JUDGMENT : GANESH RAM MEENA, J. 1. The present writ petitions arise out of the judgment and decree dated 10.1.1991 passed by the Court of Assistant Collector & Executive Magistrate, Chaksu, Camp Sanganer (for short ‘the trial court’), in Civil Suit No. 215/1986, which was allowed and decreed in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents. The validity of the said judgment and decree was assailed before the Court of Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur (for short ‘the first appellate court’), by way of filing an Appeal No. 49/1993 by the State of Rajasthan and another Appeal No. 38/1993 by the Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur (for short ‘the JDA’) which were dismissed vide judgment dated 14.12.2018. The judgment and decree of the trial court dated 10.1.1991 and judgment and decree of the first appellate court dated 14.12.2018 were challenged by the State of Rajasthan before the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer (for short ‘the second appellate court’), by filing an Appeal No. 3057/2019 and also by the JDA by filing Appeal No. 763/2019. The Court of Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer, dismissed both the appeals vide its judgment dated 6.3.2020. 2. Since both the above numbered writ petitions arise out of the judgments and decrees passed by the three courts below and the subject matter being common, both these writ petitions are being disposed of by this common order. 3. The facts in brief borne out from the pleadings of the writ petitions are that the plaintiffs/respondents filed a suit before the trial court for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of land bearing Khasra No. 4 measuring 195 bigha and 16 Biswa situated in Village Muhana, District Jaipur (present Khasra No. 275 of Village Mohanpura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur) stating therein that they are the agriculturists and residents of village Mohanpura, Tehsil Sanganer and they are the tenants of the land in question. It was further stated by the plaintiffs/respondents in the suit that at the time of commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act of 1955’) i.e. in Samvat 2012, they were in cultivatory possession of the land in question and the Settlement Department at the time of settlement proceedings illegally and without notice to them recorded the land as Siwai Chak, though the Settlement Department has no jurisdiction to change the category of the land. It was further stated that on the basis of the wrong entry about the category of the land in question as Siwai Chak, the defendants authorities are bent upon to evict the plaintiffs from the land in question. In the suit it was prayed as under: ¼d½ nkok oknhx.k fo:) Áfroknhx.k fMØh fd;k tkdj bLrdjkj bl vej dk fd;k tkos fd oknhx.k Hkwfe lkfcdk [kljk uEcj 4 jdck 195 ch?kk 16 fcLok okds xzke eqgkuk rRdkyhu rglhy t;iqj o gky [kljk uEcj 275 jdck 195 ch?kk 16 fcLok okds xzke eksguiqjk rglhy lkaxkusj ds [kkrsnkj dk’rdkj gS ,oa oknhx.k dks eqUntkZ en uEcj 4 vthZnkok [kkrsnkj dk’rdkj ?kksf"kr fd;k tkos ,oa tekcanh lsfVyesUV ,oa jktLo vfHkys[kksa esa tgka flokbZpd yxku bl Hkwfe dks fy[kk gS og fujLr dj oknhx.k dks [kkrsnkj vafdr fd;k tk;sA ¼[k½ ;g gS fd Áfroknhx.k dks tfj;s gqDe bErukbZ nokeh ls ikcan fd;k tkos fd oks Hkwfe [kljk uEcj lkfcdk 4 okds fLFkr xzke eqgkuk rRdkyhu rglhy t;iqj o gky [kljk uEcj 175 jdck 195 ch?kk 16 fcLok fLFkr xzke eksguiqj esa oknhx.k ds dCts dk’r esa fdlh Ádkj dk dksbZ gLr{ksi djs u fdlh ls djkosA ¼x½ gtkZ o [kpkZ eqdnek fnyk;k tkosA ¼?k½ vU; nknjlh tks cgd oknhx.k dks fnykbZ tkosA 4. The State through Tehsildar submitted the written statement and denied the averments as stated in the plaint and prayed to dismiss the suit. However, in the written statement the petitioner-State has admitted that the plaintiffs are agriculturists and are in cultivatory possession of the land in question. It was further stated in the written statement that during the settlement proceedings, vide order dated 3.2.1960 in Misal No. 1476/1960, the land was recorded as Siwai Chak and the land measuring 56 Bigha and 14 Biswa has been allotted to the former Jagirdars. It was further stated that the plaintiffs are in possession of the land in question as tress-passers and they cannot claim declaration as khatedars of the land in question. 5. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial court framed as many as eight issues. It was further stated that the plaintiffs are in possession of the land in question as tress-passers and they cannot claim declaration as khatedars of the land in question. 5. