JUDGMENT : The issues involved in all these writ petitions are same, similar and identical and as such they have been tagged and heard together on various dates and are being disposed of by this common order. Prayers made in writ petitions: 2. In W.P.(S). No. 1842 of 2019 petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 19.03.2019, as contained in memo No. 245, issued by respondent No. 5, by which show-cause notice has been issued to the petitioner. Petitioner has further prayed for quashing the letter dated 12.04.2019, issued by respondent No. 4 by which the petitioner has been terminated from service with immediate effect. 3. In W.P.(S). No. 1007 of 2019, prayer has been made for quashing the letter bearing memo No. 554, dated 04.02.2019, issued by respondent No. 2 and the consequential letter bearing memo No. 182/Vi, dt. 16.02.2019, issued by respondent No. 4, whereby the petitioner has been issued show-cause and in the same letter, it has been directed to the respondent No. 4 by respondent No. 2 to terminate the petitioners from services, within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of letter dated 04.02.2019. Further prayer has been made for quashing the letter dated 02.04.2019, issued by respondent No. 5, whereby the petitioners have been relieved from services w.e.f. 02.04.2019. 4. In W.P.(S). No. 1845 of 2019, petitioners have prayed for quashing the order dated 09.03.2019, as contained in memo No. 134, issued by respondent No. 4, by which a show-cause notice has been issued to the petitioners and further prayer has been made for quashing the order contained in memo No. 277/Astha. Dated 24.07.2019, issued by respondent No. 4, by which petitioners have been terminated from services with immediate effect. FACTS OF THE CASE: 5. On 08.01.1989, an advertisement was floated by the respondents for appointment of Gram Sevika. The petitioners having the requisite qualifications, applied for the same. Thereafter, following the due procedure of law, the petitioners were appointed against the vacant and sanctioned post of Gram Sevika on different dates and subsequently, their services also got confirmed. Since the date of their appointment the petitioners were discharging their duties to the full satisfaction of the respondent-authorities and no complaint whatsoever was made against them, meaning thereby that the petitioners have clean service record. Since the date of their appointment the petitioners were discharging their duties to the full satisfaction of the respondent-authorities and no complaint whatsoever was made against them, meaning thereby that the petitioners have clean service record. However, all of a sudden vide letter dated 18.03.2019 (in W.P.S. No. 1842/19); vide letter dated 04.02.2019 and consequential letter dated 16.02.2019 (in W.P.S. No. 1007 of 2019); & letter dated 09.03.2019 (in W.P.S. No. 1845/19), show-cause notices were issued to the respective petitioners seeking their reply as to why not their services be terminated. In compliance of the said show-cause notices, the petitioners submitted their reply. It is the case of the petitioners that they served the department for more than 20-30 years and also received the benefits of ACP/MACP, treating the petitioners as regular employees. Altogether 52 persons were appointed on the post of Gram Sevika but in the same transaction but the impugned show-cause notice have been issued against the petitioners only, which shows that the respondents have adopted pick and choose method. Thereafter, being not satisfied with the reply submitted by the petitioners, by the impugned orders, the petitioners have been terminated from services with immediate effect. It is the case of the petitioners that without following the cardinal principles of natural justice and without initiating a full-fledged departmental enquiry, the impugned orders of termination were issued against the petitioners, who have served the department with full dignity and sincerity, for 20-30 years. Hence, the petitioners have approached this Court for redressal of their grievances. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS 6. It has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that from perusal of impugned show-cause notice, it is clear that respondents have prejudged and pre-decided the issue against the petitioners. The impugned orders have been passed on the ground that petitioners are not regular employees and as such, they have been treated as daily wagers and their services have been terminated accordingly. Learned counsel further argues that the respondents cannot question the legality and propriety of the appointments of present petitioners more particularly, when the services of the petitioners have already been confirmed and they were granted the benefits of ACP/MACP. Learned counsel further argues that the respondents cannot question the legality and propriety of the appointments of present petitioners more particularly, when the services of the petitioners have already been confirmed and they were granted the benefits of ACP/MACP. Learned counsel further argues that the respondents were pre-determined to terminate the petitioners from services inasmuch as without following the cardinal principle of natural justice and without initiating regular departmental proceeding, the orders of termination have been passed, which is not tenable in the eyes of law ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT – STATE 7. Per contra counter affidavits have been filed by the respondents. Justifying the impugned orders, it has been argued by learned counsel for the respondent-State that the appointments of the petitioners were made under DWCRA Scheme, though the advertisement was silent about the said Scheme but the service conditions of the petitioners are guided by the said Scheme. In the appointment letters of petitioners, it was clearly mentioned that services of the petitioners can be terminated at any stage without any previous notice. Learned counsel further argues that prior to their appointment as Gram Sevika under DWCRA Scheme, the petitioners were not engaged by the government in any capacity and the petitioners have never given any objection before any authority regarding their appointment as Gram Sevika under DWCRA Scheme. Learned