JUDGMENT : (Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) Moti Mahto who was aggrieved by the orders dated 13th June 1988/5th August 1988 passed by the Deputy Commissioner and 30th May 1997 passed by the Commissioner, who is the appellate authority, approached the writ Court in CWJC No.730 of 1998(R). The writ Court declined to interfere with the orders passed by the statutory authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (in short, Ceiling Act). Aggrieved by the order dated 8th February 2021 dismissing the writ petition, Moti Mahto has filed this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. The writ Court did not interfere with the orders passed by the statutory authorities primarily for the reason that the appellant could not produce any evidence to demonstrate that the nature of the lands on Plot Nos. 1248, 1529, 1511, 1287, 1292, 1299, 305, 1315 and 1251 spread over an area of 05.38 acres within Khata No.60 of village Gari under Sadar PS in the district of Ranchi was agricultural land and, that, he was in possession over the subject lands. The writ Court further held that possession of the subject lands was taken by the State in the year 1988 and while so the resolution dated 24th January 2011 by which the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 became effective in the State of Jharkhand shall not affect the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner in ULC Case No.407 of 1978 and the Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur in Urban Land Ceiling Appeal No.14 of 1989. 3. The main plank of the appellant to challenge the writ Court’s order dated 8th February 2021 is the interim order passed by the writ Court on 22nd April 1998 which reads as under: “Admit. As Mr. P.D. Agarwal, learned Government Advocate, has appeared and accepted notice on behalf of all the respondents, no notice need be issued to them. Till further order of the Court, the operation of the orders dated 13/6/1988 / 5/8/1988 and 30-5-1997, as contained in Annexures-3 and 4, respectively, as also the notice as contained in Annexure-5 shall remain stayed. Learned Government Advocate prays for and is granted six weeks time to file counter-affidavit.” 4. The writ Court by the aforesaid order dated 22nd April 1998 stayed the operation of the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi and Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division. Learned Government Advocate prays for and is granted six weeks time to file counter-affidavit.” 4. The writ Court by the aforesaid order dated 22nd April 1998 stayed the operation of the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi and Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division. This is also quite evident at a glance at the aforesaid interim order that notice dated 25th January 1998 issued to the appellant for vacating the subject lands was also stayed by the writ Court. Based on the interim order dated 22nd April 1998, the appellant takes a plea that possession of the subject lands was not taken by the State and therefore on repeal of the Ceiling Act the proceedings thereunder shall abate. To lay support to the ground put forth on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Sanjay Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel refers to “Ghasitey Lal Sahu v. Competent Authority” (2004) 13 SCC 452 . 5. Before the writ Court, the appellant pleaded that the subject lands were described as don/tand in the revisional survey record of rights and the same are not included in the master plan for Ranchi. On enforcement of the Ceiling Act, he filed a return under section 6 providing details of his lands claiming that the lands were agricultural lands and thus outside the purview of the Ceiling Act. On his filing of the return, a draft statement under section 8(1) was prepared and served upon him to which he filed his objection under section 8(3). The appellant reiterated his stand that the subject lands were not shown as a building site in the master plan, and he was entitled to 1/3rd share as a member of the Hindu Undivided Family. The appellant further pleaded that as a precautionary measure he made an application under section 21 of the Ceiling Act for exemption from the Ceiling Act and, pursuant thereto, the Kanoongo submitted a report dated 30th March 1986 with his observation that the subject lands were tand or don lands. Taking note of the entries in the revenue records and the report of the Kanoongo, the Deputy Commissioner rejected the objection of the appellant by an order dated 13th July 1988/5th August 1988 on the ground that the subject lands can be utilized by the government for park, sports complex, stadium etc. Taking note of the entries in the revenue records and the report of the Kanoongo, the Deputy Commissioner rejected the objection of the appellant by an order dated 13th July 1988/5th August 1988 on the ground that the subject lands can be utilized by the government for park, sports complex, stadium etc. Constrained, the appellant filed Urban Land Ceiling Appeal No.14 of 1989 which was dismissed by the Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division at Ranchi by an order dated 30th May 1997 and thereafter he was served a copy of the Gazette Notification dated 29th August 1997 issued under section 10(3) of the Ceiling Act along with the order contained in letter dated 25th January 1998 for handing over possession of the subject lands. 