JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Ashish Kumar Thakur, the learned counsel for the O.P.No.2 and Mr. Vishwanath Rai, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State. 2. In all these two petitions, a common question of law is involved and that is why both these petitions have been heard together with consent of the parties. 3. In Cr.M.P. No.1320 of 2016, the prayer is made for quashing of the order dated 07.01.2015 including the entire criminal proceeding in connection with O.C.R. No.02 of 2015, pending in the court of learned S.D.J.M., Rajmahal. 4. In Cr.M.P. No.103 of 2016, the prayer is made for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated 16.04.2014 arising out of O.C.R. No.57 of 2014, pending in the court of learned S.D.J.M., Rajmahal. 5. In O.C.R. No.2 of 2015 which is the subject matter in Cr.M.P.No.1320 of 2016 the prosecution case arises out of a written complaint lodged by the Opposite Party No.2 on 7.1.2015 in the court of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajmahal, District-Sahibganj on the following allegations- (a) The Complainant/Opposite Party No. 2 is an officer of the Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board and is the Regional Officer of the said Board, posted at Dumka and is a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 21 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. (b) Sri Dilip Agarwal, the Managing Director of M/s. Standard Mercantile Co. (Processing Division) Pvt. Ltd. (wrongly recorded as 'Processing Division' instead of 'Mining Division), is having an area of 69.73 Hectares in Mouza - Ray Bazar, P.S.-Rajmahal, District Sahebganj. (c) Vide letter no. R-38 dated 4.3.2010 the unit of the petitioner was directed to stop production and also by another letter no. 3002 dated 27.12.2014, the accused was directed to immediately stop processing of China Clay and Silica Sand operated by him as well as disposal of solid and liquid waste into the River Ganga and its bed but the accused in spite of closing the said unit continued operation of the plant. (d) The Complainant/Opposite Party No. 2 vide letter no. 3002 dated 27.12.2014, the accused was directed to immediately stop processing of China Clay and Silica Sand operated by him as well as disposal of solid and liquid waste into the River Ganga and its bed but the accused in spite of closing the said unit continued operation of the plant. (d) The Complainant/Opposite Party No. 2 vide letter no. B-42 dated 2.1.2015 has been authorised by the competent authority to file complaint under the provision of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and therefore, he is competent to do so. (e) The Accused-Company and their officials named in the complaint have/has committed offence under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 for which they are liable to be prosecuted and punished. 6. In O.C.R. No.57 of 2014 which is the subject matter in Cr.M.P.No.103 of 2016 the prosecution case arises out of a written complaint lodged by the Opposite Party No.2 on 15.4.2014 in the court of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajmahal, District-Sahibganj on the following allegations - (a) The Complainant/Opposite Party No. 2 is an officer of the Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board and is the Regional Officer of the said Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board, Dumka and is a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 21 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. (b) Sri Dilip Agarwal, (petitioner herein), the lessee of M/s. Standard Mercantile Co. (Mining Division) Pvt. Ltd., is having an area of 65.197 Hectares in Mouza - Ray Bazar, P.S. - Rajmahal, District - Sahebganj. (c) Vide letter contained in memo no. 1240 dated 28.9.2004 the Dy. Secretary, Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Jharkhand has informed that mining lease was in operation during the period 7.10.1994 to 6.1.2014 without environmental clearance, which is a violation of the provisions of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. (d) By a letter no. J-11015/2010/2013-IA.II(M) dated 6.2.2014 and J-11015/438/2012-IA.II(M) dated 12.4.2013, the Ministry of Environment & Forests, New Delhi (MoEF) addressed to the Department of Environment & Forest, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi informed that operation of the mine was being carried out from 1994 to 2013 without obtaining prior environmental clearance thereby violating the provisions of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and to take action against the unit for operating without prior environmental clearance. (e) The Government of Jharkhand, Department of Forest & Environment, Ranchi vide letter no. 107 dated 10.1.2013 directed for launching the prosecution against units which have violated the provisions of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. (f) The complainant vide Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board Head Office letter no. B-4727, Ranchi dated 19.8.2013 has been authorised by the competent authority to file complaint under the provisions of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and therefore, the Complainant/ Opposite Party No. 2 is competent to do so. (g) As such the Accused No. 1, the company, and their official named as accused in the complaint, who is the lessee of the mine of the Company, has committed offence under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 for which they are liable to be prosecuted and punished. 