counsel further argues that though services of the petitioners were confirmed and benefits of ACP/MACP were also granted but their appointment was made under DWCRA Scheme, to the post of Gram Sevika, which was temporary in nature, their services can be terminated at any point of time without any prior notice. Learned counsel further argues that in the instant cases before issuing the order of termination, petitioners were show-caused and being not satisfied by the reply submitted by the petitioners, the order of termination was issued, in accordance with law, which does not warrant any interference. FINDINGS OF THE COURT 8. Be that as it may, having heard the rival submissions of the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that cases of petitioners need consideration. FINDINGS OF THE COURT 8. Be that as it may, having heard the rival submissions of the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that cases of petitioners need consideration. Admittedly, the services of the petitioners were confirmed and originally they were working under the Rural Development Department and were on deputation which is reflected from the documents brought on record i.e. Annexure-2 to the writ petition and the same is not disputed by the respondents. 9. The issue involved in this writ petition is as to when the services of the petitioners were confirmed and were granted the benefits of Assured Career Progression Scheme whether their services can be terminated without initiation of proceeding and without serving the charge-sheet i.e. the charge of misconduct? 10. In the instant case, the petitioners were never charged of any misconduct and the services of confirmed employees as guided by Service Conditions of Regular Employee cannot be terminated without following the procedure of law. The services of the petitioners have been terminated in a mechanical way without application of mind. Since the petitioners have worked for more than 29 long years as confirmed employees and received the benefits of Assured Career Progression, they cannot be ousted without initiating a regular departmental proceeding and following the cardinal principle of natural justice. In the instant case, the same are missing and as such, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed and set aside. 11. The contention of learned counsel for the respondents that the benefits of Assured Career Progression was granted wrongly and the same was cancelled and withdrawn is not accepted to this Court as nothing has been brought on record to show that the confirmation of services and ACP/ MACP benefits were granted wrongly and has been withdrawn later on. The appointment letters of the petitioners were never challenged and thus, the same attains finality and the petitioners are entitled for all the benefits admissible to a confirmed employee. Their services cannot be put to an end abruptly without following the procedure of law. 12. Further contention of learned counsel for the respondents that since fund is not available, the petitioners cannot be allowed to continue in the services is also not accepted and cannot be a ground for termination/ dismissal of services of the petitioners. 13. Their services cannot be put to an end abruptly without following the procedure of law. 12. Further contention of learned counsel for the respondents that since fund is not available, the petitioners cannot be allowed to continue in the services is also not accepted and cannot be a ground for termination/ dismissal of services of the petitioners. 13. From Annexures- 1 & 2 to the writ petition W.P.(S). No. 1842 of 2019, it is crystal clear that petitioners were working on sanctioned and vacant post. From Annexure-4 it appears that services of the petitioners were confirmed by the District Establishment Committee. As such, petitioners were not appointed purely under DWARCA Scheme and as such, contention of learned counsel for the respondents that appointment/ service of petitioners was co-terminus with DWARCA Scheme is also not tenable in eyes of law. 14. It has also been brought to the notice of the Court that similar Gram Sevikas are still continuing on the said post in other Districts and as such, action of the respondents are also discriminatory in nature as they cannot discriminate between two similarly situated persons and there cannot be any class within class and any classification based on that is not tenable in the eyes of law. 15. Similar issue fell for consideration before this Court in case of Anita Kumari Vs. Union of India & Ors. in W.P.(S). No. 4811 of 2010 and this Court after hearing the parties, granted similar benefits to the petitioner of those cases what has been claimed by the present petitioners. 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan, reported in (1998) 6 SCC 538 dealing with the similar issues has held that confirmation on permanent seat guarantees an employee security of tenure of services and such permanent employee cannot be terminated abruptly and arbitrarily by giving a simple notice. The relevant para of the said judgment reads as under: 15. Conferment of “permanent” status on an employee guarantees security of tenure. The relevant para of the said judgment reads as under: 15. Conferment of “permanent” status on an employee guarantees security of tenure. It is now well settled that the services of a permanent employee, whether employed by the Government, or government company or government instrumentality or statutory corporations or any other “authority” within the meaning of Article 12, cannot be terminated abruptly and arbitrarily, either by giving him a month's or three months' notice or pay in lieu thereof or even without notice, notwithstanding that there may be a stipulation to that effect either in the contract of service or in the Certified Standing Orders. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Basudeo Tiwary Vs. SKM University, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 19 has held as under: 9. The law is settled that non-arbitrariness is an essential facet of Article 14 pervading the entire realm of State action governed by Article 14. It has come to be established, as a further corollary, that the audi alteram partem facet of natural justice is also a requirement of Article 14, for natural justice is the antithesis of arbitrariness. In the sphere of public employment, it is well settled that any action taken by the employer against an employee must be fair, just and reasonable which are the components of fair treatment. The conferment of absolute power to terminate the services of an employee is an antithesis to fair, just and reasonable treatment. This aspect was exhaustively considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress [1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1213 : AIR 1991 SC 101 ] . …………. …………. 11. In the light of these principles of law, we have to examine the scope of the provision of Section 35(3) which reads as follows: “35. (3) Any appointment or promotion made contrary to the provisions of the Act, statutes, rules or regulations or in any irregular or unauthorised manner shall be terminated at any time without notice.” 12. The said provision provides that an appointment could be terminated at any time without notice if the same had been made contrary to the provisions of the Act, statutes, rules or regulations or in any irregular or unauthorised manner. The said provision provides that an appointment could be terminated at any time without notice if the same had been made contrary to the provisions of the Act, statutes, rules or regulations or in any irregular or unauthorised manner. The condition precedent for exercise of this power is that an appointment had been made contrary to the Act, rules, statutes and regulations or otherwise. In order to arrive at a conclusion that an appointment is contrary to the provisions of the Act, statutes, rules or regulations, etc., a finding has to be recorded and unless such a finding is recorded, the termination cannot be made, but to arrive at such a conclusion necessarily an enquiry will have to be made as to whether such appointment was contrary to the provisions of the Act etc. If in a given case such exercise is absent, the condition precedent stands unfulfilled. To arrive at such a finding necessarily enquiry will have to be held and in holding such an enquiry, the person whose appointment is under enquiry will have to be issued a notice. If notice is not given to him, then it is like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark, that is, if the employee concerned whose rights are affected is not given notice of such a proceeding and a conclusion is drawn in his absence, such a conclusion would not be just, fair or reasonable as noticed by this Court in D.T.C. Mazdoor Sabha case [1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1213 : AIR 1991 SC 101 ] . In such an event, we have to hold that in the provision, there is an implied requirement of hearing for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion that an appointment had been made contrary to the Act, statute, rule or regulation etc. and it is only on such a conclusion being drawn, the services of the person could be terminated without further notice. That is how Section 35(3) in this case will have to be read. 13. Admittedly in this case, notice has not been given to the appellant before holding that his appointment is irregular or unauthorised and ordering termination of his service. Hence the impugned order terminating the services of the appellant cannot be sustained. 14. That is how Section 35(3) in this case will have to be read. 13. Admittedly in this case, notice has not been given to the appellant before holding that his appointment is irregular or unauthorised and ordering termination of his service. Hence the impugned order terminating the services of the appellant cannot be sustained. 14. The appellant has since demised during the pendency of these proceedings, no further direction either as to further inquiry or reinstatement can be given. We declare that the termination of the appellant by the respondent as per the notification referred to by us is invalid. Consequently, it would be deemed that the appellant had died in harness. Needless to say that the appellant would become entitled to the payment of arrears of salary from the date of termination of his services up to the date of his death on the basis of the last pay drawn by him. Let the respondent take action within a period of three months from today to work out the arrears due to the appellant from the date of his termination till his death and pay the same to his legal representatives. Further, in case of D.T.C vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, reported in (1991) Suppl SCC (1) 600, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: 202. Thus on a conspectus of the catena of cases decided by this Court the only conclusion that follows is that Regulation 9(b) which confers powers on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent and confirmed employee by issuing a notice terminating the services or by making payment in lieu of notice without assigning any reasons in the order and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the employee before passing the impugned order is wholly arbitrary, uncanalised and unrestricted violating principles of natural justice as well as Article 14 of the Constitution. It has also been held consistently by this Court that the government carries on various trades and business activity through the instrumentality of the State such as Government Company or Public Corporations. Such Government Company or Public Corporation being State instrumentalities are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and as such they are subject to the observance of fundamental rights embodied in Part III as well as to conform to the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution. Such Government Company or Public Corporation being State instrumentalities are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and as such they are subject to the observance of fundamental rights embodied in Part III as well as to conform to the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution. In other words the Service Regulations or Rules framed by them are to be tested by the touchstone of Article 14 of Constitution. Furthermore, the procedure prescribed by their Rules or Regulations must be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, fanciful and unjust. Regulation 9(b), therefore, confers