JUDGMENT : (Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) The workman claiming that he was forced to superannuate on 31st March 2002 about 4 years prior to the actual date of retirement from service raised a dispute which was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court at Bokaro. 2. The Labour Court at Bokaro answered the reference against the workman and made an award dated 28th October 2005 holding that retirement of the workman from service on 31st March 2002 was justified. 3. In W.P(L) No.2969 of 2006, challenge laid by the workman to the award dated 28th October 2005 failed and therefore the present Letters Patent Appeal was filed by the workman (now, represented through his legal heirs). 4. Briefly stated, the workman Md. Khalil joined as Welder under the Management of Steel Authority of India Limited (in short, “Management”) on 21st March 1974. According to the workman, at the time of entering into the service he was asked to undergo a medical fitness test and his age as on 12th March 1974 was assessed around twenty-seven and a half years. After about twenty years of service, he came to know that his date of birth was changed to 21st March 1942 behind his back and therefore made several representations including dated 15th November 1993 and 25th June 1996 to the Management for correcting his date of birth to be 25th May 1946. The workman pleaded that Sri B. Sharma, the then Dy. Chief Personnel Manager, accepted his representation for correction in his date of birth but a corresponding entry was not made in his Personal Data Form. Later on, the Bokaro Ispat Kamgar Union espousing his cause took up the matter with the Management but, in the meantime, he received a separation order vide letter dated 17th January 2002 and he was made to retire from service w.e.f. 31st March 2002. Consequently, an industrial dispute was raised and the appropriate Government referred the same for adjudication by the Labour Court at Bokaro. The reference made by the appropriate Government was in the following terms: “Whether the retirement from services of Md. Khalil, Welder, Staff No.314790 from dated 31.3.2002 as per corrigendum notification (dt.20.10.2003 text of reference) by the management of Bokaro Steel Plant is justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?” 5. The reference made by the appropriate Government was in the following terms: “Whether the retirement from services of Md. Khalil, Welder, Staff No.314790 from dated 31.3.2002 as per corrigendum notification (dt.20.10.2003 text of reference) by the management of Bokaro Steel Plant is justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?” 5. The workman tendered evidence to the effect that his age as assessed around twenty-seven and a half years during medical examination corresponds to the date of birth declared by him at every stage. According to the workman, the Management accepted his date of birth on 25th May 1946 which is reflected in various documents of the Management. The workman in support of his stand that he was pre-maturely retired from service produced several documents including the Medical Book, Interview Letter, LTC/LLTC Forms, Medical Examination Report etc. 6. Before the Labour Court, the Management examined Mr. Braj Nandan Singh as MW1 who was working as Assistant Manager at Bokaro Steel Plant of SAIL and laid in evidence some documents such as Personal Data Form of the workman, application of the workman, reply of the Management etc. MW1 stated that medical examination of an employee is conducted to ascertain whether he is physically fit to join the post and, that, age assessment in the medical examination test cannot be considered a proof of age. He further deposed that Md. Khalil at the time of his joining himself filled up the Attestation Form and Personal Data Form disclosing his age 32 years and, on that basis, his date of retirement was fixed by the Management. This witness further stated that the Deputy Chief Personnel Manager illegally and without any authority entered the date of birth of Md. Khalil as 25th May 1946, which was detected after an inquiry and therefore corrected with red ink by the Management. 7. The Labour Court came to a conclusion that the declaration by the workman in his Personal Data Form that his age at the time of joining was 32 years was rightly taken by the Management as a basis for deciding his age of retirement, as there was no documentary proof to the contrary. The Labour Court answered the reference in favor of the Management and made the award dated 28th October 2005, observing as under: “12. The Labour Court answered the reference in favor of the Management and made the award dated 28th October 2005, observing as under: “12. Thus, upon the consideration of all the facts and circumstances and evidences discussed above, I find and hold that the workman Md. Khalil had since declared his age 32 years in the personal data form on the date of joining on 21.3.1974 s? his age so declared in the personal data form at the time of joining in absence of documentary proof viz. age certificate or School Leaving Certificate was fit to be taken to be sole basis for reckoning the age of the workman employee and also for reckoning for superannuation/ retirement of the workman Md. Khalil. The age declared by the workman 32 years on 21.3.1974 was accepted as correspondence date of birth to be 21.3.1942 and no management was right in issuing Ext.W-14 separation order as to date of retirement with effect from 31.3.02. The contention of the workman has no merit that he has been prematurely retired with effect from 31.3.2002. There is no substance in the contention of the workman that the separation order dt. 17.1.2002 (Ext. W-14) amounts to his retirement without complying of the provisions of Section 25 (F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. So, I find and hold that the action of the management of Bokaro Steel Plant in retiring the workman Md. Khalil, Staff No.314790 with effect from 31.3.2002 is justified and so the workman is not entitled to get any relief in this case. The text of reference is, therefore, answered in favour of the management.” 