JUDGMENT Aman Chaudhary, J. Present petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for setting aside of order dated 17.10.2014, vide which the complaint case No.2620-II dated 02.12.2013 titled as 'P.S. Raj Steels Private Ltd. v. Reliance Steel Industries and another' under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, was returned in original to be filed at the place having its proper jurisdiction. 2. Briefly put, the facts as emerge from the complaint, are that respondents had purchased SS Pipes from the complainant-petitioner on credit and in order to discharge the liability, issued a cheque dated 24.10.2013, for an amount of Rs.1,79,900/-, which was drawn on HDFC Bank, Indrapuri, Bhopal, got dishonoured with remarks 'stop payment' vide memo dated 29.10.2013. The legal notice of demand dated 06.11.2013, having evoked no response, the complaint dated 02.12.2013 was filed under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short 'the Act') at Hisar, where the complainant-company has its registered office. The trial Court, after recording preliminary evidence, passed the summoning order dated 02.03.2014. However, respondents-company did not appear, leading to issuance of bailable warrants to secure their presence. The complaint was however, returned in original vide order dated 17.10.2014, in view of the judgment of Hon'ble The Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra and another, Criminal Appeal No.2287 of 2009 for its presentation before the learned Court where the drawee bank is situated. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that though the complaint ought not to have been returned, as the cheque in question was payable at par and the drawee is situated in the city, wherein it was presented. However, now by way of an amendment carried out in the Act by incorporating Section 142A vide Notification dated 15.06.2015, the complaint could have been presented where the cheque was presented for collection that is the branch of the Bank of payee or holder in due course. To bolster his submission, he relies on Bridgestone India Pvt. Ltd. v. Inderpal Singh, (2016) 2 SCC 75 , and Paramvir Singh Mor v. Professional Placements Pvt. Ltd and another, CRM- M-39975-2016, decided on 19.07.2022. 4. According to the office report, none has appeared on behalf of the respondents, in the present case. As is apparent, that despite bailable warrants having been issued against the respondents, they had not caused an appearance before the learned trial Court as well. 4. According to the office report, none has appeared on behalf of the respondents, in the present case. As is apparent, that despite bailable warrants having been issued against the respondents, they had not caused an appearance before the learned trial Court as well. In view of which, it would be in the interest of justice to not keep the case pending any longer, thereby, is decided as per the amendment and the law laid down. 5. Heard. 6. It is apposite to refer to the relevant portion of Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 for consideration of the case in hand, which reads thus "3. In the principal Act, section 142 shall be numbered as sub-section (1) thereof and after subsection (1) as so numbered, the following sub-section shall be inserted, namely:- "(2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction,-- (a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated; or (b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or holder in due course otherwise through an account, the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is situated. Explanation - For the purposes of clause (a), where a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account." 4. In the principal Act, after section 142, the following section shall be inserted, namely:- "142A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any judgment, decree, order or directions of any court, all cases transferred to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, shall be deemed to have been transferred under this Act, as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (2) of section 142 or sub-section (1), where the payee or the holder in due course, as the case may be, has filed a complaint against the drawer of a cheque in the court having jurisdiction under subsection (2) of section 142 or the case has been transferred to that court under sub-section (1), and such complaint is pending in that court, all subsequent complaints arising out of section 138 against the same drawer shall be filed before the same court irrespective of whether those cheques were delivered for collection or presented for payment within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. (3) If, on the date of the commencement of this Ordinance, more than one prosecution filed by the same payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, against the same drawer of cheques is pending before different courts, upon the said fact having been brought to the notice of the court, such court shall transfer the case to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, before which the first case was filed and is pending, as if that subsection had been in force at all material times." 7. Hon'ble The Supreme Court in Bridgestone India Pvt. Ltd. (supra), with regard to Section 142(2) of the Act, held thus:- "13. A perusal of the amended Section 142(2), extracted above, leaves no room for any doubt, specially in view of the explanation thereunder, that with reference to an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the place where a cheque is delivered for collection i.e. the branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, where the drawee maintains an account, would be determinative of the place of territorial jurisdiction. xx xx xx 16. Since cheque No.1950, in the sum of Rs.26958/-, drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh, dated 02.05.2006, was presented for encashment at IDBI Bank, Indore, which intimated its dishonour to the appellant on 04.08.2006, we are of the view that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, would have the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceedings initiated by the appellant under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, after the promulgation of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015. The words "as if that sub-Section had been in force at all material times..." used with reference to Section 142(2), in Section 142A(1) gives retrospectivity to the provision." 8. The complaint in question was filed in the trial Court at Hisar, on the ground that the cheque was presented in the branch falling within the jurisdiction of the said Court, however, the same was returned in view of the unamended provision of Section 142 of the Act and the judgment of Dasrath Rupsingh Rathod (supra), as per which it ought to have been instituted in the jurisdiction of a Court where the drawee bank was situated, that in the present case was at Bhopal. 9. Hon'ble The Supreme Court in Bridgestone India Pvt. Ltd. (supra), having interpreted the said amendment to be retrospectively effective and finding that based on section 142A(1) NI Act, the judgment rendered in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod (supra), would not stand in the way in so far as the territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings emerging from dishonour of cheque is concerned, thus, in the present case, the complaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class at Hisar, by the petitioner would be statutorily required to be restored for cognizance to be taken thereof, the premise on which it was returned being lack of territorial jurisdiction. 10. In view of the aforesaid, the present petition is allowed. The order dated 17.10.2014 is set aside. On the complaint being represented by the petitioner within a period of three weeks from today, it is ordered to be restored to its original number by the Illaqa Magistrate and proceed in the matter in accordance with the law. The complaint instituted by the petitioner being of the year 2013, the trial Court is requested to decide the same expeditiously.