unbridled, uncanalised and arbitrary power on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent employee without recording any reasons and without conforming to the principles of natural justice. There is no guideline in the Regulations or in the Act, as to when or in which cases and circumstances this power of termination by giving notice or pay in lieu of notice can be exercised. It is now well settled that the ‘audi alteram partem’ rule which in essence, enforces the equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitution is applicable not only to quasi-judicial orders but to administrative orders affecting prejudicially the party-in-question unless the application of the rule has been expressly excluded by the Act or Regulation or Rule which is not the case here. Rules of natural justice do not supplant but supplement the Rules and Regulations. Moreover, the Rule of Law which permeates our Constitution demands that it has to be observed both substantially and procedurally. Considering from all aspects Regulation 9(b) is illegal and void as it is arbitrary, discriminatory and without any guidelines for exercise of the power. Rule of law posits that the power is to be exercised in a manner which is just, fair and reasonable and not in an unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary manner leaving room for discrimination. Regulation 9(b) does not expressly exclude the application of the ‘audi alteram partem’ rule and as such the order of termination of service of a permanent employee cannot be passed by simply issuing a month's notice under Regulation 9(b) or pay in lieu thereof without recording any reason in the order and without giving any hearing to the employee to controvert the allegation on the basis of which the purported order is made. 206. 206. Regulation 9(b) of the impugned Regulations framed under the Delhi Transport Corporation Act which is in pari materia with the said Rule 9(i) is void under Section 23 of the Contract Act as being opposed to public policy and is also ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 299. The Maneka Gandhi case [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 , 290-91 : (1978) 2 SCR 621 , 681] is also an authority or the proposition that the principles of natural justice is an integral part of the guarantee of equality assured by Article 14 of the Constitution. In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [ (1985) 3 SCC 398 , 424-25 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp 2 SCR 131, 166] this Court held that the principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognised as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the subject matter of that article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus: (SCC p. 476, para 95) “Violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of the State action, it is a violation of Article 14, therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. The principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to the legislation and State action but also where any tribunal, authority or body of men, not coming within the definition of ‘State’ in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice require that it must decide such a matter fairly and impartially.” 300. In Moti Ram Deka case [ (1964) 5 SCR 683 : AIR 1964 SC 600 : (1964) 2 LLJ 467 ] this Court already held that: “the rule making authority contemplated by Article 309 cannot be validly exercised so as to curtail or affect the rights guaranteed to public servants under Article 311(2). In Moti Ram Deka case [ (1964) 5 SCR 683 : AIR 1964 SC 600 : (1964) 2 LLJ 467 ] this Court already held that: “the rule making authority contemplated by Article 309 cannot be validly exercised so as to curtail or affect the rights guaranteed to public servants under Article 311(2). Article 311(2) is intended to afford a sense of scrutiny to public servants who are substantively appointed to a permanent post and one of the principal benefits which they are entitled to expect is the benefit of pension after rendering public service for the period prescribed by the Rules. It would, we think, not be legitimate to contend that the right to earn a pension to which a servant substantively appointed to a permanent post is entitled can be curtailed by Rules framed under Article 309 so as to make the said right either ineffective or illusory. Once the scope of Article 311(1) and (2) is duly determined, it must be held that no rule framed under Article 309 can trespass on the rights guaranteed by Article 311. This position is of basic importance and must be borne in mind in dealing with the controversy in question.” Further, this Court dealing with similar issues in case of Rajendra Prasad Sharma Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in (2021) 4 JBCJ 662 (HC) has held as under: “10. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties and on perusal of the records, the case of the petitioner needs consideration for the following facts and reasons:— I. The impugned order of dismissal is arbitrary and cryptic in nature and has been passed dehors the rules inasmuch as the Disciplinary Authority has considered the case of corruption against the petitioner, which is not nowhere mentioned in the Memo of Charge. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88 , it has been held thus: 25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88 , it has been held thus: 25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with. II. The cardinal principles of natural justice has been given a complete go-bye. In a case where the Disciplinary Authority proposes to award punishment of dismissal i.e. capital punishment, a full-fledged departmental proceeding is warranted, but in the instant case, there is no full-fledged department proceeding neither any Enquiry Officer nor any Presenting officer has been appointed and also the petitioner was never given any opportunity to cross examine the witnesses. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Union of India v. Ram Lakhan Sharma, reported in (2018) 7 SCC 670 has held thus: 24. The disciplinary proceedings are quasi-judicial proceedings and the Enquiry Officer is in the position of an independent adjudicator and is obliged to act fairly, impartially. The authority exercising quasi-judicial power has to act in good faith without bias, in a fair and impartial manner. 