JUDGMENT : 1. The matter comes up on an application preferred by the respondent-petitioner under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India for vacation of ex parte interim order dated 14.03.2023 passed by this Court, however, with consent of the counsel for the parties, the Special Appeal itself is taken up for hearing. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. The present appeal has been filed against the order dated 12.10.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby, the writ petition of the respondent-petitioner was allowed and the action of the appellant-Department in reducing the qualifying service of the respondent-petitioner by 3128 days has been quashed and set-aside. Further, the order of recovery dated 22.06.2021 amounting to Rs.9,97,118/-has also been quashed and set-aside. 4. Brief facts necessary to be noted for disposal of the present appeal are that the respondent-petitioner was enrolled in BSF on 16.10.1989 as a Constable (GD) at STC, BSF, Jodhpur. While in service, an FIR No.207/2000 under Section 302/34 IPC was lodged against the respondent-petitioner at Police Station-Surajgarh, District Jhunjhunu and accordingly, he was arrested on 04.01.2001 and was consequently placed under suspension w.e.f. 04.01.2001. The respondent-petitioner came to be convicted by Sessions Court, Jhunjhunu vide judgment dated 11.02.2002 and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Based on the conviction of the respondent-petitioner, he was dismissed from the service w.e.f. 18.04.2002 by order dated 19.04.2002. The respondent-petitioner filed an appeal before the High Court, which came to be dismissed. Whereafter, the respondent-petitioner approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court, who by its order dated 13.04.2011, acquitted the respondent-petitioner. The respondent-petitioner was reinstated vide order dated 04.08.2011 which reads as under :- “Dated, the 04 Aug 2011 ORDER Whereas, the representation dated 05.05.2011 submitted by No.89644707 Ex-Const Satyapal Singh of STS BSF Tigri Camp requesting for re-instatement in service, on his acquittal from the offences u/s 302/34 IPC, has been examined in detail; 2. Whereas, after careful consideration of all the points raised in the representations, fact and circumstances of the case and judgment dated 13th April 2011 passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the Competent Authority is pleased to set-aside the dismissal order No. Estt/STS/Disc/SPS/2002/848-950 dated 10.04.2002 passed by the DIG STS BSF Tigri Camp, and re-instated No.89644707 Ex-Const Satyapal Singh of STS BSF Tigri Camp, in service with immediate effect. 3. 3. Whereas, the period of absence i.e. from the date of dismissal to the date of acquittal, may be regularized by granting leave of kind due i.e. EL, HPL & EOL as per rules and no back wages may be allowed to the individual for the said period of absence.” 5. After the respondent-petitioner was reinstated, he served the appellant-Department and thereafter, took voluntary retirement from services. It is at this point of time, the appellant-Department while issuing the Pension Payment Order (PPO), treated the period of 3128 days from 20.04.2002 to 15.08.2011 as dies non. This period was not counted for qualifying service, hence the respondent-petitioner preferred a writ petition before this Court which was allowed vide order impugned dated 12.10.2022. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants vehemently argued that the period for which the respondent-petitioner did not serve the Department and was out of job, cannot be considered as a qualifying period of service and, therefore, the appellants were right in treating the same as dies non and hence, the PPO was rightly issued by the Department. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that even as per Rule 25 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules of 1972”), if a Government Servant is dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired as a consequence of the disciplinary proceedings, then subsequently reinstatement on appeal or review, the period for which a person remained out of job will be entitled to count his past services as qualifying service. On the strength of this Rule, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that since there was no disciplinary proceedings and consequently no appeal was filed in the present case, therefore, the respondent-petitioner was not entitled to treat the period for which he remained out of job as qualifying service. He further submits that since there were no disciplinary proceedings, therefore, there was no question of appeal or review. He, therefore, submits that the learned Single Bench has not correctly appreciated the position of Rule-25 of the Rules of 1972 and, thus, has committed an error while allowing the writ petition of the respondent-petitioner. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon following two judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court : 1. Baldev Singh V/s Union of India & Ors., reported in (2005) 8 SCC 747 . 2. Corp. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon following two judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court : 1. Baldev Singh V/s Union of India & Ors., reported in (2005) 8 SCC 747 . 