8. The writ Court while dismissing the writ petition has held as under: 11. Be that as it may, having heard the parties and upon perusal of the record, it appears that the order of the Labour Court, Bokaro is fully justified and no interference is warranted for the following facts and reasons:- i. the petitioner-workman had himself submitted P.D. Form disclosing his age as 32 years as on 21.3.74 and in absence of any documentary proof viz. school leaving certificate etc. it was taken as sole basis for reckoning the age of the workman (employee) and accordingly corresponding date of birth 21.3.1942 was taken as the actual date of birth of the workman for all the purposes and as such rightly he was retired w.e.f. 31.3.2002. ii. school leaving certificate etc. it was taken as sole basis for reckoning the age of the workman (employee) and accordingly corresponding date of birth 21.3.1942 was taken as the actual date of birth of the workman for all the purposes and as such rightly he was retired w.e.f. 31.3.2002. ii. The workman has raised the grievance regarding correction of date of birth for the first time in the year 1996 much after his date of joining and at the fag end of the service period as he was to retire in 2002 itself. The date of birth entered in the LTC/LLTC cannot be treated as proof for date of birth. iii. Admittedly, the petitioner represented for the first time after 20 long years at the fag end of service which itself was fatal to his case. Further, reference was stale one as it was 20 years from the date of appointment which is not permissible in the eyes of law. 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India Vs. Harnam Singh, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 162 has clearly observed that: “No Court or the Tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights.” 13. In case of “State of Tamil Nandu vs. T.V. Venugopalan, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 302 , the Hon’ble Apex Court was clearly of the opinion that the government servant should not be permitted to correct the date of birth at the fag end of his service career. The Court, in very strong terms, observed as under:- “…..The government servant having declared his date of birth as entered in the service register to be correct, would not be permitted at the fag end of his service career to raise a dispute as regards the correctness of the entries in the service register.” 14. In another judgment in case of “State of Uttaranchal Vs. Pitamber Dutt Semwal” [ (2005) 11 SCC 477 : 2006 SCC ( L & S) 106] relief was denied to the government employee on the ground that he sought correction in the service record after nearly 30 years of service. While setting aside the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the decision after almost three decades. 15. While setting aside the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the decision after almost three decades. 15. Further the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterating the same view, in case of “State of M.P. v. Premlal Shrivas”, reported in (2011) 9 SCC 664 has held as under:- “8. It needs to be emphasized that in matters involving correction of date of birth of a government servant, particularly on the eve of his superannuation or at the fag end of his career, the court or the tribunal has to be circumspect, cautions and careful while issuing direction for correction of date of birth, recorded in the service book at the time of entry into any government service. Unless the court or the tribunal is fully satisfied on the basis of the irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth and that such a claim is made in accordance with the procedure prescribed or as per the consistent procedure adopted by the department concerned, as the case may be, and a real injustice has been caused to the person concerned, the court or the tribunal should be loath to issue a direction for correction of the service book. Time and again this Court has expressed the view that if a government servant makes a request for correction of the recorded date of birth after lapse of a long time of his induction into the service, particularly beyond the time fixed by his employer, he cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth, even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. No Court or the tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights.” 16. Similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Shyam Kishore Singh, reported in (2020) 2 Supreme Today 189, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, “request for change of the date of birth in the service records at the fag end of service is not sustainable.” 