JUDGMENT : NARENDRA KUMAR VYAS, J. 1. This writ appeal has been filed under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006 against the order dated 17.09.2018 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 2540 of 2018 by which the writ petition filed by the petitioners has been dismissed holding that as the road on the land of the appellants had been constructed in housing development of Kamal Vihar Colony in the year 2012-13, the appellants are not entitled to get compensation as per Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short “the Act 2013”). 2. The brief facts, as projected by the appellants, are that respondent No. 3 had framed Kamal Vihar Town Development Scheme (for short “the Scheme”) under Section 38 (1) of M.P./C.G. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (for short “the Act 1973”). According to the Scheme, respondent No. 3 has to develop the land and handover 30% of the developed land to the land owners without any contribution from the land owners for their acquired land for development of the Scheme. It has also been contended that as per Section 56 of the Act, 1973, it would be applicable only for the land included for development of the Scheme. It has been further contended that the appellants' lands bearing Khasra No. 293/2, 293/9, 293/10, 293/11, 293/12, 293/14, 293/15, 193/16, 293/18, 293/19 and 293/20 area admeasuring 0.097 Hectare situated at Devangar, Village-Devpuri, Raipur, had been acquired by respondent No. 3 without following any procedure known to the law despite objection raised by the appellants. The said land was not included in the aforesaid Scheme as reflected from memo dated 20.10.2014. In the report given by the Revenue Inspector, it has been clearly mentioned that respondent No. 3-Raipur Development Authority is constructing concrete road on the land bearing Khasra No 328, which is a Government land near to canal, in which some of the portion of the land of Khasra No. 293/2-9-10-11-12-14-15-16-18-19-20 part measuring 0.095 and 0.0002 Hectare belonging to the appellants, is also utilized for construction of the road. 3. The records of the case would further demonstrate that on 23.01.2015 the appellants were offered reconstituted plot measuring 353.63 sq. mtr. 3. The records of the case would further demonstrate that on 23.01.2015 the appellants were offered reconstituted plot measuring 353.63 sq. mtr. by respondent No. 3 as per the Scheme, which was denied by the appellants on 27.02.2015 (Annexure A/7) and claimed compensation as per the Act, 2013. However, the same was not considered. Thereafter, the appellants preferred another representation before respondent No. 3 on 20.07.2015, which was also not considered by respondent No. 3, and as such, the appellants preferred writ petition before this Court bearing W.P. (C) No. 1425/2015, wherein this Court has passed the following order on 06.11.2017: “6. As per the submission, representation made by the petitioner is not decided and still pending before the respondent, any decision on representation pending before the respondent can be called and questioned before this Court, if so required by the petitioner later on, but for that purpose it is required that this representation should be decided first by the respondent, hence, this petition is disposed off with direction. 7. Respondents are directed to consider and decide the representation of the petitioner in accordance with the law, rules and regulations within a period of three months and they shall have the liberty to decide the representation without being influenced by any of the observation made in this order.” 4. In pursuance of the order passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 1425/2015, respondent No. 3 has decided the representation preferred by the appellants on 07.02.2018 (Annexure A/10) stating that as per the guidelines for determination of the market value of the land applicable in the year 2011-12 issued by the Collector, Raipur, the compensation of the appellants’ lands which have been acquired for construction of road comes to Rs. 44,29,860/- and accordingly, they were directed to submit the documents. This proposal made by respondent No. 3 was not acceptable to the appellants and therefore, they preferred another writ petition before this Court bearing W.P. (C) No. 2540/2018 and the said writ petition was dismissed by this Court by recording its finding at paragraphs 6 and 7, which read as under: “6. The petitioners have themselves moved and filed one document Annexure P/5 containing the report of the Revenue Inspector, Raipur-2, Tehsil Raipur, District Raipur (CG) dated 20.5.2014 mentioning on the basis of spot inspection on 16.1.2014, that the road has already been constructed over the petitioners' land in question. The petitioners have themselves moved and filed one document Annexure P/5 containing the report of the Revenue Inspector, Raipur-2, Tehsil Raipur, District Raipur (CG) dated 20.5.2014 mentioning on the basis of spot inspection on 16.1.2014, that the road has already been constructed over the petitioners' land in question. Thus, the road which was already constructed on16.1.2014 cannot be constructed overnight. 7. It appears, the road was constructed in the housing development of Kamal Vihar Colony sometime in the year 2012-13. Therefore, statement made to the contrary on being factually incorrect deserves to be and is hereby repelled.” 5. This order is being challenged by the appellants. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe and Mr. Shreyansh Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellants would submit that no proceeding for acquisition of the land, has been initiated by respondent No. 3 and without following the procedure known to law, appellants’ lands have been acquired. They would further submit that as per Article 300A of the Constitution of India, a person cannot be deprived of his property save by authority of law. They would further submit that the right of property is now considered not only to be a constitutional or statutory right, but also as a human right, though it is not the basic feature of the constitutional or a fundamental right. They would further submit that now human rights are gaining an even greater multifaceted dimension. It has been further contended that since respondent No. 3, without following any procedure of law, has acquired the lands of the appellants, the rights conferred upon by virtue of Article 300A of the Constitution of India is being adversely affected. 6. In support of the submission, they relied upon the judgments rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, (2020) 2 SCC 569 and Constitution Bench judgment in Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129 . 