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2023 DIGILAW 1349 (RAJ)

Surendra Kumar S/o Sh. Kamal Nayan v. Sant Lal S/o Sh. Tulsi Ram

2023-07-11

NUPUR BHATI

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-defendant under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with the following prayers:- “i. The impugned order dated 19-08-2019 (Annex.8), passed by the court of Senior Civil Judge, Sangriya District Hanumangarh in Civil Case No.12/1996 (Sant Lal & Ors. V/s Ashok Kumar and Anr.) may kindly be declared illegal and quashed and be set aside, and the petitioners rights to defend the case may kindly be restored. ii. That the application filed by the petitioner under Order 11 Rule 1 of CPC (Annexure-5) may kindly be allowed as prayed for. iii. Any other order or direction which this Hon’ble Court deems just and proper may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner. iv. Cost of the writ petition may kindly be awarded to the petitioner.” 2. The facts apropos are that one Shri Sant Lal filed a suit for eviction of the petitioner-defendant and respondent No.2 to which written statement was submitted by the petitioner-defendant along with respondent No.2. During the pendency of the suit, Shri Sant Lal expired and his legal representatives (respondents Nos.1/1 to 1/9) stepped into the shoes of Shri Sant Lal and continued the lis. 3. During the pendency of the suit, Shri Sant Lal expired and his legal representatives (respondents Nos.1/1 to 1/9) stepped into the shoes of Shri Sant Lal and continued the lis. 3. During the pendency of the suit, an application for determination of provisional rent was filed by the respondents-defendants on 22.10.1996, which came to be decided on 14.03.2018 (Annex.3) and the learned Senior Civil Judge, Sangariya (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned trial Court’) passed the following order:- ^^------ ,slh lwjr es oknhx.k ds 'kiFk i=ksa ds vk/kkj ij oknxzLr ifjlj dk fdjk;k varfje :i ls 500@& :i;s fu/kkZfjr fd;k tkuk equkflc gSA fygktk ;g U;k;ky; oknxzLr ifjlj dk fdjk;k 500@& izfrekg r; djus ds ckn okn nk;j djus dh frfFk 12-02-1996 ls iwoZ rhu o"kksZa dk cdk;k fdjk;s dh x.kuk djrs gq, 500@& :i;s izfrekg dh nj ls bl izdkj fdjk;s dk ewY;kadu fd;k tkrk gS%& 1- cdk;k fdjk;k fnukad 12-02-1996 ls iwoZ rhu o"kksZa dk cdk;k 36 ekg dk fdjk;k & 36 xq.kk 500 ¾ 18000@& :i;s fu/kkZfjr fd;k tkrk gSA 2- rRi'pkr ekg ekpZ 1996 ls Qjojh 2018 rd dqy 22 o"kksZa vFkkZr 264 eghuksa dk fdjk;k 132000@& :i;s] bl izdkj dqy 150000@& :i;s fdjk;k jkf'k curh gSA blds vfrfjDr mDr fdjk;s dh jkf'k ftl rkjh[k dks lans; Fkh] mlls vo/kkj.k dh frfFk rd 6 izfr'kr izfro"kZ dh nj ls C;kt izkIr djus dk Hkw&Lokeh /kkjk 13¼3½ jkt0 ifjlj fdjk;k ,oa csn[kyh fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e 1950 ds vuqlkj vf/kdkjh gksxkA ;fn izfroknhx.k us mDr cdk;k fdjk;k isVs dksbZ jkf'k oknhx.k dks vnk dj nh xbZ gS vFkok U;k;ky; esa tek djokbZ xb rks mDr fdjk;s jkf'k esa ls lek;ksftr dh tkos rFkk cdk;k fdjk;k jkf'k izfroknhx.k 15 fnu esa U;k;ky; esa tek djkosa rFkk Hkfo"; esa izfrekg dk fdjk;k 500@& :i;s izfrekg ds fglkc ls mRrjiwohZ eghus dh 15 rkjh[k rd vnk djsA** Thus, the petitioner-defendant was to pay the defaulting rent to the respondents-plaintiffs, which was calculated to the tune of Rs.1,50,000/- within a period of 15 days along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of institution of suit till the date of the order, i.e. 14.03.2018, in compliance of which the petitioner-defendant paid an amount of Rs.1,40,000/- on 23.03.2018 and the rest amount (remaining amount of Rs.10,000/-along with interest) was agreed to be paid after the proper calculation of the interest payable is done. Thereafter, with a malafide intention and in order to create further cause of action against the petitioner-defendant, the respondents-plaintiffs denied to accept the rent and moved an application under Section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1950’) on 05.04.2019 (Annex.4) stating therein that the petitioner-defendant had denied from paying the rent and prayed for striking-off the defense of the petitioner-defendant. 4. On receiving the said application, the petitioner-defendant moved an application under Order 11 Rule 1 CPC dated 10.05.2019 (Annex.5) with a prayer to furnish him the account number of the respondents-plaintiffs so that he could deposit the rent. 5. The aforesaid applications remained pending. However, in the meantime, the respondents-plaintiffs again moved another application under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950 on 05.08.2019 (Annex.6) contending that the petitioner-defendant has not paid rent and prayed for striking-off the defense of the petitioner-defendant. The petitioner-defendant filed reply to the application (Annex.7) and submitted that since the respondents-plaintiffs are not taking the rent in cash, therefore, he had moved an application under Order 11 Rule 1 CPC for providing him details of accounts so that he could deposit the rent and the said application was still pending. The learned trial court, vide order dated 19.08.2019 (Annex.8) dismissed the application filed by the petitioner under Order 11 Rule 1 CPC and allowed the application filed by the respondents-plaintiffs under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950 and struck-off the defense of the petitioner-defendant. Hence, the present writ petition is being preferred. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner-defendant submitted that the petitioner-defendant was ready and willing to deposit the rent and the respondents-defendants denied to accept the rent in cash and moved two applications under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950. It is also submitted that the learned trial Court did not consider the application of the petitioner-defendant filed under Order 11 Rule 1 CPC for providing him account details of the respondents-plaintiffs. He submitted that, while issuing notices, this Court directed the petitioner-defendant to deposit a sum of Rs.70,300/-, being the rent due and also to pay a cost of Rs.10,000/-, in compliance of which, the petitioner paid Rs.88,800/- towards arrears of rent along with cost of Rs.10,000/- and interest. 7. He submitted that, while issuing notices, this Court directed the petitioner-defendant to deposit a sum of Rs.70,300/-, being the rent due and also to pay a cost of Rs.10,000/-, in compliance of which, the petitioner paid Rs.88,800/- towards arrears of rent along with cost of Rs.10,000/- and interest. 7. Thereafter, the petitioner also moved an application before the learned trial Court for accepting the rent, which is pending as the proceedings have been stayed by this Court. However, the respondents-defendants did not accept the rent. The petitioner-defendant was ready to deposit the amount before the Trial Court and further to pay a cost of Rs.5,000/-for opening the defense of the petitioner. He placed reliance upon the judgments of this Court passed by the Jaipur Bench in the cases of Sukh Sagar Buildcon Private Limited Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [S.B.C.W.P. No.17342/2022, decided on 03.01.2023] and Mahesh Vs. Smt. Savitri & Ors. [S.B.C.W.P. No.16009/2011, decided on 09.12.2011], wherein this Court opened the defense on depositing the cost. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that before striking-off the defense, the learned trial Court ought to have considered the application filed under Order 11 Rule 1 CPC of the defendant but the learned trial Court, without considering the application of the petitioner-defendant in right perspective, struck-off the defense of the petitioner-defendant. He placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bimal Chand Jain Vs. Gopal Agarwal [ (1981) 3 SCC 486 ]. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs raised an objection that the writ petition is not maintainable on the ground of availability of alternative remedy under Section 22(1) of the Act of 1950, which reads thus:- “Section 22.-Appeal & Revision – (1) From every decree or order passed by a Court under this, an appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from original decrees and orders passed by such former Court.” 10. In rebuttal to the submission aforesaid, the learned counsel for the petitioner-defendant submitted that the same is totally misconceived and that Section 22 of the Act of 1950 provides for appeal against the final order or decree and in the present case, the impugned order is neither a final order nor a decree and hence, the present writ petition is maintainable. He submitted that even if any alternative remedy is available and the party invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has not availed the alternative remedy, the same would not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court and render a writ petition ‘not maintainable’. He placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs. The Excise and Taxation Officer cum Assisting Authority and Ors. [ AIR 2023 SC 781 ]. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs, while supporting the order impugned, submitted that the respondents-plaintiffs never refused to accept the provisional rent. The petitioner-defendant did not deposit the total amount of Rs.1,50,000/- along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date it fell due and monthly rent to be deposited by 15th of every month, as ordered by the learned trial Court. Upon filing the application under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950, the petitioner-defendant moved the application under Order 11 Rule 1 CPC. Thus, the learned trial Court has not committed any illegality or irregularity in allowing the application of the respondents-plaintiffs and striking-off the defense of the petitioner-defendant. He placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Harbans Kaur Vs. Iqbal Singh & Anrx. (Civil Appeal Nos.12561-12562 of 2017, decided on 29.01.2019). Hon’ble the Supreme Court observed as under:- “This Court in the above case has held that arrears of rent as envisaged in provision of Section 14(1)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act are the arrears demanded by the notice for payment of arrears of rent. In the present case arrears demanded by the notice i.e. Rs.16,564/-per month starting from August, 2003 to February, 2004 totalling Rs.1,15,945/-were required to be paid by the tenant, the tenant having paid only Rs.95,200/- as per his calculation of the rent at the rate of Rs.13,600/-per month has committed default.” 12. Learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that the present dispute is between landlord and tenant and thus the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as it does not involve any issue of public importance and is not violative of fundamental rights. He placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. Vs. He placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ]. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the impugned order was passed on 14.03.2018 and the petitioner was directed to deposit Rs.1,50,000/-along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date it fell due and was further directed to deposit the monthly rent by 15th of every month. The said amount to be deposited by the petitioner was to the tune of Rs.2,10,300/-out of which the petitioner-defendant deposited only Rs.1,40,000/-on 29.03.2018 and the remaining amount was not deposited. Even the application filed by the petitioner-defendant under Order 11 Rule 1 CPC did not show any willingness to pay remaining amount and the efforts made by the petitioner for paying the same. It was thus, submitted that the learned trial Court has rightly struck-off the defense of the petitioner-defendant. He placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin & Ors. Vs. Sita Ram Agarwal [Civil Appeal No.5077 of 1998, decided on 28.01.2003], wherein it has been held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply in such cases. He also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Heera Lal Vs. Mandir Shri Thakurji [WLC 2005 (2) 799], wherein the judgment in that case of Nasiruddin (supra) was relied upon and it was held that the Court has no power to extend the period for depositing the rent under Section 13 of the Act of 1950 and nor to condone the default in depositing rent as there are no provisions in the Act granting such powers to the Court. 14. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 15. It is to be noted that the present suit has been filed under the provisions of the Act of 1950, therefore, this Court will deal the issue in question as per the provisions of the Act of 1950 and learned counsel for both the parties have no objection to the same. 16. 15. It is to be noted that the present suit has been filed under the provisions of the Act of 1950, therefore, this Court will deal the issue in question as per the provisions of the Act of 1950 and learned counsel for both the parties have no objection to the same. 16. So far as the issue with regard to maintainability of the present writ petition in view of alternative remedy being available under Section 22 of the Act of 1950 is concerned, it is clear that since the impugned order is not a final order or decree, therefore, the present writ petition is maintainable. Therefore, the present writ petition is decided on merits of the case. 17. The present suit has been filed under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act of 1950 on the ground that the petitioner has failed to pay rent from 01.11.1985 to 31.01.1996. Thereafter, the respondents-plaintiffs moved an application for determination of rent on 22.10.1996, which came to be decided on 14.03.2018 (Annex.3) and the rate of rent was provisionally fixed at Rs.500/-per month and the petitioner was directed to deposit the arrear of rent to the tune of Rs.1,50,000/-along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of institution of suit till 14.03.2018 (Annex.3) (the date of fixing provisional rent) within 15 days and also to pay future monthly rent by the 15th of every month. In compliance of the order dated 14.03.2018 (Annex.3), the petitioner deposited only Rs.1,40,000/-on 23.03.2018 as mentioned by the respondents-plaintiffs in his application under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950 (Annex.4). Thereafter, when the petitioner did not deposit the remaining amount calculated in compliance of the order dated 14.03.2018 (Annex.3), the respondents-plaintiffs moved first application under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950 for striking-off the defense of the petitioner-defendant on 05.04.2019. The petitioner-defendant, thereafter, without filing any reply to the application under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950, filed an application under Order 11 Rule 1 CPC, for providing him the bank details of the respondents-plaintiffs on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs refused to accept the rent. In the said application, the petitioner-defendant has only made a submission about tendering of rent for the month of May, 2019 and that the respondents-plaintiffs have refused to accept the same. In the said application, the petitioner-defendant has only made a submission about tendering of rent for the month of May, 2019 and that the respondents-plaintiffs have refused to accept the same. However, there is no pleading or evidence placed on record to show that the payment of remaining amount of provisional rent as well as interest @ 6% per annum and monthly rent to be paid by 15th of every month had been paid by the petitioner-defendant in compliance of the order dated 14.03.2018 (Annex.3). 