JUDGMENT : (Saurabh Lavania, J.) 1. Heard Mohammad Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Prabhakar Vardhan Chaudhary and Mohammad Aslam Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned State counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 and Sri R.S. Pandey, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Rakesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the caveator. 2. The order impugned in this petition dated 23.03.2023 passed by the respondent No. 1/Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ayodhya in Revision No. 1864/2020530423000014 (Bajrang Pratap Singh and others vs. Jagdamba Singh) is an order of remand, whereby, the respondent No. 1 after interfering in the order dated 22.06.2019 passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation as also the orders dated 29.06.2016 and 11.07.2016 passed by the Consolidation Officer remanded the matter back to the Court of Consolidation Officer, Sadar, Ayodhya for deciding the matter afresh. The relevant portion of the order impugned dated 23.03.2023 on reproduction reads as under:- ^^fopkjksijkar eSa bl er dk gaw fd pdcUnh vf/kdkjh }kjk fufeZr okn fcUnqvksa dh fcUnqokj Li"V foospuk ugha dh x;h gS ,oa vihyh; U;k;ky; }kjk Hkh ljljh :i ls voj U;k;ky; ds vkns'k dh iqf"V dj nh x;h gSA bl izdj.k esa eq[; fopkj.kh; fcUnq ;gha jgk gS fd izFke pdz pdcUnh esa mi lapkyd pdcUnh Lrj rd ikfjr vkns'k ds fo#) ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; esa eqŒ y[kjkth }kjk ;kfpdk izLrqr dh x;h vkSj eqŒ y[kjkth ds e`R;q ds mijkUr mDr ;kfpdk dh iSjoh fof/kd okfjl }kjk u fd;s tkus ds dkj.k fuxjkuh U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 09-08-1958 vfUre gks pqdk gS rks f}rh; pdz pdcUnh esa mDr izdj.k ls lEcfU/kr okn /kkjk&11 d o /kkjk&49 tksr pdcUnh vf/kfu;e ls ckf/kr gS vFkok ugha ,oa fuxjkuh Lrj rd ikfjr vkns'k izkax U;k; dk izHkko j[krs gS vFkok ugha A ijh{k.k U;k;ky; dks loZizFke bUgha fcUnqvksa ij lquokbZ djdsa bu fcUnqvksa dk fuLrkj.k djuk pkfg,A bl fcUnqvks ds fuLrkj.k ds mijkUr gh vU; fcUnqvksa ij xq.knks"k ij fopkj fd;k tk ldrk gSA rnuqlkj fuxjkuh Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA vkns'k mijksDr foospu ds vk/kkj ij ;g fuxjkuh Lohdkj dh tkrh gSA cUnkscLr vf/kdkjh pdcUnh }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 22-06-2019 ,oa pdcUnh vf/kdkjh }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 29-06-2016 o 11-07-2016 fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA izdj.k Åij dh x;h foospuk ds vuqlkj iqu% fuLrkj.k gsrq pdcUnh vf/kdkjh lnj v;ks/;k ds U;k;ky; ij izfr izsf"kr fd;k tkrk gSA okn ds fuLrkj.k rd vk/kkj o"kZ dk bUnzkt ;Fkkor jgsxkA i{k pdcUnh vf/kdkjh lnj ds U;k;ky; ij vxzsrj dk;Zokgh gsrq fnukad 18-04-2023 dks mifLFkr gksA i=koyh okn vxzsrj dk;Zdkgh jktLo vfHkys[kkxkj esa laxzghr gksA^^ 3. A perusal of relevant observation, quoted above, as also the recitals of the order impugned dated 23.03.2023, this Court finds that the parties to the litigation after remand were not required to adduce evidence in support of their case. Despite this, the respondent No. 1 vide order impugned dated 23.03.2023 remanded the mater back to Consolidation Officer for decision afresh on merits. 4. Despite this, the respondent No. 1 vide order impugned dated 23.03.2023 remanded the mater back to Consolidation Officer for decision afresh on merits. 4. Sri Khan, learned Senior Advocate while assailing the order impugned dated 23.03.2023 stated that the respondent No. 1 in the given facts and circumstances of the case ought not to have remanded the matter back to the Consolidation Officer for deciding the case afresh on merits as he himself is empowered to decide it on merits in view of settled legal proposition. In support of his submission, Sri Khan has placed reliance on the judgment dated 10.02.2023 passed by this Court in WRIT-B No. 108 of 2023 (Angad Pratap Singh And Others vs. Deputy Director Consolidation/ Addl. District Magistrate (F/R), Lakhimpur Kheri And Others). 5. He further submitted that the Revisional Court/Authority under the Act of 1953 is having wide powers. Power under this section of the Act of 1953 includes power to examine any finding whether it is of fact or law. D.D.C. while hearing revision under this section is fully empowered to reassess the evidence and record its own findings of fact by virtue of Section 48 Explanation 3. Under this section of the Act of 1953, the D.D.C. has power to reassess the findings of subordinate consolidation Authorities. Reference has also been made to the judgment of this Court Prabhu Dayal v. D.D.C./Additional District Magistrate (Administration) Manipuri and Another, 2018 (140) RD 460 (All.); Musuttu vs. D.D.C. and others, 2018 (140) RD 505 (All.); Dhooram vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Bagpat, 2006 (100) RD 505 (H.C.). 