JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. I.A No. 915 of 2023 This interlocutory application has been filed for condonation of delay of 254 days in preferring the present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellants and considering the facts and circumstances of this case and also after going through the cause shown in this interlocutory application seeking condonation of delay, I.A No. 915 of 2023 is hereby allowed and delay in preferring the Letters Patent Appeal is condoned. L.P.A No. 38 of 2023 3. This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by the State of Jharkhand to challenge the writ Court’s order dated 18th April 2022 passed in W.P.(S) No. 6687 of 2016 by which the punishment order has been quashed. 4. The writ petitioner who is the respondent before us was proceeded in a departmental proceeding in connection to charge memo dated 25th January 2012 in Prapatra-K which was issued on the basis of various imputations of misconduct against him. 5. The Inquiring Officer submitted a report dated 18th May 2016 observing that none of the charges is supported by evidence. Similar observations have been made against all the charges framed against the respondent. 5. The Inquiring Officer submitted a report dated 18th May 2016 observing that none of the charges is supported by evidence. Similar observations have been made against all the charges framed against the respondent. For the sake of convenience, we would extract the findings of the Inquiring Officer recorded in relation to charge no.5, which read as under: ^^vkjksih inkf/kdkjh dk cpko&cku Lor% Li"V gS] tks Lohdkj ;ksX; gSA ;gk¡ ;g xkSjryc gS fd izklafxd ;kstuk,¡ 2006&07 esa Lohd`r gqbZA Li"V gS fd ;kstukvksa dk dk;kZjEHk o"kZ 2006&07 esa gh gqvk gksxkA vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh dk jktuxj iz[kaM esa dk;Zdky 31-12-2007 rd FkkA ;kstukvksa dk LFky tkap fnukad 30-07-08 dks fd;k x;kA bl vUrjky esa ;kstuk dh fLFkfr esa dqN ifjorZu ;Fkk ikS/kks dk lw[k tkuk] vLFkkbZ :i ls fufeZr 'ksM dk vLFkkbZ@LFkkbZ :i ls lekIr gks tkuk bR;kfn dh laHkkouk ls budkj ugha fd;k tk ldrk gSA ;kstukvksa ds dk;kZUo;u ,oa j[k j[kko ,d Vhe vk/kkfjr lrr izfØ;k gS ftl ij Vhe ds lHkh lnL; dk nkf;Ro curk gSA ek= ,d O;fDr dks blds fy, nks"kh ugha Bgjk;k tk ldrk gSA vkjksih inkf/kdkjh ds LFkkukUrj.k ds i'pkr bldk nkf;Ro muds izfrLFkkuh dk Hkh curk gSA vkjksih inkf/kdkjh ds cpko&cku ,oa blls lacaf/kr fn;s x;s lk{; ls Li"V gS fd] vfxze ds lek;kstu ds laca/k esa iz;kl fd;k x;k gSA lacaf/kr dehZ dks dbZ uksfVl Hksts x;sA dqN ;kstukvksa esa vfxze dk iw.kZ lek;kstu fd;k x;k gSA rRlaca/kh lk{; Hkh izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA yxk;k x;k vkjksi lk{; vk/kkfjr ugha gSA fcUnwokj cpko&cku ij mik;qDr dk earO; Lor% Li"V gSA bl vkyksd esa vkjksih inkf/kdkjh dk cpko&cku Lohdkj ;ksX; izrhr gksrk gSA vxzlkj.k& dkfeZd] iz'kklfud lq/kkj rFkk jktHkk"kk foHkkx] >kj[k.M] jk¡ph ds ladYi la0&412 fnukad&19-01-2016 ds lanHkZ esa lapkfyr foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh varxZr vafre izfrosnu dh vfrfjDr nks izfr;ksa ds lkFk ewy vfHkys[k iz/kku lfpo] dkfeZd] iz'kklfud lq/kkj rFkk jktHkk"kk foHkkx] >kj[kaM] jk¡ph dh lsok esa voyksdukFkZ o vxzsrj dkjZokbZ gsrq izsf"kr dj nh tk;A** English Translation: “The defence statement of the delinquent officer, which itself is evident, is admissible. It is remarkable here that the relevant schemes were sanctioned in the year 2006-07. It is obvious that the work of schemes would have commenced in the year 2006-07. The tenure of the delinquent officer at Rajnagar Block was till 31.12.2007. Site inspection of schemes was conducted on 30.07.08. It is remarkable here that the relevant schemes were sanctioned in the year 2006-07. It is obvious that the work of schemes would have commenced in the year 2006-07. The tenure of the delinquent officer at Rajnagar Block was till 31.12.2007. Site inspection of schemes was conducted on 30.07.08. During this period, possibility of some changes like wilting of plants, temporary/permanent destruction of temporarily constructed shed etc. under the schemes could not be ruled out. The implementation and maintenance of schemes is a team based continuous process which includes liability of all the team members. Only a single person could not be termed guilty for it. After transfer of the delinquent officer, it is also the responsibility of the officer replacing him. It is evident from the defence statement and the evidence adduced in this respect by the delinquent officer that he has made effort to adjust the advance. Several notices were issued against the concerned employee. Advance is totally adjusted in a few schemes. Relevant evidence is also adduced. The charges levelled are not based on evidence. The finding of the Deputy Commissioner on point wise defence statement is self-evident. In this respect, it seems appropriate to accept defence statement of the delinquent officer. Forwarding- Final report of departmental proceeding conducted with reference to Resolution No. 412 dated-19.01.2016 of the Department of Personnel, Administrative Reform and Rajbhasha, Jharkhand, Ranchi with two additional copies along with original record be forwarded to the Principal Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reform and Rajbhasha, Jharkhand, Ranchi for perusal and further action.” 