JUDGMENT : Ravi Nath Tilhari, J. 1. Heard Sri Sasanka Bhuvanagiri, learned counsel, representing Sri Alapati Lalith Nikhil, learned counsel for the appellants. 2. This Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C) by the defendant/appellants arises out of O.S.No.238 of 2012 on the file of the I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati which was decreed vide the judgment/decree dated 07.01.2017 and was affirmed in A.S.No.126 of 2017 vide judgment/decree dated 13.03.2023 passed by the V Additional District Judge, Tirupati dismissing the appeal of the present appellants. 3. The plaintiff/respondent No.1 namely Ellanti Nirmala filed O.S.No.238 of 2012 for permanent injunction restraining the defendants therein (the present appellants and the respondent No.2) and their men etc. from, in any way interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint scheduled property. 4. The plaintiff's case was that originally the property of an extent of Ac. 2.75 cents in Sy.No.11/2B 2 of No.9, Akkarampalli Revenue Village accounts was the absolute property of one Pedirappagari Kamalamma. She was in possession and enjoyment and sold it out to one Marisetti Venkatachalam under a registered sale deed dated 15.06.1981 for consideration and also delivered possession to him. Subsequently, M. Venkatachalam sold out, to an extent of Ac. 0.10 1/3rd cents out Ac. 2.75 cents with specific boundaries in Sy.No.11/2B 2 in favour of one Gogineni Venkataramana and he sold out the site measuring 2240 sq.ft with specific boundaries and measurements as mentioned in the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintiff under the registered sale deed dated 25.09.1996. The plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property without any interruption from anybody. The defendants are no way concerned with the plaint scheduled property but high handedly made a forcible attempt on 03.06.2012 to grab while the plaintiff was attempting to fence the plaint scheduled property with barbed wire. Consequently the plaintiff had to file the suit. 5. The defendants filed written statement. Their pleading inter alia is that one Gogineni Venkataramana purchased the suit scheduled property under a registered sale deed dated 23.01.1984 from his vendor Marisetti Venkatachalam. Subsequently, Marisetti Venkatachalam executed registered General Power of Attorney (GPA) in favour of the 2nd defendant on 14.11.2007. Consequently the plaintiff had to file the suit. 5. The defendants filed written statement. Their pleading inter alia is that one Gogineni Venkataramana purchased the suit scheduled property under a registered sale deed dated 23.01.1984 from his vendor Marisetti Venkatachalam. Subsequently, Marisetti Venkatachalam executed registered General Power of Attorney (GPA) in favour of the 2nd defendant on 14.11.2007. Pursuant of the registered General Power of Attorney, the power of attorney holder executed a registered sale deed in favour of the 1st and the 3rd defendants under a registered sale deed on 25.02.2008 and also delivered possession to them, and since then they have been in possession and enjoyment of the property without any interruption. The 1st defendant purchased the property situated on the southern side. Even prior thereto the 1st defendant had purchased a vacant site under a registered sale deed. The 1st defendant and the 3rd defendant constructed a compound with cement bricks with a height of 5 feet for all three sites owned by them. There are two sheds roofed with asbestos cement sheds constructed by the 1st defendant on the said compound and they are in possession and enjoyment of the suit property without any interruption from anybody. With respect to the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, it was submitted that it did not bear the signatures of Gogineni Venkataramana as he used to sign in English only. The plaintiff’s registered sale deed dated 25.09.1996 was pleaded to be created and fabricated with forged signatures and by impersonation. It was also pleaded that all the original title deeds were handed over to the 1st defendant at the time of execution of registered sale deed in his favour by Gogineni Venkataramana and those original deeds were in their possession. It was also their case that the plaintiff never entered into the possession of the plaint scheduled property. The alleged interference by defendants was denied as the plaintiffs imagination to grab the plaint scheduled property. 6. The suit against the 3rd defendant, the present respondent No.2 was dismissed as per the order dated 21.08.2012. 7. The learned Trial Court framed the following issues:- (1) Whether the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit? (2) Whether the defendants have made any attempts to dispossess the plaintiff from the plaint schedule property? 7. The learned Trial Court framed the following issues:- (1) Whether the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit? (2) Whether the defendants have made any attempts to dispossess the plaintiff from the plaint schedule property? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of permanent injunction in respect of the plaint schedule property? (4) To what relief? 8. In evidence, on behalf of the plaintiff, PWs. 1 to 3 were examined and Exhibits A.1 to A.4 were marked. 9. On behalf of the defendants, DWs. 1 and 2 were examined and Exhibits B.1 to B.6 were marked. 10. On issue Nos.1 to 3, the learned Trial Court recorded finding that the plaintiff succeeded in proving her possession over the property as on the date of filing of the suit and the defendants were interfering with her possession and enjoyment. The Ex.A1, the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff was unchallenged by the defendants, which was a document executed and registered earlier in point of time to Ex.B2, the registered sale deed dated 25.02.2008 in favour of the defendant Nos.1 and 3 by the defendant No.2 and Ex.B3, the registered general power of attorney dated 14.11.2007. The learned Trial Court further observed that Ex.B3 could also not be proved. 11. In view of the findings on issue Nos.1, 2 and 3, the learned Trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 07.01.2017. 12. