JUDGMENT : In all these cases, common questions of fact and law have arisen and that’s why all these matters have been heard together with the consent of the parties. 2. All these matters were decided by the judgment dated 13.12.2021, whereby the entire criminal proceedings were quashed. This order dated 13.12.2021 was challenged by the State of Jharkhand before the Hon’ble Supreme court in Criminal Appeal No. 2659 of 2023 [arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8591 of 2022] and its analogous cases and by judgment dated 01.09.2023, the Hon’ble Supreme court was pleased to set aside the said order and remanded the matter to this court to decide the case afresh. Pursuant to that the said matters were assigned by Hon’ble the Chief Justice of this court to this Bench and that is how these matters were posted before this Bench and thereafter the matters were posted on 11.10.2023, 16.10.2023 and 01.11.2023 and today these matters were fixed for final disposal with the consent of the parties. 3. Heard Mr. Jitendra S. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all these cases, Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned A.P.P., Mr. V.S. Sahay, learned A.P.P. and Mrs. Priya Shrestha, learned Spl.P.P. appearing for the State in respective cases. 4. In all these cases, prayers are made for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings including the order taking cognizance and analogous cases dated 15.01.2018, by which, cognizance for the offence under Sections 406, 409, 418, 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001 has been taken against the petitioners, in connection with Daltonganj Town P.S. Case No. 382 of 2017 corresponding to G.R. No. 2536 of 2017, pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palamau. 5. The FIR was lodged alleging therein that the Deputy Collector (Establishment) has lodged the First Information Report alleging therein that on 05.11.2017 an examination for appointment of 4th grade was conducted at 26 different centres and thereafter a committee consisting four members was made for counselling. It has been further alleged that on 12.11.2017, 31 candidates out of 34 selected candidates appeared before the committee for their counselling. It is further alleged that the informant received information regarding irregularities in said examination from different areas. It has been further alleged that on 12.11.2017, 31 candidates out of 34 selected candidates appeared before the committee for their counselling. It is further alleged that the informant received information regarding irregularities in said examination from different areas. It has further been alleged that on the day of counselling after verification of certificates a written test was conducted in such test 50 question was asked in which 16 questions were same as was asked on 05.11.2017 and rest 34 questions were similar. Thereafter all answer sheets were examined by the committees in which it was noticed that 30 candidates out of 31 candidates obtained very low marks than the marks obtained in the examination held on 05.11.2017. It is further alleged that the candidates could not give answer to the question asked by the counselling team and further it has been alleged that the candidates who have been selected have obtained more marks in the examination held on 05.11.2017 by committing mischief. 6. In Criminal Appeal No. 2659 of 2023 [arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8591 of 2022] and its analogous cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court by judgment dated 01.09.2023 has passed the following order:- “ Leave granted. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. These appeals have been filed by the appellant aggrieved against the impugned order dated 13.12.2021 passed by the High Court of and analogous cases Jharkhand at Ranchi in Cr.M.P. No.1079/2018 by which the First Information Report registered against the respondents for the offence punishable under Sections 406, 409, 418, 420, 120B of the IPC read with Sections 3 & 4 of the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 1981 is set aside. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the investigation made reveals that the question papers were leaked in the first examination conducted for Class IV employees which was duly utilized by the respondents in connivance with other accused. The reexamination conducted where 16 questions were exactly the same, 34 others were of similar nature as that of previous examination reveals obtaining of lower marks by the respondents. It is further submitted that there is no specific provision containing a non-obstante clause giving the over-riding effect in favour of the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001. The reexamination conducted where 16 questions were exactly the same, 34 others were of similar nature as that of previous examination reveals obtaining of lower marks by the respondents. It is further submitted that there is no specific provision containing a non-obstante clause giving the over-riding effect in favour of the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001. Learned senior Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that even otherwise the offences alleged under Section 406, 409, 418, 420 and 120B of the IPC are not made out and one has to see the impact of the order passed by the Writ Court. Upon hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties and on perusing the impugned order, we find that the only reason upon which the impugned order was passed was on the ground that in view of the existence of Section 3 & 4 of the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001, the respondents ought not to have been charged with the offences punishable under the IPC. The aforesaid reasoning in our considered view is contrary to law. Sections 3 and 4 of the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001 do not prohibit the invocation of the provisions of the IPC. There is no specific provision contained in the said Act as was found under the Information Technology Act, 2000 with particular reference under Section 81, which is duly taken note of by this Court in Sharat Babu Digumarti vs. Government (NCT and analogous cases of Delhi). In such view, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order and remit the matter back for reconsideration as no other ground has been taken into consideration. It will be open for the parties to raise all the contentions including the effect of the order passed in the writ petition. We request the High Court of Jharkhand to dispose of the Cr.M.P. No. 1079/2018 within a period of three months from today. Taking into consideration of the fact that the respondents are in employment as of now, the status quo as on today shall be maintained. The appeals are allowed accordingly. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.” 7. Mr. Taking into consideration of the fact that the respondents are in employment as of now, the status quo as on today shall be maintained. The appeals are allowed accordingly. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.” 7. Mr. Jitendra S. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all these cases submits that the petitioners have appeared in the examination for appointment on the post of Class-IV grade employees pursuant to advertisement dated 26.07.2010 issued by the establishment of Deputy Commissioner, Palamau. He submits that the examination was taken place on 05.11.2017 and thereafter the merit list was prepared on 18.01.2020. He further submits that on 12.11.2017, the petitioners were called for counselling. He further submits that on the date of counselling, the petitioners were asked to appear in reexamination. He submits that the re-examination was challenged before this Court in W.P.(S) No. 6709 of 2017 and its analogous case, which was disposed of by a co-ordinate Bench of this court holding that the appointment is required to be carried out in terms of the advertisement notice by way of further holding that the appointment notice cannot be changed when the game has already been started. On these observations, the writ petitions were allowed and the respondents-State were directed to prepare the merit list, on the basis of examination conducted on 05.11.2017, thereafter the respondents-State have prepared the merit list, in which the name of the petitioners were figured. He further submits that the only allegation in the FIR is that in the re-examination, the petitioners have received lesser marks than the examination taken on 05.11.2017. He further submits that none of the petitioners were caught red handed while writing the examination. He submits that the learned court has taken the cognizance under the IPC and analogous cases sections as well as Sections 3 and 4 of the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001. He further submits that the ingredients of none of the IPC sections are made out. He submits that the learned court has taken the cognizance under the IPC and analogous cases sections as well as Sections 3 and 4 of the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001. He further submits that the ingredients of none of the IPC sections are made out. He also submits that even if assuming that if the Special Act is there, the case can be quashed, as the order taking cognizance is not in accordance with law, as the penal Section is Section 10 of the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001, whereas the cognizance has been taken under Sections 3 and 4 of the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001, which suggests that there is non-application of judicial mind. He further submits that even if the court is not inclined to consider the case of Sharat Babu Digumati Vs. Government (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2017) 2 SCC 18 , the case is fit to be quashed, as none of the ingredients of the IPC Sections as well as the sections of Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001 is made out against these petitioners. He further submits that by the remand order, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to protect the interest of the petitioners with regard to the service of the petitioners. On these grounds, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the entire criminal proceedings may kindly be quashed. 8. Mr. Sahay, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State in Cr.M.P. No. 1079 of 2018 submits that entrustment is there, as the petitioners have appeared in the examination and in view of that the case is made out against them. 9. Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State in Cr.M.P. No. 1893 of 2020 refers to the contents of the FIR and submits that there are allegations against the petitioners and the petitioners have received the lessor marks in the re-examination in comparison of earlier examination conducted on 05.11.2017 and in view of that this court may not quash the entire criminal proceedings against the petitioners. He further submits that in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Jayant & Ors. Versus State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 670 , if the Special Act is involved, the IPC Sections as well as Special Act can be maintained. He further submits that in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Jayant & Ors. Versus State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 670 , if the Special Act is involved, the IPC Sections as well as Special Act can be maintained. He further submits that the same view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaysukh Bavanji Shingalia Versus State of Gujarat, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 772 . 