Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 1342 (RAJ)

Punjab & Sindh Bank through Shri D. S. Anand, Zonal Manager v. Judge Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal Cum Labour Court, Jaipur

2023-07-11

ASHOK KUMAR GAUR, ASHUTOSH KUMAR

body2023
ORDER : 1. The instant special appeal has been filed by the appellant-employer-Bank challenging the order dated 19.12.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge, dismissing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.4073/2000 filed by the appellant-Bank challenging the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (Central Government), Jaipur (hereinafter ‘the Tribunal’), whereby termination of the respondent No.2-employee (hereinafter ‘respondent-employee’) was found to be in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as the ‘Act of 1947’). 2. This case has a checkered history and narration of all the facts in subsequent paras would reveal the same:- (I) The respondent-employee was working as Peon with the appellant-Bank from 03.08.1987 and his services came to be retrenched w.e.f. 01.02.1996. (II) The respondent-employee raised an industrial dispute after reference being made by the Government and the Tribunal passed an award dated 03.03.2000. (III) The Tribunal while considering the various pleas raised on behalf of the workman-employee came to conclusion that the services of the respondent-employee were terminated in violation of the statutory provision contained in Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. The Tribunal further came to conclusion that there were two posts of Peon, which were available for the appointment with the employer at the time of retrenchment of services of the respondent-employee and only on account of joining of one person on transfer basis, services of the respondent-employee could not have been terminated without following the due process of law. The operative portion of the award is quoted as under:- ^^izkFkhZ dh lsok lekfIr vf/kfu;e 1947 dh /kkjk 25&,Q dk mYya?ku dj dh xbZ gSA vr% mldh lsok lekfIr voS/k o vuqfpr ik;h tkrh gSA og cSad dh lsok esa fiNys osru lfgr iqu% vkus dk vf/kdkjh gksxkA izkFkhZ fujUrj lsok esa ekuk tk,xkA cSad dh mDr 'kk[kk esa fjDr in u gksus dh n'kk esa vFkok fu;fer p;fur vH;FkhZ ds fu;qfDr gksus ij in fjDr u jgus dh n'kk es izkFkhZ dh lsok,s vf/kfu;e 1947 dh /kkjk 25&,Q dh ikyuk dj lekIr djus ds fy;s cSad Lora= gksxkA iapkV dh izfrfyfi dsUnzh; ljdkj dks vf/kfu;e 1947 dh /kkjk 17 dh mi/kkjk ¼1½ ds varZxr izdk'kukFkZ izsf"kr dh tk;A^^ 3. The appellant-employer feeling aggrieved against the award passed by the Tribunal filed, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.4073/2000 and learned Single Judge, vide order dated 17.08.2005, dismissed the said writ petition filed by the appellant-employer and as such, the award passed by the Tribunal was upheld. 4. The appellant-employer preferred D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.952/2006 and the Division Bench of this Court, vide order dated 29.07.2015, remanded the matter back to learned Single Judge, as the order of the Single Bench was treated to be cryptic and no reasons were assigned in dismissing the writ petition preferred by the appellant-employer. 5. Learned Single Judge, after remand being made by the Division Bench, has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant-employer. Learned Single Judge has found that only on account of temporary status of the respondent-employee, the provisions contained in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act of 1947 will not be applicable and the retrenchment of even temporary employee will be covered under the definition of ‘retrenchment’. 6. Learned Single Judge further found that only on account of regularly selected candidate made available with the employer, services of even temporary employee could not have been dispensed with and the requirement of mandatory provision contained in Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, was required to be complied with. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant-employer-Bank Mr.Akhil Simlote has made the following submissions:- (1) The finding of the Tribunal as well as of learned Single Judge while treating the transfer of the respondent-employee as not a regular mode of selection, is perverse finding and as such, right of the appellant-employer cannot be taken away to post a particular person by way of transfer. (2) The findings in respect of non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947 will not be applicable in present facts, as services of the respondent-employee were dispensed with on account of availability of regularly selected person by way of transfer. (3) The services rendered by respondent-employee were on temporary basis and as such, relief of reinstatement with back wages, is wholly unjustified. (4) The respondent-employee has no absolute right to man a particular post and due to exigency of services if any employee is engaged on temporary basis, the same should not result into permanent employment, as has been directed by the Tribunal. (4) The respondent-employee has no absolute right to man a particular post and due to exigency of services if any employee is engaged on temporary basis, the same should not result into permanent employment, as has been directed by the Tribunal. (5) The relief which has been granted, while passing the award has given continuity of services and full back wages and the same is against the law, as laid down by the Apex Court from time to time. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even if the termination of the respondent-employee is found to be in violation of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, the same would not always result into reinstatement of the employee and even lump-sum compensation in lieu of the reinstatement, can be adequate relief. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-employee Mr.Abhishek Sharma submitted that the findings, which have been recorded by the Tribunal, have been affirmed by the learned Single Judge, while dismissing the writ petition of certiorari filed by the appellant-employer and as such, in special appeal, the findings of fact or appreciation of the same finding, may not be undertaken by this Court. 10. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent-employee had worked for a considerable period of about nine years and his services were terminated in violation of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, hence the relief granted by passing the award, is appropriate relief granted to such employee. 11. Learned counsel further submitted that the findings in respect of availability of an employee by way of transfer will not affect the service condition of the respondent-employee, as admittedly there were two posts available with the appellant-employer at the relevant time and only on account of one appointment being made by the transfer, the rights of respondent-employee could not have been taken away without following mandatory provisions of law. 12. Learned counsel further submitted that the Apex Court in the case of Jeetubha Khansangji Jadeja Vs. Kutchh District Panchayat in Civil Appeal No.6890 of 2022 decided on 23.09.2022, has reiterated the principle that if considerable period is spent by an employee and his termination from employment is illegal, the relief of reinstatement is required to be given to such an employee. 