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial court framed as many as eight issues. The said issues are reproduced as under: ¼1½ vk;k oknhx.k lkfcdk Hkwfe [kljk uEcj 4 gky [kljk uEcj 275 jdck 195 ch?kk 16 fcLok okds xzke eksguiqjk rglhy lkaxkusj ds dkfct [kkrsnkj dk’rdkj gSA &oknh ¼2½ vk;k oknhx.k dks Áfroknh la[;k 1 csn[kyh dh dk;Zokgh dj jgk gS] ftldks LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk ls ikcan fd;k tkosA &oknh ¼3½ vk;k nkok fe;kn ckgj gSA &Áfroknh ¼4½ vk;k oknhx.k }kjk egdek cankscLr esa dksbZ dk;Zokgh u djus ds dkj.k nkok pyus ;ksX; ugha gSA &Áfroknh ¼5½ vk;k nkos esa t;iqj fodkl Ákf/kdj.k vko’;d i{kdkj gS ftlds vHkko esa nkok pyus ;ksX; ugha gSA &Áfroknh ¼6½ vk;k Áfroknhx.k la[;k 2 ls 13 }kjk oknhx.k dk Dyse Lohdkj djus dh lwjr esa bl ij nkos dk D;k vlj gksxk\ &Áfroknh ¼7½ vk;k Áfroknh uEcj 1 }kjk ;g dFku fd oknhx.k ls Áfroknh la[;k 1 dks dCtk okfil fnyk, tkus dk nkos gktk esa D;k vlj gksxk\ &Áfroknh ¼8½ vk;k nknjlh D;k gksxh\ 6. The trial court after recording the evidence of the witnesses of the parties and taking into consideration the documentary evidence submitted by the parties, decreed the suit vide its judgment and decree dated 10.1.1991 and declared the plaintiffs as khatedars of the land in question and also ordered for making alteration in the revenue record by recording their names as khatedars and further restrained the defendants from interfering in the cultivatory possession of the plaintiffs. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 10.1.1991, both the petitioners filed separate appeals before the first appellate court which were dismissed by a detailed judgment and decree dated 14.12.2018 and further two separate appeals by the petitioners were also dismissed by the second appellate court vide its judgment dated 6.3.2020. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on the record. 9. Learned counsels appearing for the petitioners/defendants submitted that the plaintiffs/respondents cannot claim khatedari rights over the land in question in view of the provisions of the Act of 1955. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on the record. 9. Learned counsels appearing for the petitioners/defendants submitted that the plaintiffs/respondents cannot claim khatedari rights over the land in question in view of the provisions of the Act of 1955. It has been argued that the plaintiffs were supposed to prove that they were kastkars over the land in question at the time of commencement of the Act of 1955 and merely because they are in possession over the land in question, they cannot claim khatedari rights. It was also argued that the land was earlier recorded as grass-beed, and therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 16(xiii) of the Act of 1955, no khatedari rights can be given over the land in question. It was also submitted on behalf of the petitioners that no documentary evidence exposing cultivatory possession of the plaintiffs as tenants has been submitted by the plaintiffs. Learned counsel appearing for the State further submitted that the land in question was recorded as a Siwai Chak by the Settlement Department vide order dated 3.2.1960 and the plaintiffs/respondents are in possession only as trespassers and the trespassers cannot claim khatedari rights. It was further argued that the findings of the courts below are not proper and further the order passed by the first appellate court is not a reasoned order. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-JDA has relied upon the case of Noor Khan vs. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan and Others (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4121/1999) decided on 29.05.2015 as also the case of Jaiphal Khan and Others vs. State of Rajasthan and Others (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14255/2013) decided on 10.10.2014 delivered by the Principal Seat at Jodhpur and argued that in a case for declaration of khatedari rights one has to produce cogent evidence on record and in absence of any evidence on record establishing the continuous old possession of the land in question so as to make him entitled for declaration of khatedari rights in his favour, the findings arrived at by the courts below, cannot be faulted with. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-State relied upon the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur in Madhupuri vs. The Board of Revenue for Rajasthan and Others (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2416 of 1974) decided on 02.02.1980. 12. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-State relied upon the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur in Madhupuri vs. The Board of Revenue for Rajasthan and Others (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2416 of 1974) decided on 02.02.1980. 