25. Rules of natural justice have been recognised and developed as principles of administrative law. Natural justice has many facets. All its facets are steps to ensure justice and fair play. The authority exercising quasi-judicial power has to act in good faith without bias, in a fair and impartial manner. 25. Rules of natural justice have been recognised and developed as principles of administrative law. Natural justice has many facets. All its facets are steps to ensure justice and fair play. This Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, AIR 1969 SC 198 ] had occasion to consider the principles of natural justice in the context of a case where disciplinary action was taken against a student who was alleged to have adopted malpractice in the examination. In para 7 this Court held that the question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in point, the constitution of the Tribunal and the rules under which it functions. The following was held in paras 7 and 8 : (AIR p. 201) “7. … The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in point, the constitution of the Tribunal and the rules under which it functions. 8. In Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) 1 All ER 109 (CA)], Tucker, L.J. observed : (All ER p. 118 D-F) ‘There are, in my view, no words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth. Accordingly, I do not derive much assistance from the definitions of natural justice which have been from time to time used, but, whatever standard is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case.’” 26. A Constitution Bench of this Court has elaborately considered and explained the principles of natural justice in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150 ]. A Constitution Bench of this Court has elaborately considered and explained the principles of natural justice in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150 ]. This Court held that the aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Initially recognised as consisting of two principles, that is, no one shall be a judge in his own cause and no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing, various other facets have been recognised. In para 20 the following has been held : (SCC p. 272) “20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules, namely, (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and, that is, that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably.…” 28. When the statutory rule does not contemplate appointment of Presenting Officer whether non-appointment of Presenting Officer ipso facto vitiates the inquiry? We have noticed the statutory provision of Rule 27 which does not indicate that there is any statutory requirement of appointment of Presenting Officer in the disciplinary inquiry. It is thus clear that statutory provision does not mandate appointment of Presenting Officer. When the statutory provision does not require appointment of Presenting Officer whether there can be any circumstances where principles of natural justice can be held to be violated is the broad question which needs to be answered in this case. It is thus clear that statutory provision does not mandate appointment of Presenting Officer. When the statutory provision does not require appointment of Presenting Officer whether there can be any circumstances where principles of natural justice can be held to be violated is the broad question which needs to be answered in this case. We have noticed above that the High Court found breach of principles of natural justice in Enquiry Officer acting as the prosecutor against the respondents. The Enquiry Officer who has to be independent and not representative of the disciplinary authority if starts acting in any other capacity and proceeds to act in a manner as if he is interested in eliciting evidence to punish an employee, the principle of bias comes into place. 36. Thus, the question as to whether the Enquiry Officer who is supposed to act independently in an inquiry has acted as prosecutor or not is a question of fact which has to be decided on the facts and proceedings of a particular case. In the present case we have noticed that the High Court had summoned the entire inquiry proceedings and after perusing the proceedings the High Court came to the conclusion that the Enquiry Officer himself led the examination-in-chief of the prosecution witness by putting questions. The High Court further held that the Enquiry Officer acted himself as prosecutor and Judge in the said disciplinary enquiry. The above conclusion of the High Court has already been noticed from paras 9 and 10 of the judgment of the High Court giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 2608 of 2012. 37. The High Court having come to the conclusion that the Enquiry Officer has acted as prosecutor also, the capacity of independent adjudicator was lost while adversely affecting his independent role of adjudicator. In the circumstances, the principle of bias shall come into play and the High Court was right in setting aside the dismissal orders by giving liberty to the appellants to proceed with inquiry afresh. We make it clear that our observations as made above are in the facts of the present cases.” 17. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, the impugned order dated 19.03.2019 & letter dated 12.04.2019 in W.P.(S). No. 1842 of 2019; order dated 04.02.2019 and consequential letter dated 16.02.2019 and also letter dated 02.04.2019 in W.P.(S). As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, the impugned order dated 19.03.2019 & letter dated 12.04.2019 in W.P.(S). No. 1842 of 2019; order dated 04.02.2019 and consequential letter dated 16.02.2019 and also letter dated 02.04.2019 in W.P.(S). No. 1007 of 2019; order dated 09.03.2019 and order dated 24.07.2019 in W.P.(S). No. 1845 of 2019, are hereby quashed and set aside. 18. The respondents are directed to reconsider the cases of petitioners and allow them to continue on their services with all consequential benefits till they attain the age of superannuation. 19. Resultantly, the writ petitions stand allowed. 20. Pending I.As., if any, stand closed.