JUDGMENT : Rajesh Shankar, J. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the common order dated 23.05.2022 passed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi in J.B.C. Revision Case No. 12 of 2022 and J.B.C. Revision Case No. 13 of 2022 whereby the said revision applications filed by the petitioner Nos. 1 & 3 to 6 have been dismissed and the orders dated 15.02.2022 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi in J.B.C. Appeal No. 38 R 15 of 2018-19 as well as in J.B.C. Appeal No. 42 R 15 of 2018-19 have been affirmed. 2. At the outset, learned counsel for the petitioners informs the Court that initially while filing the present writ petition, the petitioner No. 2 was also impleaded as the respondent No. 2 since he had not signed the Vakalatnama along with other petitioners, however, subsequently, he also filed Vakalatnama and therefore his name may be permitted to be deleted as the respondent No. 2 from the array of the parties. 3. Considering the said submission of learned counsel for the petitioners, the office is directed to delete the respondent No. 2 from the cause title of the present writ petition. 4. So far as the merit of the case is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the respondent filed a case for eviction of the petitioners being J.B.C. Eviction Case No. 14/2016 under Sections 19(1)(c), 21 & 5(3) of the Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2011 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 2011’] before the House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O, Sadar, Ranchi which was allowed vide order dated 30.08.2018 directing the petitioners to vacate the said shop within 15 days from the date of issuance of the order. The respondent however filed J.B.C. Appeal No. 38 R 15 of 2018-19 before the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi under Section 36 of the Act, 2011 challenging the part of the order dated 30.08.2018 whereby the issue No. 5 i.e. whether the plaintiff actually required the suit premises under Section 19(1)(c), was decided against him. The petitioner No. 1 and the petitioner Nos. 3 to 6 also filed J.B.C. Appeal No. 42 R 15 of 2018-19 before the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi against the order dated 30.08.2018 passed by the House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O, Sadar, Ranchi in J.B.C. Case No. 14/2016. The petitioner No. 1 and the petitioner Nos. 3 to 6 also filed J.B.C. Appeal No. 42 R 15 of 2018-19 before the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi against the order dated 30.08.2018 passed by the House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O, Sadar, Ranchi in J.B.C. Case No. 14/2016. J.B.C. Appeal No. 38 R 15 of 2018-19 was allowed vide order dated 15.02.2022 in favour of the respondent setting aside the part of the order dated 30.08.2018 passed in J.B.C. Case No. 14/2016 whereby the issue No. 5 was decided against the respondent. J.B.C. Appeal No. 42 R 15 of 2018-19 filed by the petitioner Nos. 1 & 3 to 6 was however dismissed upholding the order dated 30.08.2018 passed by the House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O, Sadar, Ranchi in J.B.C. Case No. 14/2016 whereby the said authority had allowed the respondent's application for eviction of the petitioners from the shop premises situated over M.S. Plot No. 32, Holding No. 25, Ward No. 15 (old), Ward No. 18 (new), measuring an area of 9' × 8' 6?, Main Road, Opposite Sankat Mochan Mandir, Ranchi (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said shop’). Aggrieved by the said orders, the petitioner Nos. 1 & 3 to 6 preferred revision applications being J.B.C. Revision Case No. 12/2022 and J.B.C. Revision Case No. 13/2022 before the Divisional Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, however, the said revision cases were also dismissed vide the impugned order dated 23.05.2022. 5. It is further submitted that initially Late Abdul Rauf (the grandfather of the petitioner Nos. 1 to 5) was inducted as original tenant in the said shop in the year 1920 by the respondent's grandfather, namely, Ram Krishna Sahu. After death of Abdul Rauf, his son, namely, Late Gulam Rasool came in possession of the said shop and thereafter the petitioners are continuing with the business of rubber stamp in the said shop being successor of Late Gulam Rasool. Late Gulam Rasool had paid the rent till August, 2015 @ Rs. 1400/- per month and he died on 06.10.2015 leaving behind the petitioners as his legal representatives. The electricity bill of the said shop is also being paid regularly by the petitioners which confirms the fact that they are in lawful possession of the said shop. There was no tenancy agreement (Kirayanama) between Late Gulam Rasool and the respondent. 1400/- per month and he died on 06.10.2015 leaving behind the petitioners as his legal representatives. The electricity bill of the said shop is also being paid regularly by the petitioners which confirms the fact that they are in lawful possession of the said shop. There was no tenancy agreement (Kirayanama) between Late Gulam Rasool and the respondent. Hence, the aforesaid eviction suit filed by the respondent against the petitioners was not maintainable. The said shop is the only source of livelihood for maintaining the large family of Late Gulam Rasool, who was not an individual tenant, rather Late Abdul Rauf was inducted as original tenant in the year 1920 and after his death in the year 1961, Late Gulam Rasool (the father of the petitioner Nos. 1 to 5 and the husband of the petitioner No. 6) inherited the shop premises and came in possession of the same being the son of the original tenant. 6. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the relevant materials available on record. The claim of the respondent before the House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O, Sadar, Ranchi was that Late Gulam Rasool was inducted as an individual tenant in the said shop for commercial purpose on the monthly rent of Rs. 1,400/- which was paid till August, 2015. The tenancy agreement between Late Gulam Rasool and the respondent came to an end after death of Gulam Rasool and hence the petitioners, who are the legal representatives of the original tenant, are liable to be evicted from the said shop. On the other hand, the claim of the petitioners before the House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O, Sadar, Ranchi was that the said shop was initially given on rent to Abdul Rauf (the grandfather of the petitioner Nos. 1 to 5) by Ram Krishna Sahu (the grandfather of the respondent) by way of permanent settlement. There was no tenant-landlord relationship between the petitioners and the respondent. The House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O, Sadar, Ranchi while allowing the respondent's application, held that the petitioners failed to show any document in support of their claim that the said shop was settled in favour of their grandfather and on the other hand, there were sufficient documents to suggest that the respondent is the owner of the said shop. The House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O, Sadar, Ranchi while allowing the respondent's application, held that the petitioners failed to show any document in support of their claim that the said shop was settled in favour of their grandfather and on the other hand, there were sufficient documents to suggest that the respondent is the owner of the said shop. According to the House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O, Sadar, Ranchi, the rent receipts produced by the petitioners and the respondent sufficiently proved that the rent was being paid by Md. Gulam Rasool to the respondent and as such there was tenant-landlord relationship between them. The House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O, Sadar, Ranchi also held that Md. Gulam Rasool was inducted as an individual tenant in the said shop for business purpose and therefore after his death, the tenancy came to an end in view of Section 5(3) of the Act, 2011. The House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O, Sadar, Ranchi also observed that the petitioners failed to show that even after death of Gulam Rasool, they were accepted as tenants by the respondent. The finding of fact given by the House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O, Sadar, Ranchi has been affirmed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi vide order dated 15.02.2022 passed in J.B.C. Appeal No. 42 R 15 of 2018-19 as well as by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi vide order dated 23.05.2022 passed in the aforesaid revision cases. Though the claim of personal necessity of the respondent authority was not allowed by the House Rent Controller-cum-S.D.O, Sadar, Ranchi, the appellate authority allowed the said claim of the respondent vide order dated 15.02.2022 passed in J.B.C. Appeal No. 38 R 15 of 2018-19 which has been affirmed by the revisional authority. 7. In the case of Rajendra Diwan v. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala reported in (2019) 20 SCC 143 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:— “86. In exercise of its extraordinary power of superintendence and/or judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Courts restrict interference to cases of patent error of law which go to the root of the decision; perversity; arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and usurpation of powers. The High Court does not re-assess or re-analyse the evidence and/or materials on record. The High Court does not re-assess or re-analyse the evidence and/or materials on record. Whether the High Court would exercise its writ jurisdiction to test a decision of the Rent Control Tribunal would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum, just because there is no other provision of appeal in the eye of the law.” 8. In the case of Krishnanand (Dead), through legal representatives v. Director of Consolidation reported in (2015) 1 SCC 553 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:— “12. The High Court has committed an error in reversing the findings of fact arrived at by the authorities below in coming to the conclusion that there was a partition. No doubt, the High Court did so in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is a settled law that such a jurisdiction cannot be exercised for reappreciating the evidence and arrival of findings of facts unless the authority which passed the impugned order does not have jurisdiction to render the finding or has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or the finding is patently perverse. In the present case, though the High Court reversed the concurrent findings of the authorities below and came to the opposite conclusion on matter of facts, the High Court did not do so on the ground that the authorities below acted in excess of their jurisdiction or without jurisdiction or that the finding is vitiated by perversity. 13. We are of the view that the High Court ought not to have entered into reappreciation of evidence and reversed the findings of fact arrived at by the three authorities below, especially since the authorities had neither exceeded their jurisdiction nor acted perversely. The High Court has nowhere stated that it was of the view that there is any perversity, much less the High Court failed to demonstrate any such circumstances.” 9. The High Court has nowhere stated that it was of the view that there is any perversity, much less the High Court failed to demonstrate any such circumstances.” 9. Thus, it is well settled principle of law that the High Court should not interfere with a concurrent finding of fact in exercise of its extraordinary power of superintendence and/or judicial review under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India unless the authority which has passed the impugned order does not have jurisdiction to render the finding or has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or the finding is patently perverse. 10. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that no such perversity is found in the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the original, appellate as well as revisional Courts so as to warrant any interference of this Court. 11. The present writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.