18. Further, sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act of 1950 provides for deposition of arrears of rent and further monthly rent at the rate provisionally fixed by the court concerned under sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act of 1950. Section 13(4) is reproduced here-in-below for ready reference:- “(4) The tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, nor exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord, month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3).” 19. In the case in hand, the order determining provisional rent was passed on 14.03.2018 (Annex.3) directing the petitioner to pay arrears of rent to the tune of Rs.1,50,000/-along with interest @ 6% per annum within 15 days and monthly rent to be paid by 15th of every month. Admittedly, the petitioner-defendant deposited Rs.1,40,000/-on 23.03.2018. Thereafter, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner made any effort to deposit the remaining amount along with interest in compliance of the order dated 14.03.2018 (Annex.3). It is only when the respondents-plaintiffs filed application under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950 for striking-off the defense, the petitioner-defendant moved the application under Order 11 Rule 1 CPC mentioning that the respondents-plaintiffs are not accepting the rent of May, 2019, therefore, the account details of the respondents-defendants may be provided to the petitioner-defendant. It is only when the respondents-plaintiffs filed application under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950 for striking-off the defense, the petitioner-defendant moved the application under Order 11 Rule 1 CPC mentioning that the respondents-plaintiffs are not accepting the rent of May, 2019, therefore, the account details of the respondents-defendants may be provided to the petitioner-defendant. There is no pleading in the application that the petitioner-defendant ever tendered the remaining amount along with interest and monthly rent to the respondents-plaintiffs nor there is any pleading about depositing the same before the learned court below. Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950, though provides extension of time for deposition of rent etc., but there is also nothing on record to show that the petitioner-defendant ever moved any application seeking extension of time on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs had refused to accept the due rent. Even no legal notice was served upon the respondents-plaintiffs showing that they have refused to accept the rent as and when it was tendered to them. This shows that the application filed under Order 11 Rule 1 CPC is nothing but an after-thought, intending to cover up the default committed by the petitioner-defendant. 20. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the petitioner-defendant committed default in paying arrears of rent, as fixed by the learned court below vide order dated 14.03.2018 (Annex.3) and it is only after the order of a Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 03.09.2019 the petitioner-defendant deposited the amount of Rs.88,800/-, which cannot be said to be compliance of the order dated 14.03.2018 (Annex.3). 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Asha Rani Gupta Vs. Vineet Kumar [(2022) 0 Supreme (SC) 594], has held that there was no reason for the High Court to interfere with the order of the learned court below striking-off the defense of the tenant finding that there was no evidence to show payment of rent etc. in favour of the plaintiffs. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder:- “16. In the totality of facts and circumstances, we are clearly of the view that there was absolutely no reason for the High Court to have interfered in the present case, where the Trial Court had struck off the defence after finding that there was no evidence on record to show the payment or deposit of rent in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant-respondent. The Revisional Court had also approved the order of the Trial Court on relevant considerations. Even the High Court did not find the pleas taken by the defendant-respondent to be of bonafide character, particularly when survey number of the shop let out to him was clearly stated in the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff. We find it rather intriguing that, despite having not found any cogent reason for which discretion under Rule 5 of Order XV CPC could have been exercised in favour of the defendant-respondent, the High Court, in the last line of paragraph 45 of the order impugned, abruptly stated its conclusion that: yet the defendant/tenant deserves some indulgence. 17. With respect, the said conclusion of the High Court could only be said to be an assumptive one, being not supported by any reason. In paragraph 44, of course, the High Court observed with reference to the decisions of this Court that the discretionary power must be exercised with great circumspection but, such enunciation by this Court cannot be read to mean that whatever may be the fault and want of bonafide in the defendant/tenant, he would be readily given the so-called indulgence : of not striking off defence. Such an approach is neither envisaged by the statutory provisions nor by the referred decisions. In fact, such an approach would simply render the relevant provisions of law rather nugatory. The expected circumspection would require the Court to be cautious of all the relevant facts and the material on record and not to strike off the defence as a matter of routine. However, when a case of the present nature is before the Court, disclosing deliberate defiance and volitional/elective non-performance, the consequence of law remains inevitable, that the defence of such a defendant would be struck off. 18. For what has been discussed hereinabove, the impugned order. 