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 preferred A.S.No.126 of 2017. The learned V Additional District Judge, Tirupati held that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property. It observed that possession follows title and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to protect her possession based on Ex.A1. The appellate court dismissed the appeal of the appellants and confirmed the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court. 13. Learned counsel for the appellants raised the only point that the plaintiff’s simple suit for injunction was not maintainable. The plaintiff did not seek for declaration of her title. He submitted that a complicated question of title was involved in the suit and in view of the sale deed dated 25.02.2008 in favour of defendant Nos.1 and 3 a cloud was cast over the plaintiff’s title. The plaintiff did not seek for declaration of her title. He submitted that a complicated question of title was involved in the suit and in view of the sale deed dated 25.02.2008 in favour of defendant Nos.1 and 3 a cloud was cast over the plaintiff’s title. He submitted that, consequently, in view of the law as laid down in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594 , the suit for injunction simpliciter was not maintainable nor could be decreed unless there was relief of declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. 14. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants and perused the material on record. 15. The following point arises for consideration:- Whether the suit for injunction simpliciter without seeking for declaration was competent? 16. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that simple suit for injunction without seeking declaration was not maintainable. Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance in Clause (b) of Para 21 of Anathula Sudhakar (supra) to submit that since it was a suit for injunction simpliciter with respect to vacant site, based on the title deed with respect to which the defendants raised cloud, there should have been a prayer for declaration of title also and in the absence of such a prayer the Trial Court committed error of law in decreeing the suit based on the sale deed. 17. The law is well settled, as to when simple suit for injunction is maintainable and as to when the plaintiff has to seek declaration of title as well. 18. In Anathula Sudhakar (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court summarized the position, in regard to the suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property in Para 21 of the report as under:- “21. To summarize, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under: (a) Where a cloud is raised over plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter. (b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession. (c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title (either specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar (supra)). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction. (d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case.” 19. In Para 21 (b) of Anathula Sudhakar (supra) it was held that a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession. Normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly or substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession. The law as summarized in Anathula Sudhakar (supra) has to be considered keeping in view all the clauses (a) to (d), and clause (b) is not to be read in isolation. It was held in clear terms in clause (d) that “But persons having clear title and possession seeking for injunction should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The Court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to the plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case.” 20. In Jharkhand State Housing Board v. Didar Singh, (2019) 17 SCC 692, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that in each and every case where the defendant disputes the title of the plaintiff it is not necessary that in all those cases the plaintiff has to seek the relief of declaration. In Jharkhand State Housing Board v. Didar Singh, (2019) 17 SCC 692, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that in each and every case where the defendant disputes the title of the plaintiff it is not necessary that in all those cases the plaintiff has to seek the relief of declaration. It is further held that a suit for mere injunction does not lie only when the defendant raises a genuine dispute with regard to title and when he raises a cloud over the title of the plaintiff, then necessarily in those circumstances, the plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for bare injunction. 21. In Para 11 of the Jharkhand State Housing Board (supra) is reproduced as under:- “11. It is well settled by catena of judgments of this Court that in each and every case where the defendant disputes the title of the plaintiff it is not necessary that in all those cases the plaintiff has to seek the relief of declaration. A suit for mere injunction does not lie only when the defendant raises a genuine dispute with regard to title and when he raises a cloud over the title of the plaintiff, then necessarily in those circumstances, the plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for bare injunction.” 22. The suit was filed based on title to the property vide registered sale deed dated 25.09.1996 and being in possession. 23. The issue involved was very simple. The plaintiff claimed title based on the registered sale deed dated 25.09.1996. The title of the petitioner’s vendor was not in dispute. The appellants claimed title based on the registered sale deed in their favour dated 25.02.2008 executed by the power of attorney holder of the same vendor. The plaintiff as also the defendants are not at issue that Gogineni Venkataramana was the owner. The registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff dated 25.09.1996 is prior in point of time than the sale deed in favour of the defendants dated 25.02.2008. The suit did not involve a complicated question on title. Nor the appellants’ sale deed dated 25.02.2008 could be considered as casting cloud on the title of the plaintiff based on her earlier registered sale deed dated 25.09.1996. The suit did not involve a complicated question on title. Nor the appellants’ sale deed dated 25.02.2008 could be considered as casting cloud on the title of the plaintiff based on her earlier registered sale deed dated 25.09.1996. The appellants, merely by disputing the petitioner’s sale deed that it was not signed by the plaintiff’s vendor because he used to sign in English, in the view of this Court cannot be considered to caste cloud on the plaintiffs title, so as to direct the plaintiff to seek the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of relief of declaration. The learned Trial Court has carefully exercised the discretion vested in it in terms of Para 21 (d) of Anathula Sudhakar (supra). 