6. In ULC Case No.407 of 1978, the Deputy Commissioner held as under: “4. In so far as the exemption by petition is concerned it may now be remarked here that Mauza Gari is not entirely non-residential. In the instant case partly residential and partly non-residential. moreover, even if the land happened to be non-residential there can be so many uses for the same, parks, stadium, sports ground, open space, and so many other item can be developed into a social forestry programme and can provide a green belt to the town. To say that if then creates non-residential does not justify that the land should be left to the landholder. Moreover, the landholder has got his land situate located on, a number of other houses are also located here. The way the house has come up in the locality, the distinction between residential and non-residential appears to have been vanish. However, we are to strict on the Master Plan. So the Master Plan provides part of the locality residential and part nonresidential. It is best desired that land be acquired by the govt. and used for parks, public open space, sport complex, stadium etc.” 7. The Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division dealt with the classification of agricultural and non-agricultural lands and dismissed the Urban Land Ceiling Appeal No.14 of 1989 also on the ground that no material was produced by the claimant regarding the age of the children at the time of the inquiry and therefore the findings recorded by the inquiry officer should be accepted. The Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division held as under: “4. The Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division held as under: “4. The basic philosophy behind promulgation of the Urban Land Ceiling Act is to impose a ceiling on urban property socially after the imposition of a ceiling on agricultural land so that as result of increasing urbanisation, scarce urban land could be regulated and managed properly with equitable distribution on various section of society. Various exemption which are provided under the Act are made only to give relief to those cases which needs special treatment or social consideration and therefore cannot used as means to circumvent the general provisions of the Act. In the present case, it was claimed that in the revision survey, the land is question has been recorded agriculture land. The revisional survey of record of right are conducted under a particular provision of C.N.T Act from time to time. There is no strict guideline on the classification of agricultural via-vis non agriculture land in comparison to the very strict provision under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Under this Act, agriculture includes horticulture but does not include raising of grass, dairy farming, poultry farming, breading etc. or such cultivation or growing such plants as may be prescribed and such land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purposes pf agriculture. In the present case, it is apparent from the report of kannongo that the plots in question are of a very poor quality and no profitable agricultural activities could be conducted on the plots. The matter is aggravated because the plots come under the urban area and the dwelling places which existed on these plots are not in nature of farm house used but in the nature of normal residential accommodation. It is therefore highly unlikely that the present appellant is solely dependent on agriculture claim of the appellant can not be considered worthwhile while deciding the case. As regards the age of the off-springs of the appellant are concerned, it was recorded by the enquiry officer that all the 4 children none of them were adults at the time of enquiry. 5. I have gone through the records to locate any documents which substantiate the claim of the appellant regarding the age of the children at the time of enquiry like birth certificate etc. None of these documents are available on record and I therefore conclude that the claim is not based on fact. 5. I have gone through the records to locate any documents which substantiate the claim of the appellant regarding the age of the children at the time of enquiry like birth certificate etc. None of these documents are available on record and I therefore conclude that the claim is not based on fact. The findings of the enquiry officer should therefore be held as true. 6. I therefore find no scope to interfere with the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi dated 13.08.88 and 5.8.88. With these observations, the appeal is dismissed.” 8. In the background of the aforesaid findings recorded by the statutory authorities, the writ Court in its order dated 8th February 2021 passed in CWJC No. 730 of 1998(R) held as under: “6. Be that as it may, having heard the rival submissions of the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that no case is made out for interference in view of the concurrent findings of the learned Court below. Admittedly, the order of the Deputy Commissioner has been affirmed by the Commissioner. The claim of the petitioner was enquired by the Kanoongo, who had submitted his report on 30.03.1986 itself and has stated that the house of the landlord is situated on plot nos. 1019 and 1020. The rest of the land is either tand or done, which is vacant land. As it is a vacant land, petitioner is not in possession of the said land. Even petitioner did not produce any documents to show that he was in possession of the land or the land in question was agricultural land. As such, following the legal procedure, the claim of the petitioner has rightly been rejected by the Deputy Commissioner and the same has been affirmed by the Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur. Learned Commissioner in his order has clearly held that no document was produced neither the objection was substantiated by reasons. Even the kanoongo in his report has clearly mentioned that plots in question are of a very poor quality and no profitable agriculture activities could be conducted on the said lands and the land in question is situated near the dwelling places which existed on these plots are never be said to be agricultural land.” 9. Even the kanoongo in his report has clearly mentioned that plots in question are of a very poor quality and no profitable agriculture activities could be conducted on the said lands and the land in question is situated near the dwelling places which existed on these plots are never be said to be agricultural land.” 9. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was enacted with the object of preventing the concentration of urban property in the hands of a few persons and to bring about the socialization of urban land in urban agglomerations. The Ceiling Act therefore provides for the imposition of a ceiling on the vacant lands in urban agglomerations and the acquisition of such lands in excess of the ceiling limit. The Ceiling Act is a step towards achieving the object under Article 39(b) & (c) of the Constitution by providing an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations for subserving the common good by ensuring its equitable distribution. Section 6 of the Ceiling Act provides that every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of this Act shall file statement before the competent authority. Sub-section (2) provides that the competent authority may serve a notice upon the person who in his opinion is in possession of vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and direct him to file his statement referred to in subsection (1). Explanation to sub-section (1) clarifies that commencement of this Act shall mean the day on which this Act comes into force in any State. Section 8 provides the manner of preparation and the particulars required for preparation of the draft statement as regards vacant lands held in excess of ceiling limit. Sub-section (3) to section 8 provides that the draft statement shall be served on the person concerned together with a notice stating that any objection to the draft statement shall be preferred within 30 days of such notice. After disposal of the objections, the competent authority makes the necessary alteration in the draft statement and final statement is prepared under section 9. 10. Section 10 deals with publication in the gazette Notification, vesting of the vacant land and taking over of the possession of such lands and other matters connected therewith. After disposal of the objections, the competent authority makes the necessary alteration in the draft statement and final statement is prepared under section 9. 10. Section 10 deals with publication in the gazette Notification, vesting of the vacant land and taking over of the possession of such lands and other matters connected therewith. It provides that the competent authority shall cause a notification giving the particulars of the vacant land after service of the final statement under section 9. After the notification under sub-section (1), the claims of the persons interested in the vacant land are determined and the competent authority shall pass orders thereon. Sub-section (3) provides that at any time after the publication of the notification under sub-section (1), the competent authority may by notification published in the official gazette of the State concerned declare that the excess vacant land referred to in the notification shall with effect from such date as may be specified in the declaration be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and upon the publication of such declaration such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified. For easy reference, section 10 of the Ceiling Act is reproduced below: 10. Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit.—(1) As soon as may be after the service of the statement under Section 9 on the person concerned, the competent authority shall cause a notification giving the particulars of the vacant land held by such person in excess of the ceiling limit and stating that— (i) such vacant land is to be acquired by the concerned State Government; and (ii) the claims of all persons interested in such vacant land may be made by them personally or by their agents giving particulars of the nature of their interests in such land, to be published for the information of the general public in the Official Gazette of the State concerned and in such other manner as may be prescribed. (2) After considering the claims of the persons interested in the vacant land, made to the competent authority in pursuance of the notification published under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders as it deems fit. (2) After considering the claims of the persons interested in the vacant land, made to the competent authority in pursuance of the notification published under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders as it deems fit. (3) At any time after the publication of the notification under subsection (1), the competent authority may, by notification published in the Official Gazette of the State concerned, declare that the excess vacant land referred to in the notification published under sub-section (1) shall, with effect from such date as may be specified in the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and upon the publication of such declaration, such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified. (4) During the period commencing on the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3)— (i) no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any excess vacant land (including any part thereof) specified in the notification aforesaid and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void; and (ii) no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land. (5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3), the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice. (6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly authorised by such State Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. Explanation.—In this section, in sub-section (1) of Section 11 and in Sections 14 and 23, “State Government”, in relation to— (a) any vacant land owned by the Central Government, means the Central Government; (b) any vacant land owned by any State Government and situated in a Union territory or within the local limits of a cantonment declared as such under Section 3 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924) means that State Government. 