12. Counsels appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents submitted that in view of the concurrent findings of all the three courts below after appreciation of the evidence-oral as well as documentary, no interference is warranted in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It has been further argued that in the written statement submitted by the State through its Tehsildar, he has admitted the cultivatory possession of the plaintiffs/respondents over the land in question and there are concurrent findings of all the three courts below in regard to the possession of the plaintiffs/respondents based on oral and documentary evidence. It has been further argued that the land in question was wrongly recorded as Siwai Chak by the Settlement Department as the Settlement Department during the settlement proceedings has no jurisdiction to change the revenue record as has been changed in the year 1960 by recording the land in question as Siwai Chak land. It has been further submitted that the petitioner-State in the written statement filed before the trial court has stated in the prayer clause that the plaintiffs/respondents be evicted from the land in question and the possession of the land be given to the State which clearly proves that the plaintiffs/respondents were there in the cultivatory possession of the land in question. Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents also raised an issue that the appeal before the first appellate court was not even maintainable because the same was filed without placing on record the decree under challenge. It has also been submitted that as per Clause 30 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual, 1956, copy of the decree mandatorily be required to be accompanied with the memo of appeal. It has also been submitted that though the State is the custodian of the revenue record but the State failed to consider any oral or documentary evidence contrary to the pleadings and averments made by the plaintiffs/respondents. 13. In support of their submissions, counsels appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents have placed reliance upon following judgments: 1. Dagadabai (Dead) by Legal Representatives vs. Abbas @ Gulab Rustum Pinjari, (2017) 13 SCC 705 2. 13. In support of their submissions, counsels appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents have placed reliance upon following judgments: 1. Dagadabai (Dead) by Legal Representatives vs. Abbas @ Gulab Rustum Pinjari, (2017) 13 SCC 705 2. Syeda Rahimunnisa vs. Malan Bi (Dead) by Legal Representatives and Another, (2016) 10 SCC 315 3. Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015) 4 SCC 264 4. Nagendra Nath Bora and Another vs. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and Others, AIR 1958 SC 398 5. T.C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa and Another, AIR 1954 SC 440 6. Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Others, AIR 1955 SC 233 (1) 7. Tahal Singh vs. Board of Revenue and Others, 2003 (2) RLR 485 8. Sugarbai M. Siddiq and Others vs. Ramesh S. Hankare (Dead) by LRs. (2001) 8 SCC 477 14. The argument of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners/defendants is that the khatedari rights cannot accrue to the plaintiffs/respondents in the land in question. It is noted that it is not the claim of the plaintiffs/respondents for allotment of the land in question but since they were already in possession of the said land prior to the enactment of the Act of 1955, therefore, a declaratory suit was filed by them for declaration of the khatedari rights and permanent injunction. 15. The argument of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners/defendants alleging erroneous findings recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate courts is not appreciable and acceptable because on all the issues framed by the trial court, the trial court while recording the findings on each issue examined the record, evaluated the evidence and thereafter on a detailed deliberations recorded its findings and decided the suit. The basic plea of the petitioners/defendants is that there was no documentary evidence submitted by the plaintiffs/respondents in regard to their cultivatory possession over the land in question at the time of commencement of the Act of 1955. It is pertinent to observe here that the plaintiffs/respondents filed the suit, pleading that they are in cultivatory possession over the land in question. The State filed written statement through its Tehsildar and admitted the cultivatory possession of the plaintiffs/respondents at the time of commencement of the Act of 1955 and also the plaintiffs/respondents submitted as many as 27 documentary evidence in support of their claim and pleading. The State filed written statement through its Tehsildar and admitted the cultivatory possession of the plaintiffs/respondents at the time of commencement of the Act of 1955 and also the plaintiffs/respondents submitted as many as 27 documentary evidence in support of their claim and pleading. The finding recorded by the trial court in regard to the issue No. 1 has been affirmed by the first appellate court as well as the second appellate court by the detailed reasoned judgments. The learned counsels appearing for petitioners/defendants could not point out any infirmity or perversity in the findings recorded by the trial court and affirmed by two Appellate Courts. 