6. Thereafter, without issuing second show-cause notice to the respondent, the disciplinary authority awarded punishment of withholding of two increments with non-cumulative effect contained in memo dated 8th November 2016. 7. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent approached the writ Court by filing W.P.(S) No. 6687 of 2016 to challenge the aforesaid order of punishment dated 8th November 2016. 8. As noticed above, by an order dated 18th April 2022, W.P.(S) No. 6687 of 2016 has been allowed observing as under: “6. 7. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent approached the writ Court by filing W.P.(S) No. 6687 of 2016 to challenge the aforesaid order of punishment dated 8th November 2016. 8. As noticed above, by an order dated 18th April 2022, W.P.(S) No. 6687 of 2016 has been allowed observing as under: “6. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties and upon perusal of the records, this Court is of the considered view that the case of the petitioner needs consideration for the following facts and reasons: None of the charges levelled against the petitioner has been proved in the Departmental Proceedings and the Enquiry Officer has fully exonerated the petitioner from all the charges. The charge, which was not there in the memo of charge-sheet, has been taken into consideration for inflicting the punishment, which is not tenable in the eyes of law. The Disciplinary Authority without differing with the enquiry report and without issuance of show cause notice regarding disagreement with the enquiry report, has passed the impugned order of punishment without applying his mind, which is against the mandate of law. It was incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to issue second show cause notice to the petitioner and get his reply before passing the impugned order and also assigned cogent reasons for inflicting the punishment though exonerated by the Enquiry Officer. 7. The aforesaid issues fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Ram Kishan v. Union of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 157 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under : “10. …………. The purpose of the show-cause notice, in case of disagreement with the findings of the inquiry officer, is to enable the delinquent to show that the disciplinary authority is persuaded not to disagree with the conclusions reached by the inquiry officer for the reasons given in the inquiry report or he may offer additional reasons in support of the finding by the inquiry officer. In that situation, unless the disciplinary authority gives specific reasons in the show cause on the basis of which the findings of the inquiry officer in that behalf is based, it would be difficult for the delinquent to satisfactorily give reasons to persuade the disciplinary authority to agree with the conclusions reached by the inquiry officer. In that situation, unless the disciplinary authority gives specific reasons in the show cause on the basis of which the findings of the inquiry officer in that behalf is based, it would be difficult for the delinquent to satisfactorily give reasons to persuade the disciplinary authority to agree with the conclusions reached by the inquiry officer. In the absence of any ground or reason in the show-cause notice it amounts to an empty formality which would cause grave prejudice to the delinquent officer and would result in injustice to him. The mere fact that in the final order some reasons have been given to disagree with the conclusions reached by the disciplinary authority cannot cure the defect.” 8. The same view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 , relevant paras of which is reproduced herein below: “17. These observations are clearly in tune with the observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit case quoted earlier and would be applicable at the first stage itself. The aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to give a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the enquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar case the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the enquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority. ………. 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” 9. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570 has held that: 18. In Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (2006) 4 SCC 713 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 840] whereupon both the learned counsel relied, this Court held: (SCC p. 724, para 26) “26. ……….. The enquiry officer is not permitted to travel beyond the charges and any punishment imposed on the basis of a finding which was not the subject-matter of the charges is wholly illegal. (See Export Inspection Council of India v. Kalyan Kumar Mitra [(1987) 2 Cal LJ 344] .) (6) Suspicion or presumption cannot take the place of proof even in a domestic enquiry. (See Export Inspection Council of India v. Kalyan Kumar Mitra [(1987) 2 Cal LJ 344] .) (6) Suspicion or presumption cannot take the place of proof even in a domestic enquiry. The writ court is entitled to interfere with the findings of the fact of any tribunal or authority in certain circumstances. (See Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain [ AIR 1969 SC 983 : (1969) 1 SCR 735 ] and Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [ (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429] .)” 10. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. K.K. Verma, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 494 has held that: 33. The counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Babulal Kriparam Takkamore [ AIR 1967 SC 1353 ] to submit that if the impugned order can be sustained excluding the disputed charge, this Court should not interfere. In our view, it is not possible for us to pre-judge the issue in the present case. As seen from the order of the disciplinary authority quoted above, the appellant has considered it to be a serious charge and, therefore, the respondent ought to have been given the opportunity to challenge the adverse finding of the disciplinary authority where it differed from the enquiry officer to establish his innocence. 34. It was then submitted that non-supply of enquiry report is inconsequential if the employee does not show as to how he is prejudiced thereby. Karunakar [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] , S.K. Singh v. Central Bank of India [ (1996) 6 SCC 415 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 39] and Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja [ (2008) 9 SCC 31 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 789] were relied upon in support. There cannot be any grievance with respect to the proposition. In the present case, however, we are concerned with a situation where the finding of the enquiry officer on a charge has been reversed by the disciplinary authority, which was not the case in any of the three cases. Besides, by not giving the enquiry report and the adverse order of the disciplinary authority, the respondent was denied the opportunity to represent before the finding of guilt was arrived at and thereby he was certainly prejudiced. 11. Besides, by not giving the enquiry report and the adverse order of the disciplinary authority, the respondent was denied the opportunity to represent before the finding of guilt was arrived at and thereby he was certainly prejudiced. 11. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Nirmala J. Jhala Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr., reported in (2013) 4 SCC 301 has held that: “51. There is nothing on record to show that either the preliminary enquiry report or the statements recorded therein, particularly, by the complainant-accused or Shri C.B. Gajjar, Advocate, had been exhibited in regular inquiry. In the absence of information in the charge-sheet that such report/statements would be relied upon against the appellant, it was not permissible for the enquiry officer or the High Court to rely upon the same. Natural justice is an inbuilt and inseparable ingredient of fairness and reasonableness. Strict adherence to the principle is required, wherever civil consequences follow up, as a result of the order passed. Natural justice is a universal justice. In certain factual circumstances even non-observance of the rule will itself result in prejudice. Thus, this principle is of supreme importance”. 12. Admittedly, the petitioner was fully exonerated by the Enquiry Officer and Disciplinary Authority without differing with the enquiry report and without assigning cogent reasons, has inflicted punishment of withholding of two increments with non-cumulative effect, which is in complete violation of cardinal principles of natural justice and also in violation of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and also the charge, which was not mentioned in the memo of charge, has been taken into consideration for inflicting the punishment, which is not tenable in the eyes of law as such, the order of punishment dated 08.11.2016 is not tenable in the eyes of law and the same is hereby quashed and set aside. 