19. The submissions made on behalf of the defendant-respondent that he had deposited the due rent from 10.05.2010 to 10.11.2018 and he has been further making regular deposits do not take his case any further. The defendant-respondent has made such deposits only pursuant to the order of the High Court. The said order, being not in conformity with the law applicable and with the record of this case, is required to be set aside. The defendant-respondent has made such deposits only pursuant to the order of the High Court. The said order, being not in conformity with the law applicable and with the record of this case, is required to be set aside. In any event, any deposit made under or pursuant to the said order cannot wipe out the default already committed by the defendant-respondent. On the contrary, with setting aside of the said order of the High Court, the order of the Trial Court shall stand revived. Simply put, the deposits belatedly made, pursuant only to the unsustainable order of the High Court, do not enure to the benefit of the defendant respondent.” 22. In the present case also, there is no evidence on record to show that the petitioner-defendant ever tendered or deposited the rent due etc. in compliance of the order dated 14.03.2018 (Annex.3). The only submission made in the application under Order 11 Rule 1 CPC is that the rent tendered for the month of May, 2019 had not been accepted by the respondents-plaintiffs. The deposition of arrears of amount along with interest and cost in pursuance of the order dated 03.09.2019 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court also is not beneficial to the petitioner-defendant so as to wipe-out the default committed by him. 23. Further, in view of the discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs, the submission of the petitioner-defendant that the learned court below did not consider his application filed under Order 11 Rule 1 CPC is also not sustainable on the apparent ground that the petitioner-defendant failed to establish that he tendered or deposited the arrears of rent along with interest and further monthly rent in time and thus, the same was rightly dismissed by the learned Court below. 24. The Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 is a beneficial legislation to both tenant and landlord. It protects the tenants against unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent and simultaneously also ensures certain limited rights to the landlord to recover possession on stated contingencies. This Court is conscious of the fact that the power to strike-off defense is considered to be discretionary and is to be exercised with circumspection but relaxation is to be reserved for a bonafide tenant and not as a matter of course. This Court is conscious of the fact that the power to strike-off defense is considered to be discretionary and is to be exercised with circumspection but relaxation is to be reserved for a bonafide tenant and not as a matter of course. In the present case, the petitioner has not stated the adequate reasons, factors or circumstances along with evidence for non-compliance of the order dated 14.03.2018 (Annex.3), thus the default/non-compliance on the part of the petitioner cannot be said to be a bonafide default or a bonafide cause. 25. The learned Court below also, while considering the facts and material available on record, has reached to conclusion that the petitioner-defendant has committed default, which cannot be termed as bonafide. It has also been found by the learned court below that the petitioner-defendant has neither moved any application for depositing the rent in the court nor has moved any application seeking extension before the respondents-plaintiffs moved an application under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950 on 05.04.2019 26. In view of the fact that the petitioner-defendant has failed to show his bonafides for deposition of arrears of rent along with interest and monthly rent, therefore, the learned court below has rightly allowed the application of the respondents-plaintiffs filed under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950 while striking-off the defense of the petitioner-defendant. 27. As an upshot of the discussion aforesaid, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order dated 19.08.2020 (Annex.8) passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Sangariya in Civil Case No.12/1996. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. 28. The stay application and all other pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed. 29. However, it would be expected of the learned court below to take note of the fact that the suit filed way back in the year 1996 has remained pending yet and is required to be assigned a reasonable priority for expeditious disposal.