6. Sri Khan further submitted that in the dispute between the parties, the Consolidation Officer passed the order on 10.10.1957. Thereafter, an order on 18.02.1958 was passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation and thereafter the Deputy Director of Consolidation passed the order on 09.08.1958. Being aggrieved, a Writ Petition No. 3389 of 1958 was filed by Smt. Lekhraji, which was dismissed as abated. The dispute between the parties regarding rights over the land, in issue, could not be settled. To adjudicate the issue involved, a suit for declaration was filed under Section 229-B/209 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in short "Act of 1950"), which was registered as Case No. 1168. Another suit was also filed in the same provisions, which was registered as Case No. 1099/75-519/1102. To adjudicate the issue involved, a suit for declaration was filed under Section 229-B/209 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in short "Act of 1950"), which was registered as Case No. 1168. Another suit was also filed in the same provisions, which was registered as Case No. 1099/75-519/1102. During pendency of the said suits, second operation of consolidation was started on 15.11.1980 and since then, the dispute between the parties has not been decided. The matter has again been remanded back to the Consolidation Officer concerned for decision afresh. This remand order has been passed after lapse of about 43 years from initiation of second consolidation proceedings. He says that in view of settled principle of law, the respondent No. 1 ought to have decided the issues involved in the case including the issue of maintainability after taking note of Section 11-A and 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (in short "Act of 1953"). Thus, interference of this Court is required in the matter. The prayer is to allow this petition and remand the matter back to respondent No. 1 to consider and decide the issues involved in the case after giving proper opportunity of hearings to the parties to the litigation. 7. Sri R.S. Pandey, learned Senior Advocate has opposed the present petition. He stated that in view of the facts of the case, the order of remand impugned in this petition dated 23.03.2023 is reasonable and justifiable and the same is not liable to be interfered with by this Court, as several issues, which were framed by the Consolidation Officer, ought to have been decided, however, the said issues were not dealt with as required under the law. 8. He submitted that in the similar facts and circumstances, this Court declined to interfere in the order of remand. In support of his submissions, Sri Pandey has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court dated 22.12.2022 passed in the case of Smt. Anju Rajpal and others vs. State of U.P. and others reported in [2023 (41) LCD 626]. However, on being asked, Sri Pandey could not dispute the power of Deputy Director of Consolidation, as observed in various judgments of this Court and that of Hon'ble Apex Court. 9. Considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. However, on being asked, Sri Pandey could not dispute the power of Deputy Director of Consolidation, as observed in various judgments of this Court and that of Hon'ble Apex Court. 9. Considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. This Court is not entering into the factual aspect of the case, as it is dealing with the order of remand in the light of submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the respective parties. 11. From the facts, in brief, indicated above, as also on record, it is apparent that second consolidation proceedings, in which the order impugned dated 23.03.2023 has been passed, were initiated on 15.11.1980 and the Consolidation Officer has decided the case on 29.06.2016. Thereafter, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation/Appellate Authority has decided the appeal No. 1031/2016540423000069 (Ram Prakash Singh vs. Jagdamba Singh) filed under Section 11(1) of the Act of 1953 on 22.06.2019 and the order impugned has been passed by the respondent No. 1 on 23.03.2023. From these facts, it is apparent that this order of remand has been passed after lapse of about 43 years. 12. It is undisputed that the respondent No. 1 under the Act of 1953 particularly in view of language couched under Section 48 of the Act of 1953 is having wide power, as observed in the judgment(s), referred above. 13. From the judgment relied upon by Sri Pandey passed in the case of Smt. Anju Rajpal (supra), it reflects that this Court after considering the facts of the case and taking note of the provisions of Indian Partnership Act, 1932, in para 41 and 46, observed as under:- "41. In order to arrive at a correct conclusion, the provisions contained in the Partnership Act i.e. Sections 5, 6, 14, 37, 42 to 49 have to be taken note in context with the evidence relating to the different partnership firms constituted from time to time and their respective dissolution. Since none of the two authorities i.e. Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer of Consolidation had taken a look at the problem with the correct lens of the legal provisions and this aspect has attracted the attention of the DDC who after noticing the same found that the matter required a re-look and for the said purpose it has remanded the matter. 46. 46. It may be true that the DDC is the final Court of fact and law in but in the present case where the matter has proceeded upon a tangent and ignoring the principles as attracted to the dispute in question de-hors the provisions of the Partnership Act and the parties have also not brought on record the requisite evidence which could support the respective contentions, hence, this Court is of the clear view that it cannot be said that the order of remand is bad in the given circumstance." 14. From the above quoted paragraphs of the judgment passed in the case of Smt. Anju Rajpal (supra), it is apparent that on the ground of requirement of evidence for deciding the dispute between the parties, the remand order was not interfered. Thus, the judgment relied upon by Sri Pandey is distinguishable on facts and would not apply in the instant case. 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bechan Pandey and others vs. Dulhin Janki Devi reported in AIR 1976 SC 866 , on the plea of remand of case, after considering Rule 23 of Order 41 CPC as also the age of litigation between the parties, in paragraph 9, made some observation, which on reproduction reads as under:- "9. Prayer has also been made by Mr Sarjoo Prasad for the remand of the case to the trial court as the plaintiff-appellants were labouring under the impression that the defendant-respondents had not disputed that the land in dispute was the same as had been purchased by Maina Kuer. It is urged that because of that impression, material which could have clearly proved that the land in dispute was the same as had been purchased by Maina Kuer could not be brought on the record. We find it difficult to accede to this prayer. As already pointed out above, the contesting defendants clearly stated in their written statements that Maina Kuer was not the auction purchaser of the land in dispute. In view of that unequivocal averment, there was no valid basis for the assumption or the impression under which plaintiff-appellants are stated to have laboured. Apart from that, we find that the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen was filed as long ago as January 1950. In view of that unequivocal averment, there was no valid basis for the assumption or the impression under which plaintiff-appellants are stated to have laboured. Apart from that, we find that the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen was filed as long ago as January 1950. From the title of the appeal we find that many of the original plaintiffs and defendants have during this period of more than a quarter of century departed and are no more in the land of the living, having bowed as it were to the inexorable law of nature. They are now represented by their legal representatives. To remand the suit to the trial court would necessarily have the effect of keeping alive the strife between the parties and prolonging this longdrawn litigation by another round of legal battle in the trial court and thereafter in appeal. It is time, in our opinion, that we draw the final curtain and put an end to this long meandering course of litigation between the parties. If the passage of time and the laws of nature bring to an end the lives of men and women, it would perhaps be the demand of reason and dictate of prudence not to keep alive after so many years the strife and conflict started by the dead. To do so would in effect be defying the laws of nature and offering a futile resistance to the ravage of time. If human life has a short span, it would be irrational to entertain a taller claim for disputes and conflicts which are a manifestation of human frailty. The courts should be loth to entertain a plea in a case like the present which would have the effect of condemning succeeding generation of families to spend major part of their lives in protracted litigation. It may be appropriate in the above context to reproduce what was said in the case of Sant Naroin Mathur v. Rama Krishna Mission [ (1974) 2 SCC 730 ] : (p. 737, para 15) “It is time, in our opinion, that we draw the final curtain on this long drawn litigation and not allow its embers to smoulder for a further length of time, more so when the principal contestants have all departed bowing as it were to the inexorable law of nature. One is tempted in this context to refer to the observations of Chief Justice Crewe in a case concerning peerage claim made after the death without issue of the Earl of Oxford. Said the learned Chief Justice: ‘Time hath its revolutions; there must be a period and an end to all temporal things — an end of names, and dignities and whatsoever is terrne, and why not of De Vere? For where is Bohun? Where is Mowbray? Where is Mortimer? Why, which is more and most of all, where is Plantagenet? They are all entombed in the urns and sepulchres of mortality. What was said about the inevitable end of all mortal beings, however eminent they may be, is equally true of the affairs of mortal beings, their disputes and conflicts, their ventures in the field of love and sport, their achievements and failures for essentially they all have a stamp of mortality on them.’ One feels tempted to add that if life like a dome of many-coloured glass stains the white radiance of eternity, so do the doings and conflicts of mortal beings till death tramples them down." 16. In the case of Arvind Kumar Jaiswal (Dead) through L.R. vs. Devendra Prasad Jaiswal reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 146, after considering the relevant provisions of order 41 CPC viz. Rule 23, 23A, 24 and 25, on the issue of remand of a case, observed as under:- "3. An order of remand prolongs and delays the litigation and hence, should not be passed unless the appellate court finds that a re-trial is required, or the evidence on record is not sufficient to dispose of the matter for reasons like lack of adequate opportunity of leading evidence to a party, where there had been no real trial of the dispute or there is no complete or effectual adjudication of the proceedings, and the party complaining has suffered material prejudice on that account. (See: Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa, (2021) 11 SCC 277 ; and Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur, (2008) 12 SCC 372 ) Where evidence has already been adduced and a decision can be rendered on appreciation of such evidence, an order of remand should not be passed remitting the matter to the lower court, even if the lower court has omitted to frame issue(s) and/or has failed to determine any question of fact, which, in the opinion of the appellate court, is essential. The first appellate court, if required, can also direct the trial court to record evidence and finding on a particular aspect/issue in terms of Rule 25 to Order XLI, which then can be taken on record for deciding the case by the appellate court. 4. In the present case, the High Court, as the first appellate court, which is also a court of fact and law, has passed an order of remand observing that the judgment of the trial court was, in its opinion, not written as per the mandate of Section 33 and Rule 4(2) and 5 of Order XX of the Code, as the discussion and reasoning on certain aspects was not detailed and elaborate." 17. Considering the power of DDC under Section 48 of the Act of 1953, this Court is of the view that the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments passed in the case of Bechan Pandey (supra) and Arvind Kumar Jaiswal (supra) are liable to be taken note of. 18. In the instant case regarding the dispute between the parties, the first order was passed by the Consolidation Officer on 10.10.1957 and dispute continued between them and on 15.11.1980, the second consolidation proceedings were started and the order dated 23.03.2023, an order of remand, has been passed by DDC after about 43 years from initiation of second consolidation proceedings. Moreover, the parties to the litigation in the instant case are not required to adduce evidence, as appears from the impugned order. The DDC has not observed that the evidence on record is not sufficient to dispose of the matter or re-trial is required. 19. Taking note of the aforesaid including the power of DDC and the age of litigation between the parties, this Court is of the view that interference in the impugned order dated 23.03.2023 is required. Accordingly, the order impugned dated 23.03.2023 is hereby set-aside. 19. Taking note of the aforesaid including the power of DDC and the age of litigation between the parties, this Court is of the view that interference in the impugned order dated 23.03.2023 is required. Accordingly, the order impugned dated 23.03.2023 is hereby set-aside. The matter is remanded back to the Deputy Director of Consolidation to consider and decide all the issues including the issue(s) related to applicability of Section 11-A and 49 of the Act of 1953, after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the parties to the litigation preferably within a period of six months from the date of production of certified copy of this order, if there is no other legal impediment in this regard. While conducting the proceedings, the Authority concerned is directed to avoid unnecessary adjournments to either party. 20. The writ petition is allowed in above terms.