JUDGMENT : (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) : 1. The instant criminal writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking following reliefs: (a) For appropriate writ/writ(s), order/order(s) in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated 21.07.2023 passed by the learned District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Ramgarh (Respondent No.2) in CCA Case No.23/ 2023, whereby and whereunder the order u/s 3(a)(b)(i)(ii) of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 has been passed against the petitioner and the petitioner has been directed to mark his attendance every day at 10.00 A.M. before officer in charge of Patratu for a period of six months and further directed to deposit his licensed arms, if any, and not to keep any arms with him. (b) For issuance of any appropriate writs or direction or order as may be deemed fit. 2. The factual background of the case is that a show cause notice dated 01.04.2023 was issued by learned District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Ramgarh against the petitioner in CCA Case No. 23 of 2023 stating therein as to why not an order under Section 3(a)(b)(i)(ii) of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 be passed, as per report submitted by Superintendent of Police, Ramgarh vide letter no. 134/DCB dated 28.03.2023. The nature of general allegations against the petitioner is that following criminal cases have been registered against him:- (i) Patratu P.S. Case No. 76/2022 dated 04.05.2022 registered under Sections 342, 171(E), 171(F), 504, 506, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and U/s 68(A) of the Panchayati Raj Act 2001 and Section 123 part (i) & (ii) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. (ii) Patratu P.S. Case No. 70 of 2022 dated 20.04.2022 registered under Section 385, 387, 435 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The petitioner appeared and filed his show cause denying the allegations but, according to him, the same was not properly considered and the impugned order was passed. 3. Assailing the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order is patently illegal and does not come within the ambit and scope of Section 3 of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. The impugned order has been passed merely on the proposal of Superintendent of Police on the basis of two criminal cases registered against the petitioner under the Indian Penal Code (in short I.P.C). The impugned order has been passed merely on the proposal of Superintendent of Police on the basis of two criminal cases registered against the petitioner under the Indian Penal Code (in short I.P.C). Neither the petitioner is a habitual criminal nor does he belong to any gang of known criminals rather he is a law abiding person in the village and due to village politics and political vendetta, he has been involved in aforesaid two criminal cases in quick succession within a span of 15 days and branded by police as “anti-social element”. The impugned order is based on extraneous considerations de hors the factual aspects of the case. Fundamental right of life and personal liberty which inheres “the right of privacy” is most cherished right of a citizen of India guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India and which is not even suspended at the time of Emergency, is being violated by putting unreasonable restrictions on the movement of the petitioner without following the “procedure established by law”. The petitioner is a victim of executive excess, hence, directly took shelter of this Hon’ble Court for efficacious remedy, which cannot be available through slow process of appeal provided under Section 6 of the said Act and without compromising with his personal liberty. 4. It is further submitted that mere providing the list of first information report filed against the petitioner does not mean setting out the general nature of material allegation. No specific overt act or any other reason has been mentioned in the impugned order justifying the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 3 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. Petitioner is on bail in the first case i.e. Patratu P.S. Case No. 76/2022 and in the second case i.e. in Patratu P.S. Case No. 70 of 2022 he is not named in the FIR and he is co-operating in the investigation as and when required by the investigating officer. Therefore, impugned order is not legally sustainable and fit to be set aside. Finally, it is pointed out that in the W.P. (Cr.) (D.B.) No. 542 /2023 arising out of the same CCA Case, the order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the said act against co-accused, Nishi Pandey @ Nishee has been quashed by Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court. 5. Finally, it is pointed out that in the W.P. (Cr.) (D.B.) No. 542 /2023 arising out of the same CCA Case, the order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the said act against co-accused, Nishi Pandey @ Nishee has been quashed by Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court. 5. Per Contra, learned counsel for the respondent pointing out the materials depicted in counter affidavit filed by SDPO, Patratu has submitted that petitioner belongs to the “Pandey Gang”, active in the vicinity of Ramgarh, District and indulge in realising levy/extortion from the industrialists by way of committing crimes like murder, extortion, robbery, firing, explosion, attempt to murder, stopping the ongoing work, intimidating and threatening the stakeholders. Petitioner has two criminal antecedents and charge sheet has been submitted in one of the above criminal cases along with dreaded criminals like Nishi Pandey and members of “Pandey Gang”. It is also submitted that on the basis of local inputs and intelligence sharing, it has surfaced that the petitioner indirectly, by associating with dreaded criminal like Vikash Tiwari and Nishi Pandey, is committing crimes like threatening and intimidating business-men, traders, contractors etc. for extorting money, creating fear and panic among them. As such disturbing peace, normalcy and tranquility at Patratu and adjoining areas and also disrupting the economic activities of the region. 6. It is further pleaded that in the Panchayat Election, 2022, the candidates were threatened to abstain from filing nomination form by abducting of some candidates by the petitioner. Therefore, if the activities of petitioner are not restricted, he may indulge in commission of further offences. Hence, impugned order does not warrant any interference. A further objection has been taken that the petitioner has to take legal recourse as prescribed under law by filing an appeal rather than to move before this Hon’ble Court directly, hence, this petition is fit to be dismissed. 