16. On consideration of the material available on the record and on detailed examination of the judgments of the courts below it can be safely held that there is no infirmity and perversity in the findings recorded by the trial court and the reasoned orders of the Appellate Courts affirming the findings of the trial court. The First Appellate Court in Para 8 of its judgment and the Second Appellate Court from Para Nos. 5 to 13 of its judgment have also gone in detail while scanning the findings recorded by the trial court. This Court is of the view that concurrent findings of fact recorded by three courts below are not required to be interfered with as there is no infirmity and perversity in the same. 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Kondiba dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 722 held that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by three courts below are not required to be interfered with. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Para 5 of the said judgment has observed as under: “5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court had given satisfactory reasons for doing so. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court had given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the tower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable of its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex Court, or was based upon in inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 18. This Court in the case of Ganga Ram and Another vs. State of Rajasthan, 2012 (1) RRT 325 held as under: “In this view of the matter, in considered opinion of this Court, the concurrent findings arrived at by the three Courts below after due appreciation of evidence on record cannot be said to be capricious or perverse and the order impugned passed by the Board does not suffer from any jurisdictional error so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction.” 19. In Deep Chandra Juneja vs. Lajwanti Kathuria (Dead) through LRs. (2008) 8 SCC 497 , it was held that well reasoned concurrent findings and reasons recorded by the prescribed authorities under the statute or by the appellate authority thereunder would not warrant any interference unless there is any illegality, infirmity or error of jurisdiction. 20. Relying upon the judgment in the case of Noor Khan (Supra), learned counsel appearing for the petitioner JDA argued that no khatedari rights can be allowed to a person without there being any documentary evidence of cultivatory possession over the land claimed at the time of commencement of the Act of 1955. 20. Relying upon the judgment in the case of Noor Khan (Supra), learned counsel appearing for the petitioner JDA argued that no khatedari rights can be allowed to a person without there being any documentary evidence of cultivatory possession over the land claimed at the time of commencement of the Act of 1955. In the said case the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that “moreover, the petitioner (claiming khatedari rights) was under an obligation to prove his case for declaration of his khatedari rights by producing cogent evidence on record and thus, in absence of any evidence on record establishing the continuous old possession of the petitioner over the land in question so as to make him entitled for declaration of khatedari rights in his favour, the findings arrived at by the courts below, cannot be faulted with.” 21. In the present case the plaintiffs/respondents made claim for declaration of khatedari rights pleading cultivatory possession over the land in question at the time of commencement of the Act of 1955 and also submitted the oral as well as documentary evidence. Though the State is the custodian of the revenue record did not submit any documentary evidence which could be the legal basis for denying the claim of the plaintiffs/respondents but the State while submitting the written statement through its Tehsildar has admitted the cultivatory possession of the plaintiffs/respondents over the land in question. The trial court upon scrutiny of the record and the evidence has held that the plaintiffs/respondents are in cultivatory possession of the land in question at the time of the commencement of the Act of 1955, the findings so arrived at by the trial court have been affirmed by the two Appellate Courts. 22. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case and the findings recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the two Appellate Courts, the judgments cited by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner JDA are of no help to the petitioners. 