2. Corp. Mithilesh Kumar @ Mithilesh Singh V/s Union of India & Ors., reported in (2020) 12 SCC 423. 9. On the strength of these two judgments, learned counsel for the appellants submits that since the respondent-petitioner had not served the Department, therefore, merely acquittal in criminal case does not automatically entitle him to get all the consequential benefits. He, therefore, prays that the Special Appeal may be allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Bench may be quashed and set-aside. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner, while opposing the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants, has submitted that no error has been committed by the learned Single Bench while allowing the writ petition of the respondent-petitioner. While supporting the order impugned, he has reiterated the submissions made before the learned Single Judge and has prayed that the appeal may be dismissed. 11. We have considered the submissions made at the Bar and have gone through the relevant record of the case including the order impugned. 12. There is no dispute on facts and the only question involved in the present case is, “Whether the period of absence of the respondent-petitioner from the services on account of conviction and dismissal till the acquittal by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and reinstatement by the Department can be treated to be a period as qualifying service or not”. 13. To appreciate the controversy in correct perspective, we consider it appropriate to reproduce Rule 25 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 :- “Rule 25-Counting of part service on reinstatement: (1) A Government Servant who is dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired from service, and is reinstated on appeal or review, is entitled to count his past service as qualifying service. (2) The period of interruption in service between the date of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, and the date of reinstatement, and the period of suspension, if any, shall not count as qualifying service unless regularized as duty or leave by a specific order of the authority which passed the order of reinstatement.” 14. (2) The period of interruption in service between the date of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, and the date of reinstatement, and the period of suspension, if any, shall not count as qualifying service unless regularized as duty or leave by a specific order of the authority which passed the order of reinstatement.” 14. A plain reading of the Rule-25 of the Rules of 1972 very clearly shows that if a Government Servant is dismissed, removed or compulsory retired from service, then his subsequent reinstatement on appeal or review, will entitle him to count his past services as qualifying service. Sub-rule 2 of Rule-25 of the Rules of 1972 also prescribes that the period of interruption in service shall not be counted as qualifying service unless it is regularized by passing a speaking order by the authority which has passed the order of reinstatement. In the present case, after reinstatement of the respondent-petitioner, the competent authority had passed the order dated 27.08.2011, whereby, the entire period of absence of the respondent-petitioner was regularized. The learned Single Bench has also reproduced the order of regularization, therefore, the same is not being reproduced by us. The passing of the order dated 27.08.2011 clearly goes to show that Rule-25 of the Rules of 1972 has been operated upon and the period of absence of the respondent-petitioner was regularized for counting the same as qualifying service. Not only this, after the reinstatement, the respondent-petitioner was also granted the service benefits while he was in service i.e. pay scale etc. The appellant-Department is trying to undo the order dated 27.08.2011 regularizing the period of absence of the respondent-petitioner by issuance of the Pension Payment Order while treating the said period of 3128 days as dies non. Once the period of absence was regularized by passing a speaking order, the same cannot be nullified by issuance of the Pension Payment Order, more particularly, when the benefits of the absence had already been extended to the respondent-petitioner. 15. The judgments relied upon by the appellants in the present case have no application in the facts and circumstances of this case as the absence of the respondent-petitioner was duly regularized by the appellant-Department vide order dated 27.08.2011 in conformity with Sub-rule 2 of Rule-25 of the Rules of 1972. 15. The judgments relied upon by the appellants in the present case have no application in the facts and circumstances of this case as the absence of the respondent-petitioner was duly regularized by the appellant-Department vide order dated 27.08.2011 in conformity with Sub-rule 2 of Rule-25 of the Rules of 1972. The reliance placed by the learned Single Judge on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. V/s Jaipal Singh, reported in 2004(1) SCC 121 is fully applicable in the present case. 16. In view of the discussions made above, we find no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Bench. The Special Appeal is, therefore, bereft of merit and the same is hereby dismissed.