7. On the basis of a report contained in memo no. 134/ DCB dated 28.03.2023 of the Superintendent of Police addressed to District Magistrate/ Deputy Commissioner, Ramgarh, CCA Case No. 23/2023 was registered against the petitioner. Through the aforesaid memo no. 134 the Superintendent of Police, Ramgarh referred a proposal with recommendation that the petitioner is required to mark his attendance on every day at the police station. 134/ DCB dated 28.03.2023 of the Superintendent of Police addressed to District Magistrate/ Deputy Commissioner, Ramgarh, CCA Case No. 23/2023 was registered against the petitioner. Through the aforesaid memo no. 134 the Superintendent of Police, Ramgarh referred a proposal with recommendation that the petitioner is required to mark his attendance on every day at the police station. In the Show cause notice dated 01.04.2023 (Annexure 1), the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Ramgarh referred to two criminal cases showing involvement of petitioner in connection with Patratu P.S. Case No. 76/2022 & Patratu P.S. Case No. 70 of 2022. The petitioner submitted his detailed show cause reply (Annexure 2) but surprisingly a very short and cryptic order mentioning wrong Sections and Sub-Clauses of Section 3 of the Jharkhand Crime Control Act, 2002 was passed by the District Magistrate only on the basis of registration of two criminal cases against the petitioner. 8. We have considered the whole gamut of the case and examined the records. The Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 is a Preventive Detention Law and was enacted for the control and suppression of antisocial elements with a view to maintenance of public order. Since the provisions of the Act tend to take over the right to life and personal liberty of a citizen, these must be construed literally in strict manner. 9. Section 3 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act is quoted as under:- “3. Externment etc. of anti-social elements. -(1) Where it appears to the District Magistrate that- (a) any person is an anti-social element; and (b) (i) that his movements or acts in the district or any part thereof are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to persons or property; or (ii) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is engaged or about to engage, in the district or any part thereof, in the commission of any offence punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code, or under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, or abetment of such offence; The District Magistrate shall by notice in writing inform him of the general nature of the material allegation against him in respect of clauses (a) and (b) and shall give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding them. (2) The person against whom an order under this section is proposed to be made shall have the right to consult and be defended by a counsel of his choice and shall be given a reasonable opportunity of examining himself, if he so desires and also of examining any other witnesses that he may wish to produce in support of his explanation, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing the District Magistrate is of opinion that the request is made for the purpose of vexation or delay. (3) The District Magistrate on being satisfied that the conditions specified in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) exist, may by order in writing- (a) direct him to remove himself outside the district or part thereof, as the case may be, by such route, if any, and within such time as may be specified in the order and to resist from entering the district or the specified part thereof, until, the expiry of such period, not exceeding six months as may be specified in the order; (b) (i) require such person to notify his movement, or to report himself, or to do both, in such manner, at such time and to such authority or person, as may be specified in the order; (ii) prohibit or restrict possession or use by him of such article as may be specified in the order; (iii) direct him otherwise to conduct himself in such manner as may be specified in the order; until the expiry of such period, not exceeding six months, as may be specified in the order.” 10. The provisions under section 3 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 provide that the District Magistrate (in this case, the Deputy Commissioner) can pass an order of externment or any other order in the nature of requiring the person to notify his movement, prohibit or restrict possession or use of such article which may be specified in the order or to direct him to conduct himself in the manner as may be specified in the order passed against him. In the first place, we need to indicate that the order dated 21st July 2023 has been passed for a maximum period of six months and no special reason has been recorded for passing of the said order for the maximum period at one go. In the first place, we need to indicate that the order dated 21st July 2023 has been passed for a maximum period of six months and no special reason has been recorded for passing of the said order for the maximum period at one go. Secondly, the provisions under clause (b) to sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 indicates that the Deputy Commissioner has three options under clause (b); either (i) to require the person to notify his movement; or (ii) to prohibit or restrict possession of any article; or (iii) to direct him to conduct himself in a particular manner. The fact that an order under clause (a) to sub-section (3) of section 3 which requires a person to remove himself outside the District or a part thereof has not been passed against the petitioner is quite relevant in the sense that the Deputy Commissioner in passing the order dated 21st July 2023 seems to have accepted the position that the presence of the petitioner within the District of Ramgarh is not prejudicial to public order. 