24. Learned Trial Court on consideration of the entire oral and documentary evidence recorded finding that the plaintiff is in possession of the plaint scheduled property. The learned appellate court also affirmed the said finding. It also considered the evidence on record and came to the same conclusion as reached by the learned Trial Court. The finding on the point of possession is a finding of fact. It is based on consideration of the evidence on record by both the courts below. It is concurrent finding of fact. In the exercise of second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure such finding of fact is not open to interference by this Court. 25. In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and others, (2020) 19 SCC 57 , the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that in a Second Appeal the jurisdiction of the High Court being confined to substantial question of law, a finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal, even if the appreciation of evidence is palpably erroneous and the finding of fact incorrect. 26. In Nazir Mohamed (supra), it was further restated that the general rule is, that the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding. 27. It is apt to reproduce Paragraphs 28 to 33.4 as under:- “28. To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way. 29. To be a question of law “involved in the case”, there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings, and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact, arrived at by courts of facts, and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. 30. Where no such question of law, nor even a mixed question of law and fact was urged before the trial court or the first appellate court, as in this case, a second appeal cannot be entertained, as held by this Court in Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami, (1997) 4 SCC 713 . 31. Whether a question of law is a substantial one and whether such question is involved in the case or not, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The paramount overall consideration is the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and the impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. This proposition finds support from Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 . 32. The paramount overall consideration is the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and the impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. This proposition finds support from Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 . 32. In a second appeal, the jurisdiction of the High Court being confined to substantial question of law, a finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal, even if the appreciation of evidence is palpably erroneous and the finding of fact incorrect as held in V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1963 SC 302 . An entirely new point, raised for the first time, before the High Court, is not a question involved in the case, unless it goes to the root of the matter. 33. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: 33.1. An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document, involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. 33.2. The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. 33.3. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. 33.4. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. 33.4. The general rule is, that the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where : (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 28. As aforesaid the finding on the point of plaintiffs possession affirmed by the Appellate Court could not be shown to be suffering from any of the infirmities on which the finding of fact is open for challenge in the exercise of the second appellate jurisdiction. 29. Even based simply on the finding of possession, the plaintiffs suit for injunction was rightly decreed. 30. In Hari Narayan Bansal v. Dada Dev Mandir Prabandhak Sabha, (2015) 16 SCC 540 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that a substantial question of law is not required to be framed if the High Court decides to dismiss the second appeal at the admission stage. Only in a case where the second appeal is admitted or is decided finally by allowing the same, a substantial question of law is required to be framed by the High Court. 31. Para 3 of Hari Narayan Bansal (supra) is reproduced as under:- “3. In our opinion, a substantial question of law is not required to be framed if the High Court decides to dismiss the second appeal at an admission stage. Only in a case where the second appeal is admitted or is decided finally by allowing the same, a substantial question of law is required to be framed by the High Court. In the instant case, no substantial question of law was involved in the second appeal and therefore, the High Court had rightly dismissed the second appeal at the admission stage by passing the impugned order. In the instant case, no substantial question of law was involved in the second appeal and therefore, the High Court had rightly dismissed the second appeal at the admission stage by passing the impugned order. We, therefore, see no reason to entertain this petition.” 32. The learned Appellate Court did not commit any illegality in affirming the decree of the learned Trial Court. 33. The second appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. 34. The Second Appeal is dismissed at the admission stage. No order as to costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand closed.