23. The suit was preferred by the plaintiffs/respondents for declaration and permanent injunction for the land which they were in possession prior to commencement of the Act of 1955 and the trial court on the basis of the pleadings and evidence-oral as well as documentary, recorded a finding that the plaintiffs/respondents were in possession of the land in question prior to the commencement of the Act of 1955. Even by operation of law after 15.10.1955 the khatedari rights were required to be made in the name of the plaintiffs/respondents. The Hon’ble Apex Court almost in similar circumstances in the case of Prabhu vs. Ramdeo and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1721 in Para 8 of the judgment has observed as under: “8. Let us now refer to section-15 as it stood at the relevant time. Section 15 provides, inter-alia, that subject to the provisions of section-16 every person who, at the commencement of this Act, is a tenant of land, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act and subject further to any contract not contrary to section-4 be entitled to all the right conferred and be subject to all the liabilities imposed on Khatedar tenants under the Act. In other words, as soon as section-15 came into operation on October 15, 1955, the possession of the respondents, who had been inducted into the land by the mortgagee was substantially altered and they became Khatedars by virtue of the statutory provisions prescribed by section-15. Section 161 of the Act provides that no tenant shall be ejected from his holding otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The position thus is clear that as soon as the Act came into force the respondents were entitled to the benefits of section 15 and cannot be ejected except under the provisions of the Act in view of section-161. It is because of these provisions that the appellant was driven to make the plea that the respondents were trespassers inasmuch as they had voluntarily surrendered possession of the land to him after the redemption decree was passed and had wrongfully entered into possession thereafter. That plea has not been proved and the matter falls to be considered squarely within, the provisions of ss.15 and 161 of the Act. It is true that s.183 of the Act provides for the ejectment of a trespasser but that section has no application to this case inasmuch as the respondents cannot be held to be trespassers at all.” 24. It is true that s.183 of the Act provides for the ejectment of a trespasser but that section has no application to this case inasmuch as the respondents cannot be held to be trespassers at all.” 24. The judgments cited by the counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents relate to the scope of interference in the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below and there cannot be any dispute in respect to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Courts that the current findings arrived at by the courts below are not required to be interfered with until and unless some infirmity in the said findings is proved and the same cannot be reopened in absence of any perversity and without there being any substantial question of law. 25. In case of Nagendra Nath Bora and Another (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para 30 has observed as under: “30. A Constitution Bench of this Court examined the scope of Art.227 of the Constitution in the case of Waryam Singh vs. Amarnath, 1954 SCR 565 : AIR 1954 SC 215 . This Court, in the course of its judgment, made the following observations at p. 571 (of SCR): (at p.217 of AIR): “This power of superintendence conferred by article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. vs. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal. 193 , to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.” It is, thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Art.227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the powers under Art.226 of the Constitution. Under Art. 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. Hence, interference by the High Court, in these cases, either under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution, was not justified.” 26. In case of Sugarbai M. Siddiq and Others (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para 6 of its judgment has observed as under: “6. Hence, interference by the High Court, in these cases, either under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution, was not justified.” 26. In case of Sugarbai M. Siddiq and Others (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para 6 of its judgment has observed as under: “6. There can be little doubt that in an application under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has to see whether the lower courts/tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with the matter and if so, whether the impugned order is vitiated by procedural irregularity; in other words, the court is concerned not with decision but with decision making process. On this ground alone the order of the High Court is liable to be set aside.” 27. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the three courts below do not suffer from any infirmity as the same have been recorded after correct appreciation of evidence on record. There is no jurisdictional error in the findings recorded by the courts below which warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. There is no force in these writ petitions. The same are, therefore, dismissed. 28. Stay application and all pending applications, if any, are also disposed of. 29. The Registry is directed to place a copy of this order in the connected case file.