11. In the show-cause notice (Annexure 1), there is no whisper about “general nature of the material allegations” except pendency of two criminal cases against the petitioner. In the impugned order also (Annexure 3) the satisfaction of District Magistrate is based upon only above two cases. There is no statement of facts showing that the petitioner is a member of any gang and his movements in the locality is causing disturbance to the peace and public order. In Patratu P.S. Case No. 76/2022, the petitioner is on bail and charge sheet has been submitted. In Patratu P.S. Case No. 70/2022 petitioner is not named in the FIR which is lodged against unknown miscreants and there is no direct allegation against him for commission of any crime. There is no material placed on record that the petitioner is not abiding the terms and conditions of bail bond or not co-operating in the investigation of the case. 12. For passing an order under section 3 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002, this must appear from the records that the person is an anti-social element. There is no material placed on record that the petitioner is not abiding the terms and conditions of bail bond or not co-operating in the investigation of the case. 12. For passing an order under section 3 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002, this must appear from the records that the person is an anti-social element. Sub-section (d) to section 2 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 which defined the expression “Anti Social Element” reads as under: “(d) "Anti-social element" means a person who- (i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code; or (ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; (iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or other grounds whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different religions, racial or language groups or castes or communities; or (iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls; or (v) who has been convicted of an offence under sections 25,26, 27, 28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959.” 13. The impugned order records that the activities of the petitioner attract the provision under Clause (i) of Sub-Section (d) to Section 2 of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. The term “habitually” has not been defined in the said Act, but has been explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Narayan Singh V. State of Bihar reported in (1984) 3 SCC 14 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “31. It is seen from Section 12 of the Act that it makes provision for the detention of an anti-social element. If a person is not an antisocial element, he cannot be detained under the Act. The detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an order is made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social element as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. If a person is not an antisocial element, he cannot be detained under the Act. The detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an order is made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social element as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Sub-clauses (ii), (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d) of the Act which are not quite relevant for the purposes of this case may be omitted from consideration for the present. The two other sub-clauses which need to be examined closely are sub clauses (i) and (iv) of Section 2(d). Under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting the human body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property, of the Penal Code, 1860 is considered to be an anti-social element. Under subclause (iv) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who has been habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls, is an anti-social element. In both these sub clauses, the word “habitually” is used. The expression “habitually” means “repeatedly” or “persistently”. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. It connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in each of the said sub clauses or an aggregate of similar acts or omissions. This appears to be clear from the use of the word “habitually” separately in subclause (i), sub-clause (ii) and sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(d) and not in sub clauses (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d). If the State Legislature had intended that a commission of two or more acts or omissions referred to in any of the sub-clauses (i) to (v) of Section 2(d) was sufficient to make a person an “anti-social element”, the definition would have run as “Anti-social element” means “a person who habitually is. ..”. If the State Legislature had intended that a commission of two or more acts or omissions referred to in any of the sub-clauses (i) to (v) of Section 2(d) was sufficient to make a person an “anti-social element”, the definition would have run as “Anti-social element” means “a person who habitually is. ..”. As Section 2(d) of the Act now stands, whereas under sub-clause (iii) or sub-clause (v) of Section 2(d) a single act or omission referred to in them may be enough to treat the person concerned as an ‘antisocial element’, in the case of sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iv), there should be a repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii) or in sub-clause (iv) by the person concerned to treat him as an “anti-social element”. Commission of an act or omission referred to in one of the sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) and of another act or omission referred to in any other of the said sub-clauses would not be sufficient to treat a person as an “anti-social element”. A single act or omission falling under sub-clause (i) and a single act or omission falling under sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(d) cannot, therefore, be characterized as a habitual act or omission referred to in either of them. Because the idea of “habit” involves an element of persistence and a tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of the same class or kind, if the acts or omissions in question are not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when they are committed with a long interval of time between them they cannot be treated as habitual ones.” 14. Taking into notice the overall facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the very foundational facts for initiation of proceeding under Section 3 are lacking in this case; Notwithstanding that, the impugned order has been passed directing the petitioner to mark his attendance before the officer-in-charge of Patratu Police Station at 10 A.M. daily, does not satisfy the requirements of law and violative of right of the petitioner as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Here, it is also pointed out that an “alternate remedy” by itself does not divest the High Court of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case, though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s South Indian Bank Ltd. & Ors. V. Naveen Mathew Filip and Anr. etc. reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 435 has held that exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where: (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by the constitution; (b) there has been violation of the principle of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged; 16. In view of above discussions and reasons, impugned order dated 21.07.2023 passed by District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Ramgarh cannot be sustained in law and is, accordingly quashed. 17. The present writ petition stands allowed.