7. 7. They would further submit that since no land acquisition proceeding has been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act 1894”) and no award as per Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act, 2013, but possession of the land has been taken and compensation has not been paid, therefore, in view of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, the compensation has to be determined as per the Act, 2013 only. On the above factual and legal submission, the appellants would pray that the order dated 17.09.2018 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 2540 of 2018, may be set aside and respondent authorities may be directed to pay appropriate compensation in accordance with the Act, 2013. 8. Ms. Astha Shukla, Government Advocate for the State/respondents No. 1, 2 and 4 would submit that certain lands were taken by respondent No. 3 for development of the Scheme wherein appellants’ lands were also included and their compensation has rightly been assessed by respondent No. 3 as per the guidelines issued for the year 2011-12. She would further submit that similar treatment has also been given to the other land owners, and as such, the appellants were also offered compensation equivalent to the compensation determined for other land owners as per the guidelines issued for the year 2011-12. She would further submit that respondent No. 3 has not made any proposal to the respondents for acquisition of land of the appellants and therefore, no compensation under the Act, 2013 could be determined by the respondents for the appellants’ lands, which was used by respondent No. 3 for construction of road under the Scheme, and as such, the appellants were rightly offered compensation to the tune of Rs. 44,29,860/-. Thus, the appellants are not entitled to get compensation as per the Act, 2013 and she would pray for dismissal of the appeal. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Rohishek Verma, counsel for respondent No. 3 would submit that they have filed return wherein they have annexed note-sheet (Annexure R/3-1) to demonstrate that the appellants are entitled to get compensation to the tune of Rs. 44,29,860/- only, which is in accordance with the guidelines for the year 2011-12 for determination of compensation of Village-Devpuri where the lands of the appellants are situated. 44,29,860/- only, which is in accordance with the guidelines for the year 2011-12 for determination of compensation of Village-Devpuri where the lands of the appellants are situated. They would further submit that the compensation along with solatium comes to Rs. 44,29,860/- and the appellants are only entitled for the said amount as assessed by them. They would further submit that Rs. 44,29,860/- has already been offered to the appellants on 07.02.2018, but the appellants have not accepted the same, and therefore, the writ petition filed by the appellants has rightly been dismissed by the learned Single Judge and the instant appeal is also liable to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction. 11. From perusal of the records, it is not in dispute that the appellants’ lands have been utilized by the respondents for construction of road, which is being used for the Scheme as evident from letter dated 07.02.2018 (Annexure A/10) issued by respondent No. 3 itself and from the records also, it is quite vivid that no land acquisition proceeding has been initiated either under the Act, 1894 or under the Act, 2013 and without following the procedure and authority of law, the respondents had utilized the lands of the appellants, which is in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Article 300A of the Constitution of India reads as under: “300A. Persons not be deprived of property save by authority of law - No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.” 12. Article 300A of Constitution of India provides that right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or a statutory right but also a human right, though it is not the basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra), at paragraphs 9 and 10 held as under: “9. The right to property is now considered to be, not only a constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human right. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment etc. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment etc. Now however, human rights are gaining an even greater multi faceted dimension. The right to property is considered, very much to be a part of such new dimension. [Vide: Lachhman Dass vs. Jagat Ram and Others, (2007) 10 SCC 448 , Amarjit Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2010) 10 SCC 43 , Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, AIR 2011 SC 1989 , State of Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar and Others, AIR 2012 SC 559 and Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and Another, AIR 2012 SC 573 ]. 10. In the case at hand, there has been no acquisition. The question that emerges for consideration is whether, in a democratic body polity, which is supposedly governed by the Rule of Law, the State should be allowed to deprive a citizen of his property, without adhering to the law. The matter would have been different had the State pleaded that it has right, title and interest over the said land. It however, concedes to the right, title and interest of the appellants over such land and pleads the doctrine of delay and laches as grounds for the dismissal of the petition/appeal.” 13. Again the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidya Devi (supra), has held at paragraphs 12.2 to 12.9 as under: “12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2 in a welfare State and a Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300A, can be inferred in that Article 300. Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300A, can be inferred in that Article 300. State of West Bengal vs. Subodh Gopal Bose and Others, AIR 1954 SC 92 , Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others vs. M.I.D.C. and Others, (2013) 1 SCC 353 and K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 . 12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Darius Shapur Chenai, wherein this Court held that: “6......Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of “eminent domain” may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.” 12.4. In N. Padmamma vs. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, this Court held that: “21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.” 