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of “Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. Vs. Shyam Kishore Singh, reported in (2020) 2 Supreme Today 189, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, “request for change of the date of birth in the service records at the fag end of service is not sustainable.” 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of “Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty & Ors., reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 , dealing with the issue relating to stale claim, has held that, reference of the said dispute at a belated stage is bad in eyes of law both on the grounds of delay as well as on non-existence of an industrial dispute. 18. Further this Court in case of “Ajit Singh vrs. M/s Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., Jamshedpur through its Manager, H.R./IR Legal vide order dated 05.10.2020 taking into consideration several judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court has opined that correction in the date of birth at the fag end of service is not permissible in the eyes of law and also was of the view that no interference is required in the writ petition for correctness of date of birth after almost 3 decades. 19. Considering the observation made in the aforesaid cases it can be comfortably inferred that the aforesaid decisions lead to a different dimension of the case that correction of date of birth at the fag end would be at the cost of large number of employees, therefore, any correction at the fag end must be discouraged by the Court. 20. Thus, this Court finds no illegality or any infirmity in the order of the Labour Court, Bokaro and the same requires no interference. 21. Resultantly, the writ petition devoid of any merit and the same is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.” 9. The proceedings before the Labour Court are no doubt civil in nature and therefore the Court is required to decide the dispute keeping in mind the preponderance of probability which is applied in civil proceedings. The expression “preponderance of probability” is not defined in any Statute but this expression certainly does not mean a mere probability. This is too well settled a law that the Labour Court and the Tribunal are required to decide the dispute strictly in terms of the reference on the basis of the materials laid by the parties. The expression “preponderance of probability” is not defined in any Statute but this expression certainly does not mean a mere probability. This is too well settled a law that the Labour Court and the Tribunal are required to decide the dispute strictly in terms of the reference on the basis of the materials laid by the parties. The Labour Court is therefore required to assess and weigh the evidence laid by the parties during the trial for rendering a decision. But what has been done by the Labour Court in the present case is that by raising an adverse inference against the workman who failed to produce the school leaving certificate the reference has been answered against him. The Labour Court raised an adverse inference against the workman also for the reason that he failed to produce the age certificate to support his claim that his correct date of birth is 25th May 1946. However, the Labour Court ignored that there are several documents not even disputed by the Management wherein the date of birth of the workman was recorded as 25th May 1946. The Management produced Personal Data Form vide Exthibit-M1, application of the workman for correction of age vide Exthibit-M2 and reply of the Management to the workman’s representation dated 25th June 1995 vide Exhbit-M3. Whereas on behalf of the workman as many as 15 documents were laid in evidence such as; offer of an appointment vide Exhbit-W1, application of the workman for correction of age vide Exhibit-W2, representation of the workman dated 11th March 1998 vide Exhibit-W3, copy of the Employee’s Superannuation Benefit Fund vide Exhibit-W4, representation of the workman to the Manager [PERS/W/SP(O)] vide Exhibit-W5, the copies of LTC, LLTC Forms etc. vide Exhibits-W6, W7, W8, W9 and W10, Medical Book of the workman vide Exhibit-W11, Interview Letter issued to the workman vide Exhibit-W12, Medical Examination Report vide Exhibit-W13 etc. From the materials produced by the workman, it is thus apparent that date of birth of the workman as recorded in the employer’s records is 25th May 1946. The Employee’s Superannuation Benefit Fund records, LTC and LLTC documents, Medical Book issued to the workman, Medical Examination Report and the Interview Letter issued to the workman were all prepared by the Management wherein date of birth of the workman was recorded as 25th May 1946. The Employee’s Superannuation Benefit Fund records, LTC and LLTC documents, Medical Book issued to the workman, Medical Examination Report and the Interview Letter issued to the workman were all prepared by the Management wherein date of birth of the workman was recorded as 25th May 1946. Notwithstanding that, the Labour Court raised an adverse inference against the workman for not producing a certificate from the school and held that the workman failed to establish that his actual date of birth was 25th May 1946. As to the delay in raising the dispute for correction in date of birth, from the Management’s own records it is clear that on 15th November 1993 the workman made a representation which was followed by another representation made on 11th March 1998 for correction of his date of birth