7. Mr. Mehta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in both the petitions submits that the cognizance has been taken against the company by order dated 07.01.2015 in O.C.R. No.02 of 2015 and there is no cognizance so far as the Director or any officer of the said company is concerned. He submits that in connection with O.C.R. No.57 of 2015, the cognizance was taken on 16.04.2014 against the company and Director namely, Dilip Agarwal. He submits that so far as the cognizance order of O.C.R. No.02 of 2015 is concerned, that is bad in law. He further submits that cognizance has been taken against the petitioners under section 49 of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, under section 43 of Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and under section 19 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. He submits that the cognizance of O.C.R. No.57 of 2014 is taken under section 19 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. He further submits that in view of the section 19 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, only the Central Government or a person authorized by the Central Government is empowered to file the complaint case. He further submits that the allegations are made in the year 2010 as the company in absence of any consent from the Pollution Control Board was operating the unit in question. He submits that it is a false allegation and to buttress his argument he draws the attention of the Court to Annexure -2 which is Consent to Operate Letter issued by the Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board. He submits that it is a false allegation and to buttress his argument he draws the attention of the Court to Annexure -2 which is Consent to Operate Letter issued by the Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board. He submits that the said consent letter is for the period 18.02.2010 to 31.03.2011. He submits that by the said consent order, for all the two O.C.Rs the consent was provided. He submits that in view of that the allegations are false. He further submits that only the authorized person can lodge the case under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and to buttress his argument he refers to section 43 of the said Act. He further submits that so far as the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 is concerned, section 49 of the said Act is also on the same line of the provisions made. He further submits that the permission granted annexed with the complaint petition is not in accordance with law. He submits that Principal Secretary, Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board has delegated the power to the Regional Officer, Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board, Dumka. He submits that this is not in accordance with law. He further submits that section 19 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.Pramila and Others v. State of Karnataka and Another, (2015) 17 SCC 651 and he refers to paragraph no.5 to 12 of the said judgment, which are quoted below: “5. Our attention has been pointedly invited to sub-section (1) of Section 43 of the Air Act. Having perused the same, there cannot be any doubt, that when the authorities decided to initiate proceedings under the provisions of the Air Act, the complaint could have been made either by the Board or by an officer authorised by the Board. The question which has to be adjudicated upon (as has been raised by the appellants), was whether, the complaint in furtherance of which CCs Nos. 546-49 of 2006 had been filed by the Board or an officer authorised by the Board. To be valid, in terms of the mandate of Section 43(1) of the Air Act, it ought to be filed either by the Board or by an officer authorised by the Board. 6. 546-49 of 2006 had been filed by the Board or an officer authorised by the Board. To be valid, in terms of the mandate of Section 43(1) of the Air Act, it ought to be filed either by the Board or by an officer authorised by the Board. 6. Insofar as the abovementioned aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not a matter of dispute that vide Notification/Resolution dated 29-3-1989, the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board delegated certain powers to the Chairman of the Board. The aforesaid resolution (limited to the instant issue), is being reproduced below: “Subject No. 63.11: Delegation/Empowering of technical, administrative and financial powers to Chairman, Member-Secretary and other officers working in the Board. The subject of delegation of power to the Chairman was also discussed, while Subject No. 10 was being discussed. After detailed discussion, the Board decided to delegate its power and functions to the Chairman of the Board in terms of Section 11-A of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1978 (amended) and Section 15 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 under the following circumstances: (a) In respect of industries that are discharging their effluent without a valid consent under Sections 25/26 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and under Section 23 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, the Chairman is authorised to initiate legal action under relevant sections. (b) In respect of industries against whom orders passed by the Chairman under Section 32(1)(c) of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and under Section 23 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and if such units have not complied with the directions issued, the Chairman of the Board is authorised to initiate legal action for violating the direction issued under Section 32(1)(c) under the Water Act and Section 23 of the Air Act, under relevant penal provision of the respective Acts. The legal action initiated in terms of above delegation of powers, the Board shall be kept informed at the next immediate meeting.” The Board could delegate the above power to the Chairman of the Board, because Section 43(1) of the Air Act, allowed it to do so. The legal action initiated in terms of above delegation of powers, the Board shall be kept informed at the next immediate meeting.” The Board could delegate the above power to the Chairman of the Board, because Section 43(1) of the Air Act, allowed it to do so. In view of the conclusions recorded above, consequent upon the passing of the Resolution dated 29-3-1989, the complaint under Section 43(1) of the Air Act could have been filed either by the Board or by its Chairman. 7. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, proceedings came to be initiated by an order dated 4-4-2006 passed by the Chairman of the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board. Relevant extract of the above order is reproduced below: “In view of the above, I do hereby authorise the Regional Officer, Karwar to initiate criminal action under Section 37 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 by filing criminal case in the competent court against 17 occupiers of the iron ore stackyards located in and around the Karwar, Ankola and Jolda Taluks of Uttara Kannada District as per the list enclosed as Annexure 1.” Having perused the aforesaid communication it emerges that the Chairman of the Board authorised the Regional Office, Karwar to initiate criminal action under Section 37 of the Air Act, by filing criminal cases in courts having jurisdiction to deal with them, against 17 owners of iron ore stackyards, located in and around the Karwar, Ankola and Jolda Taluks of Uttara Kannada District. It is not possible to accept the contention of the respondents that initiation of the proceedings on the basis of the above order dated 4-4-2006 can be treated as compliance with the mandate contained in Section 43(1) of the Air Act, because the same has reference to a complaint made by the “Board or any officer authorised in this behalf by it”. 8. In compliance with the order of the Chairman dated 4-4-2006, the Regional Officer (Deputy Environmental Officer) Shri Gopalakrishna B. Sanatangi, filed complaints before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class II, Karwar. It is natural therefore to conclude that the complaint against the appellants was neither filed by the Board or its Chairman but was filed by the Regional Officer (Deputy Environmental Officer). 9. Section 43 of the Air Act has already been extracted hereinabove. It is natural therefore to conclude that the complaint against the appellants was neither filed by the Board or its Chairman but was filed by the Regional Officer (Deputy Environmental Officer). 9. Section 43 of the Air Act has already been extracted hereinabove. It is apparent therefrom that courts would take cognizance of complaints filed by the Board, or any officer authorised by the Board in that behalf. The Notification/Resolution dated 29-3-1989 indicates that the officer authorised was the Chairman of the Board. The Board could delegate the above power to the Chairman of the Board because Section 43(1) of the Air Act authorised the Board to do so. In that view of the matter, either the Board or the Chairman of the Board could have filed the complaints in terms of the mandate contained in Section 43(1) of the Air Act. The power to file the complaint could not be exercised by any other authority/officer. Under the principle of “delegatus non potest delegare”, the delegatee (the Chairman of the Board) could not have further delegated the authority vested in him, except by a clear mandate of law. Section 43 of the Air Act vested the authority to file complaints with the Board. Section 43 aforementioned also authorised the Board to delegate the above authority to any “officer authorised in this behalf by it”. The “officer authorised in this behalf” was not authorised by the provisions of Section 43 of the Air Act, or by any other provision thereof, to further delegate the authority to file complaints. The Chairman of the Board, therefore, had no authority to delegate the power to file complaints to any other authority for taking cognizance of offences under the Air Act. 10. It is apparent that the determination to initiate action against the appellants, and other similarly placed persons, against whom action was proposed to be taken by the Chairman of the Board vide his order dated 4-4-2006 was not in consonance with law. Annexure P-11 appended to Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 2012 reveals that the complaint was filed and the proceedings were initiated before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class II, Karwar, by the Regional Officer (Deputy Environmental Officer) Shri Gopalakrishna B. Sanatangi, in his capacity as a complainant. The Regional Officer (Deputy Environmental Officer) Shri Gopalakrishna B. Sanatangi had no jurisdiction to prefer such complaints. The Regional Officer (Deputy Environmental Officer) Shri Gopalakrishna B. Sanatangi had no jurisdiction to prefer such complaints. Accordingly, we are of the view that the aforestated complaints dated 28-4-2006 are liable to be set aside on the instant technical ground itself. Ordered accordingly. 11. Since the petitions filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code are being accepted merely on a technical ground, we hereby direct the competent authority, namely, the Board (or the Chairman of the Board) to reinitiate the above proceedings, in consonance with the provisions of Section 43(1) of the Air Act. The process shall positively be reinitiated within two months from today. In case of failure to initiate fresh proceedings within the time stipulated hereinabove, it shall be imperative for the competent authority to place the reasons for not doing so before this Court on the expiry of a period of two months. Extension of time, if needed, shall also be sought by the authorities from this Court by moving an appropriate interlocutory application. 