree of the trial Court being affirmed, the appellate decree becomes enforceable and that can be put into execution. The Judgment debtors' contention that since there was no stay order, the decree holder could not take advantage of the time spent in prosecution of the appeal, does not appeal to us to be tenable. A judgment-debtor does not lose by the decree holder's not putting his decree into execution. The decree-holder has the choice to wait for the decision of the appeal. The law does not cast any duty on him to put the decree into execution immediately after its being passed. It had not been denied that in case of a decree being modified or varied, the period of limitation would start from the date of passing of the decree in the appeal. If that so, there is no reason to take contrary view in respect of a decree which is confirmed in appeal. There is no logic in holding a decree of the latter category to have become barred by time if the execution of the same is not made immediately after its being passed by the trial Court. If the principle of merger applies, the decree of the trial Court would get merged with that of the appellate Court and it is that decree which will become enforceable.” 10. The principle of doctrine of merger was applied by the Supreme Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 : AIR 2000 SC 2587 . If the principle of merger applies, the decree of the trial Court would get merged with that of the appellate Court and it is that decree which will become enforceable.” 10. The principle of doctrine of merger was applied by the Supreme Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 : AIR 2000 SC 2587 . It was clarified that so far as principle of merger is concerned, on principle there is no distinction between order of reversal or modification and order of confirmation passed by the appellate Court. As in all the three cases the order passed by the lower authority shall merge in the order passed by the appellate authority whatsoever be its decision - whether of reversal or modification or only confirmation. The Court relied upon the following observation of the Supreme Court in UJS Chopra v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 633 : (1955 Cri LJ 1410 at page 649 : of AIR). “A judgment pronounced by a High Court in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction after issue of a notice and a full hearing in the presence of both the parties would replace the judgment of the lower Court, thus constituting the judgment of the High Court the only final judgment to be executed in accordance with law by the Court below.” 11. x x x 12. In view of the above the application filed by defendant-respondents for execution of the partition decree was within time as it was filed within 12 years from the date of the judgment of the High Court in Second Appeal referred to above. (emphasis by Court) 29. On appeal, the decision of this Court in Chandi Prasad was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Chandi Prasad and others vs. Jagdish Prasad and others, (2004) 8 SCC 724 , where it was held by their Lordships: “23. The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of propriety in the hierarchy of the justice-delivery system. The doctrine of merger does not make a distinction between an order of reversal, modification or an order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. 24. The doctrine of merger does not make a distinction between an order of reversal, modification or an order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. 24. It is trite that when an appellate court passes a decree, the decree of the trial court merges with the decree of the appellate court and even if and subject to any modification that may be made in the appellate decree, the decree of the appellate court supersedes the decree of the trial court. In other words, merger of a decree takes place irrespective of the fact as to whether the appellate court affirms, modifies or reverses the decree passed by the trial court. When a special leave petition is dismissed summarily, doctrine of merger does not apply but when an appeal is dismissed, it does. [See V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. (P) Ltd. v. CIT [ (2000) 5 SCC 373 : AIR 2000 SC 1623 ] .] 25. The concept of doctrine of merger and the right of review came up for consideration recently before this Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [ (2000) 6 SCC 359 ] wherein this Court inter alia held that when a special leave petition is disposed of by a speaking order, the doctrine of merger shall apply stating: (SCC p. 383, paras 41-43) “41. Once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or non-speaking one. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or non-speaking one. Whenever this Court has felt inclined to apply its mind to the merits of the order put in issue before it though it may be inclined to affirm the same, it is customary with this Court to grant leave to appeal and thereafter dismiss the appeal itself (and not merely the petition for special leave) though at times the orders granting leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal are contained in the same order and at times the orders are quite brief. Nevertheless, the order shows the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and therein the merits of the order impugned having been subjected to judicial scrutiny of this Court. 42. ‘To merge’ means to sink or disappear in something else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up. Merger in law is defined as the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is not increased; an absorption or swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity and individuality. (See Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LVII, pp. 1067-68.) 43. We may look at the issue from another angle. The Supreme Court cannot and does not reverse or modify the decree or order appealed against while deciding a petition for special leave to appeal. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before the Supreme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage. 26. In Kunhayammed [ (2000) 6 SCC 359 ] it was observed: (SCC p. 370, para 12) “12. If the order impugned before the Supreme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage. 26. In Kunhayammed [ (2000) 6 SCC 359 ] it was observed: (SCC p. 370, para 12) “12. … Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way — whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subjectmatter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view.” 27. The said decision has been followed by this Court in a large number of decisions including Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. [ (2004) 2 SCC 747 ]” 30. The same principles were reiterated in a very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Shanthi vs. T.D. Vishwanathan and another, (2019) 11 SCC 419 , where their Lordships followed their earlier decision in Chandi Prasad. 31. The indisputable position, therefore, is that limitation has to be reckoned from the date of the decree of the Appellate Court, even if the date of the order of this Court dismissing the second appeal in limine is ignored. The appellate decree was passed on 31.03.2011 by the learned Additional District Judge and the execution application was made on 21.07.2011, which was well within the limitation of 12 years under Article 136 of the Schedule appended to the Act of 1963. The mention of the date of original decree in Column No. 3 would not make any difference because there is copious reference in Column No. 4 of the execution application to the decree passed in appeal. 32. In the opinion of this Court, therefore, the execution is competent and must proceed. 33. No other point was pressed. 34. This petition fails and is dismissed with costs.