13. Kutchh District Panchayat in Civil Appeal No.6890 of 2022 decided on 23.09.2022, has reiterated the principle that if considerable period is spent by an employee and his termination from employment is illegal, the relief of reinstatement is required to be given to such an employee. 13. Learned counsel further submitted that in the instant case, the employee is running from pillar to post to get justice and even after getting an award in his favour passed in the year 2000, the respondent-employee has not been able to get the fruits of the award, as the appellant-employer is filing frivolous petition in this Court by way of special appeal. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 15. We on a careful reading of the award passed by the Tribunal, find that services of the respondent-employee were terminated without following the due process of law, as envisaged in the Act of 1947. The Tribunal has clearly recorded a finding that neither any notice was given to the respondent-employee nor any compensation in view of the notice, was paid to him and as such, if services of an employee were terminated without following the due process of law, the same cannot be approved by the Court of law. 16. We, further find that the award passed by the Tribunal takes into account the availability of two posts and the Tribunal has rightly come to conclusion that even if, one person was transferred in the Branch where the respondent-employee was working, the same could not have been a valid reason to dispense with service of the respondent-employee and that too, without following the mandatory provisions of law. 17. We have also gone through the order dated 19.12.2016 passed by learned Single Judge and we find that the learned Single Judge has rightly come to conclusion that the provisions contained in Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Act of 1947, will be attracted in respect of retrenchment of services of an employee, even who is appointed on a temporary basis. 18. We further find that the learned Single Judge has rightly come to conclusion that only on account of regular mode of selection not followed while appointing an employee on temporary basis, the same should not result into depriving the protection which is given under the Act of 1947. 19. 18. We further find that the learned Single Judge has rightly come to conclusion that only on account of regular mode of selection not followed while appointing an employee on temporary basis, the same should not result into depriving the protection which is given under the Act of 1947. 19. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant-employer that the observations and findings by the Tribunal and by learned Single Bench that the post by way of transfer cannot be treated as regular mode of appointment, suffice it to say by this Court that neither the learned Single Judge nor the Tribunal has made any such observation or has given any finding that by way of transfer, an employee cannot be brought from one place to another. Both the Courts below have taken into account the pleas which have been taken by the employer to justify the termination of service of the respondent-employee. 20. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant-employer that relief granted in favour of the respondent-employee, by way of reinstatement and in a given case adequate compensation, can be given in lieu of reinstatement, we at one point of time before deciding the special appeal had asked learned counsel for the appellant-employer to seek instructions in the matter, as whether, respondent-employer was prepared to give any lump-sum amount to the respondent-employee in place of his reinstatement with backwages. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr.Akhil Simlote expressed his inability, as no instructions were received by him, in spite of such information being given to the Officers of the appellant-Bank. 22. This Court since now finds that counsel for the appellant has made submission on merits, we accordingly deal with such submissions. 23. The submission of counsel for the appellant that reinstatement is not the only relief and as such, the Court can still grant lump-sum compensation to the respondent-employee, we find that the Apex Court recently in the case of Jeetubha Khansangji Jadeja (supra) has extensively dealt with the law relating to relief, which can be granted to an employee, whose services are terminated/retrenched by the employee without following the mandatory provisions contained in the Industrial Disputes Act. This Court, deem it proper, to refer the para Nos.10, 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 of the said judgment, are as under:- “10. This Court discerns no material to establish the proposition put forth by the appellant. This Court, deem it proper, to refer the para Nos.10, 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 of the said judgment, are as under:- “10. This Court discerns no material to establish the proposition put forth by the appellant. In the circumstances, given the fact that the direction of the Labour Court was only to reinstate but not pay backwages, the Division Bench’s substitution of that relief is not based on any known principle. In the present case, the Labour Court had rendered its award on 31.08.2010; the learned Single Judge rejected the management’s writ petition on 04.05.2011. The management’s appeal was, in the first instance, rejected on 16.01.2014; however, it approached this Court by filing special leave petition, which was allowed on 29.04.2016. It was thereafter–5 years later, that the impugned judgment was delivered. Having regard to these factors, the Court is of the opinion that the appellant workman could not have been made to suffer on account of the management’s obdurate attempt to have the relief set aside. Furthermore, the Division Bench’s impugned judgment has not interfered with the factual findings. Therefore, the direction to substitute the relief of reinstatement with one for lumpsum payment was not warranted in the circumstances of this case. 11. This court, in a three-judge Bench decision, in Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. And Others, (1979) 2 SCC 80 . when retrenchment of services of 56 employees due to non-availability of the raw material necessary for utilisation of full installed capacity by the employer, was held to be illegal, held that: “‘9. It is no more open to debate that in the field of industrial jurisprudence a declaration can be given that the termination of service is bad and the workman continues to be in service. The spectre of common law doctrine that contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced or the doctrine of mitigation of damages does not haunt in this branch of law. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It would mean that the employer has taken away illegally the right to work of the workman contrary to the relevant law or in breach of contract and simultaneously deprived the workman of his earnings. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It would mean that the employer has taken away illegally the right to work of the workman contrary to the relevant law or in breach of contract and simultaneously deprived the workman of his earnings. If thus the employer is found to be in the wrong as a result of which the workman is directed to be reinstated, the employer could not shirk his responsibility of paying the wages which the workman has been deprived of by the illegal or invalid action of the employer. Speaking realistically, where termination of service is questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has to go through the gamut of litigation, his capacity to sustain himself throughout the protracted litigation is itself such an awesome factor that he may not survive to see the day when relief is granted. More so in our system where the law's proverbial delay has become stupefying. If after such a protracted time and energy consuming litigation during which period the workman just sustains himself, ultimately he is to be told that though he will be reinstated, he will be denied the back wages which would be due to him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved. Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is motivated as in this case viz. to resist the workmen's demand for revision of wages, the termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. In such circumstances reinstatement being the normal rule, it should be followed with full back wages.” 12. In a more recent decision, Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya and Others, (2013) 10 SCC 324 this court highlighted the need to adopt a restitutionary approach, when a court has to consider whether to reinstate an employee and if so, the extent to which backwages is to be ordered. The court observed: “22. In a more recent decision, Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya and Others, (2013) 10 SCC 324 this court highlighted the need to adopt a restitutionary approach, when a court has to consider whether to reinstate an employee and if so, the extent to which backwages is to be ordered. The court observed: “22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer-employee relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the employee concerned, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi-judicial body or court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. The denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments.” 13. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Bhurumal, on the other hand, the discretion of the court in directing reinstatement with backwages in the event of a retrenchment being declared illegal, was described in the following terms: “33. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Bhurumal, on the other hand, the discretion of the court in directing reinstatement with backwages in the event of a retrenchment being declared illegal, was described in the following terms: “33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious. 34. The reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily-wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularisation [see State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ]. Thus when he cannot claim regularisation and he has no right to continue even as a daily-wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. 35. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. 35. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily-wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground that it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularised under some policy but the workman concerned terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief canbe denied.” 14. In the present case, this court finds no perversity or unreasonableness on the part of the Labour Court and the single judge in directing the appellant’s reinstatement. Had the respondent management chosen to accept the verdict, the appellant would have been spared the agony of waiting for more than 10 years. In such circumstances, the denial of backwages, has resulted in punishing him, although the delay is attributable to the judicial process. However, the respondent management cannot be absolved of the primary responsibility in its litigative proclivity. In these circumstances, the appellant shall be entitled to backwages for a period of two years immediately preceding, i.e., from 01.01.2020 to 01.01.2022. 15. In light of the above discussion, the impugned judgment is hereby set aside. The appellant workman shall be reinstated in the services of the respondent within six weeks from today. He shall also be entitled to backwages for a period of two years immediately preceding, i.e., from 01.01.2020 to 01.01.2022. The direction of the Labour Court and the learned Single Judge for continuity of service is also restored. The respondent management is directed to pay the backwages as directed by this court, at current rates, within 6 weeks from today. Hence, the appeal is allowed in above terms, with no order as to costs.” 24. The direction of the Labour Court and the learned Single Judge for continuity of service is also restored. The respondent management is directed to pay the backwages as directed by this court, at current rates, within 6 weeks from today. Hence, the appeal is allowed in above terms, with no order as to costs.” 24. We therefore find that in the present case, the respondent-employee has rendered service for about 9 years and the findings relating to his illegal retrenchment is in his favour, which has not been set-aside by the learned Single Judge in a writ petition filed by the Employer and as such, the respondent-Employee is running from pillar to post to get his award implemented. 25. We find substance in the submission of learned counsel for the respondent-employee that once the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal have been examined by the Single Bench, it would not appropriate for this Court to give findings in respect of factual aspect, where the parties have already adduced their evidence before the Tribunal and the same are upheld by the Single Bench. 26. We therefore find that the present special appeal lacks merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. 27. We also find that the award passed in favour of the respondent-employee has not been implemented so far, as there was an interim order passed by the Division Bench after hearing both the sides. 28. We, after considering all the facts of the case, deem it proper to direct the appellant-employer to implement the award passed by the Labour Court within a period of eight weeks after receipt of copy of this order.