11. Before the statutory authorities, the appellant based his case mainly on the ground that the subject lands are not shown as a building site in the master plan. In ULC Case No.407 of 1978, the Deputy Commissioner held in his order dated 13th June 1988/5th August 1988 that Mouza Gari where the subject lands are situated is partly residential and partly non-residential and in that context he held that even if the subject lands fall in the non-residential area such lands can be used for park, stadium, sports ground, open space and social forestry program. Under clause (o) to section 2 the expression “urban land” has been defined. It provides that any land which is mainly used for agriculture shall not fall under the definition of urban land. Explanation to clause (ii) of clause (o) provides that agriculture includes horticulture but does not include (i) raising of grass (ii) dairy farming (iii) poultry farming (iv) breeding of live straw and (v) such cultivation or the growing of such plant as may be prescribed. Furthermore, explanation (B) to clause (o) provides that the land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for agriculture if such land is not entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture. The Deputy Commissioner has held that in the close vicinity of the subject lands several houses were constructed and part of the locality has been earmarked for residential purposes in the master plan. By operation of section 10(3), from the date of publication of the Gazette Notification dated 29th August 1997 the subject lands vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances, and the appellant was required to vacate and handover possession of the subject lands by 24th February, 1998, that is, on expiry of 30 days from 25th January 1998 when a notice under section 5(1) was issued to him. A writ petition involving a disputed question of fact may be entertained in certain circumstances where it can be easily inferred that the dispute on facts sought to be raised by the respondent is merely a pretence and the same does not require any elaborate inquiry into the facts to decide the prayer made in the writ petition. However, a writ petition which involves such dispute on facts which cannot be decided on the basis of affidavits filed by the parties shall not be entertained by the writ Court and must be dismissed at the initial stage itself. Moreover, the writ remedy is discretionary in nature and the petitioner is required to plead such facts and evidence in support thereof that shall entitle him to seek relief. The writ Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also must remain alive to whether sufficient material/evidence has been laid before the Court in support of the relief claimed. However, pleadings before the writ Court do not indicate that the appellant handed over possession of the subject lands to the competent authority or any person duly authorized in this behalf. Sub-section 6 to section 10 provides that if any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land or causing to be given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly authorized by such State Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such forces as may be necessary. However, having regard to the object behind the Ceiling Act, the provisions under sub-section (6) cannot be construed to mean that actual physical possession of the vacant land must have been taken by the competent authority and the Court may infer taking of possession of the subject lands on expiry of the notice period. No doubt section 6 confers powers to the competent authority to take possession and to use force as may be necessary for taking possession over the vacant land, but then, the use of the expression “may” is quite significant and provides sufficient indications that constructive possession of the State Government shall be deemed on expiry of the notice given under sub-section (5). “Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport” ( 2010 8 SCC 467 clearly pronounces that in a case where the possession has been taken the repeal of the Act would not confer any benefit to the owner of the land. 12. “Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport” ( 2010 8 SCC 467 clearly pronounces that in a case where the possession has been taken the repeal of the Act would not confer any benefit to the owner of the land. 12. Gazette Notification dated 29th August 1997 issued under section 10(3) of the Ceiling Act is extracted as under: vf/klwpuk 29 vxLr] 1997 'k0Hkw0g0 okn la[;k&407@1978&'kgjh Hkwfe Hkwgncanh vkSj fofu;eu vf/kfu;e 1976 dh /kkjk 10 ¼3½ esa iznÙk 'kfDr;ksa ds vUrxZr esa ,l0,l0oekZ mik;qDr≶&l{ke inkf/kdkjh] jkaph] ;g ?kksf"kr djrk gwWa fd mDRk vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 10 ¼1½ ds vUrxZr ftyk xtV la[;k 18] fnukad 1 tuojh] 1989 esa izdkf'kr vf/klwpuk la[;k 1418] fnukad 21 fnlEcj] 1988 esa of.kZr vfrfjDr ijrh iM+h tehu ftldk fooj.k uhps fn;k x;k gS] bu ?kks"k.kk ds izdk'ku dh frfFk ls jkT; ljdkj }kjk vftZr le>h tk;xh rFkk uhps nh xbZ mDr of.kZr tehu izdk'ku dh frfFk ls iw.kZ :i ls lHkh rjg ls _.k Hkkj eqDr jkT; ljdkj ds v/khu gks tk;xhA ;g Hkh lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mi;qZDr vf/klpwuk esa of.kZr ijrh tehu blds fdlh Hkkx lfgr dk fdlh Hkh O;fDr }kjk fcØh] ca/kd] nku ;k fdlh vU; :i esa vUrj.k ugha fd;k tk;xk rFkk bl lEcU/k esa fdlh rjg dk vUrj.k izo`frghu ekuk tk;sxkA blds vykos ;g Hkh vf/klwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vafdr ijrh tehu esa fdlh Hkh O;fDr }kjk u rks jn~nkscny fd;k tk;sxk vFkok u djk;k tk;xkA tehu dk fooj.k Hkw/kkjh Jh eksrh egrks] firk Jh uUnw egrks] ekStk xkM+h ftyk jkaphA jkT; ftyk ekStk Fkkuk ua0 [kkrk ua0 IykWV ua0 jdck pkSgn~h vkj0,l0 oxZehVj fcgkj jkaph xkM+h 194 60 1672 5555-20 m0&vkj0,l0IykWV la[;k 1680 va'k 220-54 1670]1696]1697]1675 1685 277-76 n0&vkj0,l0IykWV la[;k 1673 992-00 1682]1687]1686]1695 1683 6348-80 iw0&vkj0,l0IykWV la[;k 1687 4642-56 1696]1698]1695]1694 1674 833-28 1693 ,oa 1685 1684 1745-92 i0&vkj0,l0IykWV la[;k 20616-06 1671]1643]1641]1615] 1680 va'k 1682]1686]1687 ¼g0½ mik;qDr≶&l{ke inkf/kdkjh] jkaphA English Translation NOTIFICATION 29th August 1997 ULC Case No. 407/1978 – I, S.S.Verma, Deputy Commissioner-cum-Competent Authority, Ranchi make a declaration in exercise of the powers under section 10(3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 that from date of publication of the declaration that the lands of which details have been given in the District Gazette No. 18 dated 1st January 1989 published under section 10(1) vide Notification No. 1418 dated 21st December 1988 and the aforementioned lands, are deemed to be acquired by the State Government and the aforementioned lands shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances from the date of publication. This is also informed that any part of the lands described in the aforementioned Notification shall not be sold, pledged, donated or transferred in any manner whatsoever and any transaction in this regard shall be held invalid. Besides the above, this is also notified that no person shall make any change in the vacant land mentioned in the Notification or shall get caused any change thereof. DESCRIPTION OF LAND Name of land owner Sri Moti Mahto, Father Sri Nandu Mahto, Mouza Gari, District Ranchi State District Mauza Thana Khata Plot No. Area Boundary No. No. RS (Sq. Mtr.) Bihar Ranchi Gari 194 60 1672 5555.20 N. – RS Plot No. 1680 Part 220.54 1670, 1696, 1697, 1675 1685 277.76 S. – R.S. Plot No. 1673 992.00 1682, 1687, 1686, 1695 1683 6348.80 E. – R.S. Plot No. 1687 4642.56 1696, 1698, 1695, 1694, 1693 & 1685 1674 833.28 W – RS Plot No. 1684 1745.92 1671, 1643, 1641, 1615, 1680Part, 1682, 1686, 1687 20616.06 Sd/- Deputy Commissioner-cum-Competent Authority Ranchi 13. This is a well-settled law that on the repeal of a statute the concluded proceedings are not affected and it is only the pending proceedings that by the operation of law shall stand abated. Sections 3 and 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (in short, Repeal Act) provide that vesting of the vacant land of which possession was taken shall not be affected by virtue of the Repeal Act, and only those proceedings shall abate which were pending at that time. 14. The provisions under sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act are extracted as under: 3. Savings.—(1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect— (a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; (b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20 or any action taken thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary; (c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20. (2) Where— (a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and (b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land, then, such land shall not restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government. 4. Abatement of legal proceedings.— All proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the principal Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, before any court, tribunal or other authority shall abate: Provided that this section shall not apply to the proceedings relating to Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the principal Act in so far as such proceedings are relatable to the land, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority. 15. Section 5 of the Repeal Act deals with “repeal and saving”, sub-section (2) starts with a “non obstante clause”. The legislative intention is thus made clear under section 5 that the repeal of the Act shall not affect the validity of anything done or any action taken thereunder. The general law as regards “things done” on repeal of a statute is provided under section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The effect of repeal of any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of that Act shall have implications as indicated under clauses (a) to (e). It is quite clear on a plain reading of section 6 that the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes place but the acts done when that enactment was in operation shall not be affected. 16. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act which deals with the effect of repeal is extracted hereunder: 6. 16. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act which deals with the effect of repeal is extracted hereunder: 6. Effect of repeal.—Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not— (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or any thing duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. 17. Under clause (c), it is specifically provided that the repeal of any Central Act or Regulation shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the enactment so repealed. The object of the provision under section 6(c) is to ensure the protection of any right or privilege acquired under the repealed Act. The only exception to it is legislative intention to the contrary. That is, the Repeal Act may expressly provide or it may impliedly provide against the continuance of such right, obligation or liability. In “Director of Public Works & Ans. v. Ho Po Sang & Ors.” 1961 AC 901, Lord Morris while construing section 10 of the Hongkong Interpretation Ordinance, which is almost similar in effect to section 6 of the General Clauses Act, held that the right given under the repealed enactment shall be unaffected and preserved. In “Ghasitey Lal Sahu v. Competent Authority” (2004) 13 SCC 452 it was established by the aggrieved party that the proceedings under the Ceiling Act were not even initiated and there were interim orders in his favor which had continued beyond the date of the Repeal Act. In “Ghasitey Lal Sahu v. Competent Authority” (2004) 13 SCC 452 it was established by the aggrieved party that the proceedings under the Ceiling Act were not even initiated and there were interim orders in his favor which had continued beyond the date of the Repeal Act. The writ Court rightly held that repeal of the Ceiling Act which took effect in the State of Jharkhand from 24th January 2011 shall not annul the past proceedings completed and closed. 18. For the aforementioned reasons, LPA No. 266 of 2021 is dismissed.