JUDGMENT : (Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) Against the order dated 14th January 2011 passed in Civil Review No. 121 of 2009, the Bihar State Electricity Board [now Bihar State Power (Holding) Company] and its officers have preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. The appellants are aggrieved by the modification in the writ Court’s order to the extent that liability to pay the post retiral benefits to the writ petitioner has been fastened on the Bihar State Electricity Board (in short ‘Bihar Board’). 3. Briefly stated, the writ petitioner who is the respondent no. 5 in the present proceeding (hereinafter referred to as ‘respondent’) was issued a show cause notice for producing his matriculation and other certificates to establish that his actual date of birth as recorded in the service book was 1st January 1958. However, on scrutiny of the records, it was detected that he was born on 1st February 1941 but got a wrong date of birth recorded in the service book and continued in service till 7th April 2000. That is, beyond 31st January 1999 when he was due to retire. The respondent who was employed under the erstwhile Bihar State Electricity Board (in short ‘Bihar Board’) approached the writ Court with a grievance that the resolution dated 16th July 2001 of the Bihar Board was illegal and the direction to recover the excess amount paid to him after 31st January 1999 cannot be enforced against him. 4. The Bihar Board referred to Rule 78(ii)(a) of the Bihar State Electricity Board Service Regulations to oppose W.P. (S) No. 2792 of 2003 setting up a stand that it was the duty of the employee to demit office on attaining the age of superannuation but Bhuneshwar Mondal continued in service beyond the date when he was due to superannuate and, therefore, liable to return the excess amount received by him in salary and other allowances for the period beyond 31st January 1999. The writ Court interfered with the resolution dated 16th July 2001 and the order of recovery of excess amount was quashed. However, a direction was issued to the Jharkhand State Electricity Board (in short ‘Jharkhand Board’) to pay the post retiral dues to the respondent. This is the direction of the writ Court that was challenged by the Jharkhand Board by filing Civil Review No. 121 of 2009. However, a direction was issued to the Jharkhand State Electricity Board (in short ‘Jharkhand Board’) to pay the post retiral dues to the respondent. This is the direction of the writ Court that was challenged by the Jharkhand Board by filing Civil Review No. 121 of 2009. From the materials on record, it appears that the Jharkhand Board filed Civil Review No. 121 of 2009 because Contempt Case (Civil) No. 771 of 2009 was instituted against its officers alleging intentional and willful violation of the writ Court’s order dated 23rd July 2009. 5. The review petition was allowed and the order dated 23rd July 2009 passed in W.P. (S) No. 2792 of 2009 was modified to the extent that the Bihar Board was directed to pay the post retiral benefits to Bhuneshwar Mondal. 6. Mr. Manoj Tandon, the learned counsel for the appellants submits that the Bihar Board in view of agreement dated 27th December 2003 entered into between both the Boards is not liable to pay the post retiral benefits to the employees who superannuated from service from a place now falling under the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Jharkhand/Jharkhand Board. To lay support to his submission, the learned counsel for the appellants has referred to the judgment in “Akhileshwar Prasad v. Jharkhand State Electricity Board & Others” 2006 (2) JCR 418 (Jhr.). The learned counsel has therefore raised a preliminary objection to the order passed by the review Court on the ground that there was no apparent error in the writ Court’s order dated 23rd July 2009 particularly in view of a previous decision of this Court in “Akhileshwar Prasad”. According to the appellants, Civil Review No.121 of 2009 filed by the Jharkhand Board did not fall within the ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to invite the exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution by the writ Court (refer, “Shivdeo Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others” AIR 1963 SC 1909 ). 7. A glance at “Akhileshwar Prasad” and the materials on record indicate that the employees of the erstwhile Bihar Board as well as the Jharkhand Board faced serious problems because final allocation of division of the assets and liabilities between both the Boards could not be effected for a considerable period of time. 7. A glance at “Akhileshwar Prasad” and the materials on record indicate that the employees of the erstwhile Bihar Board as well as the Jharkhand Board faced serious problems because final allocation of division of the assets and liabilities between both the Boards could not be effected for a considerable period of time. The situation led to filing of cases in the Court and both the Boards also decided to resolve the problem of the employees by agreeing to an ad-hoc arrangement under which it was decided that the employees retiring from a place falling within the jurisdiction of the Board shall be paid their post retiral benefits by the respective Board. The resolution dated 27th December 2003 entered into between both the Boards was the outcome of such an understanding. The resolution dated 27th December 2003 provided as under: “1. It was agreed that both the successor State Electricity Board i.e. successor Bihar State electricity Board and successor Jharkhand Electricity Board will pay retiral benefit to the employees who have retired from the present territorial jurisdiction of the successor SEB’s irrespective of their date of retirement. This will be a temporary arrangement till and subject to the final division of assets and liabilities between the two Boards by the competent authority. This agreement will also be without prejudice to the outcome of the SLP filed by the JSEB in the Hon'ble Supreme Court in JSEB vrs. Abdul Qadir and LPA filed by BSEB in the Hon'ble High Court, Ranchi in the case of BSEB vrs. Jhaba Pandit and others. This tentative agreement is being made as per the direction dated 12.12.2003 of Hon'ble High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi in W.P.