12. Needless to mention that on reinitiation of the proceedings, the authorities concerned and the courts below shall not take into consideration any observations recorded by us, or the courts below, while adjudicating upon the merits of the instant controversy. It shall be open to the parties to raise all contentions, as may be available to them, in consonance with law.” 8. Relying on this judgment, he submits that if the delegation itself is bad in law, the entire criminal proceeding may kindly be quashed. He further submits that so far as the Director is concerned, there is no allegation that he is looking after the day to day affairs of the company in Cr.M.P. No. 103 of 2016. He submits that in view of section 16 of the Environment (Protection) Act, a person who is responsible is only liable to be prosecuted. He submits that there is no averment to that effect and in view of that, the case of the petitioner is fully covered in view of the judgment rendered in the case of National Small Scale Industries Corporatino v. Harmeet Singh Pental, (2010) 3 SCC 330 . He submits that the said judgment was further considered by this Court in the case of Prakash Chandra Tibrewal and Others v. The Regional Officer, Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board, 2015 SCC OnLine Jhar. 3292. He submits that the said judgment was further considered by this Court in the case of Prakash Chandra Tibrewal and Others v. The Regional Officer, Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board, 2015 SCC OnLine Jhar. 3292. On these grounds, he submits that the entire criminal proceeding may kindly be quashed. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Thakur, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.No.2 submits that in spite of the letter issued for not operating, the unit was being operated and in view of that the allegations are true and at this stage, this Court may not quash the entire criminal proceeding. He submits that the authorization with regard to filing of the case is already there at page no.30 of the Cr.M.P. No.103 of 2016. He submits that in view of section 19 of the Environment (Protection) Act, the Central Government or any authorized person can file the case. On these grounds, he submits that this Court may not interfere with the quashing of the entire criminal proceedings. 10. The Court has perused the complaint petition and finds that so far as O.C.R. No.02 of 2015 is concerned, the cognizance has only been taken against the company and the cognizance has not been taken against any of the officer of the company. Even assuming that if the company is convicted, that cannot be enforced as conviction cannot be implemented on the company and only the penalty can be there against the company. In view of impossibility of sentencing a corporate body to imprisonment and the maxim- “lex non cogit ad impossibilia” and “impotentia excusat legem”, the court should read down the sentencing provision and impose fine in lieu of imprisonment and that was held in the case of Standard Chartered Bank and Others v. Directorate of Enforcement and Others, (2005) 4 SCC 530 . Further section 19 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 speaks as under: “19. Further section 19 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 speaks as under: “19. Cognizance of offences.—No court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act except on a complaint made by— (a) the Central Government or any authority or officer authorised in this behalf by that Government; or [(aa) adjudicating officer or any officer authorised by him in this behalf;] (b) any person who has given notice of not less than sixty days, in the manner prescribed, of the alleged offence and of his intention to make a complaint, to the Central Government or the authority or officer authorised as aforesaid.” 11. Looking into the above, it is crystal clear that the complaint can be only on the direction of the Central Government or by a person upon which the authority has been provided by the Central Government. In the case in hand, there is no such document to suggest that Regional Officer was authorized by the Central Government and this aspect of the matter has already been set at rest in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of P.Pramila and Others v. State of Karnataka and Another(supra). Identical is the situation with regard to section 43 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and section 49 of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. Further there is no averment in O.C.R No.57 of 2014 that the said petitioner was looking after the day-to-day affairs of the company and if such averment is not there, the case of the petitioners are fully covered in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Small Scale Industries Corporation v. Harmeet Singh Pental (supra). The order taking cognizance in O.C.R. No.57 of 2016 is bad in law as the name of the Act, the name of the accused and the word ‘cognizance’ have been filled up in dotted lines which speaks that there is non-application of judicial mind. 12. In view of the above reasons, facts and analysis, entire criminal proceeding including the cognizance order dated 07.01.2015 in connection with O.C.R. No.02 of 2015, pending in the court of learned S.D.J.M., Rajmahal and cognizance order dated 16.04.2014 in O.C.R. No.57 of 2014, pending in the court of learned S.D.J.M., Rajmahal are quashed. 13. 12. In view of the above reasons, facts and analysis, entire criminal proceeding including the cognizance order dated 07.01.2015 in connection with O.C.R. No.02 of 2015, pending in the court of learned S.D.J.M., Rajmahal and cognizance order dated 16.04.2014 in O.C.R. No.57 of 2014, pending in the court of learned S.D.J.M., Rajmahal are quashed. 13. Cr.M.P. No.1320 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.103 of 2016 stand allowed and disposed of. 14. Interim order stands vacated.