12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others, this Court recognized the right to property as a basic human right in the following words: “30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property.” Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.” 12.6. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property.” Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.” 12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar vs. State of Gujarat, this Court held as follows : “48.......In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.” 12.7. In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967. 12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State. 12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others vs. M.I.D.C. and Others, wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.” 14. From the abovestated factual and legal position, it is quite vivid that the State could not have deprived a citizen of his property without the sanction of law. As such, it is incumbent upon the State to comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition or any other permissible statutory mode being a welfare State governed by rule of law. The State cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. As such, it is incumbent upon the State to comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition or any other permissible statutory mode being a welfare State governed by rule of law. The State cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. In the present case, it is quite vivid that no procedure has been followed by respondent No. 3 and therefore, acquisition of the lands of the appellants is illegal and against the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. On the pleadings of the parties, the issue required to be determined by this Court is whether in absence of any land acquisition proceeding under the Act, 1894, which stood repealed on 01.01.2014, taking the possession of appellants’ lands prior to coming into force of the Act, 2013, compensation has to be determined as per the provisions of the Act, 2013 or the Act, 1894. 16. For better understanding the issue raised in the present case, it is expedient for this Court to extract Section 11A of the Act, 1894 and Section 24 of the Act, 2013, which read as under: “11A. Period within which an award shall be made: (1) The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation: In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.” “24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply. (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 17. From perusal of the records of the case, it is quite vivid that no land acquisition proceeding under the Act, 1894 has been initiated by respondent No. 3, but the lands of the appellants have been utilized for construction of road without payment of compensation. Section 114 (2) provides that save as otherwise provided in this Act, the repeal under sub-section 1 shall not be held to be prejudiced or affect general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 also provides the effect of repeal as under: “6. Effect of repeal - Where this Act, or any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not: (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed. (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.” 18. From perusal of Section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897 as well as Section 114 of the Act, 2013, it is quite vivid that once the Act, 1894 has been repealed and no action for acquisition of land has been initiated as per the Act, 1894, then any action for acquisition of the land has to be taken as per the Act, 2013 only as respondent No. 3 without any authority of law, cannot acquire the lands of the appellants in view of well-settled legal position as discussed in the abovestated paragraphs. Therefore, it is incumbent upon respondent No. 3 to determine the compensation as per the Act, 2013. Section 24 of the Act, 2013 provides that the land acquisition process under the Act No. 1 of the Act, 1894, shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases and the said issue had come up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority (supra), wherein it has been held at paragraph 366 as under: “366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under: 366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014 the date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013. 366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed. 366.3. 366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed. 366.3. The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse. 366.4. The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. 366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). 366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). Land owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. 366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be treated as part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24(1)(b). 366.7. The mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2). 366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the Act of 2013 came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years. 366.9. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e. 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.” 19. Thus, it is clear that without initiating a land acquisition proceeding, respondent No. 3 has taken the lands in question for construction of road. Respondent No. 3 has failed to establish that they have acquired the subject land in accordance with law and paid compensation to the appellants. Thus, it is clear that without initiating a land acquisition proceeding, respondent No. 3 has taken the lands in question for construction of road. Respondent No. 3 has failed to establish that they have acquired the subject land in accordance with law and paid compensation to the appellants. The learned Single Judge failed to take note of the fact that without initiating acquisition proceeding, respondent No. 3 had acquired the lands of the appellants. Therefore, the order passed by learned Single Judge on 17.09.2018 in W.P. (C) No. 2540 of 2018, deserves to be set aside. 20. Accordingly, the instant writ appeal is allowed and the order dated 17.09.2018 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 2540 of 2018 is set aside. Respondent No. 3 is directed to initiate land acquisition proceeding as per the Act, 2013 and determine the compensation as per the Act, 2013, within six months from date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 21. No order as to costs.