13. As a result of quashment of the impugned order, the petitioner is entitled for all the consequential benefits. 14. Resultantly, writ petition stands allowed.” 9. Taking exception to the observations of the writ Court that the respondent was fully exonerated by the Inquiring Officer, Mr. Jai Prakash, the learned AAG-IA refers to the opinion rendered by the Inquiring Officer to submit that no such conclusive finding was recorded by the Inquiring Officer as observed by the writ Court and, therefore, the writ Court’s order must be held flawed for this reason alone. Jai Prakash, the learned AAG-IA refers to the opinion rendered by the Inquiring Officer to submit that no such conclusive finding was recorded by the Inquiring Officer as observed by the writ Court and, therefore, the writ Court’s order must be held flawed for this reason alone. 10. From the writ pleadings, it does not appear that the respondent raised any serious objection to the procedure adopted during the domestic inquiry. The Inquiring Officer discussed the charge against the respondent, the opinion of the Deputy Commissioner and defence of the respondent, and in a report spread over 32-page has categorically stated therein that the charges against the delinquent government employee are not based on any evidence. The Inquiring Officer has therefore rendered an opinion that the defence put forth by the delinquent government employee deserved to be accepted. 11. In a departmental proceeding, the inquiry report is a vital document which provides foundation for taking a decision by the disciplinary authority whether or not to hold the delinquent government employee guilty of the charge/charges. This is a right of the delinquent government employee to answer the adverse findings recorded by the Inquiring Officer in the report and, therefore, a second show-cause notice is a mandatory requirement in any disciplinary proceeding. This is therefore of a fundamental importance that a second show-cause notice is issued to the delinquent government employee so as to persuade the disciplinary authority with respect to the adverse findings recorded by the Inquiring Officer. That apart, this is also a well settled law that when the disciplinary authority takes a decision to disagree with the favorable findings recorded by the Inquiring Officer a note of dissent in the form of a notice must first be given to the delinquent government employee indicating the reasons for disagreeing with the inquiry report and then only a final order can be passed by the disciplinary authority. 12. In “Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Kunj Behari Misra” (1998) 7 SCC 84 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “17. These observations are clearly in tune with the observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit case quoted earlier and would be applicable at the first stage itself. The aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to give a hearing to the delinquent officer. These observations are clearly in tune with the observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit case quoted earlier and would be applicable at the first stage itself. The aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to give a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the enquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar case the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the enquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority. 18. Under Regulation 6, the enquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the enquiry is conducted by the enquiry officer, his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer's report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as explained in Karunakar case. 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” 13. In the case at hand, the punishment order was liable to be quashed not only on the aforementioned grounds, as held by the Inquiring Officer the charges against the respondent are based on no evidence and while so this was the case of “no evidence” against the respondent. 14. In the case at hand, the punishment order was liable to be quashed not only on the aforementioned grounds, as held by the Inquiring Officer the charges against the respondent are based on no evidence and while so this was the case of “no evidence” against the respondent. 14. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances in the case, we are not inclined to interfere with the writ Court’s order dated 18th April 2022 passed in W.P.(S) No. 6687 of 2016 and, accordingly, L.P.A No. 38 of 2023 is dismissed. 15. I.A No. 916 of 2023 for stay is dismissed.