in the service records kept with Statistical Cell. 10. In our opinion, the procedure adopted by the Labour Court cannot be countenanced in law. It was for the reason that the workman could not produce any documentary evidence in support of his date of birth that he was directed to undergo the medical fitness test in which his age was assessed at twenty-seven and a half years. No doubt the medical fitness test is generally not relatable to the age assessment but, in the present case, the age so assessed by the Medical Board matches with the date of birth of the workman recorded at the time of his employment. Section 114 of the Evidence Act provides that the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Illustration (g) to section 114 provides that the evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. However, this cannot be said with any certainty that had the workman produced a certificate from the school it would have gone against him and therefore he did not produce a certificate from the school. The case pleaded by the workman was based on the Management’s records and to establish his case he had produced those documents. Moreover, this was not an objection taken by the Management that the workman intentionally withheld his school leaving certificate. The case pleaded by the workman was based on the Management’s records and to establish his case he had produced those documents. Moreover, this was not an objection taken by the Management that the workman intentionally withheld his school leaving certificate. Furthermore, Chapter VII of the Evidence Act which deals with “the burden of proof” provides under section 101 that the person who asserts the existence of a fact must prove that those facts exist and therefore the burden of proof lies on that person. The workman by tendering oral and documentary evidence sought to prove that his actual date of birth is 25th May 1946. On the other hand, except MW1 who said that the workman got his age recorded in the Personal Data Form as 32 years, the Management could not produce any other evidence in support thereof. On the contrary, striking off the date of birth of the workman recorded in the Personal Data Form supports the stand of the workman that the Management had all along accepted his date of birth as 25th May 1946. In fact, the date of birth of the workman was altered behind his back and when he raised objection and made a representation, the Management tried to float a story of collusion with the then Deputy General Manager. Now in view of the abundance of documentary evidence which records that the date of birth of the workman was 25th May 1946, the award dated 28th October 2005 made by the Labour Court has become unsustainable and requires interference of this Court. 11. The writ Court referred to the decisions in “Union of India v. Harnam Singh” (1993) 2 SCC 162 , “State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V Venugopalan” (1994) 6 SCC 302 , “State of Uttaranchal v. Pitamber Dutt Semwal” (2005) 11 SCC 477 , “State of M.P v. Premlal Shrivas” (2011) 9 SCC 664 , and “Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. v. Shyam Kishore Singh” (2020) 3 SCC 411 to come to a conclusion that a correction in the date of birth cannot be made at the fag end of the service because the same shall affect a large number of employees. v. Shyam Kishore Singh” (2020) 3 SCC 411 to come to a conclusion that a correction in the date of birth cannot be made at the fag end of the service because the same shall affect a large number of employees. In the first place, a different consideration shall arise when the Court is considering an application for correction in the date of birth in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and when the Court has to examine legality of the award made by the Labour Court. The scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which retained most of the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act, 1929 indicates that this Act seeks industrial peace by taking measures for settlement of disputes and securing amity and good relations between the employer and employee. The heading of section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act reads; “to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen”. This heading itself provides sufficient indication that the Labour Court has ample powers to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and to direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions as it may think fit. No doubt a certiorari shall not lie on the ground that the Labour Court has committed some errors of fact but where the award is made by the Labour Court on a patently erroneous premise the writ Court shall exercise its powers to correct the error. 