(S) No. 2272/2003 and 3317/2003 alongwith Contempt Case Nos.998/2002, 562/2002 and 659/2003. It was agreed that this tentative decision will be submitted by both the parties in these cases on the next date of hearing fixed on 23rd January, 2004 and meanwhile, both the successor Boards will start disposing of the pending cases as per this tentative agreement giving priority to cases pending in the Hon'ble High Courts of Patna and Ranchi, and the cases in which the compliance of orders of both the Hon'ble High Courts at Patna and Ranchi are pending compliance. 2. 2. It was agreed that for the employees who continued in CPF scheme and who have retired after 1.4.2001 or were working in the present territorial Jurisdiction of JSEB on 1.4.2001 and are still in service or the employees who have retired prior to 1.4.2001 from the present territorial jurisdiction of JSEB, but whose final payment of CPF was made by present JSEB- for all these cases the Regional CPF Trust will prepare the employees wise statement of balance in CPF Trust as on 31.3.2001 and will submit it to the Administrator, BSEB CPF Trust along with the statement of remittance and other documents, as required and BSEB CPF Trust will transfer the outstanding balance for these employees as on 31.3.2001 along with up-to-date interest to the JSEB CPF Trust whenever it is formally created, or Regional CPF Trust of Ranchi, Patratu and Loyabad if the JSEB takes decision to that effect. 3. With respect to employees who CPF to CPF as well as on 1.4.2001 in the territorial jurisdiction of present BSEB, the outstanding balance against their name, as on 8.11.1987 in CPF with up-to-date interest shall be evaluated by both the successor Boards taking accorded with between 8.1.1987 and JSEB CPF must whenever it is formally created. 4. It was agreed that implementation of para 2 and 3 will be subject to the final decision of Regional Provident Fund on successor.” 8. In “Akhileshwar Prasad” this Court observed that in view of the agreement reached between both the Boards and subject to final accounting/adjustment of their liabilities the respective Boards shall make payment of retiral benefits to the employees who had retired from the offices falling within their territorial jurisdiction. This Court finally held as under: “From the discussions aforesaid, the following modalities have earlier emerged as a solution to the controversy. As per the ratio, laid down by the Jharkhand High Court in the case of “Jhabbu Pandit”, reported in 2002(2) JCR 372 (Jhr). This Court finally held as under: “From the discussions aforesaid, the following modalities have earlier emerged as a solution to the controversy. As per the ratio, laid down by the Jharkhand High Court in the case of “Jhabbu Pandit”, reported in 2002(2) JCR 372 (Jhr). An employee, who retired from the office, which falls within the territory of Jharkhand, is entitled to receive pensionery benefits from the J.S.E.B.; As per Patna High Court’s decision in the case of S.M. Abdul Quadir”, reported in 2003(1) PLJR 708 , the equitable formula is that the respective Board should pay the pensionery dues and arrears to the employees, retired/retiring from the areas, now fall under their jurisdiction, subject to final accounting/adjustment of their liabilities; As per the agreement dated 27th December, 2003, reached between the J.S.E.B. and B.S.E.B., the successor B.S.E.B. and successor J.S.E.B. will pay the retiral benefits to the employees or erstwhile State Electricity Board, who have retired from the offices, which now fall within their respective territorial jurisdiction, irrespective of their dates of their dates of retirement; As per the direction of the Supreme Court dated 19th August, 2004, passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 1651 of 2004 and 1652 of 2004, but J.S.E.B. and B.S.E.B. are to act on the basis of the agreement dated 27th December, 2003; and The J.S.E.B. vide order No. 81, dated 21st January, 2004 has also given the following directions: Henceforth, the payment of retiral benefits of all such employees, who retired died from the territorial jurisdiction of Jharkhand, even prior to 15.11.2000, will be made by the Jharkhand State Electricity Board, disbursing officer will maintain separate accounting of the payments made, so that it can be adjusted at the time of final apportionment of assets and liabilities between the two Boards. Having considered all the aspects and noticed the above modalities, we hold that the respective Boards should pay the pensionery dues and arrears to the employees, retired/retiring from the areas, now falling under their jurisdiction, subject to final accounting/adjustment of their liabilities. Such payment will be subject to the decision of the Supreme Court in Suit No. 1 of 2005 and subject to final apportionment/adjustment, as may be made in the beginning of the next financial year(s). Such payment will be subject to the decision of the Supreme Court in Suit No. 1 of 2005 and subject to final apportionment/adjustment, as may be made in the beginning of the next financial year(s). In the present case, all the petitioners having retired from the offices, now falling within the territorial jurisdiction of Jharkhand, J.S.E.B. will be liable to pay all their retiral benefits and other dues to which they are entitled. We, accordingly, direct the J.S.E.B. and its official to pay the petitioner immediately their ‘current pension’ within fifteen days from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. So far as other dues, as claimed by the individual petitioners in their respective case, are concerned, the J.S.E.B. will decide the claim and will pay the admitted benefits to such petitioner(s), who are so entitled, within a period of four months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. On failure, the respondents will be liable to pay interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the admitted dues from the date(s), the petitioner(s) are so entitled, and also a cost of Rs. 5,000/- to each of the petitioners. All the writ petitions are, thus, allowed with the aforesaid observations and directions.” 9. Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned senior standing counsel for the Jharkhand Board has referred to “Surendra Prasad Thakur vs. State of Jharkhand & Others” reported in (2014) 3 AJR 749 to distinguish the judgment in “Akhileshwar Prasad”. We observe that “Surendra Prasad Thakur” referred to several other orders passed by this Court and held that those orders/judgments are not an authority on the point that if the employee has retired prior to the appointed day from an office now falling under the territory of State of Jharkhand, the liability to pay post retiral dues to the employees shall be fastened on the State of Jharkhand. This judgment is based on Paragraph No. 5 of Eighth Schedule which clearly provides that it shall be the liability of the unified State of Bihar to pay pension and other retiral benefits to the employees whose pension and other retiral benefits were granted before the appointed day even though being drawn in any area outside the territories of the existing State of Bihar, subject to adjustment to be made in accordance with paragraph No. 3 as if such pensions and other retirement benefits have been drawn in any treasury in the State of Bihar under paragraph No. (1). 9 10. More than half a century back, in “British Rlys. Board v. Herrington” (1972) 1 All ER 749, the Privy Council observed as under: “There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.” 11. This rule of interpretation has been adopted by the Courts in India to hold that a judgment is an authority to what it actually decides. In “R.L. Jain v. DDA” (2004) 4 SCC 79 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that what is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made therein. There is no doubt that a little difference in facts may lead to different conclusion and moreover a judgment should not be read as a statute [refer, “Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati & Ors.” (2004) 10 SCC 65 ]. Yet again, in “Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Union of India” (2012) 1 SCC 619 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the ratio of a case must be understood having regard to the fact-situation obtaining therein. “Akhileshwar Prasad” is not a binding precedent according to which liability to pay post retiral benefits to an employee who superannuated from service prior to the appointed day shall be decided on the basis of the place from where the employee superannuated. On the contrary, paragraph No. 5 of the Eighth Schedule regulates the rights and liabilities of both the Boards. On the contrary, paragraph No. 5 of the Eighth Schedule regulates the rights and liabilities of both the Boards. The legislative intention under Eighth Schedule is very clear and only on account of dispute between both the Boards and for the reason that a final decision on apportionment of assets and liability of both the Boards had not taken place by that time, the decision in “Akhileshwar Prasad” was rendered. In fact, that order was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the following order was passed therein: “Leave granted. Pursuant to our order dated 8th September 2006, the Government of India has taken a decision by its order dated 3rd November 2006. After hearing both the parties, we direct the parties to implement clauses (3) and (4) of the decision taken on 3rd November 2006. If any party is aggrieved by the said decision, they may resort to further proceedings in accordance with law. The High Court’s order is accordingly modified to that extent. The Appeal is disposed of in the above terms. Central Government shall ensure that the parties abide by its decision.” 12. Apparently the agreement dated 29th December 2003 on which the decision in “Akhileshwar Prasad” was based no longer exists. 13. In the hindside, the issue may pertain to judicial discipline and proprietary inasmuch as there seems to be judgment by two Co-ordinate Benches of this Court regarding payment of pensionary benefits to the employees. This is well accepted a norm of judicial discipline that a Bench of co-equal strength must follow the decision of this Court of a Bench of co-equal strength, provided the issue in law is the same. However, this is also well accepted within the powers of the Court that the judgment of even a larger Bench of the Court can be explained by a Bench of lesser strength. “Akhileshwar Prasad” is not an authoritative pronouncement on the interpretation of Eighth Schedule and the said decision was based on resolution dated 27th December 2003. Therefore, we are not inclined to accept the suggestion of the learned counsel for the appellants that in view of the decisions in “Akhileshwar Prasad” and “Surendra Prasad Thakur” the issue regarding payment of post retiral benefits to the employees of the two Boards may be referred to a larger Bench. 14. Therefore, we are not inclined to accept the suggestion of the learned counsel for the appellants that in view of the decisions in “Akhileshwar Prasad” and “Surendra Prasad Thakur” the issue regarding payment of post retiral benefits to the employees of the two Boards may be referred to a larger Bench. 14. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake apparent on the face of record. The expression “error apparent on the face of record” is distinct from an erroneous decision. The error apparent on record refers to such an error which does not require a process of reasoning to arrive at a conclusion and which is self evident. In “Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury” (1995) 1 SCC 170 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and must strictly remain confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In “Meera Bhanja”, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent observations: (SCC p. 390, para 3) “It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” 9. Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale wherein, K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record: An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.” 15. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.” 15. The submission made on behalf of the appellants that the review Court could not have exercised its powers to modify the order dated 23rd July 2009 passed in W.P. (S) No. 2792 of 2003 is rejected also for the reason that an error in law can always be a ground for reviewing the previous decision(s). 16. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any reason to interfere in this matter and, accordingly, LPA No. 152 of 2011 is dismissed.