10. Mrs. Priya Shrestha, learned Spl.P.P. appearing for the State and analogous cases in Cr.M.P. No. 1086 of 2018 submits that the materials are there and the witnesses have supported the case, which has been brought on record by way of Annexure-A Series filed in the counter affidavit on behalf of the State. She refers to that Annexure and submits that the case is made out against the petitioners. On these grounds, she submits that this court may not exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 11. In view of the above submissions of learned counsel appearing for the parties, the court finds that admittedly the advertisement was made on 26.07.2010 for appointment to the posts of Class-IV in the district of Palamau. On 05.11.2017, the written examination was conducted and on 09.11.2017 the result was published. On 12.11.2017, the petitioners were called for counselling and on that day itself, the petitioners were asked to sit for reexamination. There was no prior notice that these petitioners were further required to sit in re-examination and that was not stipulated in the advertisement dated 26.07.2010 and this fact has been taken note by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 6709 of 2017 and its analogous cases, wherein the subsequent action was challenged and the Court has held that once the game starts, rule cannot be changed and direction was issued to publish the result in light of the examination conducted on 05.11.2017. In the meantime, a contempt petition was filed, in which, the State undertaken that they will publish the result disclosing the names of the petitioners. Pursuant thereto the petitioners have already been appointed and the said order of the writ court was affirmed by the Division Bench of this court in L.P.A. No. 455 of 2019. The said LPA was dismissed for default. Thus, the order of the Single Judge has attained the finality. Pursuant thereto the petitioners have already been appointed and the said order of the writ court was affirmed by the Division Bench of this court in L.P.A. No. 455 of 2019. The said LPA was dismissed for default. Thus, the order of the Single Judge has attained the finality. 12. Learned court has been pleased to take cognizance under Sections 406, 409, 418, 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001. In course of argument, it has been pointed out by Mr. Jitendra S. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that on a confessional statement of Sanjay Kumar Mahto, the case has said to be investigated, however, the said Sanjay Kumar Mahto has not been chargesheeted and in view of that it is settled that the confessional statements are being recorded of an accused wherein and analogous cases the case in hand Sanjay Kumar Mahato is not chargesheeted. 13. Further none of the petitioners have caught red handed of cheating in the examination. Looking into the FIR, it appears that on 05.11.2017, the petitioners have received certain higher marks where in subsequent examination i.e. on 12.11.2017, they have received the lesser marks. It is an admitted fact that all the questions of the first examination and the re-examination were not similar, however, some of the questions were similar. In such a situation, whether a criminal case under the IPC Sections are made out or not, that is the crux of the issue, so far as these cases are concerned. When none of the petitioners are caught red handed in such re-examination, how a case under Sections 406, 409, 418, 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code can be made out. 14. Section 406 IPC speaks of punishment for criminal breach of trust. The offence of criminal breach of trust is defined in Section 405 of IPC and the same is punishable under Section 406 of IPC. In order to bring home the criminal breach of trust the proof of entrustment is essential, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Lal Raina Versus State Of Jammu & Kashmir, reported in AIR 1983 SC 631 . 15. In order to bring home the criminal breach of trust the proof of entrustment is essential, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Lal Raina Versus State Of Jammu & Kashmir, reported in AIR 1983 SC 631 . 15. Section 409 IPC speaks of criminal breach of trust by public servant or by the banker, merchant or agent and for two ingredients are to be proved and they are (i) entrustment of property of which the accused is duty bound to account for and (ii) committal of criminal breach of trust. Reference may be made to the case of Kailash Kumar Sanwatia Versus State of Bihar, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 399 . 16. Section 418 IPC speaks of cheating with knowledge that wrongful loss may ensure to person whose interest offender is bound to protect. This Section is not attracted so far the allegations made in the FIR is concerned. 17. For bringing a charge to home under Section 420 IPC, the intention of cheating from very beginning is one of the requirement in view of section 415 of the IPC, which is lacking in the case in hand. 18. Further Section 420 IPC was considered in the case of S.W. Palanitkar Versus State of Bihar, reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 129, in which, the ingredients of offence of cheating are held saying that (i) and analogous cases there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him (ii)(a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b) the act of omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. 19. The petitioners are held to be successful in the examination conducted on 05.11.2017 and on the basis of re-examination dated 12.11.2017, they have been chargesheeted under Section 420 and other Sections of IPC as well as Sections 3 and 4 of the Jharkhand Examination of Conduct Rules, 2001. 19. The petitioners are held to be successful in the examination conducted on 05.11.2017 and on the basis of re-examination dated 12.11.2017, they have been chargesheeted under Section 420 and other Sections of IPC as well as Sections 3 and 4 of the Jharkhand Examination of Conduct Rules, 2001. In view of the above ratio, the said section is also not attracted in the cases in hand. 20. The intention of starting a judicial proceeding with respect to an offence or taking steps to see whether there is a basis for starting the judicial proceeding by the court is taking cognizance. It is trite that before taking cognizance that court should satisfy that ingredients of the offence charged are, there or not. Chapter XIV, Cr.P.C. deals with, "taking the cognizance of offences". Section 190 and 193 talks about the mode for taking the cognizance by courts of magistrates and court of sessions whereas the power empowered is not absolute; it also puts certain restrictions given under Section 195 to 197 of the Code. In R.R. Chari vrs. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1951 SC 207 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, "taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate as such applies his mind to the suspected commission of offence." It was further held that "Before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under S.190 he must have applied his mind to the offence for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of Chapter. Taking cognizance of an offence is the first and foremost step towards trial. Cognizance literally means knowledge or notice, and taking cognizance of offence means and analogous cases taking notice, or becoming aware of the alleged commission of an offence. Obviously, the judicial officer will have to take cognizance of the offence before he could proceed to conduct a trial A Magistrate takes cognizance when he applies his mind or takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of offence which is said to have been committed. It bears repetition to state that taking cognizance is entirely an act of the Magistrate." In Darshan Singh Ram Kishan vrs. It bears repetition to state that taking cognizance is entirely an act of the Magistrate." In Darshan Singh Ram Kishan vrs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1971) 2 SCC 654 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that "Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action, or indeed action of any kind, but occurs as soon as a Magistrate. as such, applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence for the purpose of proceeding to take subsequent steps towards inquiry and trial". 21. The Court further finds that Section 3 of the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001 speaks of Prohibition as to the using of unfair means or cheating in examinations and Section 4 of the said Act stipulates of Helping in use of unfair means or abetting or conspiring. The learned court has taken the cognizance under these two Sections, which are the definition Sections, however, the penal Section is Section 10 and under that Section, the learned court has not taken the cognizance, which speaks that there is complete non-application of judicial mind. 22. The entire case as disclosed in the FIR, on the face of it appears to be concocted and fabricated. Reference may be made to the case of State of Haryana and others V. Bhajan Lal and others” reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, wherein the following parameters are made:- “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following and analogous cases categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and analogous cases and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 23. In view of the above facts, the case of the petitioners are covered in view of paras-102(v) and (vii) of the Bhajan Lal Case (Supra). 24. In view of the above, the cases are not made out against the petitioners either under the IPC Sections as well as under the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001. The cases i.e. Jayant & Ors. (Supra) and Jaysukh Bavanji Shingalia (Supra) relied by Mr. 24. In view of the above, the cases are not made out against the petitioners either under the IPC Sections as well as under the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001. The cases i.e. Jayant & Ors. (Supra) and Jaysukh Bavanji Shingalia (Supra) relied by Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State in Cr.M.P. No. 1893 of 2020 was of the view that the Hon’ble Supreme court that if the case is made out, the IPC Sections and as well as the Special Act can be maintained, that is not in dispute. However, in the cases in hand, in view of above discussion, the court comes to a conclusion that maliciously the petitioners have been made escape goat by way of lodging the FIR against them. 25. It is well settled that mechanically criminal motion should not be started, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Pepsi Food Limited and Another- versus- Special Judicial Magistrate & Others, reported in (1998) (5) SCC 749, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para-28 has observed as follows:- “28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and analogous cases the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any f the accused.” 26. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any f the accused.” 26. Further the order taking cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. and order issuing process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. can very well a composite order, but the application of mind would be different in both the case, as has been held in several cases by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the High Courts. The application of mind must be reflected in the order itself, the order should not be mechanical, at least prima facie material are required to be disclosed in the order taking cognizance/summing order, which is lacking in the cases in hand. 27. As a cumulative effect of the above discussions, reasons and analysis, the court finds that no case under the IPC or under the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001 are made out against the petitioners. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceedings including the order taking cognizance dated 15.01.2018, by which, cognizance for the offence under Sections 406, 409, 418, 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Jharkhand Conduct of Examination Act, 2001 has been taken against the petitioners, in connection with Daltonganj Town P.S. Case No. 382 of 2017 corresponding to G.R. No. 2536 pf 2017, pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palamau, are hereby, quashed. 28. All these petitions are allowed and disposed of.