12. In “Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. v. Virendra Kumar Jayantibhai Patel” (1997) 6 SCC 650 the Hon'ble Supreme Court elucidated the law on the subject, as under: “4. High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution are entitled to issue directions, writs and orders for correcting the record of the inferior courts or tribunals. It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot convert itself into a court of appeal and assess the sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence in support of the finding of fact reached by the competent courts or the tribunals, but this, however, does not debar the High Court from its power to enquire whether there is any evidence in support of a finding recorded by the inferior court or tribunal. It is well established that there is a difference between a finding based on sufficiency or adequacy of evidence and a finding based on no evidence. If the finding of fact recorded by the tribunal is based on no evidence, such a finding would suffer from error of law apparent on the face of record. As noticed earlier the award of the Tribunal and circulars issued in pursuance thereof by the Corporation were not applicable to the case of the respondent and if these materials are excluded, the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent is a workman entitled to permanent status in the service of the Corporation is rendered without any evidence and exposed to the vice of error apparent on the face of record. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court fell into error in dismissing the writ petition holding that the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal does not call for interference.” 13. In a catena of judgment including in “State of Haryana v. Devi Dutt” (2006) 13 SCC 32 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the parameters for interference with the order of an inferior Tribunal and held as under: “8. The High Court ordinarily should not have interfered with the said finding of fact. We, although, do not mean to suggest that the findings of fact cannot be interfered with by the superior courts in exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but the same should be done upon application of the well-known legal principles such as: (1) when it is perverse; (2) when wrong legal principles have been applied; (3) when wrong questions were posed; (4) when relevant facts have not been taken into consideration; or (5) the findings have been arrived at on the basis of the irrelevant facts or on extraneous consideration.” 14. In our opinion, the writ Court proceeded on a wrong premise and overlooked the glaring errors in law committed by the Labour Court. The writ Court failed to appreciate that the adverse inference raised by the Labour Court against the workman was not warranted, particularly, in view of the Management’s own records. The writ Court’s order dated 6th October 2020 is therefore set aside. The writ Court failed to appreciate that the adverse inference raised by the Labour Court against the workman was not warranted, particularly, in view of the Management’s own records. The writ Court’s order dated 6th October 2020 is therefore set aside. Consequently, the award dated 28th October 2005 passed by the Labour Court at Bokaro is set aside and the reference dated 10th July 2002 is answered in favor of the workman. 15. Now as to the consequential relief to the workman who passed away during the pendency of this litigation, we are of the opinion that full back wages cannot be awarded to him. The issue of whether or not to grant full back wages was considered in “M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. The Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.” (1979) 2 SCC 80 as under: “9. It is no more open to debate that in the field of industrial jurisprudence a declaration can be given that the termination of service is bad and the workman continues to be in service. The spectre of common law doctrine that contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced or the doctrine of mitigation of damages does not haunt in this branch of law. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It would mean that the employer has taken away illegally the right to work of the workman contrary to the relevant law or in breach of contract and simultaneously deprived the workman of his earnings. If thus the employer is found to be in the wrong as a result of which the workman is directed to be reinstated, the employer could not shirk his responsibility of paying the wages which the workman has been deprived of by the illegal or invalid action of the employer. Speaking realistically, where termination of service is questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has to go through the gamut of litigation, his capacity to sustain himself throughout the protracted litigation is itself such an awesome factor that he may not survive to see the day when relief is granted. More so in our system where the law's proverbial delay has become stupefying. More so in our system where the law's proverbial delay has become stupefying. If after such a protracted time and energy consuming litigation during which period the workman just sustains himself, ultimately he is to be told that though he will be reinstated, he will be denied the back wages which would be due to him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved. Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is motivated as in this case viz. to resist the workmen's demand for revision of wages, the termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. In such circumstances reinstatement being the normal rule, it should be followed with full back wages. Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution would assist us in reaching a just conclusion in this respect. By a suitable legislation, to wit, the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the State has endeavoured to secure work to the workmen. In breach of the statutory obligation the services were terminated and the termination is found to be invalid; the workmen though willing to do the assigned work and earn their livelihood, were kept away therefrom. On top of it they were forced to litigation up to the Apex Court now they are being told that something less than full back wages should be awarded to them. If the services were not terminated the workmen ordinarily would have continued to work and would have earned their wages. When it was held that the termination of services was neither proper nor justified, it would not only show that the workmen were always willing to serve but if they rendered service they would legitimately be entitled to the wages for the same. If the workmen were always ready to work but they were kept away therefrom on account of an invalid act of the employer, there is no justification for not awarding them full back wages which were very legitimately due to them. If the workmen were always ready to work but they were kept away therefrom on account of an invalid act of the employer, there is no justification for not awarding them full back wages which were very legitimately due to them. A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Dhari Gram Panchayat v. Safai Kamdar Mandal and a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Postal Seals Industrial Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Labour Court II, Lucknow have taken this view and we are of the opinion that the view taken therein is correct. 10. The view taken by us gets support from the decision of this Court in Workmen v. Calcutta Dock Labour Board. In this case seven workmen had been detained under the Defence of India Rules and one of the disputes was that when they were released and reported for duty, they were not taken in service and the demand was for their reinstatement. The Tribunal directed reinstatement of five out of seven workmen and this part of the award was challenged before this Court. This Court held that the workmen concerned did not have any opportunity of explaining why their services should not be terminated and, therefore, reinstatement was held to be the appropriate relief, and set aside the order of the Tribunal. It was observed that there was no justification for not awarding full back wages from the day they offered to resume work till their reinstatement. Almost an identical view was taken in Management of Panitole Tea Estate v. Workmen. 11. In the very nature of things there cannot be a strait-jacket formula for awarding relief of back wages. All relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a motion addressed to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At that stage the Tribunal will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on the face of the record. At that stage the Tribunal will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on the face of the record. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the Rules of reason and justice, according to law and not humour. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular (see Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield).” 16. The law on the subject has been further elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Uday Narain Pandey” (2006) 1 SCC 479 wherein after referring to several other judgments of the Court including “Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited” it has been held that payment of full back wages cannot be the natural consequence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: 42. A person is not entitled to get something only because it would be lawful to do so. If that principle is applied, the functions of an Industrial Court shall lose much of their significance. 43. The changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this Court, probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing, is evident. 44. In Hindustan Motors Ltd. v. Tapan Kumar Bhattacharya this Court noticed Raj Kumar and Hindustan Tin Works but held: (SCC p. 45, para 16) “16. As already noted, there was no application of mind to the question of back wages by the Labour Court. There was no pleading or evidence whatsoever on the aspect whether the respondent was employed elsewhere during this long interregnum. Instead of remitting the matter to the Labour Court or the High Court for fresh consideration at this distance of time, we feel that the issue relating to payment of back wages should be settled finally. There was no pleading or evidence whatsoever on the aspect whether the respondent was employed elsewhere during this long interregnum. Instead of remitting the matter to the Labour Court or the High Court for fresh consideration at this distance of time, we feel that the issue relating to payment of back wages should be settled finally. On consideration of the entire matter in the light of the observations referred to supra in the matter of awarding back wages, we are of the view that in the context of the facts of this particular case including the vicissitudes of long-drawn litigation, it will serve the ends of justice if the respondent is paid 50% of the back wages till the date of reinstatement.” 17. Therefore, no fixed parameter can be laid down on the grant of back wages and the issue regarding the grant of back wages shall necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances in the case. We have considered the matter keeping in mind the relevant factors and decided to grant 25% back wages to the workman treating him in service till 31st May 2006. 18. L.P. A No.158 of 2021 is allowed, in the aforesaid terms.